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A b stract
Software engineering design is a vital component of modern industry, unfortunately, the 
processes involved are still poorly understood. This poses a major problem for teachers 
of the subject, who are under constant pressure to improve the quality of education, 
but are unsure how to bring this about, or even how to detect such improvement. This 
thesis attem pts to start the process of clarifying what we mean by “software engineering 
design”, and apply the insights gained to the activity of curriculum design.
First, we establish a method for the research, by constructing a framework to constrain 
and guide the process of seeking new insights. This leads to a decidedly eclectic approach 
to the problem, as software engineering design is viewed, and reviewed, from a number 
of different perspectives. Next, these views are synthesised into a model of the software 
engineering design process, and new insights are sought to refine the model. The central 
theme of this model is the idea that the design process can be considered as a one 
of theory building. Finally, we bring this model into direct contact with the task of 
curriculum design, both in a general sense, and also by providing illustrations of some of 
the consequences of its use.
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C h a p ter  1
T h e G ift o f  W on d er
“In philosophy methods are unimportant; any method is legitimate if it leads 
to results capable of being rationally discussed. What matters is not methods 
or techniques but a sensitivity to problems, and a consuming passion for 
them: or, as the Greeks said, the gift of wonder”
Karl Popper
Tlie research documented in this thesis has a number of unusual characteristics. These 
have arisen because the author, rather than seeking out a suitable, if arbitrary, problem 
for a doctoral research programme, has set out to tackle a problem which he was actually 
experiencing at a personal level. This problem was how to improve his teaching of 
software engineering design, and how to help others to improve their teaching of the 
subject too. Magee sums up the ensuing situation very neatly, when he writes
“A consequence of always proceeding from problems which really are problems—  
problems which one actually has, and has grappled with—is, for oneself, that 
one will be committed to one’s work; and for the work itself, that it will have 
what Existentialists call “authenticity”. It will not only be an intellectual 
interest but an emotional involvement, the meeting of a felt human need. 
Another consequence will be an unconcern for conventional distinctions be­
tween subjects; all that matters is that one should have an interesting problem 
and be trying to solve it .” [Mag73, page 68]
The most significant consequence o f deciding to tackle such a problem has been the 
decision to embrace eclecticism, reacting against the current trend in western culture of 
partitioning academic disciplines into smaller and smaller units. This decision was not 
made lightly, for it has far reaching consequences for the research programme, not least 
of which has been to deprive the author of the benefit of precedent in selecting both the 
research method and also the style o f thesis presentation. Another implication • of the 
choice of problem is that it has led to the researcher “being forced into philosophy by 
the pressure of non-philosophical problems” [Pop63, page 73].
The title of the thesis also warrants some clarification, for the reader may be under 
the misapprehension that the denouement of this work will be the presentation of a 
curriculum, neatly packaged and ready to  teach. This, as we will argue in Chapter Seven,
5
is not a sensible view of curriculum, and would not solve the problem we are setting out 
to tackle. The end product of this research is a resource that curriculum designers and 
teachers can use in carrying out their duties. This resource comprises the documented 
exploration of the nature of software engineering design, from a teacher’s perspective, 
together with the production of a model around which future discussions, or the teaching 
process itself, can take place. It is the task o f presenting this exploration and model, 
and linking them into existing bodies o f knowledge, that constitutes the doctoral aspects 
of the research programme. No apology is made for the fact that very few answers 
are presented during the course of this discussion. We would argue that teachers must 
arrive at their own answers if their lessons are to carry authority and commitment. The 
role of the discussions presented here is to analyse questions, distilling them into more 
precise forms that can be fruitfully discussed. This, as Dewey has said, is the true role 
of educational philosophy [Dew69].
It might be argued that an analysis of software engineering design should not be carried 
out by those currently working within the discipline of Computing, but by philosophers, 
psychologists and sociologists. It has indeed been argued, for example, that scientists 
should not attem pt to discuss the processes of science, but should leave such discussions 
to philosophers of science [Fin86]. Fener presents a discussion of the cases for and against 
this point of view [Feu69]. Suffice it to say, however, that at present there is no other 
discipline within which suitable discussion of the processes of software engineering is 
taking place. Moreover, due to the intimate connections between the methods of the 
discipline and the tools, techniques and languages being developed within it, methodology 
is currently seen as a mainstream activity within software engineering: our methods are 
part of our technology. We would also argue that if Software Engineering aspires to 
becoming a genuine engineering profession, it cannot avoid the responsibility for self- 
analysis, as this is the route to improvement in quality.
One result of the eclectic approach has been the emergence of striking similarities be­
tween the processes of software design and curriculum design. In retrospect, this is not 
surprising as both activities share a number of common characteristics:
1. They are both concerned with the design of complex artifacts which are required 
to be adaptive in an environment of complex values.
2. The processes involved are usually carried out by teams of professionals without 
particularly autocratic management structures.
3. There is at present little scientific support for many of the decisions that need to 
be made.
4. Entities which can be classified as “information” and “knowledge” are manipu­
lated and transmitted within the final products, so both Education and Software 
Engineering use complex linguistic systems.
5. External pressures exist for change (such as the call for more effective methods
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of design or of teaching reading), but little time is made available for internal 
reflection, theory formation and experiment.
It is interesting to note that the production of software systems has been dubbed “sci­
ence”, “engineering” , “architecture” and “craft” , but never education. Similarly, educa­
tion is rarely viewed as an engineering discipline, in spite of the considerable amount of 
design that takes place.
This insight has led to a number of dual applications of ideas, where a topic originally 
researched for its relevance to the software design process has subsequently been applied 
to curriculum design, and vice versa. The emergence of such meta-level discussions was 
predicted by Popper, whose philosophy suggests that a general investigation of scientific 
matters, without imposition of the particular research methods associated with individual 
disciplines, is a possible approach to the whole area of epistemology. The issues being 
investigated here are merely vehicles which serve as unusually well-structured, small- 
scale, models of more general problems involving knowledge. As the questions we are 
asking are at an unusually high level of abstraction, we should not be surprised if the 
answers display an unusually high degree of applicability. These ideas are not developed 
explicitly in this thesis, as they add a meta-level to the discussion which is unnecessary for 
main the thrust of the arguments. We will be unable to ignore some of the implications 
of this relationship, however, when we come to apply our results to curriculum design 
later in the thesis.
Ill the rest of this chapter we will set the scene for the discussions to follow. We will start 
by discussing the background to the identified problem, highlighting some of the features 
that add to the complexity of the task. We will then make the aims of the research more 
explicit. The research method adopted to meet these aims will then be presented and 
discussed. Finally, a brief overview of the structure of the rest of the document will be 
given.
1.1 Background to the Problem
It lias been suggested that the software industry worldwide is being hit by a “software 
crisis” . The manifestations of this crisis include the number of bugs found in systems 
after delivery, the missing of deadlines, the delivery of software that simply does not 
work, and the problems of software maintenance. A hypothesis central to this thesis is 
that it is counter-productive to consider such a state of affairs as a “crisis” . A crisis 
is supposed to be a decisive moment, a turning point, not an ongoing state of affairs. 
Moreover, a crisis will usually be resolved by a rapid action, or sequence of actions. The 
adoption of the term “crisis” by the software industry has lead to  a period of belief that 
all we need to do to resolve the crisis is to find the appropriate actions. Many such actions 
have been suggested in the past, but the plethora is not always helpful. As Riddle has 
observed:
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“So many people seem so certain about how better to achieve the full potential 
of Software Engineering, that I feel more crippled than the blind man who 
couldn’t identify the elephant.” [Rid85, page 1]
Amongst the panaceas that have been identified in recent years, are
• Autom atic programming, whereby a machine takes over the task of generating 
programs.
• Prescriptive design methods, whereby the designer can be made to function as a 
machine, following sets of rules which will lead to working systems.
• Formal methods, which would make the design of software more “scientific” and 
hence less fallible.
• Tools, or factories, which would reduce the complexities of the task by orders of 
magnitude.
One of the major assumptions of this thesis is that no such panacea can exist. Software 
Engineering is an essentially difficult task. The “crisis” is a reflection of the fact that 
the demands made upon the discipline have consistently exceeded the discipline’s ability 
to cope. This observation is not particularly helpful, however, unless some suggestions 
are made for improving the situation. The central tenet of this thesis is that proper 
education of software engineers would be of major benefit, and that current educational 
practice in the area falls short of that which is possible and desirable.
The education of software engineers in the United Kingdom is currently hindered by a 
number of factors, in addition to those hindering education as a whole.
P a c e  o f  D e v e lo p m e n t
Computing is a relatively new academic discipline. Computers, however, have found their 
way into every possible walk of life. It has proved impossible for the academic discipline 
to keep abreast of technological change, carry out the task of consolidation, and spend 
time reflecting on the nature of the subject itself. Most educators in the subject would 
readily admit that they have to run just to keep up with changing technology and external 
demands. Moreover, many educators have not been formally educated in the discipline 
themselves, and so they have no fall-back position of preserving the traditional approach. 
As Popper has noted,
“..  .the long term ‘proper’ functioning of institutions depends mainly on such 
traditions. It is tradition which gives the persons (who come and go) that 
background and that certainty of purpose which resists corruption.” [Pop63, 
page 134]
Iii the absence of these traditions, Computer Science has also failed to adopt the estab­
lished norms of science. Dijkstra identifies two causes of this phenomenon. The pioneers 
of the subject generally came from scientific backgrounds, but had never been trained 
to carry scientific thinking across subject boundaries, and “many of them must have felt 
that scientific thought was a luxury that one conld afford in the more established disci­
plines, but not in the intellectual wilderness they now found themselves in.” The second 
cause is the large number of people who have entered the discipline from non-scientific 
backgrounds. “By their sheer numbers they form by themselves already an explanation  
for the phenomenon.” [Dij82, page 61]
If education is to play a major role in overcoming the problems facing the software 
industry then it must be given time to reflect and determine a strategy. This is not a 
requirement for software engineering education specifically, but for education as a whole. 
Brameld noted, in 1969, that
“education has suffered because it has not maintained adequate perspective.
It has not viewed itself from a distance, as it were, so that when a crisis 
occurs, . . . ,  it is unprepared to do much more than go on the defensive with  
loud and unintelligible noises.” [Bra69, page 218]
Since this observation was made the situation appears to have deteriorated. Even less 
time and resources are now available for “non-productive” activities such as discussing 
the curriculum. This criticism has been levelled against institutional education on many 
occasions. Cyert, for example, says
“Perhaps the most difficult organization to change in society is the university. 
Scratch a Professor from any discipline and you will receive a lecture on how 
business organizations, churches, governments etc., should reform. Yet uni­
versities ignore the problems of education in their own institutions.” [Cye80, 
page 7]
Discussion of software engineering education certainly does take place, but this concen­
trates on features that can be considered fairly superficial. Considerable attention is paid 
to the transient details, such as which language should be used as a vehicle for teaching 
programming, or which microprocessor is suitable for teaching students about computer 
architecture. The literature is primarily concerned with matters of content (that is ivhat 
should we teach), but without any real appeal to the deeper issues such as the value 
systems that should underpin the selection of content (that is why we should teach it). 
There is also very little informed debate as to how we should teach the subject. There 
are, of course, exceptions such as Cohen’s paper on curriculum inversion [Coh86], and 
the publication of the debate on teaching Computing sparked off by Dijkstra [Dij89], 
both of which do raise fundamental issues.
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D em an d s o f Indu stry
Industry has two types of expectation when recruiting graduates into Software Engineer­
ing. First, it expects the recruits to be immediately useful, knowledgeable in current 
technologies, and to be able to  work as part of a team. Second, it expects recruits to  
have a reasonable “useful life expectancy” , being able to play increasingly important 
roles in design teams for the duration of their careers. These expectations are certainly 
not mutually exclusive, and are no different from the expectations of other engineer­
ing disciplines. A difference arises, however, in the balance of these requirements. A 
study of the appointments advertisements for software engineers reveals that employers 
are requiring knowledge of several current, but usually short-lived, methods, languages, 
platforms and tools. Similar advertisements for civil engineers, for example, are rarely 
so specific.
In attempting to make their students generally employable, educators are faced with 
the task of covering several such technological ephemera. Unless a way can be found 
to turn experience with these ephemera into transferable skills, then this requirement 
militates against the long term effectiveness of the recruit. Very often, educators fall 
into the trap of teaching a particular technique simply because industry currently uses 
it, ignoring the fact that industry is also saying that the technique is not very good. 
Often the approaches adopted are driven primarily by this aim, and are not always very 
constructive. To quote Mills,
“There is a real danger in over using soft topics and survey courses loaded 
with buzz words to provide near-term job salability. But without adequate 
technical foundations people will become dead-ended in mid-career, just when 
they are expected to solve harder problems as individuals, as members or as 
managers, of team s.” [Mil80a, page 1161]
The problem may be ascribed in part to a tactical error on the part of educators. When 
institutions attempt to adapt to changes in demand as quickly as possible, they lose the 
stability usually associated with the educational system. As Kozmetsky has observed, 
however, this may not be the best tactic. W hat is actually required is that the student 
can adapt, not the institution. If we can find ways of educating students so that they 
can adapt quickly in a world of constant change then the institutions can adapt more 
slowly, thus maintaining their stability [Koz80, page 152].
P o lit ic a l
Education has always been subjected to various political forces, both external and inter­
nal. In general, there has been a large amount of inertia within the system  to provide 
stability in the face of these pressures. Computing, however, has been subjected to great 
pressures but has never been given the time to stabilise. These pressures are often not 
well thought out: they manifest themselves in slogans and buzz words which Comput-
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ing departments are expected to utilise: Information Technology, IKBS, A l, databases, 
Software Engineering, Information Systems, design methodologies, formal methods, real 
time systems, safety critical system s, . . . .  But exactly what do these terms mean? W hat 
is a “non-expert system ”? W hat system  is not a “database”? Is a “formal method” a 
method? Is an editor “safety critical” , given that it may be used to write the code for 
nuclear reactor control systems? There is no time for such debates. Personal experience 
shows that raising such questions is likely to lead to rebukes such as “This is all very 
interesting, but it is not getting ns anywhere” , the implication being that adopting the 
terminology is in some sense progressive, but to what end? The professional educator 
has an obligation to “submit slogans and rules of thumb to critical analysis” [Tay69, 
page 28].
This problem is compounded by the fact that research funding is often available for 
investigating these “subjects” , so there is little incentive amongst academics for showing 
that the subjects may not be very appropriate ways of partitioning the discipline.
Another problem that has arisen for education generally is the imposition of a producer- 
consumer model. Educational establishments are increasingly being seen as the providers 
of a service which must meet the needs of consumers. Unfortunately, the manner of fund­
ing obscures the issue of who the consumer actually is. For schools, the parents are often 
referred to as consumers, but for higher education that role is variously adopted by the 
government, the funding agencies, the students, their parents, society at large, potential 
employers, or professional bodies. For a stable discipline, the effects of this attitude are 
reduced by inertia. Everyone “knows” what Physics is all about, so consumer pressure 
may produce changes over time, but not dramatic ones. For Computing, however, the 
pressures can be catastrophic, leading to gross inconsistencies. Rather than the discipline 
converging to a stable state as time goes on, it could diverge and become inherently un­
stable. Software engineers know the dangers of applying patches to systems they do not 
fully understand 111 order to meet changes in requirements; unfortunately they persist in 
patching the curriculum in just this fashion. Blind acceptance of a producer-consumer 
model, coupled with the cultural acceptance of the slogan “the customer is always right” , 
could destroy the discipline. The educator must accept responsibility as a professional, 
and be prepared to take informed decisions based on wider issues than this. Failure to  
do so will make the teacher fit tie more than an educational technician, and remove all 
claim to professional status.
1.2 The Research Aims
The primary aim of this research is to improve the quality of software engineering edu­
cation and hence to improve the quality of software systems being produced in industry. 
An assumption that is made in meeting this aim is that a deeper understanding of the 
software design process will place the educator in a better position to bring this about, 
by facilitating curriculum design in the widest sense. Thus our primary aim can be met
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by helping the educator to  reach such a deeper understanding.
We would argue that this cannot be achieved simply by presenting a neatly packaged 
description of the system design process, supported by elegant arguments, for this will 
not necessarily increase understanding. Neatly packaged ideas tend to be accepted on 
authority, or ignored in their totallity, they do not provoke the reader sufficiently to  
promote deeper understanding, for they do not involve the reader sufficiently in the 
process. Our aim, therefore, must be to provoke the readers into challenging their existing 
constructs by raising questions and viewing issues from unusual angles. We will offer 
suggestions for ways the system design process can be construed, but this will be done 
in the full knowledge and expectation that they will be rejected.
To assist the reader, however, we must provide the necessary framework for exploration 
to take place, so that challenges are not presented as a number of ad hoc questions, but 
through a structured analysis of the problem. This gives rise to  three subsidiary aims of 
the research:
1. To develop a framework for the discussion of the software engineering design pro­
cess.
2. To use this framework for the development of a model of the design process that 
can be used to discuss curriculum issues.
3. To illustrate how the increased understanding reached through these discussions 
can be translated into action through curriculum design.
It is important to realise that we are not proposing the framework, or the resulting model, 
as “right” or “true” . We are adopting Bacon’s maxim that “Truth emerges more readily 
from errors than from chaos” , so we are prepared to make mistakes in imposing structure, 
for at least then they can be recognised as such. Indeed, we anticipate that it is primarily 
through disagreeing with the ideas put forward in this thesis, including objections to the 
choice of framework, that the aim of increasing the reader’s understanding will be met. 
We should also stress that there is no intention of arriving at a set of axioms from which 
to deduce a curriculum. As Hirst has observed, discussion can only serve to inform and 
guide the curriculum design process, not to define it [Hir69, pages 178-183].
Typical of the sort of issues that our analysis will cause us to consider is what we really 
mean by a number of terms and slogans. W hat exactly do we mean when we say that 
“functional specifications should state what a system is to do, not how it is to do it”? Is 
there any substance to the debate that takes place regarding the teaching of “theoretical” 
versus “practical” skills? We will also consider the role of issues such as “m ethods” and 
“formalisation” in the system design process, and the implications of our discussions for 
how such topics should be presented in the curriculum.
Although it is not an aim of this research, the discussion carried out may also prove 
useful to those charged with the task of developing design methods and CASE tools, for
12
research in these areas has identified a set of questions that need to be addressed which 
are similar to those arising from our problem [Tul87].
1.3 Research Method
The problem being addressed is highly complex, and it was clear from the outset that 
no existing research programme would be found upon which to build. In particular, no 
established research method would suffice to tackle the problem, for the issues are largely 
technological, and, as Rapp has said,
. .technology has by no means yet received the attention in philosophical 
literature which is commensurate with its actual significance. . . .  As a con­
sequence, there exists no generally accepted theoretical frame of reference or 
inventory of methodological tools to which one can resort in any particular 
investigation.” [Rap81, pages 19-20].
The fact that modern technological problems are giving rise to philosophical issues that 
require a new approach for their exploration has also been noted by Lenk and Ropohl, 
who write
“Philosophy has to accept the challenge of interdisciplinary efforts . .  .It has 
to step out of the ivory tower of restricted and strictly academic philosophy.” 
[LR79, page 47].
This research is in no way “scientific” , in the traditional sense of the term. There is no 
attempt to adopt a process of conjecture followed by empirical refutation, for example. 
Such an approach necessarily invokes simplifications of the problem domain, which are 
never arbitrary, but arise naturally out of the problems being addressed. It is the analysis 
necessary to identify these sorts of simplifications that is being carried out in this research 
programme.
There have been attempts to study very simple problems of software engineering educa­
tion scientifically, notably the ways in which people learn to program effectively [SI86], 
and some tentative results from these studies have been incorporated into this research. 
In general, however, the number of assumptions that are made in such studies (such as 
equating “programming” with “procedural programming in the small” , and “effective 
programming” with “running programs”) limits the applicability of these results. Sim­
ilarly, there have been some investigations carried out into how students learn. Most 
research into these areas has been limited to young children, however, and little seems to 
have been done in relation to students in higher education, or adults. This is changing, 
and cognitive science is starting to turn its attention to areas more pertinent to this re­
search programme. If cognitive science develops into a body of knowledge that contains 
really useful results, then clearly we must be prepared to utilise them. We cannot assume 
that education will always remain “safe from scientific solution” [Bro69, page 117].
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Tlie approach adopted here is more like the philosophical discussion that takes place 
in the pre-scientific phase of any discipline. The aim is to  clarify the problems to be 
discussed scientifically, both those of Software Engineering, and also those of Software 
Engineering education, and to seek some unification of ideas upon which a curriculum 
can be constructed. Modern views of science frequently accept that this is a valid stage 
of science, and not “pre-scientific” . Dye, for example, says that
“The most creative part of enquiry seems to reside largely in generating 
the right questions. The question is the elemental, indispensable, scientific 
instrument.” [Dye86, Page 103]
This corresponds to the analytical and speculative modes of philosophy identified by 
Kneller [Kne71], and is metaphysical in the sense of establishing a framework of models 
within which analytical theories are expected to develop. The need for such pre-scientific 
stages is discussed in [Hir69, page 185] and [Asi74]. As Dncasse has observed, however, 
this philosophical reflection is not being carried out for its own sake, nor as a matter of 
personal choice; it is something that is forced upon any person facing “practical problems 
of a certain type” [Duc69, page 169].
The realisation that pre-scientific analysis leads us into philosophical investigations is of 
little help in identifying a method, however, for as Popper has observed,
“Philosophers are as free as others to use any method in research. There is 
no method peculiar to philosophy.” [Pop59, page 15]
The adopted method is essentially that recommended by Feuer for educational matters:
“Are there any methods of philosophy other than being most honest with 
oneself concerning one’s spontaneous, uncoerced beliefs? And don’t we reject 
doctrines because we feel behind the facade of pedantic profession a certain 
dishonesty?” [Feu69, page 40]
Care must be taken not to over-react, however. It is neither practical or sensible to  
question everything we do, for this too would allow us to escape from tackling the really 
lia.rd issues of Software Engineering education. Poincare makes this point most forcibly:
“To doubt everything and to believe everything are two equally convenient 
solutions; each saves us from thinking.” [Poil3, page 37]
It is not the questioning that is important per se, but the rational processes that lead 
to the questions and the answers. The questions must be clearly posed, and the answers 
critically analysed. Even some seemingly pointless questions can serve to increase our 
understanding of the world. A careful study of Zeno’s paradoxes, for example, leads 
to some significant insights into the nature of space, time and motion, even though the 
paradoxes may seem esoteric and artificial.
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A rationalisation of the method actually adopted, and it can be no more than that 
for no clear methodology existed at the outset of the project, is as follows. First, an 
investigation into the nature of software engineering design was carried out in the light 
of a number of existing bodies of knowledge. The original intention had been to start 
with the philosophy of engineering, but a survey of the literature showed that no such 
thing existed, so the philosophy of science was chosen instead. In retrospect, this proved 
to be a very fortunate accident. The design process was also considered in the light of a 
number of other bodies of knowledge, including the (embryonic) philosophy of technology, 
the psychology of problem solving, and the theory of discourse. As a result of these initial 
explorations, a model of the software design process was developed. The model gave rise 
to a number of issues that required clarification, which in turn led to a refinement of the 
model. Bringing this model into contact with the task of curriculum design requires the 
adoption of a philosophy of education, and also discussion of some aspects of learning 
theory. It was obvious by this stage in the proceedings that learning theory also has 
a role to play in our discussion of the system design process, so one particular theory 
was explored to broaden our discussion, and also to provide a bridge to examples of 
curriculum design.
Alongside the development of the model, use was made of the understanding being 
gained by the analysis to carry out a number of curriculum design activities. These 
were not “scientific” , controlled, experiments, but they allow discussion of some possible 
interpretations of our model in terms of practical teaching activities.
1.4 Presentation of the Research Results
The nature of this research programme poses some interesting problems in finding a 
suitable way to present the results. Most academic disciplines have developed specific 
styles for the publication of its literature, and the wise doctoral student conforms to these 
norms. Moreover, the end product of most research programmes is a set of conclusions, 
and the logic that is used to support and justify these conclusions can also be used 
to provide a structuring mechanism for the presentation of the results. This research, 
however, has been eclectic, and its end point is not a set of conclusions in the traditional 
sense, but the presentation of an exploration.
The main thrust of the research has been philosophical, but the styles that are often 
adopted for presenting the results of philosophical enquiry are not necessarily appropri­
ate for our purposes1. The motivation for this research dictates that the thesis must be 
accessible to the software engineering education community. Educational practitioners 
find little of value in an academic philosophical approach consisting of “stories about 
philosophers, and ghosts from a philosophical cemetery” [New69, pp 165-167], and nei­
ther do engineers [Asi74, page 152]. The style we have adopted for the presentation of
’ Indeed, m any philosophers question the su itab ility  of these presentation sty les for the purposes of 
com m unication w ith  other philosophers.
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results can best be described as a practical philosophical one.
We start off in Chapter Two by considering a fairly specific, if complex, question: “in 
what sense is software engineering a scientific enterprise”? This question is focussed by 
Popper’s philosophy of science, and then broadened by a discussion of three pieces from 
the Computing literature which have a direct contribution to make. This starting point 
is too restricted, however, to support the development of our model, so in Chapter Three 
we widen this base by considering software engineering as a technological activity, then 
as a problem solving activity, and finally as a process of discourse.
Chapters Two and Three are primarily resources that are drawn upon in the development 
of our model of software engineering design, providing insights and terminology that 
prove useful in this process. The construction of the model begins in Chapter Four, 
where the view of software design as a theory building process is presented and developed. 
This model gives rise to the need to refine two key concepts: theories and methods. This 
refinement is undertaken 111 Chapters Five and Six.
One aspect of the model, how the individual builds theories initially, shares a common 
theme with the issue of how students learn, for both can be considered to raise the 
question of how people construe themselves, and the world about them. This is clearly 
a complicated question, and it is far beyond the scope of this research programme to 
provide an answer, but in Chapter Seven Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory is presented 
and discussed as a candidate framework within which the question can be addressed. This 
allows us to build links between our model and the teaching process, so that we have 
sufficient context to discuss some examples of the application of our model to  practical 
curriculum design. Chapter Eight briefly discusses the application of this exploration, 
and describes some of the curriculum developments that the author has undertaken 
during the latter stages of this research.
Chapter Nine comprises concluding comments on the research programme, including a 
discussion of how well the aims have been met and observations on the research method. 
It also highlights future research that arises naturally out of this exploration.
A number of issues raised by this research have led to conference papers and publications 
available elsewhere. Appendix A contains a list of these, together with a brief description 
of the role they have played in meeting the aims of the research programme.
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C h a p ter  2
C o m p u tin g  as a S cien ce
“Science is nothing more but trained and organised common sense, differing 
from the latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw recruit: and its 
methods differ from those of common sense only as far as a guardsman’s cut 
and thrust differ from the manner in which a savage wields his club”
Thomas Huxley
In this chapter a discussion of the question “In what senses is Software Engineering a 
Scientific Discipline” is set out. This question is important not because it helps us to 
classify academic disciplines but because it forces us to evaluate aspects of the discipline 
within a readily available body of knowledge, the Philosophy of Science.
This Philosophy of Science, of course, does not describe science but discusses it, and 
proposes a number of conflicting views on different aspects of the subject. It is not 
feasible or sensible to utilise all of these views in our discussion, so one particular view 
has been selected as a starting point.
Two principal criteria were used for the selection of a suitable view:-
1. The view selected must be mature enough to form a well-documented, stable, basis 
for the intended purpose. This is easy to meet, as a large number of philosophies 
of science have been proposed, and criticised, and a wealth of excellent, readily 
available, literature exists.
2. The view selected must still be progressive, in the sense that philosophers are still 
bothering to debate and criticise it as a candidate explanation. This excludes 
philosophies that have been found to be uninteresting because they can be refuted 
too easily, and also the classic philosophies, which, although still widely discussed 
for historical interest and because of the foundation they provide, are no longer 
generally held as explanations of scientific progress. This criterion is rather harder 
to satisfy, and perhaps needs some justification. Strictly, there is no reason why 
a classic view of science, such as P lato’s or Aristotle’s, should not be adopted. 
The danger in this, however, is that the discussion of Software Engineering turns 
into a thinly disguised evaluation and refutation of the philosophy itself, rather 
than a constructive analysis of the particular discipline within the given framework.
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There is also the worry that a discussion framed in such terms could lack credibility 
among practitioners of software engineering education: such a reaction would be 
ill-founded, of course, but likely none the less.
The philosophy chosen as a starting point for the discussion is that of Karl Popper. In 
subsequent chapters, discussions will he broadened to include additional views as the 
need arises. An uncritical exposition of Popper’s philosophy is presented in this chapter, 
for it is not important that it should be “true” , only that it provides a good starting 
point for the discussions to  follow.
This chapter could be viewed as setting the scene for a demarcation between Software 
Engineering and Computer Science. This is certainly not its intention, however, and 
two reasons can be given why any such demarcation, drawn as a side effect, may be 
detrimental.
1. The discipline of Computing has been saddled with the terms “software engineer­
ing” and “computer science”. Any attempt to “define” these terms is a nominalist 
exercise that could have far-reaching consequences but little obvious merit. Such 
attem pts that have been made in the past often seem politically motivated, rather 
than constructive (for example, departmental empire building, the partitioning of 
research funds, marketing advantages, and so on). The view adopted here is that if, 
as a result of a deeper understanding of the discipline of Computing, two disciplines 
emerge called “Software Engineering” and“ Computer Science” then this is natural 
evolution, and a discussion of the results will be warranted : consideration of the 
terms simply because they currently exist is fruitless, and potentially dangerous. 
As Popper says,
“Disciplines are distinguished partly for historical reasons and reasons 
of administrative convenience (such as the organisation of teaching and 
of appointment), and partly because the theories which we construct to 
solve our problems have a tendency to grow into unified systems. But 
all of this classification is a comparatively unimportant and superficial 
affair,” [Pop63, page 67].
We shall follow this lead, “adopt the current lack of respect for etymology and go 
on to more serious things” [Bun74, page 19].
2. The traditional distinction between science and engineering is one of purpose 
[Rap74, page 94]. Science is motivated by a goal of increasing understanding, 
engineering by a goal of production [Sko72, page 43]. The link between the two is 
that the theories produced by scientists are utilised by engineers [Fei72, page 33]. 
If one adopts the view that the products of Software Engineering (i.e. software 
system s) are actually theories, in some sense, then this distinction is clearly not 
satisfactory. It may well be the case that an investigation of software engineering 
design will deepen our understanding of the relationship between the activities of 
science and engineering, which is more fruitful than classification for its own sake.
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Support for the view that Computer Science and Software Engineering are too close to  
separate usefully for the purpose of curriculum design is provided by Denning, who writes 
that
“In the core material, there is no fundamental difference between the two
fields.” [Den88, page 41]
2.1 Popper’s Philosophy of Science
It is important to note that Popper is not playing nominalist games in his philosophy, that 
is, he is not attempting to define terms or to answer the question “what is science?”, 
but to explore the ways in which science is actually carried out. Lakatos sums up 
Popper’s view of science very succinctly when he states that it “can best be put in terms 
of ‘conventions’ or ‘rules’ governing the ‘game of science’ ” [Lak74, page 243]. This 
investigation naturally leads to several subsidiary issues, some of which do require us to  
ask what we mean by certain terms, but these issues arise from the consideration of a 
particular problem. The idea that all philosophical investigation should be motivated 
by practical problems, and that “philosophy” carried out as purely linguistic analysis, 
contrary to W ittgenstein, is both pointless and meaningless, is vital to  understanding 
all Popper’s philosophy, including his philosophy of science. Indeed, much of Popper’s 
philosophy of science can be fully appreciated only in the context of his philosophy as a 
whole. Unfortunately, this holistic view cannot adequately be reflected in such a short 
summary of the principal features of his philosophy.
Although Popper makes no attempt to define science, he does stress the importance of 
drawing a line of demarcation between scientific and metaphysical theories. He is at 
pains to  point out, however, that he is not following Kant in equating the metaphysical 
with the meaningless, or suggesting that metaphysics is in some way inferior to science. 
This is an important point to note, because as we shall see this line of demarcation will 
partition a scientific discipline itself into scientific and metaphysical pursuits.
The classical (non-Popperian) distinction between science and metaphysics hinges on 
the idea that science proceeds by observation of the real world and the discovery (by 
induction) of the laws, embodied in theories, governing nature, whereas metaphysics 
proceeds by pure thought. Conventionalists, such as Poincare, developed the view that 
we impose these theories on nature, rather than engaging in a search for the inherent, 
God-given, rules. Under this interpretation, theories are not true or false, but useful or 
not useful in particular situations.
Popper seeks to maintain the notion of truth in science, but to refute that of inductive 
proof. This he does by introducing the idea that theories are entirely man-made, in the 
sense that they are the products of intuition, possibly guided by history and observation, 
but that they can be shown to be false if predictions based on them can be shown not to 
correspond with the facts. In this way he also removes the idea that there is one “true”
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theory (that is, the true essence of the subject) and allows for a multiplicity of theories, 
all of which ultimately may be shown to be false. He replaces the idea of a hypothesis 
that science seeks to prove true, by that of a hypothesis which science seeks to prove 
false. The “truth” of a theory can be nothing more a measure of the extent to which 
science has attempted, but failed, to falsify the statements that follow deductively from 
it.
This approach is based on the idea that every theory contains universal statem ents, but 
that no number of individual observations
W a p W a p W - p W
can ever be sufficient to permit the deduction of 
Vx:T • P(x)
unless the domain of interest, T, is completely covered by xi . .  xn. Moreover, if this 
ever happens, then the theory is of little interest, since it just records a number of 
observations. Popper claims that statem ents over such a restricted domain are not truly 
universal.
Although we are unable to induce the truth of a theory from any number of observations, 
we are able to infer its falsity from a single one. Popper assumes that a first order logic 
is sufficient for such deductions. From a number of true statements we can deduce, using 
a suitable logic, another true statem ent. This property is usually called the transmission 
of truth. Of course, we cannot conclude that a theory is true simply because we can 
deduce true things from it. However, if we can deduce things from a theory which we 
can show to be false, then we can assert the theory to he false. This property is usually 
called the retransmission of falsity.
Scientific activities comprise, according to Popper, just those activities for which such 
an approach is possible, and where a willingness to practice these activities is demon­
strated. It thereby excludes all forms of activity where statements are made which are 
not refutable, such as
• would-be sciences like astrology, where the predictions made are usually so vague 
that it is hard to decide if they have come true or not.
• pure mathematics, where “truth” is just a measure of internal consistency1, or 
provability in the case of constructive mathematics.
• activities based on “theories” which are held dogmatically, where observations 
which appear to refute the theory are simply re-interpreted so they support it, (such 
as Marxism’s blind acceptance of Hegel’s philosophy), situations where terms are
1 A lthough Popper expresses this view quite strongly in his earlier work, he later com plicates m atters  
when he introduces his notion o f the third world. T his is discussed below.
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redefined in an ad hoc way to exclude all refuting cases from the theory, or where
metaphysics is prior to experience.
It must be stressed that Popper in no way denigrates such activities: it merely observes 
that they should not be considered scientific.
One very important corollary of this line of demarcation is that the methods of science, 
and any theories we may have regarding them, are not themselves generally amenable 
to the activity of science. This separation of the objects from the methods shows clearly 
that we must take care when using the term “scientific” to establish which of its many 
senses we are invoking. For example, the term “scientific method” does not mean a 
method that can be studied scientifically, but a method that is used in a discipline where 
scientific theories are the norm.
Popper identifies several main thrusts to scientific activities based on this notion of 
refutation. First, various properties of the theory can be checked. In particular, we 
can ask whether a theory is (internally) consistent. If a theory allows the derivation 
of both P and -»P , then it must be rejected, for P , -iP h Q, regardless of the Q we 
choose. Clearly a Q that does not correspond with the facts is trivially found, and hence 
the theory is easily refuted. Similarly, we must reject as useless any theories which are 
tautologous, or self-fulfilling. Such a theory will merely tell us things about all possible 
worlds (in which our underlying logic holds), such as P V ->P or P  =>• P , and will add 
nothing to our understanding of the world: they are information free.
Second, we can compare each theory with other similar theories that exist. Not all pairs 
of theories will be directly comparable, as they may make statem ents about different 
facets of the real world. For those that are comparable, Popper provides an opinion on 
possible metrics that can be used for selecting the better theory. Of particular interest 
is Popper’s claim that his view of science turns upside down the intuition that we should 
look for the most likely explanation of things. For him, the bolder a theory, the less likely 
it is, but also the more refutable it will be. Refutable theories are more credit-worthy 
than theories which are hard to refute, therefore we should be seeking theories which are 
less probable, rather than more probable. This seems to be using the term “probable” 
in a rather unconventional way [Put74, page 224]. All important point to note here, is 
that we must remain in the domain of observability: producing a theory for the orbits 
of planets based on the existence of some extra-terrestrial, undetectable, being might be 
an improbable theory, but it is not refutable (at this moment in time) and so is not an 
acceptable candidate as a scientific theory.
Following 011 from this idea, we can see that more general theories are to be considered 
more useful (in science) than less general. We can consider as a normal form for a 
theory T
\f x • P t (x) = >  Qt(x) 
where Pt(x) defines the domain of application of the theory and Qt(x) defines the
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conclusions that can be drawn. The theory T ' ,  expressed in normal form as
V x ♦ P^ fix) =$■ Qt>(v)
will be more general than T if
V X • P j ’(.'c) ==? Px>(x)
For example, if a theory allows us to deduce that some property follows from the assertion 
that x is a mammal, then the theory is clearly more general than a similar theory that 
allows us to deduce the property only if x is a dog, for if x is a dog then x is also a 
mammal, That is,
Vx • dog(x) =>■ mammal(x)
As well as generality, precision can be used for the comparison of similar theories. The ' 
theory that says more precisely what will happen is more useful than the one that is less 
precise. The theory T", expressed in normal form as
V x • .Px"(x) ==>• Qt"(x) 
will be more precise than T if
V x * Qt"(x) Qt(x )
For example, eats(pork chops) is more precise than eats (meat), since 
eats(pork chops) => eats(meat)
We can thus form a lattice, using generality and precision as orderings 011 our theories. 
Figure 2.1 shows the lattice for the examples introduced.
Ti: A ll dogs eat meat
T3: All mammals eat meat T2: All dogs eat pork chops
T4: All mammals eat pork chops
Figure 2.1: Lattice of Generalisation and Precision
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Ti is the least bold theory, and is hardest to refute. We need to find at least one dog 
that does not eat meat. T2 is more precise, and hence easier to refute than T\\ any 
pork-hating dog will do. T3 is more general than Ti, any meat-hating mammal will 
serve to refute it. T4 is the most general and the most precise. To refute it, any mammal 
that does not eat pork chops will do.
The third major scientific activity we can engage in is to check our theories in some way 
with the “real” world. This is the central issue of debate for most of the philosophies 
of science, and there have been many suggestions as to what it means for a theory to 
be “true”. The classical view was that a true theory was a perfect discovery, from the 
world of forms, of the essence that God gave to some object. A more modern view, that 
of the pragmatists, is that a theory is neither true of false, merely useful or not useful. 
Theories are not uncoverings of God’s laws, but m an’s successful attem pts to impose 
order on the real world. Another proposed view is that theories are man made, but that 
they are true if they are consistent with the totality of existing knowledge, that is, with 
all other theories. Such a coherence theory of truth necessarily means that the “truth” 
must change as theories change. Popper prefers to dissolve this issue, by declaring that 
the truth of theories is not the real question, rather we should be concerned with the 
truth of the statements that they entail. He adopts a correspondence theory of truth, 
that is, statements are true if they correspond with observable facts. This is not a new 
stance, but one that was largely discredited by the number of paradoxes that could be 
constructed by its adoption. Tarski, however, with his observation that we cannot discuss 
the meaning of terms in a language without recourse to some meta-language, effectively 
rescues the correspondence theory from many of these criticisms [Tar56]. Thus we can 
say that
The statement P is true if and only if P corresponds to the facts, 
where P is the name of some statement in another language.
The acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth raises another important point, 
namely the objectivity of science. That is to say, we want to distinguish between
P corresponds with the facts.
and
I believe (or I know) that P corresponds with the facts.
Popper notes that objectivity is a methodological issue, and hence not itself a scientific 
concern. Methodology cannot be considered as a scientific concern until we know fiow to 
make refutable statem ents about it. The current state of disciplines such as psychology, 
sociology and management is such that refutable statements about how individuals act 
are hard to find2. It cannot become a scientific concern until psychology, for example,
2 Popper originally sta ted  th is several decades ago, but there seem s to  be no reason to believe that 
the situation has changed m uch
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gives us th e  necessary  fram ew o rk  to  ana ly se  scientifically  s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t how  people  
th in k  a n d  fo rm u la te  theo ries.
In  com m on w ith  m an y  o th e r  p h ilo sophers, P o p p e r  places a  lay er o f in d irec tio n  b e tw een  
th e  scientific theories an d  rea lity . T h is  lay e r com prises s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t th e  rea l w orld  
th a t  we will call o b se rv a tio n  re p o rts . P o p p e r  says th a t  o b jec tiv e  s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t th e  
re a l w orld  m u s t be “ inter-subjectively testable". T h a t  is to  say, th e y  m u s t be reflec ted  by 
o b se rv a tio n  re p o r ts  th a t  a re  am en ab le  to  in te r-su b je c tiv e  critic ism . In  fa c t, P o p p e r  does 
n o t in s is t th a t  th ese  te s ts  ta k e  p lace , ju s t  t h a t  th e y  m u s t be possib le . T h is  is th e  reaso n  
for req u irin g  th e  p ro p e rty  o f re p e a ta b ility  for scientific ex p erim en ts . W e m u s t b e  ab le  to  
re-observe  ex p e rim en ta l re su lts  if  we w ish. T h u s  th e  decision to  accep t an  o b se rv a tio n  
s ta te m e n t as “tru e ” is a n o th e r  m ethod o lo g ica l concern: i t  is th e  decision n o t to  keep 
a tte m p tin g  to  re fu te  th e  o b se rv a tio n  by  fu r th e r  in v es tig a tio n . P o p p e r  sum s th is  up  very  
e leg an tly  w hen  he says
“T h e  em pirica l basis o f o b jec tiv e  science th u s  has n o th in g  “a b so lu te ” a b o u t 
it .  Science does n o t re s t 011 solid b ed ro ck . T h e  ho ld  s tru c tu re  o f its  theo ries 
rises, as i t  w ere, above  a  sw am p. I t  is like a  bu ild ing  e rec ted  on  piles. T h e  
piles a re  d riven  dow n from  above in to  th e  sw am p, b u t n o t dow n to  an y  n a tu ra l  
o r “g iven” base; an d  if we s to p  d riv ing  th e  piles deeper, it  is n o t becau se  we 
hav e  reach ed  firm  g ro u n d . W e sim ply  s to p  w hen we are  satisfied  th a t  th e  
piles a re  firm  enough  to  ca rry  th e  s tru c tu re , a t  least for th e  tim e  b e ing .” 
[Pop59, pag e  111]
P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy  is clearly  m ethod o lo g ica l in  th e  sense th a t  i t  co n ta in s  severe con­
s tr a in ts  on th e  b eh av io u r th a t  he is p re p a re d  to  ad m it as scientific. T h e  ideal o f re fu ta ­
tio n , for exam ple , p rov ides a  m e ta -m eth o d o lo g ica l rule: No rule m ay protect s ta tem ents  
from  being refuted. His view s on  m e th o d  seem  to  be sum m ed  u p  by  his s ta te m e n t
“p ro n o u n cem en ts  o f th is  th eo ry  [of m ethod] are  . . .  for th e  m o s t p a r t  con­
v en tions of a  fairly  obvious k ind . P ro fo u n d  tru th s  a re  n o t to  b e  ex p ec ted  of 
m eth o d o lo g y .” [Pop59, page  54]
I t has been  largely  left to  th o se  follow ing P o p p e r , such  as K u h n , L ak a to s  an d  F ey erab en d , 
to  discuss th e  im p lica tio n s o f his ph ilosophy  for m e th o d , in  th e  sense of guidelines for 
scientific  p rogress. He does, how ever, observe th a t
“I f  th e  m e th o d  of tr ia l  an d  e rro r is developed  m ore  an d  m o re  consciously, th e n  
it  begins to  ta k e  on th e  c h a ra c te ris tic  fea tu re s  o f a  “scientific m e th o d ” . T h is 
“m e th o d ”3 can  briefly  b e  described  as follows. Faced w ith  a  c e r ta in  p rob lem , 
th e  sc ien tis t offers, te n ta tiv e ly , som e so r t o f so lu tion— a th eo ry . T h is  th e o ry
3 P opper’s Footnote: It is not a m ethod  in the sense that, if  you practice it, you will succeed; or if  you  
don’t succeed you can’t have practiced it; that is to  say, it is not a  definite way to results: a m ethod in 
this sense does not exist.
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science accep ts only provisionally , if  a t  all; an d  it  is m o st c h a ra c te ris tic  o f th e  
scientific m e th o d  th a t  sc ien tis ts  will sp a re  110 pa ins to  criticise a n d  te s t  th e  
th eo ry  in  q u estio n .” [Pop63, page  313]
P o p p e r  sees his m e th o d  o f re fu ta tio n  as ak in  to  th e  process o f n a tu ra l  selection: th e  
“f i t te s t” theo ries surv ive.
O ne of th e  few concessions to  m e th o d  th a t  P o p p e r  does a p p e a r to  m ak e  is th e  observ a tio n  
th a t ,  w hen  a  th e o ry  ap p ea rs  to  be  re fu ted , we need  w ays o f decid ing  how  m uch  of th e  
th eo ry  is to  be re jec ted , o r , indeed , if th e  th e o ry  can  be p ro te c te d  in  som e way. C onsider 
a  se t of assu m p tio n s a an d  som e th eo re tica l sy stem  T . I f  we consider th e  consequence 
closure of th ese  as r ,  th e n  o u r h y p o th esis  I I  fo r re fu ta tio n  can  b e  expressed  in  th e  fo rm
t = >  II
If  we observe - 1I I  th e n  clearly  o u r law s o f logic allow  us to  in fer ->r. As r  w as a  closure, 
how ever, we can n o t in fer w h a t p a r t  o f i t  is to  he  re jec ted . I t  w ould  be  m ethodo log ica lly  
u n so u n d  to  re jec t all o f r ,  an d  s ta r t  again  fro m  sc ra tch  every tim e . I t  w ould , o f course, 
be  logically sound.
O ne ap p ro ach  m ig h t be to  change o u r se t o f a ssum ptions: th is  is o ften  used  as a  w ay 
o f p ro p p in g  up theories th a t  a re  held  dea r, an d  P o p p e r iden tifies th is  as , in  genera l, 
undesirab le . H e does acknow ledge th a t  on  occasions such a  co m m itm en t to  a  th e o ry  has 
p roved  w ell-founded, such  as w hen  N ew ton ian  m echanics w as defended  in  th e  lig h t o f th e  
(a p p a re n t)  re fu ta tio n  arising  from  th e  fa ilu re  o f U ran u s to  follow its  p red ic ted  p a th . T h e  
in tro d u c tio n  o f an  aux ilia ry  h y p o th esis  a sse rtin g  th e  ex istence o f an  ad d itio n a l p la n e t, 
N ep tu n e , effectively rescued  th e  theory . T h is defence is only accep tab le  as science because  
th e  existence of N ep tu n e  could itse lf  give rise to  re fu tab le  p red ic tio n s. T h e  p o sitio n  of 
N ep tu n e  could be p red ic ted  to  a  sufficiently sm all region of th e  sp ace-tim e co n tin u u m  
th a t  i t  w as deem ed possib le to  search  it  exhaustively . H ad  th e  defence been  th e  ex istence 
of som e heaven ly  b o d y  w hose lo ca tio n  could  n o t be p red ic ted , th e n  th is  w ould  n o t have 
co n s titu te d  scientific p rac tice .
T h e  a lte rn a tiv e  is to  re fu te  T , b u t do we need  to  re fu te  all o f T1? P o p p e r  suggests , 
p re -em p tin g  K uh n  an d  L ak a to s, th a t  if  we c o n s tru c t T  as an  en rich m en t o f som e o th e r  
theory , T ' , w hich has s to o d  th e  te s t  o f tim e  ( th a t  is, h a s  been  su b je c te d  to  severe 
a t te m p ts  a t  re fu ta tio n , b u t  su rv ived ) th e n  an  obvious-place to  s ta r t  is b y  assum ing  th a t  
th e  ex tensions have  been  re fu ted  ra th e r  th a n  th e  w hole of T . C are  needs to  be ta k e n  
here  w ith  im plic it a ssu m p tio n s, such  as th o se  em bedded  in  th e  theories we a re  using  for 
critic ising  ou r o b se rv a tio n  s ta te m e n ts  o r th o se  em bedded  in  th e  n o ta t io n  we a re  using. 
In  th e  physica l sciences, fo r exam ple , a ll m easu rem en ts  a re  ta k e n  in d irec tly , o ften  using  
a  com plex  th e o ry  of m easu rem en t.
In  choosing betw een  th eo ries , P o p p e r suggests a  n u m b er of fac to rs  th a t  shou ld  be ta k e n  
in to  acco u n t, inc lud ing  p recision , g enera lity , degree of d e ta il, su rv ival o f te s ts , n u m b er 
of te s ts  suggested , and  degree of un ifica tion . F u rth e r  d iscussion of th ese  issues will
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be delayed  u n til  th e  ch a p te rs  on  m e th o d s  an d  th eo ries , w here m ore  co n cre te  exam ples 
re lev an t to  co m p u tin g  can  b e  given.
A p a rtic u la rly  im p o r ta n t questio n  is th e  source of theories. F o r th e  in d u c tiv is t, theories 
can  be found  lu rk ing  am ong  th e  collection of observations th a t  h av e  been  m ad e . P o p p e r 
refers to  th is  as th e  bu ck e t th e o ry  o f know ledge [Pop72, pages 341-361]. T h e  o bserva tions 
a re  m ad e , s to red , an d  th e n  a  th e o ry  em erges. He dism isses th is  o u t o f h a n d , say ing  th a t  
it  is nonsense to  suggest t h a t  observ a tio n s can  precede th e o ry  in  th is  way. W e can n o t 
ju s t  “observe” b u t  w e have  to  “observe so m eth in g ” .
H e rep laces th e  b u ck e t th e o ry  w ith  th e  search ligh t th eo ry  [Pop72, pages 341-361]. W e 
search  o u t observ a tio n s to  re fu te  th eo rie s , o r possib ly  to  p rov ide  psychological su p p o rt 
th a t  o u r th e o ry  can  a t  le a s t pass som e te s ts . T h e  search ligh t is p ro v id ed  by th e  cu rren t 
theo ry . T h is view  requ ires m o tiv a tio n  for th e  search , o f course, a n d  th is  is p rov ided  
by  problem situations. In  P o p p e r ’s philosophy, p roblem s a re  th e  ro o t n o t only  for all 
ph ilosoph ical enqu iry  b u t  also for all scientific enquiry. His m e th o d  can  be expressed  
ra th e r  sim plistically  as
P i  —► T T  —*• E E  —► P 2
T h e  in itia l p rob lem , P\ is in v es tig a ted  a n d  gives rise to  a  te n ta tiv e  so lu tio n , T T , w hich 
will b e  a  th eo ry  w ith in  w hich th e  p rob lem  can  b e  solved. T h e  scientific m e th o d  is th e n  
app lied  to  th is  so lu tion , re su ltin g  in  e rro r  e lim ina tion , E E , w hich in  tu rn  leads to  new  
p rob lem s, P 2. T h e  p rob lem s them selves, how ever, are  n o t th e o ry  free. T h ey  will be 
p h ra sed  in  te rm s  o f ex isting  theo ries. T h is  raises th e  question  o f w hich com es f irs t, th e  
p rob lem  o r th e  th eo ry , b u t as P o p p e r im plies, th is  all h ap p en ed  long  ago , so does it  really  
m a tte r?  A ll p rob lem s th a t  a re  expressed  in  cu rren t civ ilisations in h e rit a  v as t a r ra y  of 
th eo ries .
As to  th e  in itia l source o f in d iv id u a l th eo rie s , P o p p e r  is unconcerned . T h ese  sources are  
in  th e  second w orld  (see below ) an d  hence a re  th e  p rob lem  o f psycho log ists . H e does 
observe  th a t  in tu itio n s  u n d o u b ted ly  have  a  ro le  to  play, b u t th a t  we m u s t n o t fo rge t th a t  
th ese  in tu itio n s  a re  likely to  develop as a  p ro d u c t o f theo ries, so a re  n o t s ta tic  d u ring  
th e  so lu tion  of a  p a r tic u la r  p rob lem .
T h e  no tio n  of re fu ta tio n  th a t  P o p p e r  in tro d u ces  for science p o te n tia lly  leaves m a th e ­
m atic s  on  th e  non-scien tific  side o f th e  line. In  his earlier w orks, P o p p e r  says th is  is 
co rrec t; m a th e m a tic s  is a  m e tap h y sica l concern , b u t  i t  does hav e  a  m a jo r  ro le  to  p lay  
in  science. M a th e m a tic a l theo ries  can  be m ad e  (em pirically ) scientific by  b ring ing  th e m  
in to  c o n ta c t w ith  th e  rea l w orld , th a t  is, by  p rov id ing  in te rp re ta tio n s  fo r th e ir  te rm s. 
A t th is  p o in t, says P o p p e r, th ey  cease to  b e  m a th e m a tic a l theo ries an d  becom e descrip ­
tive  theories o f th e  rea l w orld . I t  is h ere  th a t  P o p p e r differs from  th e  conven tionalist: 
he  a sse rts  th a t  such  d escrip tive  theories can now  be  re fu ted , as th e ir  logical s ta tu s  no 
longer p ro te c ts  th em . S tric tly , of course, i t  is th e  in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  th e o ry  th a t  is 
be ing  re fu ted : a  th e o ry  can  only  b e  re fu ted  as a  th eo ry  o f  som eth in g . A ll non-scientific  
theo ries  have  th is  p o te n tia l  (as science develops, s ta te m e n ts  o ften  becom e re fu ta b le  th a t
26
could only be tre a te d  m etap h y sica lly  befo re), b u t  m a th e m a tic s  is especially  useful. T h e  
n a tu re  of m a th e m a tic s  itse lf  is such  th a t  it  provides rich  d ed u ctiv e  sy stem s th a t  can  a id  
in  th e  process o f re fu ta tio n . T h e  m ore  th a t  can  be deduced  w ith in  th e  th eo ry , th e  m ore 
re fu tab le  it  is, an d  hence th e  b e t te r  th e  theo ry .
In  his la te r  w ork , how ever, P o p p e r  ap p ea rs  to  ad o p t a  d ifferent a t t i tu d e  to  rea lity , an d  
hence to  m a th e m a tic s , th a t  ra ises severa l questions reg a rd in g  his earlie r philosophy. 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , he does n o t review  all his p u b lish ed  w orks on  o th e r  issues to  acco m m o d a te  
th is  d ra m a tic  change, a n d  so w e a re  left guessing as to  how  he in te n d s  to  answ er th ese  
questions. T h e  change involves th e  in tro d u c tio n  of th re e  w orlds: th e  (firs t)  n a tu ra l  
w orld , th e  (second) w orld  of ideas an d  th o u g h ts  p riv a te  to  ind iv id u a ls , a n d  a  th ird  w orld  
o f m an -m ad e  s tru c tu re s . In  th is  th ird  w orld  reside, for exam ple, m a th e m a tic s , theo ries, 
books of know ledge, an d  m an -m ad e  p h ysica l o b jec ts . Such th ird  w orld  o b jec ts  m ay  have 
em b o d im en ts  in  b o th  th e  firs t an d  second w orld , as well as be ing  in  th e  th ird  w orld . 
B ooks, for exam ple , h av e  a  physica l fo rm , an d  m ay  also b e  concep tu a lised , as ho listic  
en titie s , by  ind iv iduals . P o p p e r s ta te s  th a t  th e  tru e  dom ain  o f in te re s t o f ep istem ology  
is th is  th ird  w orld , an d  we should  n o t ge t bogged dow n in  try in g  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  w ays 
in w hich know ledge is s to re d , m a n ip u la te d  an d  co m m unica ted  b y  using  th e  o th e r  w orlds.
T h is  th ird  w orld , accord ing  to  P o p p e r, is w here a  p ro p e r s tu d y  of an y  discip line should  
occur. W e should  s tu d y  th e  s tru c tu re s  (such  as theo ries) th a t  a re  p ro d u ced  before  we 
s ta r t  to  ask how  th ey  m ig h t be  a rriv ed  a t  by  using  th e  second w orld  processes. F u r th e r­
m ore , th is  th ird  w orld  has assum ed  an  au to n o m y  of its  ow n. W e can  now  tr e a t  th ird  
w orld  o b jec ts  in  iso la tion  from  th e  processes th a t  b ro u g h t th e m  a b o u t. In  p a r tic u la r , 
we can  discover p ro p ertie s  o f th ese  o b jec ts  th a t  we never knew  th e y  h ad : th a t  is to  say, 
th e se  o b jec ts  can  them selves be considered  as am enab le  to  scientific in v es tig a tio n . T h is 
id ea  is n o t new , an d  th e  p o te n tia l  d ilem m a it poses has been  recognised  by  E u ler, for 
exam ple , w hen he w rites
“As we m u st refer th e  n u m b ers  to  th e  p u re  in te llec t a lone, we can  h a rd ly  
u n d e rs ta n d  how  o b se rva tions an d  q u asi-experim en ts can  be  o f use in  in v esti­
g a tin g  th e  n a tu re  of th e  n u m b ers . Y et, in  fac t, as I shall show  th e re  will be 
good  reasons, th e  p ro p e rtie s  o f th e  n u m b ers  know n to d a y  h av e  b een  m o stly  
d iscovered by  o b se rv a tio n , an d  d iscovered long before  th e ir  t r u th  has been  
confirm ed by  rig id  d e m o n s tra tio n .” c ited  in  [P0I68, p age  3]
G iven, as a  th ird  w orld  o b je c t, a  fo rm ally  expressed  th eo ry , we can  ask  w h e th e r te rm  
x is a  dedu c tiv e  consequence of te rm s y and  z . I t  m ay  seem  th a t  P o p p e r ’s th ird  w orld  
is s im ilar to  P la to ’s w orld  of fo rm s, w ith  a  se p a ra te  existence th a t  can  be  discovered. 
T h e re  is a  m a jo r  difference, how ever: P o p p e r ’s w orld  is n o t D ivine b u t  m an -m ad e . F or 
th is  reason  we m u s t accep t t h a t  i t  can  be changed  by m en , an d  so we m u st re jec t all 
n o tio n s th a t  th e  th ird  w orld  cap tu re s  any  e te rn a l “t r u th ” .
O ur accep tan ce  of th e  th ird  w orld  allows us to  m odify  som ew hat P o p p e r ’s o rig inal s ta te ­
m e n t t h a t  m a th e m a tic s  is a  m e tap h y sica l a c tiv ity  unless we a re  using  a  m a th e m a tic a l
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th eo ry  to  describe th e  rea l w orld . W e m u s t now  ad m it th e  p ossib ility  th a t  a  m a th e m a t­
ical th e o ry  can  be su b jec ted  to  scientific analysis , th u s  giving rise to  m o re  m a th e m a tic a l 
m e ta -th eo ries . T hese  m e ta -th eo ries  a re  scientific, b u t  th e  “re a lity ” th a t  th e y  describe is 
n o t th e  n a tu ra l  w orld  b u t  o th e r  m a th e m a tic a l o b jec ts  in  th e  th ird  w orld . I t  is th is  th a t  
allows a  scientific tre a tm e n t of con jec tu res reg a rd in g , for exam ple , th e  th e o ry  of p rim e 
n u m b ers .
W e m u st now  reconsider th e  w hole id ea  o f re fu ta tio n , how ever, fo r i t  seem s th a t  such 
a  “scientific” ex p lo ra tio n  m ig h t well yield n o t only a  re fu ta tio n  o f E u le r ’s con jec tu re , 
b u t also a  “p ro o f” . T h e  so lu tion  to  th is  d ilem m a, w hich P o p p e r does n o t a p p e a r to  
h av e  discussed anyw here , is to  h e  found  in  th e  b ed ro ck  of m a th e m a tic a l cu ltu re . T o  use 
P o p p e r ’s earlie r analogy, as we seek to  d rive th e  piles deeper an d  deeper we reach  a  layer 
of u n iversa l ag reem en t u p o n  w hich o u r d ed u ctiv e  p ro o f s its. T h is  lay e r includes concep ts 
such  as o rderings, w hich allow  us to  c o n s tru c t proofs using  m a th e m a tic a l in d u c tio n . 
T h ese  a re , of course dedu c tiv e  in  n a tu re . Such proofs re s t on  th e  accep tan ce  o f a  n u m b e r 
o f im p lic it theo ries. In  p rov ing
•A  . n (n  +  1)
+  * =  2
for exam ple , we assum e th e  ex istence of in teg ers  w ith  p a r tic u la r  p ro p e rtie s . P ro p e rtie s  
like th ese  h av e  becom e such a  c e n tra l p a r t  o f o u r th ird  w orld th a t  we c a n n o t im ag ine  th em  
to  be false, an d  so we proceed  as if th ey  a re  u n d o u b ted ly  “tru e ” . W e shou ld  rem em b er, 
of course, th a t  th is  h as  n o t alw ays been  th e  case. T h e  ex istence of th e  n u m b er 0, fo r 
exam ple , w as d isp u ted  for a  long tim e  befo re  it  found  its  w ay in to  th e  collection o f 
generally  accep ted  th ird  w orld  o b je c ts , an d  “p ro o fs” b ased  on  na iv e  se t th e o ry  w ere also 
accep ted  largely  w ith o u t question  u n til  q u ite  recen tly  (an d  in  som e q u a rte rs  co n tinue  to  
be so).
T h e  u ltim a te  exam ple of th is , o f course, is th e  very  logic itse lf  th a t  P o p p e r  is qu ite  
co n te n t to  use for th e  p u rp o se  o f ded u c tio n  lead ing  to  re fu ta tio n . T h is  is itse lf  a  th ird  
w orld  o b jec t. D are  we allow th e  p ossib ility  o f re fu tin g  it?  I f  so, w h a t possib le logic do 
w e use to  do so? T h is  is a  very  rea l p rob lem  w hich P o p p e r h as  allow ed to  slip in , b u t  we 
can  ac tu a lly  su rv ive w ith o u t an  answ er. W e will ju s t  accep t th a t  c e r ta in  m a th e m a tic a l 
an d  logical fo u n d a tio n s  of o u r th ird  w orld  a re  to  he tre a te d  as n o t re fu tab le , an d  revel 
in  th e  fac t th a t  m o st o f th e  m ore  advanced  m a th e m a tic a l concep ts we requ ire  can  be 
c o n s tru c te d  from  th ese  sim pler fo u n d a tio n s. T h is effectively overcom es th e  p rob lem s of 
language  shift th a t  accom pany  th eo ry  d eve lopm en t, w here te rm s  ta k e  on  new  m eanings 
as theo ries a re  developed. T erm s such  as “m a t te r ” an d  “en erg y ” , fo r exam ple , hav e  q u ite  
d ifferen t m ean ings before  an d  a fte r  E in ste in . In  ou r T h ird  W orld , we can  u sua lly  give 
a  fo rm al sem an tics to  o u r language , th a t  is, we can define o u r te rm s using  te rm s d raw n  
from  o th e r  estab lish ed  T h ird  W orld  o b jec ts . W e can  define re la tio n s , fo r exam ple , in 
te rm s  o f se ts.
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2.2 Computing as Science: a Review
I t is cu rren tly  considered  good ad v ertis in g  copy to  apply  tlie  te rm  “science” , o r “scien­
tific” , to  p ro d u c ts  th a t  you  a re  try in g  to  sell, th u s  we h ave  scientifically  designed w ashing  
pow ders, to o th p a s te , m o to r  cars  an d  e lectric  razo rs. I t  is n o t su rp ris in g , th e re fo re , th a t  
th e re  has been  a  m ove in  recen t years  to  p o r tr a y  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f so ftw are  system s as 
scientific. T h e re  is a  g rave  d an g er, how ever, th a t  th e  te rm  is rea lly  bein g  used  to  m ean  
“h igh  q u a lity ” . If  th is  is th e  case th e n  ask ing  th e  so ftw are in d u s try  to  becom e m ore  
scientific is ac tu a lly  ju s t  a  th in ly  disguised req u est for i t  to  becom e “b e t te r ” . Such a  
req u est is com pletely  lack ing  in  gu idance , b o th  as to  how  such  im p ro v em en ts  a re  to  be 
b ro u g h t a b o u t an d  also how  to  a sce rta in  w h e th e r any  im p ro v em en t h as  ac tu a lly  ta k e n  
place.
T h is  sec tion  is an  a t te m p t to  view  C o m p u tin g  as a  scientific ac tiv ity , as described  by  
P o p p e r. T h e re  is no  a t te m p t ,  o f course, to  answ er th e  q uestion  “is C o m p u tin g  a  sci­
ence” , only to  discuss it. If  we m an ag e  to  b rin g  C o m p u tin g  in to  reaso n ab le  c o n ta c t w ith  
P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy th e n  we will hav e  estab lish ed  a  useful s ta r tin g  p o in t for subseq u en t 
d iscussions. A reas of d ifficulty  will hav e  been  identified  for fu r th e r  ana lysis , w hich could 
lead  to  a  refinem ent o f o u r view s o f C o m p u tin g  or science. A  few o f th e se  areas will be 
discussed in  th is  thesis , as th e y  a re  p e r tin e n t to  th e  cen tra l pedagog ical a im , b u t  m an y  
m ore  will be left as open  research  top ics. I f  th e  c o n tac t can  be m ad e  on ly  by  a  series of 
to ta lly  u n reaso n ab le  in te rp re ta tio n s  (such  as m ig h t b e  found  in  ask ing  th e  question  “is an  
app le  scientific” ), th e n  we m u s t e ith e r look for an  a lte rn a tiv e , a n d  m o re  acco m m o d a tin g , 
ph ilosophy  o f science, o r accep t t h a t  i t  is difficult to  view C o m p u tin g  as a  science.
T h e  ap p ro ach  a d o p te d  is to  review  th re e  m a jo r  co n trib u tio n s  to  th e  l i te ra tu re  of C om ­
p u tin g  th a t  seem  to  have  p a r tic u la r  re levance to  th e  question . T h ese  th re e  w orks are  
very  d ifferen t in  n a tu re , allow ing ns to  exp lo re  d ifferent face ts  o f th e  q u estion .
1. I lo a re ’s “P ro g ram m in g : Sorcery  or Science?” [Hoa84]: th is  p a p e r  addresses p ro ­
g ram m in g  in a  w ide sense, an d  holds o u t th e  p rom ise o f a  f ro n ta l  a t ta c k  on  th e  
prob lem  being  considered.
2. G ile s ’s “T h e  Science o f P ro g ra m m in g ” [G riS l]: th is  book  t r e a ts  p ro g ram m in g  as 
th e  ta sk  of m oving  from  a  fo rm al specification  to  code. I t  p re se n ts  a  n u m b er 
of p rincip les th a t  can be used  an d  also discusses th e  te ch n ica l d e ta ils  o f p rov ing  
p ro g ram s co rrec t.
3. N a u r’s “P ro g ram m in g  as T h eo ry  B uild ing” [Nau85]: th is  p a p e r  also t r e a ts  p ro ­
g ram m in g  in  a  very  w ide sense, b u t  uses a  m ore  psychological view  o f theories.
“Program m ing: Sorcery or Science?” by Hoare
T his  p a p e r  [Hoa84] ra ises one im p o r ta n t  question  reg a rd in g  th e  l i te ra tu re  of a  scientific 
discipline: shou ld  th e  p ap e rs  an d  books pub lish ed  them selves b e  scientific in  th e  sense
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t h a t  th e y  can  be  re fu ted ?  T h e  answ er a ssum ed  h ere  is “n o ” , fo r o therw ise  all discussion o f  
science m u s t e ith e r be  d e tach ed  from  science or carried  o u t in  a  scientific m an n e r. G rea t 
ca.re m u s t be ta k e n  if we accep t th is  answ er, how ever, in  case we unconsciously  open  
th e  floodga tes to  such  m etap h y sica l w ritin g s a t  th e  expense o f tru ly  scientific lite ra tu re . 
C are  m u s t also be ta k e n  to  ensu re  th a t  th e  read e r is aw are o f th e  on to log ica l s ta tu s  of 
p ub lish ed  p ap e rs , for o therw ise  re su lts  p u t  fo rw ard  m ay  be  g iven a  s ta tu s  as p a r t  of 
th e  d isc ip line’s scientific b o d y  o f know ledge. T h is  is unlikely  to  p re sen t a  p rob lem  in  
e stab lish ed  sciences, w here th e re  is l i ttle  d an g er o f confusing th e  d iscussion o f how  an  
ex p erim en t should  be co n d u c ted  w ith  th e  re p o r t o f its  re su lts . In  co m p u tin g , how ever, 
th e re  a re  com plica tions, such  as th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f C A SE  to o ls , w here  th e re  is a  risk  of 
e levating  discussion o f how  co m p u tin g  shou ld  be carried  o u t in to  a  th e o re tic a l basis for 
such  to o ls , an d  tre a tin g  such  a  basis as scientific. H o are ’s p a p e r is c learly  m e tap h y sica l, 
in  th e  sense th a t  it  is ta lk in g  a b o u t th e  processes involved in  p ro g ram m in g , ra th e r  th a n  
ta lk in g  a b o u t p ro g ram s (o r even p ro g ram m ers) in  a  scientific way.
O nce th e  s ta tu s  of th is  p a p e r  has been  n o ted , we can  accep t it  as p a r t  o f th e  scientific 
lite ra tu re . I t  is a  piece o f p ersu asiv e  d iscourse, th e  p u rp o se  of w hich  is to  co n v ert th o se  
w ho see p ro g ram m in g  as a  b lack  a r t  to  th e  p o in t o f view of th o se  w ho believe th a t  
so ftw are  p ro d u c tio n  shou ld  be “b ased  on  underly in g  theories a n d  follow  th e  tra d itio n s  
o f b e tte r-e s ta b lish ed  engineering  d iscip lines” (page  5). O ne rem ark ab le  fac t a b o u t th is  
p a p e r  is th a t  H oare  m anages to  ca rry  o u t th e  w hole discussion w ith o u t an y  rea l reference 
to  “science” . He seem s to  e q u a te  p rofessional engineering p rac tice  (w hich he assum es as 
a  goal) w ith  scientific p ra c tic e , an d  in  so doing answ ers th e  questio n  in  his t i t le  sim ply  
by  defin ition . T h e  re s t o f th e  p a p e r  is largely  d ivorced  from  th e  t itle , be ing  a  d iscussion 
of th e  w ays in w hich so ftw are developm ent should  proceed . W e can , how ever, analyse  
som e of th e  m ore re lev an t s ta te m e n ts  an d  see if th ey  offer any  in sig h ts  in to  C o m p u tin g  
as science.
H o are  says, fo r exam ple,
“T h e  chief p ro g ram m er, like th e  a rc h ite c t, will s ta r t  b y  d iscussing  req u ire ­
m en ts  w ith  his client. F rom  ed u ca tio n  an d  experience, th e  p ro g ra m m e r will 
be ab le  to  gu ide his client to  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of his t ru e  n eed s .” (p ag e  8)
T h is  m ay  well be  a.11 a c c u ra te  reflection of w h a t should  h a p p e n , b u t  i t  does l i ttle  to  
convince th e  read er th a t  p ro g ram m in g  is scientific. A rc h ite c tu re , p a r tic u la r ly  th e  m o d ­
ern  varie ty , is n o to rio u s for its  h igh ly  su b jec tiv e  n a tu re , an d  b y  in tro d u c in g  th e  c lien t’s 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  in to  th e  p ic tu re , H oare  ad m its  b la ta n t  psychologism , w hich P o p p e r  con­
tin u a lly  sou g h t to  rem ove from  th e  rea lm s of science. Sim ilarly, th e  te rm  “tru e  needs” 
requ ires carefu l co n sidera tion . If  we accep t P o p p e r ’s view th a t  ob serv a tio n s a re  th e o ry  
lad en , th e n  th e  discovery  of needs can  only b e  as “t ru e ” as th e  th eo ries w e used  to  search  
th em  o u t. H oare  seem s to  be se ttin g  th e  scene fo r ab so lu te  c e r titu d e  in  science, and  
hence in  p ro g ram m in g , by assum ing  th a t  in itia l observations can  b e  ta k e n  as “t ru e ” . In  
so doing, he is p rom ising  m ore  th a n  e ith e r p ro g ram m in g  or science can  deliver.
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Iloare goes on to say that
“T his ac tiv ity  will cu lm in a te  in  a  com plete , u n am b ig u o u s, a n d  p rovab ly  
co n sis ten t specification  for th e  en tire  end  p ro d u c t. I t  will serve th e  sam e 
role as b lu ep rin ts  in  engineering  o r scaled  p lans an d  elevations in  a rch itec ­
tu re .” (page  8)
N o t co n te n t w ith  ab so lu te  t r u th ,  H oare  now  ad m its  th e  w hole tru th !  As T arsk i has 
n o te d , how ever, re la tiv e  com pleteness is a  m o re  p rac tica l to o l th a n  to ta l  com pleteness. 
T h e  la t te r ,  in  logical te rm s , m eans th a t  th e  m ax im al set o f co n sis ten t conclusions can  
be d raw n . C learly  i t  is re la tiv e  com pleteness th a t  H oare in ten d s: he w an ts  to  be  able 
to  draw  all consis ten t conclusions re lev an t to  th e  prob lem . M ade exp lic it, th e  p rob lem  
w ith  th is  s ta te m e n t is m an ifest. W h a t p ro ced u re  can th e  p ro g ra m m e r a d o p t th a t  will 
g u a ra n te e  d iscovery of a  com plete  specification? In  science it  h as  long  been  accep ted  
th a t  such  a  p ro ced u re  is im possible.
In  sim ilar vein  we m u st ask  w h a t H oare  m eans by an  “unam b ig u o u s specifica tion” . He 
could b e  suggesting  th e  use of a  n o ta tio n  w ith  an  u nam biguously  p a rsab le  g ra m m a r, a  
fa irly  sim ple th in g  to  ensure . He could also be  requ iring  a  lan g u ag e  w ith  som e un iversa lly  
accep tab le  sem an tics th a t  can  be in te rp re te d  in  only one w ay (a n d  he m u s t accep t th e  
p rob lem  of su b jec tiv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , because  of th e  psychologism  he a d m its  elsew here); 
a  r a th e r  h a rd e r th in g  to  achieve, an d  we clearly  do n o t w a n t such an  u n am biguous 
specification . A n e levation  in  a rc h ite c tu re , for exam ple, does n o t un iquely  define a  wall, 
b u t leaves open  various p ro p e rtie s  such  as choice of c o n stru c tio n , facing an d  geograph ica l 
lo ca tion . If  we assum e th a t  H oare  requ ires som e fo rm  of u n am b ig u ity  in  th e  second sense 
above  (a n d  n o t ju s t  an  un am b ig u o u s g ra m m a r)  th e n  we m ay  observe  a  possib le cause of 
th e  p rob lem . H oare  w an ts  to  use th e  specifications in  tw o w ays; as a r tifa c ts  to  e stab lish  
c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d arie s , b u t  also as b lu ep rin ts  for co n stru c tio n , a lth o u g h  he  does la te r  
observe  th a t  a lte rn a tiv e  form s (such  as p ro to ty p e s  an d  m odels) m ay  b e  m o re  su itab le  for 
th e  firs t pu rp o se . T his d u a l p u rp o se  is p ro b lem atic  because  we w a n t th e  am b ig u ity  to  b e  
in  th e  d eta ils  o f co n stru c tio n  an d  n o t in  th e  p ro p ertie s  o f th e  a r tifa c t th a t  th e  custo m er 
is in te re s te d  in . T h is  can  b e  achieved b y  n o tin g  th a t  observations a re  th e o ry  lad en , so we 
w a n t to  observe th e  specification in  d ifferent ligh ts: th e  th eo ry  th a t  h as  been  developed 
in  co n junc tion  w ith  th e  cu sto m er shou ld  yield u n am biguous observa tions; th a t  used  
by th e  c o n stru c tio n  engineer shou ld  be unam b ig u o u s in  ce rta in  im p o r ta n t  a sp ec ts  b u t  
leave  freedom  of in te rp re ta tio n  in  o th e r  resp ec ts . I t  m ig h t be  said  th a t  im p lem en ta tio n  
deta ils shou ld  n o t a p p e a r in  a  specification  a t  th is  level, so th a t  all a sp ec ts  shou ld  be 
unam b ig u o u s, o r th a t  any  “am b ig u ity ” shou ld  be rem oved by  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f non- 
de te rm in ism . T h e  fac t rem ain s, how ever h a rd  we w riggle, th a t  every  o b se rv a tio n  m u s t be 
in te rp re te d  in  th e  lig h t of som e theo ry , and  unless we can ensu re  t h a t  a  com m on th eo ry  
is being used to  illu m in a te  th e  o b serva tion , we can n o t achieve u n am b ig u ity . O ne w ay 
a ro u n d  th is  is to  use n o t second w orld  sem an tics (w h a t we read  in to  a  specification) b u t 
a  fo rm al sem an tics. T h is does n o t help  us to  “convince” custo m ers , or to  ensu re  com m on 
“u n d e rs ta n d in g ” , o f course, b u t it  does su p p o rt fo rm al analysis, a n d  m ay  expose areas
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of m isu n d e rs tan d in g  o r s tra teg ie s  t h a t  can  b e  used  to  p rov ide  convincing a rg u m en ts .
O nce th e  p rob lem s o f req u irem en ts  c a p tu re  an d  analysis ha.ve been  overcom e, H oare  is 
on  safer g ro u n d . He th e n  d isp lays a  t ru e  P o p p e ria n  sp irit b y  a d o p tin g  re fu ta tio n a lism :
. . i t  will b e  possib le to  devise a  series o f rigorous an d  search ing  accep tan ce  
te s ts  . . . I f  th e  p ro d u c t fails th e  te s t ,  an d  th e  im p lem en to rs claim  th a t  th e  
te s t  is u n fa ir , any  c o m p e te n t logician  o r m a th e m a tic ia n  will be ab le  to  decide 
w ho is r ig h t” (page  9)
H e is a t  odds w ith  P o p p e r, how ever, w hen  he  says th a t
“ . .  . th e  chief p ro g ram m er will convince h im self and  his colleagues by  m a th ­
em a tica l p ro o f th a t  if  each  o f th e  co m ponen ts m eets  its  specification , th e n  
w hen all th e  com p o n en ts  are  assem bled , th e  overall p ro d u c t will m ee t th e  
overall specification  agreed  by  th e  c lien t.” (page  9)
for such “conv ic tion” has no p lace  in  P o p p e r ’s science. R a th e r  we shou ld  view p ro o f as 
an  a id  to  re fu ta tio n , by  exposing  y e t m ore  s ta te m e n ts  th a t  could possib ly  be te s te d .
T h e  p rob lem  here  is th a t  we a re  s ta r tin g  to  m ak e  th e  tra n s itio n  fro m  sc ien tis t, w ork ing  
w ith  th e  rea l p rob lem s of a  c lien t, to  m a th e m a tic ia n , w orking w ith  conven tionally  defined 
th ird  w orld  o b jec ts , in  a d d itio n  to  o u r agreed  specification. T h ese  o b je c ts , accord ing  to  
P o p p e r , a re  still open  to  re fu ta tio n , b u t in  p rac tice  we accep t th e m  as irre fu tab le . O nce 
th is  tra n s itio n  has been  m ad e , we can  use dedu c tiv e  reason ing  to  e s tab lish  irre fu tab le  
chains of reason ing , th a t  is, fo rm a l proofs. W e should  still avoid confusing such  proofs 
w ith  “convincing a rg u m e n ts” , how ever, for th e re  are  to o  m an y  convincing a rg u m en ts  
th a t  a re  logically flaw ed, o r even sound  logical a rg u m en ts  t l ia t  a re  n o t a t  all convincing. 
R a th e r  we should  s e p a ra te  th e  tw o concerns, allow ing conv iction  to  a c t as a  reason  
for question ing  som e of ou r assum ed  theo ries, w hen a  d eduction  is c o u n te r-in tu itiv e  for 
exam ple , b u t using fo rm al proofs to  p rov ide  th e  chain  of reason ing  w ith o u t th e  d is tra c tio n  
of in tu itio n .
In  observ ing  th a t  co n s tru c tin g  a  la rg e  an d  com plex p ro g ram , th e n  a t te m p tin g  to  debug  
it ,  is a  flaw ed ap p ro ach , H oare  is essen tia lly  observ ing  th a t  it  is n o t sensible to  c o n s tru c t 
a  la rg e  th eo ry  and  co n tinue  to  defend it  ag a in st re fu ta tio n  on th e  w ay (by  refusing  to  
app ly  deduc tive  reaso n in g ), an d  th e n  su b m it it  to  a  m assive dose o f re fu ta tio n  a fte r  we 
hav e  c o n s tru c te d  an  em pirica l (first w orld) o b jec t. R a th e r  we shou ld  s ta y  in  co n tro l o f 
ou r th ird  w orld  theories an d  ge t th ese  co n sis ten t w ith  th e  req u irem en ts , an d  all o th e r  
accep ted  theories, as fa r as possib le before  un ifica tion  and  im p lem en ta tio n .
H e does seem  to  be  o v e rs ta tin g  th e  case, how ever, w hen he says
“B ecause o f th e  c la rity  o f p ro g ram  s tru c tu re s  an d  th e  com pleteness o f design 
d o c u m e n ta tio n , i t  will b e  qu ite  easy to  d e te rm in e  w hich p a r ts  o f th e  design 
an d  coding need  to  be  changed  in  o rd e r to  m eet a  new re q u ire m e n t.” (page  10)
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I t m ay  well be  tlie  case th a t  we can  id en tify  areas of change if  th e  new  req u irem en ts  
can  still be view ed in  th e  lig h t o f th e  ex isting  theo ry , for th e n  we h a v e  an  a p p ro p ria te  
search ligh t. If  th e  new  req u irem en ts  effectively re fu te  th e  ex isting  th e o ry  th e n  th e re  is 
no w ay of know ing  how  rad ica l, o r localised , th e  changes need  to  be . I t  m ay  well be 
a rg u ed  th a t  such  a  scenario  is a  com ple te  redesign , an d  n o t a  m od ifica tion , for as T ursk i 
has observed ,
“T h e  c rux  o f th e  m a tte r  is th a t  an  in ep tly  chosen te rm  m asks th e  rea l issue.
(O nce again , sloppy lingu istic  h a b its  a n d  a  childish en th u s ia sm  for new  gam es 
th a t  can  be p lay ed  w ith o u t ru les have  lead  us a s tray .)  M ain ten an ce , as defined 
by  d ic tionaries, is th e  a c t o f m a in ta in in g , i.e. o f keeping in  an  ex isting  s ta te , 
o f su sta in in g  ag a in s t op p o sitio n  or d an g er, e tc . Y et, to  q u o te  a  friend  of 
m ine, so ftw are  eng ineering  is th e  on ly  discipline w here ad d in g  a  new  w ing to  
a  bu ild ing  w ould  be  considered  as a  m a in ten an ce  a c tiv ity .” [T u rS l, page  107]
In  th is  case H oare m u s t p rov ide a  m echan ism , or m e ta -th eo ry , th a t  can  be used  to  decide 
w hen to  m odify an d  w hen to  s ta r t  again .
H o a re ’s o p tim ism  also b e tra y s  itse lf  w lien he ta lk s  a b o u t im proved  e s tim a te s  o f p ro je c t 
co st, delivery tim e  an d  size of th e  final p ro g ram . T h e  ex istence  of good  su b s ta n tiv e  
theories does n o t ensu re  th e  ex istence of effective m e ta -th e o re tica l p ro ced u res . If  i t  d id , 
th e n  we should  expec t sc ien tis ts  to  be  ab le  to  p red ic t how  long it  w ill ta k e  to  find a  
cu re  for cancer, o r a. m a th e m a tic ia n  to  p red ic t how  long it  will ta k e  to  find  a  particular- 
p ro o f . In  th ese  c ircum stances it  is only experience th a t  can  help . Indeed , i t  m ay  
even  b e  easier to  m ake  acc u ra te  e s tim a te s  if  we stick  to  a  no il-scientific a p p ro ach , for 
ru les-o f-thum b  are  s tab le  an d  th e re  a re  necessarily  case h isto ries to  stu d y . O f course , 
q u a lity  can n o t be  ensured . J u s t  as th e  m o to r m echan ic  w ho m u st service a  ca r in  a  fixed 
tim e  m ay  have to  ignore an y  fau lts  th a t  h av e  n o t been  allow ed fo r, a n d  m ay  a d o p t a  
w ork ro u tin e  so th a t  lie does n o t even n o tice  th e m , so m ay  th e  so ftw are  engineer ignore 
a d d itio n a l “fe a tu re s” th a t  m ig h t creep u n in ten tio n a lly  in to  th e  sy stem , an d  avoid being 
to o  an a ly tic a l in  case such  p rob lem s a re  no ticed . N either should  we ignore  th e  fac t th a t  
m an y  es tim a te s  a.re cu rren tly  m ad e  by  th o se  w ith  vested  in te re s ts  in  keeping  e s tim a ted  
costs as low as possib le , an d  n o t by  th o se  w ith  th e  techn ica l ex p e rtise  an d  experience 
to  m ake  sensible ju d g em en ts . Being scientific will no m ore  overcom e th e se  prob lem s 
th a n  it  overcam e th e  fund ing  p rob lem s of m an y  g rea t sc ien tis ts  w ho h ad  to  w ork in 
un d er-reso u rced  lab o ra to rie s  even w hen th ey  w ere a b o u t to  m ak e  g re a t discoveries.
H oare goes on to  m o u n t a  fairly  explicit a t ta c k  on in d u c tio n ism  in  C o m p u tin g  w hen he 
no tes  th a t
“ . .  . in te rp o la tio n  an d  e x tra p o la tio n  a re  w holly invalid  [in C om pu ting ]. T h e  
fac t th a t  a  p ro g ram  w orks for values zero an d  65535 gives no  confidence th a t  
i t  will w ork  fo r an y  of th e  values in  be tw een , unless th is  fa c t is p ro v ed  by  
logical reason ing  b ased  on  th e  very  te x t  o f th e  p ro g ram  itself. B u t if th is
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logical reason ing  is co rrec t, th e n  th e re  w as no  need  for th e  te s t  in  th e  first 
p lace .” (page  12)
U n fo rtu n a te ly  he has aga in  used  a  psychological te rm  in  ta lk in g  of “confidence” . T h e  fac t 
is t h a t  for m o st people  such  te s tin g  does bu ild  confidence. T h e  rea l questio n  is w h e th e r 
such confidence is w ell-founded, an d , as P o p p e r has n o ted , no  n u m b e r of o bserva tions 
of re su lts  we th in k  a re  p ro b ab le  shou ld  serve to  increase o u r confidence. T h a t  should  
h a p p e n  only w hen so m eth ing  th a t  is unlikely b u t  p red ic ted  tu rn s  o u t to  be  th e  case. 
T h is  is is p a r tia lly  reflec ted  in  th e  te s tin g  s tra te g y  th a t  favou rs special cases over ra n d o m  
in stan ces. O f course, a  search  for such  cases requ ires a  th e o re tic a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  
p ro g ram .
H oare  gives th e  im pression  th a t  th is  a p p ro a c h  will do aw ay w ith  th e  w hole of te s tin g , 
rep lac ing  it  by logical reason ing . T h is  can n o t be th e  case, o f course, if  o u r p ro g ram s 
are  to  be considered  in  an y  sense as first w orld  em pirical o b jec ts . If  we a re  p rep a red  
to  t r e a t  th e m  as pu re ly  fo rm al o b je c ts , fo rever lo ca ted  in  th e  th ird  w orld , th e n  w e can  
escape th e  need  to  te s t ,  b u t  th e n  o u r p ro g ram s will he of l i ttle  p ra c tic a l use. W h a t 
H oare  ac tu a lly  achieves is a  re lo ca tio n  of th e  onus of te s tin g ; by  estab lish in g , once and  
for all, th e  c u s to m e r’s req u irem en ts  before  th e  p ro g ram  design is s ta r te d , he  rem oves 
th e  need to  te s t  th e  p ro g ra m  as a  su itab le  can d id a te  for solving th e  c u s to m e r’s p rob lem . 
T h is  m ay  be theo re tica lly  valid , an d  could even be legally enforcib le, b u t  in  p rac tice , 
th e  professional so ftw are engineer will s till w an t to  te s t  such areas as th e  u ser in te rface  
design , an d  possible m an y  o th e rs , d u ring  th e  design s tag e  of a  p ro je c t to  give th e  clients 
a  chance  to  change th e ir  m inds. As is well know n, u se r’s “re q u ire m e n ts” change as th ey  
see th e  a r tifa c t being developed, th a t  is, th e y  a lte r  th e ir  ow n theo ries  as th e  em pirica l 
ev idence of o b serva tion  becom es available for th e ir  re fu ta tio n . I t  m ay  b e  a rg u ed  th a t  o u r 
new  softw are  engineers will b e  so p ro fic ien t a t  req u irem en ts  analysis th a t  th e ir  clients will 
n o t need  th is  second chance; in  p rac tice , ju s t  as th e  bu ild ing  o f a  new  ro a d  causes e x tra  
traffic  flow , so th e  c lien t, seeing w h a t g re a t im p ro v em en ts  w ere effected by  th e  engineer 
before  th e  design s ta r te d , will be  even m ore  keen  to  m o n ito r th e  p rog ress o f th e  design 
in  case th e  possib ility  o f m ore  im provem en ts p resen ts  itself. P ro v id ed  th a t  th e  so ftw are 
engineer is able to  m an ag e  th e  p ric ing  of such  changes, th e re  seem s no  reason  to  th ro w  
o u t such te s tin g  ju s t  because  it  is n o t necessary  to  achieve conform ance w ith  th e  o rig inal 
specification . W e should  observe, how ever, th a t  such “te s tin g ” m ig h t be b e t te r  called 
“te s t-d riv in g ” , because  a lth o u g h  th e  client m ay  view it as a  te s t ,  th e  engineer should  
n o t. W e shall reserve  th e  te rm  “a n im a tin g ” fo r te s tin g  of th is  k in d  [Coh82].
T h e  second re lo ca tio n  o f te s tin g  is caused  b y  th e  use of fo rm al proofs of co rrec tness as 
evidence th a t  so ftw are  satisfies its  specification . F igu re  2.2 show s a  p ro o f  th a t  a  given 
p ro g ram  m eets  a  given specification. T h is  p ro o f  is carried  o u t in  a  sim ple I lo a re  logic4 .
4 W e will not quibble over tlie fact that there should clearly be an upper bound on the data: the data  
set is practically infinite, in the sense that for m ost real problems it is infeasible to  test all possible cases. 
T his is analogous to the acceptance of N ew ton’s theory for certain practical tasks, the onus being on the  
engineer, of course, to ensure that the theory is not used outside its dom ain o f application. In this case, 
we assum e that the programmer intends to prepend a sufficiently strong in itia l condition  guard.
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F ig u re  2.2: A  P ro o f  o f P ro g ra m  C orrec tness
For th e  in itia l p rob lem , we w ere faced  w ith  an  in fin ite  set o f te s t cases. Now we are  faced 
w ith  no te s ts  a t  all unless we a t te m p t  to  re fu te  th e  th eo ry  o f th e  p ro g ram m in g  language  
u p o n  w hich th e  p ro o f  re s ts  (o r, p e rh ap s  less likely, th e  th e o ry  o f in eq u a lities , o r even 
p re d ic a te  logic itse lf) . W e m ig h t a rg u e , o f course, th a t  th ese  theo ries a re  to  b e  tr e a te d  
as conven tionally  tru e . T h ey  a re  bey o n d  question . T h ey  define p ro p e rtie s  r a th e r  th a n  
describ ing  th em . T h is m ig h t well be th e  case for th e  lem m a on line 11, fo r exam ple. W e 
could tr e a t  th e  axiom s an d  ru les of th e  H oare logic in  th e  sam e way, b u t  th is  will only 
w ork if  we a re  p rep a red  to  accep t th a t  o u r p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  is a  p u re  th ird  w orld 
o b je c t. O nce we accep t t h a t  o u r lan g u ag e  is im p lem en ted  in  som e re a l way, th e n  we have 
sim ply sh ifted  th e  onus o f te s tin g  o n to  th e  im p lem en to r of th e  com piler, w ho m u s t now  
show  th a t  each  o f th e  in s tru c tio n s  used  gives rise to  em pirica l o b serv a tio n s th a t  will n o t 
re fu te  th e  th eo ry , an d  also th a t  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  of n a tu ra l  n u m b e rs  will sa tisfy  th e  
lem m as.
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T his ta sk  is no sim pler th a n  th e  te s tin g  o f th e  orig inal p ro g ram , fo r each  assignm en t 
s ta te m e n t (in  fa c t, each  possib le call o f an  assignm en t s ta te m e n t) , fo r exam ple , m u st 
be show n to  sa tisfy  its  axiom . I t  does, how ever, allow th e  reu se  o f te s t  re su lts . T h e  
com piler w rite r can  a d o p t a  sim ilar s tra te g y , o f course, by  fo rm ally  p ro v in g  his com piler, 
co n tin g en t u p o n  th e  code of th e  m icrocode w rite r, w ho can  pass th e  ta sk  dow n to  th e  
h a rd w a re  designer. U ltim a te ly , th e  respo n sib ility  can  be  la id  a t  th e  d o o r of th e  engineer 
responsib le  for th e  fab rica tio n  sy stem  used  in  th e  p ro d u c tio n  of th e  devices used . I t  is 
d eb a ta b le  w h e th e r th e  engineer has any  r ig h t to  pass re sp o nsib ility  on  to  th e  sc ien tis t 
responsib le  for th e  theo ries of solid s ta te  physics th a t  und erp in s  his design.
A lte rn a tiv e ly , we could th in k  of o u r H oare  logic n o t as a  conven tion , b u t  as an  em pirica l 
th eo ry  p ro d u ced  b y  analysis o f an  ex isting  im p lem en ta tio n  of a  lan g u ag e . T esting  in  th is  
case is an  a t te m p t  to  re fu te  th e  th e o ry  in  th e  u su a l way. T h is  view  seem s less s tra n g e  if 
we rem em b er th a t  languages such  as A d a  w ere im p lem en ted  befo re  being  g iven a  fo rm al 
sem an tics.
I f  we accep t th a t  th e  re lo ca tio n  o f te s tin g  can  be th o u g h t o f as th e  avo idance  o f  te s tin g  for 
a  p a r tic u la r  so ftw are  engineer, th e n  H o a re ’s case can  be su p p o rte d . F o rm a l d ed u c tio n  al­
lows th is  re lo ca tio n , an d  effectively p e rm its  so ftw are engineers to  bu ild  u p o n  th e  theories 
of o th e rs , in  ju s t  th e  sam e w ay as sc ien tis ts  do. In  conclusion, H o a re ’s p a p e r  seem s to  be  
recom m end ing  a  scientific a t t i tu d e , to g e th e r  w ith  th e  use of th e  m a tliem atico -sc ien tific  
m e th o d , as th e  w ay ahead .
“The Science of Programming” by Gries
T h is  book  [G riSl] is one o f th e  m o st in fluen tia l item s of C o m p u tin g  li te ra tu re . G ries, like 
H oare , re s tr ic ts  his a tte n tio n  to  “p ro g ram m in g ” , b u t i t  is clear th a t  he  is using  th e  te rm  
to  d en o te  th e  p ro d u c tio n  of code from  a  fo rm al specification . He does n o t, for exam ple, 
in tro d u c e  issues such as req u irem en ts  c a p tu re  o r m an ag em en t o f th e  developm en t p rocess 
in to  th e  discussion.
G ries is clearly  aw are  of th e  confusion th a t  m ay  arise from  his use  of th e  te rm  “science” , 
an d  so tak es  th e  tro u b le  to  exp la in  w hich o f th e  O xford  D ic tio n ary  defin itions he h a d  in  
m in d  w hen  a d o p tin g  th e  te rm :
“S om etim es, how ever, th e  te rm  science  is ex ten d ed  to  d en o te  a  d e p a r tm e n t 
o f p ra c tic a l w ork w hich depends on  th e  know ledge an d  conscious ap p lica tio n  
o f princip les; an  a r t ,  on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , being u n d e rs to o d  to  req u ire  m erely  
know ledge o f tra d itio n a l ru les an d  skill acqu ired  by h a b i t .”
He goes on to  say  th a t ,  a lth o u g h  p ro g ram m in g  s ta r te d  as an  a r t ,  th e  science is ju s t  
em erg ing . I t  is u n fo r tu n a te  th a t  science an d  a r t  should  b e  seen as m u tu a lly  exclusive 
in  th is  w ay, an d  even m o re  u n fo r tu n a te  th a t  a  value ju d g em en t is im plied  th a t  places 
science above a r t .  T h e re  is no  evidence in  th e  book  th a t  G ries agrees w ith  such  a  value 
ju d g e m e n t, b u t  n e ith e r does he show  ns th a t  he d isagrees. A  d iscussion o f p ro g ram m in g
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as an  a r t  is co n ta in ed  in  K n u th ’s T u rin g  A w ard  L ectu re  [Knu74].
G ries does n o t m ake explic it th e  fac t th a t  th e  book  is ad d ressing  to p ics  on  tw o  d is tin c t 
levels:
1. T h e  ac tiv ities o f p ro g ram m ers , an d  th e  principles th a t  shou ld  gu ide  th e ir  ac tions.
2. T h e  p ro g ram m in g  lang u ag es th a t  p ro g ram m ers use an d  th eo ries  t h a t  govern  th e ir  
use.
O n th e  firs t level, G ries is try in g  to  e s tab lish  a  n u m b er o f p rinc ip les th a t  govern  th e  
ac tio n  o f w ritin g  good  p ro g ram s. In  a  sense th is  is tru ly  an  a t te m p t  a t  a  science of 
programming  r a th e r  th a n  a  science o f p ro g ram s. A d o p tin g  P o p p e r ’s a rg u m e n t, how ever, 
we can  see th a t  th is  is n o t a  science in  o u r  s tr ic t  sense of th e  te rm  (as G ries clearly  realised  
w hen  he  to o k  th e  tro u b le  to  p rov ide  his w ork ing  defin ition  of science). G ile s ’s p rincip les 
are  n o t re fu tab le  law s, b u t guidelines for ac tio n , a lbe it guidelines th a t  hav e  a risen  from  
th e o re tic a l considera tions. In  fa c t, we can  view  th ese  guidelines as a  very  sim plified 
reflection  o f G ries ph ilosophy  o f p ro g ram m in g . I f  we ta k e  th is  lib e rty , th e n  we can  
com pare  th is  ph ilosophy  w ith  P o p p e r ’s com m en ts on  m e th o d s , an d  see if  any  sim ilarities 
o r conflicts can  be found . T h is , o f course, p resupposes th a t  we a re  p rep a red  to  accep t 
som e correspondence  b etw een  p ro g ram s an d  scientific theo ries. F or th e  m o m e n t, we ask  
th e  read e r to  ta k e  th is  on  t r u s t ,  o r, a t  le a s t, to  su spend  disbelief.
W e will only consider som e o f th e  m ore  g enera l princip les ra ised  in  th e  b o o k , fo r th ese  are  
sufficient for th e  ta sk  in  h an d . M an y  o f th e  o th e r princip les a re  specific to  a  p a r tic u la r  
p ro g ram m in g  p a rad ig m  an d  th erefo re  sensibly com parison  w ith  th e o ry  c o n s tru c ts  w ould  
only be possib le by  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f p a r tic u la r  th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  p a rad ig m s.
££ • P r in c ip l e :  A  p ro g ram  an d  its  p ro o f should  be developed h an d -in -h an d , 
w ith  th e  p ro o f usually  lead ing  th e  w ay.” (page  .164)
To help  us u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t he m eans here , G ries provides us w ith  a n o th e r  defin ition , 
th is tim e  of a  proof, from  W e b s te r’s T h ird  New In te rn a tio n a l D ic tio n a ry
“ th e  cogency of evidence th a t  com pels belief by th e  m in d  o f a  t r u th  or fa c t.”
T h u s  G ries is a d m ittin g  psychologism  as a  basis , a  p o sition  th a t  can  easily be defended 
by  n o tin g  th a t  his p rincip les a re  guides to  ac tio n , an d  ac tio n  is governed  by  second w orld  
en titie s  such  as belief or em otion . I t  is ev iden t from  th e  c o n tex t o f th e  re s t o f th e  book , 
how ever, th a t  th is  “cogency of ev idence” is to  be p rov ided  th ro u g h  rigorous deductive  
reason ing , ju s t  as fo r P o p p e r, and  th a t  all th e  a ssertions tu rn  o u t to  be in te r-su b jec tiv e ly  
te s ta b le  o b serv a tio n  re p o rts . T h is  m eans th a t  we can  s to p  sh o rt o f using  th e  evidence 
for th e  p u rp o se  o f inducing  belief, an d  consider G ries’ deductions as th ird  w orld  o b jec ts  
ju s t  like P o p p e r ’s. T h e  m o tiv a tio n  for th ese  deductions is clearly  d ifferen t, how ever, fo r 
P o p p e r w ould have  us deduce th in g s th a t  can  be  observed , an d  hence a c t as re fu ta tio n s  of 
th e  th eo ry , w hereas G ries deduces resu lts  w hich he hopes a re  n o t re fu tab le , an d  w hich he
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can  ta k e  as “tru e ” . T h is  com es a b o u t p a r tly  because  G ries accep ts  c e rta in  base  theories 
an d  in itia l cond itions as effectively irre fu tab le .
T h e  n o tio n  th a t  a  p ro o f an d  a  p ro g ram  (o r th eo ry ) should  be developed  h an d -in -h an d  is 
he ld  by  b o th  P o p p e r an d  G ries. F or G ries, th e  p ro g ram  is m ad e  m o re  precise by  add ing  
th e  d eta ils  o f chunks of code in  a  top -d o w n  fash ion , w hereas P o p p e r  w ould  ad d  bo lder 
co n jec tu res . T h e  id e a  th a t  th e  p ro o f leads th e  w ay is h a rd e r to  reconcile. T h is  ap p ears  
d irec tly  c o n tra ry  to  P o p p e r ’s view  th a t  evidence in  su p p o rt o f a  th e o ry  shou ld  be sough t 
only a fte r  a  th e o ry  has been  p ro p o sed , an d  will ta k e  th e  fo rm  o f severe te s ts  o f th e  theo ry . 
W e can n o t know  w h a t te s ts  will b e  needed  u n til  we have  ana lysed  th e  bo ld  con jec tu re . 
Indeed , G ries h im self seem s to  su p p o rt th is  view w ith  a n o th e r  princ ip le :
“ • P r in c ip l e :  U se th e o ry  to  p rov ide  in sigh t; use com m on sense a n d  in tu itio n  
w here i t  is su itab le , b u t  fall back  on  th e  fo rm al th e o ry  for su p p o rt w hen 
difficulty an d  com plexities a rise .” (p ag e  165)
T h is gives us th e  h in t we requ ire  to  reconcile th e  tw o  view s, fo r it  is th e  p ro o f  o f p ro g ram  
version  1 th a t  gives rise to  p ro g ra m  version  2; for P o p p e r, re fu ta tio n  will requ ire  us to  
bu ild  new  th eo ries , an d  fa ilu re  to  re fu te  shou ld  lead  to  c o n s tru c t b o ld e r th eo ries , w hereas 
for G ries, a tte m p tin g  d ed u c tiv e  proofs o f p ro g ram s will lead  e ith e r  to  fau lts  th a t  m u s t 
be co rrec ted , o r to  lem m as th a t  m u s t be satisfied  by  pieces o f code y e t to  be w ritte n .
F or b o th  P o p p e r  an d  G ries th e  n o tio n  o f p rob lem  solving is im p o r ta n t .
“♦ P r in c ip l e :  P ro g ram m in g  is a  goal-oriented  a c tiv ity .” (page  173)
T h is  ties in  n ea tly  w ith  P o p p e r ’s sim plified d iag ram
P i -> T T  -+ E E  -* P2
F or P o p p e r, p rob lem s give rise  to  te n ta tiv e  theo ries, from  w hich w e a t te m p t  to  e lim ina te  
e rro rs , an d  th is  in  tu rn  leads to  new  prob lem s to  solve. F or G ries, p rob lem s give rise 
to  o u tlin e  p ro g ram s, w hich leave gaps in  th e  deduc tive  chain , th a t  req u ire  ad d itio n a l 
p rob lem s to  b e  solved in  g en e ra tin g  th e  req u ired  code to  fill th e m . U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is  
m odel is so genera l th a t  i t  can  also be used  to  explain  un d esirab le  p rac tice : ta k e  a  
p rob lem , guess a  so lu tion , discover th e  bugs an d  t ry  to  fix all th e  p rob lem s.
T h e  crucial differences b etw een  such  hack ing  an d  th e  m e th o d s  o f G ries a n d  P o p p e r  a re
1. T h e  te n ta tiv e  theories (p ro g ram s) a re  developed w ith  a  view  to  re fu tin g  (p rov ing ) 
th em , an d  n o t in  an  ad hoc way.
2. T h e  s tep  from  T T  to  E E  involves d eductive  reason ing , n o t seem ingly  ran d o m  
o b serv a tio n  of b eh av io u r. T h e  h ack er will observe th e  sy m p to m s o f any  e rro r an d  
induce  a  p a tc h  to  reduce  th e  severity  of th e  problem . T h e  sc ien tis t will use logical 
too ls to  a t te m p t  to  iden tify  possib le  sources of th e  p rob lem  a n d  p ro p o se  changes 
to  th e  th e o ry  (p ro g ram ) accordingly.
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T h e  d ed u c tiv e  sy stem  availab le  to  th e  sc ien tis t is c ritica l to  th is  p rocess. B o th  P o p p e r 
an d  G ries assum e a  base  line o f a  firs t o rd e r logic. F o r P o p p e r , how ever, th is  is th e  only  
irre fu tab le  base; ev e ry th in g  else is he ld  only te n ta tiv e ly , aw aiting  re fu ta tio n . In  p rac tice , 
he does concede th a t  th e  sc ien tis t will have  som e theories th a t  a re  e lev a ted , for p a r tic u la r  
p u rp o ses , to  such  a  level th a t  he  o r she will p roceed  as if  th e y  are  “tr u e ” , an d  call th em  
in to  questio n  only as a  la s t re so rt. I t  is a t  th is  p o in t th a t  th e  second s ta g e  of G ile s ’s book  
is called in to  p lay , for h ere  he discusses in  d e ta il a  su itab le  th e o ry  o f p ro g ra m  s ta te m e n ts , 
in  a  p a r tic u la r  lan g u ag e , th a t  can  b e  ta k e n  as p a r t  o f th is  irre fu ta b le  dedu ctiv e  system . 
T h is  effectively localises th e  do m ain  o f a p p lica tio n  of his ap p ro ach  to  s itu a tio n s  for w hich 
th e  dedu ctiv e  sy stem  has n o t been  re fu ted .
G ries does n o t refer to  his fo rm al sy stem , w hich  is ac tu a lly  D ijk s tra ’s calculus of w eakest 
p reco n d itio n s [Dij76], as a  th eo ry , b u t  as a  sem an tics. He is th u s  tre a t in g  th e  th e o ry  in 
a  conven tio n a lis t way, effectively say ing  th a t  th is  th eo ry  cannot b e  re fu ted  as it  defines 
th e  p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  com prising  th e  p ro g ram  s ta te m e n ts  in  qu estio n . T h is , as we 
saw  in  H o a re ’s p a p e r, does n o t rem ove th e  possib ility  of re fu ta tio n ; i t  ju s t  pushes th e  
p rob lem  dow n to  th e  ind iv id u a l try in g  to  im p lem en t th e  com piler for th e  lan g u ag e , o r 
to  th e  p e rso n  try in g  to  select a  com piler th a t  can  be show n to  im p lem en t th e  language  
in question .
T h e  choice of D ijk s tra ’s w eakest p reco n d itio n  sem antics does ra ise  one o th e r  im p o r ta n t 
issue, n am ely  th a t  we usually  th in k  o f th is  as a  calculus ra th e r  th a n  a  d ed u ctiv e  system . 
T h a t  is, we are  try in g  to  ca lcu la te  th e  w eakest p reco n d itio n  ra th e r  th a n  try in g  to  prove 
som e th eo rem . T h is  is ac tu a lly  a  tr iv ia l d is tin c tio n , for an y  th e o ry  th a t  uses eq u a lity  will 
co n ta in  th eo rem s o f th e  fo rm  x =  y w hich can  b e  in te rp re te d  as e ith e r tru e  p ro p o sitio n s, 
or as ru les for ca lcu la ting  th e  values o f one te rm  from  a n o th e r . T h is  p o in t coun te rs  
th e  a sse rtio n  th a t  p ro g ram s can n o t b e  view ed as theo ries because  th e y  yield values n o t 
s ta tem en ts[Jo h 8 8 ]. T h is is ill-founded , as we can  in te rp re t th e  values th a t  a re  y ielded 
as p u re  values, o r as s ta te m e n ts  w ith  an  im plied  left h a n d  side ( “answ er  =  ®” ). Such 
discussion, how ever, m u s t b e  carried  on  o u ts id e  o f th e  th eo ry , a n d  can n o t be a  p ro p e r ty  
o f th e  th eo ry  itself.
In  conclusion, G ile s ’s book  serves to  p rov ide  b o th  a  m ethodo log ica l a n d  a  th eo re tica l 
basis fo r p ro g ram m in g . I t  is p e rh ap s  u n fo r tu n a te  th a t  th is  d u a l a sp ec t is n o t m ad e  m ore  
explic it in  th e  te x t. T h e  book  does show  very  clearly, how ever, th a t  su itab le  deduc tive  
system s can  be fo u n d  for reason ing  a b o u t p ro g ram s (as th ird  w orld  o b jec ts , r a th e r  th a n  
psychological o b jec ts  o r ru n n in g  m ach ines).
“Programming as Theory Building” by Naur
In  th is  p a p e r [Nau85] N au r, like H oare , t r e a ts  p ro g ram m in g  “in  a  w ide sense . .  . to  den o te  
th e  w hole ac tiv ity  o f design an d  im p lem en ta tio n  o f p ro g ram m ed  so lu tio n s” , b u t he m akes 
m ore  of th e  fac t th a t  i t  shou ld  be view ed “as a  h u m a n  a c tiv ity ” . U nlike H oare , how ever, 
N au r tak es  a  ho listic  view  o f th e  ac tiv ity , iden tify ing  only tw o  m a jo r  su b -ta sk s , n am ely  
th e  in itia l c rea tio n  of a  p ro g ram  an d  its  su b seq u en t m odifica tion . N a u r ’s c e n tra l te n e t
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is that
“p ro g ram m in g  p ro p erly  should  b e  reg a rd ed  as an  a c tiv ity  b y  w hich th e  p ro ­
g ram m ers  form  o r achieve a  ce rta in  k ind  of in s ig h t, a  th eo ry , o f th e  m a tte rs  
in  h an d . T h is  suggestion  is in  c o n tra s t to  w h a t ap p ea rs  to  be  reg a rd ed  as a  
p ro d u c tio n  of a  p ro g ram  a n d  c e rta in  o th e r  te x ts .” (page  253)
T h is  s ta te m e n t b o th  serves to  b rin g  his ph ilosophy  in to  c o n ta c t w ith  th a t  o f P o p p e r, 
an d  also to  c re a te  a  sign ifican t gap . C learly , th e  s ta te d  aim  o f p ro g ra m  c rea tio n  as th e  
c o n s tru c tio n  o f a  th eo ry  is very  sim ilar to  P o p p e r ’s s ta te d  aim  of science. U n fo rtu n a te ly , 
th e  link ing  o f th e o ry  w ith  “in s ig h t” , an d  N a u r’s subseq u en t refusa l to  decouple th e  tw o , 
leads us dow n th e  ro u te  of psychologism , w hich P o p p e r w as a t  g re a t p a in s  to  avoid . N au r 
seem s to  encourage  us dow n th is  ro u te , an d  ac tu a lly  seem s to  b e  say ing  th a t  theories 
m ust be psychological, an d  can n o t be sh ared .
“A m ain  claim  of th e  T h eo ry  B uild ing  View of p ro g ram m in g  is th a t  an  
essentia.15 p a r t  of any  p ro g ram , th e  th eo ry  of i t ,  is som eth in g  th a t  could 
n o t conceivably b e  expressed , b u t is in ex tricab ly  b o u n d  to  h u m a n  be in g s.”
(p ag e  258)
As we shall see, th is  leads h im  in to  a  p a ra d o x  w hich he seem s n o t to  n o tice , or a t  le a s t, 
fails to  acknow ledge.
T h e  suggestion  th a t  th e re  is m ore  to  p ro g ram m in g  th a n  p ro d u c in g  p ro g ram s an d  re la te d  
d o cu m en ts  is a  com plex one. I t  is u nc lear w h e th e r N au r is m ak ing  a  ju d g em en t of th e  
form  “th e re  a re  m ore im p o r ta n t th in g s th a t  com e o u t o f p ro g ram m in g  th a n  p ro g ra m s” 
or a  m ethodo log ica l o b serv a tio n  th a t  “in  o rd e r to  achieve th e  a im  o f w ritin g  a  p ro g ram , 
th e re  a re  several ta sk s  th a t  need to  be carried  o u t in  a d d itio n  to  th a t  o f w ritin g  dow n 
th e  code” or any  one of m an y  o th e r  possib le in te rp re ta tio n s . W e will in te rp re t th e  
s ta te m e n t as m ean ing  th a t  th e  tra d itio n a l m odels used  for discussing p ro g ram m in g  are  
n o t sufficiently  rich  to  cover th e  rea l issues, as th ey  c o n cen tra te  to o  m u ch  on  th e  process 
of code p ro d u c tio n  a n d  o th e r  d o c u m e n ta tio n . In  p a r tic u la r , th e y  do n o t p ay  sufficient 
a t te n tio n  to  th e  people  involved  in  th e  process. T his is a  recu rrin g  th e m e  in  m o d ern  
philosophies o f science, w here it  is o ften  s ta te d  th a t  we can n o t u n d e rs ta n d  th e  h is to ry  
o f science sim ply  from  th e  scientific l i te ra tu re , as th is  ignores th e  c o n tex ts , or p rob lem  
s itu a tio n s , w ith in  w hich discoveries a re  m ade. C onsequen tly  any  ph ilosophy  th a t  seeks 
to  ra tio n a lise  science only as reflected  in  th e  scientific l i te ra tu re  will n o t be a  ph ilosophy  
o f th e  ac tions of rea l sc ien tis ts .
N au r m akes no  claim  th a t  th e  theo ries he is discussing are  in  an y  w ay scientific, b u t  
his p a p e r  does a m o u n t to  a  claim  th a t  science is n o t possible. His n o tio n  of “th e o ry ” 
is so g enera l th a t  i t  m u st include scientific theo ries. I t  a p p ea rs , fo r exam ple , as if  N au r
5 W e will assum ed here that Naur is not adopting an essentialist view of theories, but is using the term  
“essential” in its m odern conventional sense o f necessary. T o discuss this further would be pointless, as 
there are no further hints in the paper as to  the valid ity of this interpretation.
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lias igno red  th e  fac t t h a t  one o f th e  aim s o f m o d ern  science has been  to  find  w ays of 
expressing  theories so th a t  th e y  a re  as in d ep en d en t as possib le from  th e  co n tex t in  w hich 
th e y  arose. In  P o p p e r ’s te rm s , we seek to  m ove th e  theories from  th e  Second W orld  to  
th e  T h ird , th u s  m ak ing  th e m  p a r t  o f science r a th e r  th a n  p a r t  o f an  in d iv id u a l’s th o u g h ts . 
S cien tists  a re  positive ly  d iscouraged  from  includ ing  in  th e ir  scientific w ritings d eta ils  o f 
th e  th o u g h t p rocesses th a t  led to  th e ir  h y p o th eses , r a th e r  th e y  a re  tra in e d  to  p re sen t a  
co h eren t, an d  logical, re c o n s tru c tio n  o f th e ir  ac tiv ities  u tilis ing  only  th e  p resen ted  fac ts  
an d  e stab lish ed  theo ries. A s M ed aw ar h as  n o ted
“T h e  concep tion  u n d erly in g  th is  s ty le  o f scientific w ritin g  is th a t  scientific
discovery  is an  in d u c tiv e  p rocess.” [M ed64, page  8]
an d  th is  leads sc ien tists  to  ignore th e  a c tu a l sources o f th e ir  ideas, especially  if th ey  
can n o t ra tio n a lly  re c o n s tru c t th e m , an d  to  p roceed  as if th e  ideas aro se  only o u t o f th e  
scientific d a ta  u n d er co n sidera tion . W e m u st n o t infer from  th is , how ever, th a t  a  logical 
d iscussion o f th e  th eo ry , an d  its  t r u th ,  shou ld  depend  on  th e  sources o f  th e  theo ry . I t  
is c e n tra l to  P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy  th a t  w e m u st decouple th e  th e o ry  fro m  its  source, 
an d  th is  in  tu rn  m eans th a t  we m u st find  a  w ay of expressing  th eo ries  so th a t  th e y  
can  b e  u n d e rs to o d  w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  w orkings of th e  b ra in . C o n sid e ra tio n  of 
th e  processes involved  in  th e  concep tion  o f a  th e o ry  is a  psychological p rob lem , b u t  by  
tre a t in g  th e  th e o ry  only  as em b ed d ed  in  th e  T h ird  W orld  w e can  allow  science to  m eet 
its  o b jec tiv e  ideals. In  suggesting  th a t  such  a  sep a ra tio n  is im possib le  N au r s trik es  a t 
th e  very  h e a r t  o f m o d ern  science.
N au r ra ises th e  in te re s tin g  q u estio n  as to  w h e th e r i t  is ever possib le  to  com plete  a  p ro ­
g ram m in g  ta sk , ju s t  as P o p p e r  s ta te s  th a t  we can  never find the th e o ry  of som eth ing . If  
we express th e  req u irem en ts  of a  sy stem  in  te rm s  of som e o th e r  e x te rn a l a g e n t(s ) , th e n  we 
m u st recognise th a t  th ese  ag en ts  a re  liab le  to  change over tim e . C onsequen tly , we m u st 
m ak e  it  clear w h a t i t  m eans to  “m eet th e  req u irem en ts” . W e m u st also  be aw are  th a t  
b y  expressing  th e  sy stem  in  te rm s  o f th ese  req u irem en ts , we are  fu n c tio n a lly  b ind ing  th e  
sy s tem  to  th e  ex te rn a l ag en t. T h a t  is, th e  req u irem en ts  a re  now  a  fu n c tio n  o f th e  ag en t 
( a t  a  given tim e), b u t  also it is possib le  to  in te rp re t th is  b ind ing  in  th e  o th e r  d irec tion , 
an d  th u s  m ak e  th e  ag en t a  fu n c tio n  o f th e  system . M any com panies hav e  d iscovered 
th is  to  th e ir  cost, w hen th e y  rea lise  th a t  a  com pu terised  se t o f p ro ced u res  is q u ite  ca­
p ab le  of d e te rm in in g , u sually  by c o n s tra in t, th e  changes possib le  fo r th e  com pany. A n 
ex trem e  case o f th is  is th e  m a jo r  im p ac t o f com pu terised  system s on  co m p an y  m ergers: 
if  th e  co m p u te r system s a re  n o t co m p atib le , th e n  th e  m ergers o ften  can n o t ta k e  place, 
regard less o f th e  com m ercial desirab ility .
T h e  im p lica tions o f th is  for S oftw are E ng ineering  a re  obvious. W e m u st consider th e  
e x te n t to  w hich such  changes are  to  b e  acco m m o d a ted , how  to  ach ieve s tab ility , how  
to  cost an d  m an ag e  change, an d  how  to  p ro v id e  legally  b ind ing  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d aries . 
T h is  is considered  fu r th e r  in  su b seq u en t ch ap te rs .
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N a u r’s evidence in  su p p o rt o f th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view o f p ro g ram m in g  is la rgely  anecdo­
ta l ,  w hich is n o t necessarily  a  b a d  th in g  fo r it  is th e  w ay m u ch  o f th e  ph ilosophy  o f science 
itse lf  is co n s tru c te d  an d  ju stified , b u t  sad ly  he seem s to  fall in to  th e  t r a p  o f using  these  
anecdo tes to  su p p o rt ju s t  his p re fe rred  conclusions. T h e  cen tra l te n e t o f his a rg u m en t is 
th a t  p ro g ram m ers  w ho design a  sy s tem  are  b e t te r  able to  m odify  i t  th a n  a re  new com ers. 
T h is  he a t tr ib u te s  to  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  designers have  th e  th e o ry  o f th e  sy s tem , a n d  
th a t  th e  new com ers will never b e  ab le  to  acqu ire  i t ,  in  sp ite  o f th e  d o c u m e n ta tio n . His 
evidence, how ever, could equally  well su p p o rt th e  view  th a t  th e  c u rre n t s ta te  o f sy stem  
d o c u m e n ta tio n  is w oefully in a d e q u a te  fo r p ro g ram m ers  w ho h av e  to  m a in ta in  system s. 
T h is  is a  conclusion th a t  m an y  will find  m u ch  m ore  accep tab le , as ty p ic a l d o c u m e n ta tio n  
seem s to  add ress th e  issues of specification  ( th e  “w h a t” ) an d  im p lem en ta tio n  ( th e  “how ” ) 
b u t  ra re ly  exp lica tion  ( th e  “w hy” ), th u s  leav ing  th e  layers o f d o c u m e n ta tio n  un linked  
by  any  logical s tru c tu re . If  he h a d  a d o p te d  th is  ro u te , th e n  his su b seq u en t a t ta c k  on 
design  m e th o d s  w ould  also be m ore  co h eren t, for th ese  are  p re d o m in a n tly  a t te m p ts  to  
tra n s fo rm  th e  “w h a t” d o cu m en ts  in to  th e  “how ” docu m en ts  v ia  a  p resc rib ed  se t o f ru les. 
H e could  also have  m o u n te d  an  a t ta c k  on  th e  life-cycle m odel for sy s tem  d eve lopm en t, 
w hich  suffers from  th e  sam e lack  o f logical coherence. W e will ta k e  u p  th is  challenge in 
su b seq u en t ch ap te rs .
A second p rob lem  w ith  N a u r’s conclusions is th a t  he seem s to  be  assum ing  a  un ique  
th e o ry  for th e  p ro g ram  (he c o n s ta n tly  refers to  “ th e  th e o ry ” ), a n d  th u s  overlooks th e  
possib ility  th a t  th e  new com ers m ig h t c o n s tru c t a  b e tte r  theo ry . T h is new  th eo ry , how ­
ever, w ould  n o t be a  tru e  reflection o f w hy th e  p ro g ram m ers d id  w h a t th ey  d id , b u t  a  
p o s t-ra tio n a lisa tio n  o f ev en ts . T h e re  is no  evidence th a t  th is  w ould  p re v e n t th e  new ­
com ers from  m odify ing  th e  p ro g ram . R esearch  in to  reverse  eng ineering , for exam ple , is 
ev idence th a t  som e people  believe q u ite  th e  o p posite . I t  m ay  well be  th e  case th a t  a  te a m  
of new com ers, by  b ring ing  new  theories an d  persp ec tiv es , m ay  id en tify  a  m ore  rad ica l 
an d  effective set o f m odifications.
T h is also gives rise to  a  m a jo r  p a ra d o x  w ith in  N a u r’s view , fo r he m errily  ta lk s  o f a  
te a m  o f p ro g ram m ers an d  th e ir  th eo ry , th e re b y  suggesting  th a t  severa l p ro g ram m ers  can  
sh a re  a  th eo ry , b u t  th e n  w an ts  ns to  accep t th a t  th is  th eo ry  can  ex ist only  inside th e ir  
h eads. He seem s to  w an t th e  o rig inal te a m  of p ro g ram m ers to  have  a  cap ab ility  for 
th e o ry  tran sm iss io n  th a t  th e  new com ers can n o t have . He obviously  w a n ts  theo ries to  be 
held  co rp o ra te ly , b u t  is n o t p re p a re d  to  allow  for th e  corpus to  g row  a fte r  th e  th eo ry  
has been  c o n stru c ted . In  th is  case, how  does th e  first th e o ry  g e t com m u n ica ted ?  T h e  
first p ro g ram m er to  have  a  th e o ry  fo rm s a  co rpus of one, an d  th e  o th e r  m em b ers  o f th e  
team  a re  new com ers: th e  te a m  can n o t b o o ts tra p  itself. T h is a sp ec t o f N a u r ’s view  seem s 
u n ten ab le .
T h e  p rob lem  seem s to  be th a t  N au r h as  failed  to  d istingu ish  b e tw een  h av in g  a  th eo ry  
inside y o u r h ead , an d  th e  ex istence o f a  su itab le  th eo ry  in  th e  T h ird  W orld . T h is  is 
s tra n g e , because , a lth o u g h  he uses R y le ’s n o tio n  o f tlieory[R yl49], he refers to  P o p p e r ’s 
T h ird  W orld  explicitly  w hen  h e  observes th a t  R y le’s no tio n  of th e o ry
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“ap p ea rs  as an  exam ple  of w h a t P o p p e r  calls unem bod ied  W orld  3 o b jec ts  
an d  th u s  h as  a  defensible ph ilosoph ical s tan d in g , (page  255)
P e rh a p s  th is  is an  exam ple  o f th e  m isuse o f philosophy, using  it  to  p ro v id e  answ ers an d  
ju s tif ica tio n s  in s te a d  o f expec tin g  it  to  ra ise  questions. T h e  reason  th a t  P o p p e r  in tro ­
duced  th e  T h ird  W orld  w as precisely  to  overcom e th e  p rob lem s th a t  N au r is c rea tin g  
for him self. T heories in  th e  T h ird  W orld  can  be  tre a te d  o b jec tive ly  a n d  can  b e  com ­
m u n ica ted . N ew to n ’s th eo ry , for exam ple , as a  Second W orld  o b je c t d ied  w ith  N ew ton , 
b u t as a  T h ird  W orld  o b jec t i t  is alive an d  well. N au r could hav e  developed  a  fa r  m ore  
p ersu asiv e  a rg u m en t h a d  he n o te d  th a t  p ro g ram m ers are  re lu c ta n t to  allow  th e ir  theories 
in to  th e  T h ird  W orld , w here th e y  can  be o b jec tive ly  te s te d  an d  possib ly  re fu ted , hence 
th e ir  re lu c tan ce  to  p rov ide  answ ers to  th e  “w hy” questions in  th e  d o c u m e n ta tio n . T h is 
re lu c tan ce  can  b e  seen as a  m a jo r  b a rr ie r  p rev en tin g  C o m p u tin g  from  becom ing  m ore  
scientific. I t  p rov ides a  very  clear link  b e tw een  th e  p ap ers  o f H oare , G ries an d  N au r, an d  
th e  ph ilosophy  of P o p p e r, a n d  seem s to  be a t  th e  h e a r t  o f ou r qu estio n . H oare is asking 
th a t  we use theories exp lic itly  to  im p ro v e  th e  engineering o f softw are; G ries is m ak ing  
availab le  som e guidelines fo r th e  use o f th eo ry , an d  also c o n tr ib u tin g  a  solid b o d y  of 
th eo ry  for our use; N au r is observ ing  n o t only th a t  we m u st use th eo rie s , b u t th a t  we 
m u s t c o n s tru c t them ; an d  P o p p e r is p rov id ing  a  fram ew ork  w ith in  w hich  we can  view 
theo ries  them selves.
N au r an d  P o p p e r agree th a t  th e re  can  be no m e th o d , in  th e  sense of a  p resc rib ed  sequence 
o f ac tions th a t  we know  in  advance  will lead  to  th e  discovery  of a  co rrec t theo ry . T h is 
does n o t m ean , how ever, th a t  th e re  can n o t be guidelines an d  h in ts  th a t  m ay  be  useful 
in  p ro m p tin g  th e  m e n ta l p rocesses th a t  a re  likely to  lead  to  th e  d iscovery  o f new  ideas. 
N au r uses th is  id ea  to  criticise th o se  m e th o d s  o f so ftw are d eve lopm en t th a t  a re  geared  
to w ard s th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f specific d o cu m en ts , for th ese  can n o t be g u a ra n te e d  to  w ork, 
an d  m ay  even in h ib it th e  p ro g ram m er w ho is fo rced  to  follow th e m  fro m  ever bu ild ing  a  
co rrec t theo ry . T h is p o in t is fu r th e r  developed in  C h a p te r  Six.
A key consequence of N a u r’s view is th e  need  to  elevate th e  s ta tu s  o f th e  p ro g ram m er. 
A p ro g ram m er w ho is ju s t  follow ing th e  ru les, an d  c rea tin g  th e  p resc rib ed  d o cu m en ts , is 
effectively de-skilled. N a u r ’s view  requ ires p ro g ram m ers to  m ak e  all th e  decisions, th u s  
th ey  can  no  longer be
“reg ard ed  as a  co m p o n en t o f . . .p r o d u c t io n ,  a  com p o n en t th a t  h as  to  be 
con tro lled  by  ru les of p ro ced u re  an d  w hich can  be rep laced  easily .” (page  260)
U n fo rtu n a te ly , N au r ex tends th is  a t ta c k  on  m eth o d s to  include an  a t ta c k  on  th e  view of 
p ro g ram m ers as tho se  who
“ . .  .fo rm u la te  ce rta in  a rg u m en ts  in  te rm s  o f rules of fo rm al m a n ip u la tio n ”
(page 260)
O nce aga in  he seem s to  be m issing th e  p o in t, a lth o u g h  p e rh ap s  in  th is  case th e  critic ism  
shou ld  be levelled equally  a t  th e  fo rm alis ts  w ho have failed to  exp la in  th e ir  p o in t o f view
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ad eq u a te ly . T h e  fo rm al a rg u m en ts  a re  n o t used  to  deduce th e  th eo rie s , b u t  to  a rg u e  for 
th e ir  co rrec tness. P o p p e r  is n o t seeking to  rep lace  in d u c tiv e  science b y  d educ tive , b u t 
to  rep lace  in d u c tio n  as ju stif ic a tio n  fo r theo ries by  ded u c tio n  as an  a id  to  re fu ta tio n .
T h e  m ain  th ru s t  o f N a u r’s a rg u m en t he re , how ever, is th a t  we m u st recognise th e  p ro ­
g ram m er as
“a  responsib le  developer an d  m an ag e r o f th e  a c tiv ity  in  w hich  th e  co m p u te r 
is a  p a r t .  In  o rd e r to  fill th is  p o sitio n  he o r she m u st be g iven a  p e rm a n e n t 
p o s itio n , o f a  s ta tu s  equ ivalen t to  th a t  o f o th e r  professions, such  as engineers 
o r law yers, w hose ac tive  co n trib u tio n s  as em ployers of en te rp rise  re s t 011 th e ir  
in te lle c tu a l proficiency.” (page  261)
I t is in te re s tin g  th a t  N au r im plies th is  s ta tu s  is a  gift to  be g iven, w hereas H oare  suggests 
it  is a  th in g  we should  a d o p t for ourselves. T h is  is n o t an  im p o r ta n t p o in t o f d isag reem en t, 
fo r u n d o u b ted ly  th ey  b o th  in te n d  th a t  th e  s ta tu s  should  be  b o th  ea rn ed  an d  aw arded , 
b u t  it  does h igh ligh t th e  fac t th a t  n o t all o f th e  changes th a t  m ay  b e  needed  to  im prove 
c u rre n t p rac tice  a re  necessarily  w ith in  th e  co n tro l o f th e  d iscip line itself.
N au r also n o tes  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f ed u ca tio n a l change:
“T h e  ra ising  o f th e  s ta tu s  o f p ro g ram m ers suggested  by  th e  T h eo ry  B uild­
ing View will have  to  be su p p o rte d  by  a  co rrespond ing  re o r ie n ta tio n  of th e  
p ro g ram m er edu ca tio n . W hile skills such  as th e  m a s te ry  o f n o ta tio n s , d a ta  
re p re se n ta tio n s , an d  d a ta  processes, rem ain  im p o r ta n t, th e  p rim a ry  em p h a­
sis w ould have to  tu rn  in  th e  d irec tio n  o f fu rth e rin g  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  an d  
ta le n t fo r th e o ry  fo rm a tio n . T o w h a t e x te n t th is  can  be  ta u g h t a t  all m u st 
rem ain  an  open  q u estio n .” (p ag e  261)
In conclusion, in  sp ite  of its  m an y  sho rtco m in g s, N a u r’s p a p e r raises th e  im p o r ta n t  no tio n  
th a t  p ro g ram m in g  can  be seen as th e o ry  bu ild ing , ra th e r  th a n  m erely  an  a c tiv ity  th a t  
uses ex isting  theories. A lth o u g h  N au r is com pletely  a t  odds w ith  P o p p e r  in  his insistence 
th a t  theo ries can  only be psychological th in g s, w hich seem s to  p ro h ib it all o f science as 
d e m a rc a ted  by  P o p p e r, he h as  ra ised  th e  w hole question  as to  w h e th e r p ro g ram m in g  is 
science ra th e r  th a n  m erely  using  science. T h is co n tr ib u tio n  m u s t be acknow ledged as 
very  im p o r ta n t to  all th a t  follows. In  fac t, N au r provides a  q u o ta tio n  th a t  could b e  seen, 
su itab ly  generalised , as th e  very  raison d ’etre fo r th is  research .
“A m ore  genera l b ack g ro u n d  o f th e  p re se n ta tio n  is a  conv ic tion  th a t  i t  is 
im p o r ta n t to  h av e  an  a p p ro p ria te  u n d e rs tan d in g  o f w h a t p ro g ram m in g  is.
If  ou r u n d e rs ta n d in g  is in a p p ro p ria te  we will m isu n d e rs tan d  th e  difficulties 
th a t  arise  in  th e  a c tiv ity  an d  o u r a t te m p ts  to  overcom e th e m  will give rise  to  
conflicts an d  f ru s tra tio n s .” (page  252)
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In  th is  c h a p te r  we h av e  se t th e  scene fo r th e  discussion th a t  follow s, by  s ta r t in g  to  
view th e  ac tiv ities o f th e  S oftw are E ng ineer w ith in  th e  fram ew ork  p ro v id ed  by  P o p p e r’s 
p h ilosophy  o f science. T h is  ph ilosophy  will be  refined as we p ro g ress , b u t  i t  p rov ides a  
useful basis for tlie  discussions to  follow . W e hav e  also set th e  scene fo r th e  id ea  th a t  
S oftw are  D esign is closely allied to  th e  process o f th eo ry  bu ild ing , an  id e a  th a t  will be  
developed  fu r th e r  in  C h a p te r  F our.
2.3 Summary
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C hapter 3
Computing as Technology, 
Problem Solving and Discourse
“I f  one considers at once all the ramifications and ultim ate consequences o f  
each exploratory act, he will be overwhelmed and unable to form ulate any  
new constructs. One who has directed graduate students in  their research 
efforts will have frequently seen this kind o f intellectual drowning take place”
George Kelly
In th e  prev ious c h a p te r  we s ta r te d  to  explore  th e  n a tu re  of so ftw are  eng ineering  design, 
b u t from  a  very  lim ited  p ersp ec tiv e . T h e  m a in  p u rp o se  o f th is  c h a p te r  is to  b ro ad en  
th e  discussion by  considering  th e  process of so ftw are design from  th re e  ad d itio n a l p e r­
spectives. T h e  first o f th e se  re la te s  to  th e  aim s of th e  ac tiv ity . I t  is usually  assum ed  
th a t  science is th e  qu est fo r know ledge or t r u th ,  p rim arily  for its  ow n sake. T h e re  m ay  
well be occasions in  C o m p u tin g  w here such  an  aim  is accep tab le . M ore generally , how ­
ever, th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f so ftw are  system s is m o tiv a ted  by u til i ta r ia n  values. A ctiv ities 
w ith  u til i ta r ia n  goals a re  m ore  usually  te rm ed  “design” , “techno logy” o r “eng ineering” . 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , these  te rm s a re  also freq u en tly  associa ted  w ith  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f “rea l 
o b je c ts” , an d  it  is fa r  from  obvious th a t  in fo rm atio n  or know ledge b ased  system s m eet 
th e  generally  accep ted  c r ite r ia  fo r such rea l o b jec ts . In  section  one we will discuss S oft­
w are  E ng ineering  in  th e  lig h t o f a  b rie f review  of th e  philosophies of technology , design 
an d  engineering  to  see if i t  can  b e  considered  a  technological d iscip line.
T h e  second an d  th ird  perspec tives we shall ta k e  seek to  b ro ad en  th e  d iscussion by  ra ising  
th e  h u m an  dim ension. T h e  g roundw ork  for th is  has a lread y  been  la id  by  accep ting  
P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy as a  s ta r tin g  p o in t, fo r, as A gassi observed:
“ . . .  w hen K arl P o p p e r ’s Logic der Forschung  o f 1934, o r its  ex p an d ed  tra n s la ­
tio n , The Logic o f  Scientific  Discovery o f  1959, cau g h t re a d e rs ’ a t te n tio n , th ey  
found  h a rd e s t to  com prehend  his coupling— his explicit an d  q u ite  sy s tem a tic  
coupling— of a t t i tu d e s  an d  theo ries. H e d em arca ted  scientific th eo rie s , no t 
a t t i tu d e s , ye t he ad d ed  a  cond itio n  re la tin g  to  a tt i tu d e s . T heo ries a re  sci­
en tific , he sa id , if  an d  only if  th e y  a re  em pirically  re fu tab le ; th is  how ever, 
is cond itioned  on  o u r w illingness to  su b jec t theories to  em pirica l te s ts  an d
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ou r read iness to  je tt iso n  th e m  once th e y  a re  em pirically  re fu ted . I t  is a  fac t 
w ith in  liv ing m em ory  th a t  people  fo u n d  th is  very  puzzling .” [A ga86, page  39]
T h e  decision to  ex p an d  th e  discussion to  include th e  p ra c titio n e r  as w ell as th e  p rac tice  
b rings w ith  i t  a  n u m b e r o f a d d itio n a l questions. T h e  m o st fu n d a m e n ta l o f th ese  is 
o u r  p e rcep tio n  o f society  itself. A  n u m b e r o f views have  been  ex p o u n d ed  reg a rd in g  
th e  n a tu re  o f society , ran g in g  from  in d u c tiv is t in d iv idua lism , w hich ta k e s  society  to  be 
ju s t  an  ag g reg a te  o f a  n u m b e r of in d iv id u a ls , to  organ ic ism , o r ho lism , w hich tak es  
each  ind iv id u a l to  be m erely  a  co m p o n en t in  society. T h is q u estio n  is discussed fu r th e r  
in  C h a p te r  Six, w here th e  issue m a te ria lly  affects th e  questio n  o f m e th o d s . T h e  tw o  
questions we will discuss in  th is  c h a p te r , how ever, a re , how  do ind iv id u a ls  solve p rob lem s, 
an d  w h a t lan g u ag e  processes a re  invo lved  in  th e  arriv ing  a t  th ese  so lu tions.
T h e  firs t q u estio n  gives rise  to  a  sec tion  on p rob lem  solving. T h is  su b je c t can  be  a d ­
d ressed  from  a  n u m b e r o f p ersp ec tiv es  g iving rise to  several fa irly  d isjo in t bodies o f 
lite ra tu re . R esearch  has been  ca rried  o u t on  th e  psychology o f p ro b lem  solving, concen­
tra t in g  on th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f m odels of th e  m e n ta l processes involved an d  o f th e  s tru c tu re s  
bu ilt up  d u rin g  th e  process. T h e re  h as  also been  research  ca rried  o u t on  im prov ing  th e  
p ra c tic e  o f p rob lem  solving, b o th  by  in d iv idua ls an d  g roups. T h is  w ork  h as  p ro d u ced  
a  n u m b e r o f classifications an d  h eu ristics  for p rob lem  solvers. A n o th e r  b o d y  o f w ork 
is th a t  o f th e  A .I. com m unity , w ho h av e  so u g h t w ays of a u to m a tin g  th e  p rob lem  solv­
ing  process. O f p a r tic u la r  in te re s t to  us is th e  ap p ro ach  th a t  a t te m p ts  to  discover an d  
e m u la te  h u m a n  m e th o d s . In  o u r d iscussions of p rob lem  solving, ideas d raw n  from  th e  
l i te ra tu re  o f th ese  th re e  p ersp ec tiv es  will b e  in tro d u c e d , b u t  no  a t te m p t  will be  m ad e  to  
forge th em  in to  a  unified theo ry .
T h e  final section  in  th is  c h a p te r  review s th e  issue of using lan g u ag e  to  solve prob lem s. 
T h e  a p p ro ach  used will b e  sim ilar to  th a t  a d o p te d  for C h a p te r  T w o. A  p a r tic u la r  th eo ry  
of d iscourse has been  selected  ( th a t  o f K inneavy  [Kin84]) an d  an  a t te m p t  will be  m ad e  
to  discuss so ftw are d evelopm en t w ith in  th e  fram ew ork  th is  p rov ides. T h is  process is 
p o ten tia lly  very  com plex, as th e re  a re  m an y  d isp a ra te  ty p es  of d iscourse  th a t  ta k e  place 
d u rin g  th e  developm ent of a  ty p ica l so ftw are system . T hese  m ig h t inc lude , for exam ple, 
th e  persu asiv e  d iscourse o f sales sta ff, th e  social in te ra c tio n s  necessary  for a  g roup  of 
in d iv idua ls to  develop in to  a  p ro je c t te a m , as well as all th e  tech n ica l d iscussions th a t  
need  to  ta k e  p lace an d  th e  d o cu m en ts  th a t  need  to  be  w ritte n . W e will c o n c e n tra te  solely 
on th e  tech n ica l asp ec ts  o f th e  developm en t process, as we are  concerned  p rim arily  w ith  
th e  tech n ica l ed u ca tio n  of so ftw are engineers.
3.1 Computing as Technology, Design or Engineering.
In  se ttin g  o u t to  ask  “In  w h a t sense is C o m p u tin g  a  techno log ica l p u rs u it? ” , we find 
ourselves in a  very  different s itu a tio n  to  th a t  o f th e  p rev ious c h a p te r . W h en  considering 
Science, th e  p rob lem  w as a  v as t l i te ra tu re , con ta in in g  m an y  co h eren t ph ilosophies, and  
ou r so lu tion  w as to  select one p a r tic u la r  p e rsp ec tiv e  upon  w hich to  c e n tre  d iscussions. In
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considering  technology , how ever, no  snch  l i te ra tu re  ex ists; as R ap p  says, th e  P h ilo sophy  
o f T echnology “is s till m ore  o f a  d es id e ra tu m  th a n  a  concre te  re a llity ” [ l la p S l, page  xii]. 
F e ib lem an  has n o te d  th is  fa c t to o , w hen  he w rites
“T h ro u g h o u t h is to ry , techno logy  has p layed  a  crucial p a r t  in  h u m a n  cu ltu re  
b u t  th e re  is 110 reco rd  th a t  ph ilosophers to o k  an y  accoun t of i t .  T h ey  give a  
lo t o f a tte n tio n  th ese  days to  th e  existence  o f techno logy  b u t  very  l i t t le  to  th e  
products o f technology , b u t  in  no  m a jo r  w ritings of th e  classical ph ilosophers 
h as  th e  ex istence o f techno logy  ever been  m en tioned . N ow here, to  m y  know l­
edge, a t  le a s t, has th e re  been  a  ph ilosophy  w hich to o k  th e  fu ll m easu re  of 
h u m a n  p rac tices  b y  assum ing  th a t  w h a tev e r m en  did a b o u t th e  m ak in g  an d  
using  of a rtifa c ts  w as filled w ith  m ean ings w hich needed  to  b e  in te rp re te d  in 
ph ilosoph ical te rm s .” [Fei82, p ag e  1]
W e can  only specu la te  on  th e  reason  fo r th is  lack  of l i te ra tu re . T w o  of th e  reasons 
com m only p u t fo rw ard  a re  sign ifican t to  o u r discussion. Ja rv ie  observes th a t
“T echnology seem s to  h av e  been  tre a te d  like C indere lla  by  ph ilosophers of 
science. I t  has alw ays been  p u t in  th e  second-best p lace, m en tio n ed  a lm ost 
as an  a f te r th o u g h t. T h is is p e rh ap s  u n d e rs ta n d a b le , since th e  received  n o tio n  
o f th e  ro le  of techno logy  is th a t  i t  is th e  prov ince o f engineers an d  o th e r  such  
n o n-gen tlem en , an d  its  ph ilosophy  th u s  is n o t a  m a t te r  o f g re a t concern  to  
th e  ph ilosoph ical p u r is t ,” [Jar74 , pages 86-87].
B unge offers an  a lte rn a tiv e , b u t  equally  re lev an t, view:
T hese  prob lem s h av e  been  neglec ted  by  m o st ph ilosophers, p ro b ab ly  because  
th e  p ecu liarities  o f m o d ern  technology , an d  p a rticu la rly  th e  differences b e ­
tw een  it and  p u re  science, a re  realized  in frequen tly  and  can n o t b e  realized 
as long as technologies are  m is tak en  fo r c ra fts  and  reg a rd ed  as th eo ry -free .” 
[B un74, page  19]
T h e  id ea  th a t  we place values on disciplines in  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e  degree of a b s tra c t
c o n tem p la tio n  we perceive in  th e m  h as also been  n o ted  by  D eh n ert:
“T h e  degree of co n cep tu a liza tio n  req u ired  by  an  ac tiv ity  or field of s tu d y  
b ecam e th e  m ark  o f its  d ign ity  as a n  a r t  o r a  science.” [D eh86, page  109]
T o com p o u n d  th e  p ro b lem , c rea tiv ity  in  th e  a r ts  has also largely  been  ig no red  by  ph iloso­
p h ers , w ho leave th e  m a tte r  to  psycho log ists, p re fe rring  to  c o n c e n tra te  011 ae sth e tic s . 
T h u s  design is im poverished  by  being  ignored  on  tw o  accoun ts: i t  is to o  concre te  to  be 
re sp ec tab le , an d  it  is ca rried  o u t b y  people. T h is  lack  o f ph ilo soph ical s tu d y  leaves i t
be re ft o f fo u n d a tio n s u p o n  w hich to  flourish  as an  academ ic p u rsu it.
I t  is tru e  th a t  th e re  have  been  ph ilosophers w ho have a d o p te d  p a r tic u la r  s tan ces  to  
w ider issues th a t  hav e  sign ifican t b ea rin g  on  accep tab le  views of technology . A ris to tle ,
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for exam ple , a d o p ted  th e  positio n  th a t  th e  p u rsu it of know ledge for i ts  ow n sake is 
sup erio r to  ac tio n s u n d e rta k e n  in  th e  p u rsu it o f w ordly  life, fo r th e  la t te r  is m erely  a 
m eans to w ard s  th e  end  of u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  G od-given cosm os by  co n tem p la tio n .
“F or co n tem p la tio n  is a t  once th e  h ighest fo rm  o f a c tiv ity  (since th e  in te llec t 
is th e  h ighest th in g  in  u s, an d  th e  o b jec ts  w ith  w hich th e  in te llec t deals a re  
th e  h ighest th in g s th a t  can  be  k n o w n ).” [Ars34, E th ics X , 6, 1177, a]
W e m u st rem em b er th a t  A ris to tle  w as ta lk in g  w ith in  a  very  d ifferen t c u ltu re  from  th a t  o f 
th e  m o d e rn  read er. R an d a ll, a  m o d e rn  follow er o f A ris to tle , claim s th a t  A ris to tle  w ould 
n o t “elevate  know ing  above p ra c tic a l a c tio n ” w ere he w ritin g  w ith in  a  m o d e rn  A m erican  
p rax is-o rien ted  c u ltu re  [R an60, page  248].
A ris to tle ’s view is only one am ong  m any , o f course. K arl M arx  in v e rts  th is  dom inance 
o f know ledge by ta k in g  th e  m a te r ia l cause as p rim a ry  [M ar59]. M a rtin  H eidegger, on 
th e  o th e r  h a n d , tak es  a  rad ica lly  d ifferen t ap p ro ach . He asse rts  th a t  we m u st overcom e 
th is  purely  in s tru m e n ta l concep t o f techno logy  if we are  ever to  u n d e rs ta n d  it. W e m u st 
com e to  te rm s w ith  th e  w ays in  w hich m an  ontologically  addresses en titie s .
. .if  th e  ‘w o rld ’ itse lf  is so m eth ing  c o n s titu tiv e  for D asein , one m u s t h av e  an  
in sig h t in to  D ase in ’s basic  s tru c tu re s  in  o rd e r to  t r e a t  th e  w orld -p lienom enon  
concep tua lly .” [Hei62, pag e  77]
F or H eidegger we a re  all techn ic ians, for c rea tin g  th in g s is th e  p erfec t expression  of 
o u r ra tio n a lity  [Hei59, pages 16-17]. T h e  fac t th a t  technology  is such  an  im p o r ta n t, 
an d  com plex, p a r t  o f h u m a n  ex istence, b u t  has largely  been  ignored  by  ph ilosophers, 
leads to  w h a t S tro k e r calls “th e  p a ra d o x  of its  co n tin u a l beg inn ing” [S tr83, page  323]. 
All th e  sem inal w ritin g  on  th e  P h ilo sophy  of Technology ta k e s  th e  fo rm  o f sketches 
or in itia l a t te m p ts  a t  an  overview  of th e  su b je c t, and  no-one seem s p re p a re d  to  build  
on th ese  sketches by  an a ly tica l d iscussion a im ed a t  clearly  defin ing a  to p ic , critica lly  
assessing p o in ts  o f view , o r seeking som e g lobal coherence. Such new  w ritin g  as does ta k e  
p lace com prises ad d itio n a l sketches, an d  hence th e  beg inn ing  co n tinues. S tro k er suggests 
th a t  technology  m ig h t p re sen t p a r tic u la r  p rob lem s u npara lle led  in  o th e r  su b je c ts  so fa r 
su b m itte d  to  ph ilosoph ical analysis, an d  th a t  “a  ce rta in  skep tic ism  is a roused  . .  .a s  to  
w h e th e r ph ilosophical analysis in  th e  sam e w ay as has been tr ied  can  succeed in  arriv in g  
a t  la rg e r co n tex ts  th a t  exceed m ere b eg inn ings” [S tr83, page  333]. T h is  shou ld  n o t be 
ta k e n  to  m ean  th a t  a  b e t te r  ph ilosoph ical sy stem isa tio n  is n o t possib le , ra th e r  th a t  th e  
m eans for finding it  h av e  y e t to  be discovered. T h is endorses th e  view  th a t  no obvious 
research  m e th o d  ex ists for th is  p ro g ram m e.
I t  is im possib le  in  th is  thesis  to  a t te m p t a  fu n d a m e n ta l t r e a tm e n t of th e  P h ilo sophy  of 
Technology, so we m u st be c o n te n t w ith  a  fa irly  superficial t re a tm e n t  o f p a r tic u la r  issues 
o f re levance (superficial because  an y  d ep th  o f tr e a tm e n t w ould  req u ire  su itab le  fo u n d a ­
tions u p o n  w hich to  bu ild ). F u rth e rm o re , we m u st b e  co n ten t w ith  th e  “beg inn ings” , an d  
accep t th e  absence of an  an a ly tica l fram ew ork  w ith in  w hich th e se  issues can  b e  d iscussed.
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M any  o f th ese  issues arise  n n d e r th e  head ings o f “E ngineering” o r “D esign” as well as 
“T echno logy” , b u t  in  th e  absence o f philosophies o f any  o f th e se  d iscip lines, if  th e y  can  
b e  so called, no  a t te m p t will b e  m ad e  to  d istin g u ish  b etw een  th e m . In  ad d itio n , th e  te rm  
“app lied  science” is o ften  u sed  as a  b rid g e  b e tw een  science an d  technology , an d  th is  te rm  
will also b e  ta k e n  to  m ean  techno logy  in  th e  m o d ern  sense.
Science and Technology, the demarcation
O ne o f th e  m ore  w idely d iscussed issues in  th e  l i te ra tu re  is th e  re la tio n sh ip , o r d em ar­
ca tio n , b e tw een  science an d  tech n o lo g y 1. M ost o f th is  can b e  considered  “appalling ly  
superfic ia l” [G as72, page 297], an d  seem s to  c o n cen tra te  on  idealised  an d  o u td a te d  p e r­
cep tions of b o th  science an d  technology.
O ne of th e  m o st com m on dim ensions o f d em arca tio n  is th a t  b ased  on  th e  p ro d u c t o f th e  
ac tiv ity . T h e  p ro d u c t of science is ta k e n  to  be  an  increase in  know ledge, a n d  th e  p ro d u c ts  
o f techno logy  are  a r tifa c ts . P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy  is founded  u p o n  such  an  assu m p tio n : 
“ap p lica tio n  an d  p red ic tio n s in te re s t [the  scien tist] only for th e o re tic a l rea so n s-b e c au se  
th ey  m ay  be used  as tests  o f th eo rie s” [Pop59, page  59]. T h is  a ssu m p tio n  h as been  sharp ly  
critic ised  by  P u tn a m , am o n g st o th e rs  [P u t74 , page  222], for m o d e rn  science is ac tu a lly  
concerned  w ith  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f com plex  m odels to  exp lain  how  th in g s  a re . T echnology 
is concerned  w ith  m odels of how  th in g s  m ig h t b e  b ro u g h t a b o u t. T h e  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  
th a t  w hich  “is” an d  th a t  w hich “m ig h t b e ” is a  su b tle  one, an d  is o ften  c a p tu re d  in  a  
line o f d em arca tio n  th a t  has science concerned w ith  th e  n a tu ra l  w orld , an d  techno logy  
w ith  th e  a rtific ia l [Sko72]. W e m u s t accep t, how ever, th a t  m o d e rn  science does n o t 
ju s t  observe th e  n a tu ra l  w orld  w ith o u t in te rv e n tio n , b u t  seeks to  c re a te  s itu a tio n s  in  an  
ex p e rim en ta l c o n tex t th a t  m an  has a lread y  b ro u g h t ab o u t. E ven  o b se rv a tio n  o u ts id e  o f a  
la b o ra to ry  is o ften  concerned  w ith  issues like th e  en v iro n m en t, w here i t  is now  accep ted  
th a t  ma.n h as  h a d  a  sign ifican t im p a c t [R ap74, page  94].
F or C o m p u tin g , th e  s itu a tio n  is even less c lear cu t, for we becom e fo rced  to  consider very  
carefully  w h a t is “n a tu ra l” a b o u t o u r dom ain  of in te re s t. A re  n u m b e rs , fo r exam ple , 
n a tu ra l  o r artific ia l en tities?  I t  is here  th a t  P o p p e r  offers us a ss is tan ce , b y  allow ing such 
en titie s  to  have  an  in d ep en d en t th ird  w orld  ex istence. W e m u st also rem em b er th a t  m an y  
of th e  system s we p ro d u ce  a re  ac tu a lly  em b o d im en ts  o f p red ic tiv e  th eo rie s , an d  th e re  
seem s no essen tia l difference b e tw een  th e  en v iro n m en ta l sc ie n tis t’s th e o ry  o f dep le tion  in  
th e  ozone lay e r a n d  th e  so ftw are  eng ineer’s th e o ry  o f s to ck  co n tro l w ith in  a  com pany.
I t  is o ften  a rg u ed  th a t  i t  is th e  a im s of science an d  techno logy  th a t  allow  th em  to  be 
d is tingu ished  ra th e r  th a n  th e  p ro d u c ts . Science aim s a t  increasing  know ledge for its  ow n 
sake , techno logy  a t  im p ro v in g  m a n ’s ex istence by  c rea tin g  usefu l a r tifa c ts . B unge, for 
exam ple , s ta te s  th a t
1 One of the side-effects o f this research is the light thrown upon th is dem arcation by considering  
the location o f Softw are Engineering. A s a “m arginal object” , it causes us to reflect carefully on the  
dem arcation as m uch as the object [Tur84, page 31],
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“If th e  goal is is pu re ly  cognitive, p u re  science is ob ta in ed : if  p rim arily  p ra c ­
tica l, app lied  science.” [B un74, page  19]
T h u s  th e  process of techno logy  is som etim es considered  to  be th a t  o f d em an d -p u ll, w here 
th e  perceived needs o f socie ty  o r ind iv id u a ls , in  te rm s of th e  a r tifa c ts  th e y  desire, m o ­
tiv a te s  th e  ac tiv ity . T h is  d is tin c tio n  is r a th e r  naive in  m o d ern  c ap ita lis t societies. I t 
m ig h t also be  a rgued  th a t  m a n ’s ex istence  is n o t ju s t  his being b u t  his well-being, an d  
th a t  th e  quest fo r know ledge is a n  essen tia l p a r t  o f th is  w ell-being: m a n  only being  con­
te n t  w hen  he is co n tinua lly  increasing  his u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  w orld  in  w hich he ex ists 
[G as72, page 293]. In  th is  case, th e  quest fo r know ledge is sim ply  a  m ean s to  th e  end  of 
w ell-being. E ven  if  we deny  th is  line o f a rg u m e n t, we m u st accep t th a t  m o d e rn  science is 
ra re ly  carried  o u t for th e  p u rsu it of know ledge per se. F ey erab en d , fo r exam ple , suggests 
th a t
“ L a te  2 0 th .-cen tu ry  science h as  g iven up  all philosophical p re ten sio n s an d  
has becom e a  pow erfu l business t h a t  shapes th e  m e n ta lity  of its  p ra c titio n e rs .
G ood  p a y m e n t, good  s ta n d in g  w ith  th e  boss an d  th e  colleagues in  th e ir  ‘u n i t ’ 
a re  th e  chief aim s of th ese  h u m a n  a n ts  w ho excel in  th e  so lu tio n  of tin y  
p rob lem s b u t  w ho can n o t m ak e  sense of an y th in g  tran scen d in g  th e ir  dom ain  
o f com p eten ce .” [Fey75, page  188]
In d iv id u a l sc ien tists  m ay  derive th e ir  jo b  sa tisfac tio n  th ro u g h  believ ing  th ey  a re  con­
tr ib u tin g  to  th e  body  of know ledge, b u t  th is  should  n o t be confused w ith  th e  aim s of 
science as a  c o rp o ra te  en d eav o u r w ith in  m o d e rn  w este rn  society. In  o u r society, i t  seem s 
th a t  science and  technology  b o th  sh a re  a  com m on aim , nam ely  to  m eet th e  req u irem en ts  
o f tho se  fund ing  th e  en te rp rise  [Rop83, pag e  91]. If  we a sse rt t h a t  th e  n a tu re  o f these  
req u irem en ts  is fu n d a m e n ta l to  th e  d em arca tio n  betw een  science an d  technology , th e n  
we m u st accep t th a t  id en tica l ac tions carried  o u t by  id en tica l in d iv idua ls m ay  be deem ed 
science, techno logy  or n e ith e r  d epend ing  on  w h e th e r th e  req u irem en ts  o f th e  sponsors 
a re  for im proved  know ledge, im p ro v ed  w ell-being o f society, o r an  increase  in  w ea lth  for 
th e  sponso r. Such a  positio n  seem s unhelp fu l, an d  by  ad o p tin g  it  we w ould  effectively 
be depriv ing  b o th  “science” an d  “techno logy” of m ean ing  in  th e  m o d e rn  w orld .
Follow ing th is  line of d em arca tio n , we can  consider th e  codes of p rac tice , exp lic it o r 
im p lic it, d raw n  up for engineers an d  sc ien tists . T ypically , th e  sc ien tis t m u s t value t r u th  
an d  h o n esty  above all else [Sno34]. T h e  engineer, on th e  o th e r  h a n d , “h as  to  fulfill his 
p rofessional w ork in  th e  service o f m an k in d  . . .  to  w ork w ith  re sp ec t for th e  d ig n ity  of 
h u m an  life . . .  m ay  n o t give w ay to  th o se  w ho do n o t fully re sp ec t th e  r ig h ts  o f a  h u m an  
being  an d  w ho ab u se  th e  tru e  essence o f technology; he m u st b e  a  fa ith fu l co llab o ra to r of 
h u m a n  m o ra lity  and  c u ltu re ” . T hese  w ere th e  s ta n d a rd s  set dow n for p rac tic in g  engineers 
by th e  V D I ( th e  G erm an  equ ivalen t o f th e  E ng ineering  C ouncil) in  M ay  1950 [H un83, 
page 51]. Such an  idealised  view of th e  eng ineer, desirab le  th o u g h  it  m ay  be, does n o t 
seem  an  a c c u ra te  reflection of th e  ty p ica l p ra c titio n e r  of S oftw are E ng ineering . D ie te r 
h as n o te d  th a t  “it  is som etim es said  . .  . t h a t  an  engineer is a  p e rso n  w ho can  do for $1
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w h a t any  fool can  do for $2 .” [Die83, p ag e  286], an d  th e  p ro v erb  “ru b b ish  t h a t  sells isn ’t 
ru b b ish  a t  all” , o ften  acc red ited  to  B ritish  business [R op83, pag e  94], m ay  well be seen as 
m ore  a p p ro p ria te  fo r su m m ing  up  th e  value system s w ith in  w hich  th e  m o d ern  engineer 
has to  w ork. Indeed , such  value system s m ay  even b e t te r  reflect th e  en v iro n m en t of m an y  
in d u s tr ia l sc ien tists .
T h e  use to  w hich theo ries a re  p u t in  science an d  techno logy  is a n o th e r  com m only  ad o p ted  
m e th o d  o f d em arca tio n . I t  is o ften  sa id  th a t  a  techno log ist accep ts a  th e o ry  if it  is 
useful, ra th e r  th a n  if i t  is tru e . T h e  sc ien tis t, on  th e  o th e r h a n d , accep ts  only theories 
th a t  a re  tru e . Follow ing P o p p e r , such  a  p o sitio n  is u n ten ab le . B o th  th e  sc ien tist an d  
th e  techno log ist accep t th a t  a  th e o ry  is n e ith e r t ru e  n o r false, b u t  ra th e r  re fu ted  or 
c u rren tly  u n re fu ted . I t  is th e  case th a t  a  techno log ist is generally  concerned  w ith  a  m uch 
m ore  re s tr ic te d  dom ain  of ap p lica tio n  th a n  th e  sc ien tis t, w ho seeks gen era lisa tio n s w here 
possib le. E ven  th e  sc ien tis t, how ever, will co n tinue  to  use th e  princip les of N ew ton ian  
m echanics in  s itu a tio n s  w here he is confident th a t  o bserva tions can n o t be  m ad e  to  re fu te  
th em . T h is is o ften  d iscussed using  th e  id ea  of an  a p p ro x im a te  th eo ry , b u t such  a 
concept seem s unhelpfu l in  th e  absence o f g enuine m etrics for th e  degree o f app licab ility  
of a  theory .
A n o th e r possib le line of d em arca tio n  is th e  id ea  th a t  science precedes technology, by 
p rov id in g  th e  th e o re tic a l fo u n d a tio n s  u p o n  w hich technological decisions re s t, an d  th a t  
th e  p ro d u c tio n  of a rtifa c ts  is th e  re su lt o f supp ly -push . M a rtin  H eidegger discusses 
th is  p o in t, and  observes th a t ,  a lth o u g h  we m ay  consider science historically  p rio r to  
technology , we shou ld  accep t th a t  ontologicaly i t  follows from  it [Hei77]. Ihde  suggests 
th a t  even th e  h is to rica l p recedence o f science is perceived  r a th e r  th a n  a c tu a l [Ihd83, 
pag e  240]. T h e  w idespread  accep tan ce  of th e  id ea  th a t  science feeds technology , r a th e r  
th a n  th e  converse, is illu s tra te d  by  R yle, w ho s ta te s  w ith o u t question :
“E ng ineering  does n o t advance  physics, chem istry  or econom ics; b u t  com ­
p e ten ce  a t  engineering  is n o t com p a tib le  w ith  com plete  innocence o f these  
b ran ch es of th e o ry .” [Ryl49, page  298]
In m o d ern  society  th e  h is to rica l p recedence o f science is s ta r t in g  to  w ane. In  1974, R ap p  
w ro te
“I t can  be ta k e n  as a  ru le  o f th u m b  th a t  sooner or la te r  scientific find ings are  
app lied  in  techno log ica l p rac tice  in som e w ay o r an o th e r. As a  re su lt o f th e  
pow erfu l p ressu re  of co m p e titio n  in  th e  econom ic an d  a rm a m e n t spheres th e  
tim e  lapse  in  th is  p rocess b e tw een  d iscovery  of new  findings a n d  techno log ical 
u tiliza tio n  of th e m  is being  c o n s ta n tly  red u ced .” [Rap74, pag e  98]
Since 1973 th is  tim e  lapse  has reduced  still fu r th e r , and  in  m an y  cases ap p e a rs  to  have 
becom e neg a tiv e , in  th e  sense th a t  techno logy  is w aiting  for specific scientific re su lts , 
w ith  th e  ap p lica tio n  a lread y  decided u p o n . O ne side-effect o f th is  is th a t  th e  d is tin c tio n  
b etw een  science an d  techno logy  is becom ing  increasing ly  b lu rred . In  m an y  cases, th e
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techno log ist is b reak in g  new  g ro u n d  w hilst so lving p ra c tic a l p rob lem s, an d  th u s  p lay ing  
th e  ro le  of sc ien tis t by  advancing  th e  th e o re tic a l un d erp in n in g s of th e  d iscipline. T h is  
re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  science an d  techno logy  has also led  to  th e  m o d e rn  techno log ical 
im p e ra tiv e . In  1975, T eller, th e  so-called “fa th e r  o f th e  a to m ic  b o m b ” to ld  a  jo u rn a lis t 
from  “B ild  der W issen sch afts” th a t  th e  techno log ist “o u g h t to  app ly  e v e ry th in g  he has 
u n d e rs to o d ” . T h is c rea tes  a  new  m o ra l d ic tu m  to  accom pany  K a n t’s “o u g h t to  im plies 
ca n ” , nam ely  th a t  “can  im plies o u g h t to ” . A ccep ting  b o th  o f th ese  m ax im s, o f course, 
leads to  a  sp ira l o f in v es tig a tio n  an d  a p p lica tio n  in d ep en d en t o f any  e x te rn a l axiology.
T h e  s itu a tio n  is even m ore  confused fo r so ftw are engineering, fo r i t  ca,n be  a rg u ed  th a t  
o u r p ro d u c ts  have  m an y  of th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  o f theories them selves. M oreover, ou r 
ap p lica tio n  dom ains a re  o ften  b e re ft o f theo ries to  use a t  th e  o u tse t, so th e  softw are 
engineer has to  c o n s tru c t theo ries  o f w h a t th e  system  is to  b e , as well as using  theo ries 
to  b rin g  th is  a b o u t. C ivil engineers, on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , do n o t u sua lly  need  to  w orry  
to  th e  sam e e x te n t a b o u t c o n s tru c tin g  theories o f th e  a rtifa c ts , fo r th ese  a re  generally  
w ell-understood . T h ey  can  co n c e n tra te  on using  th e  theories o f co m p o n en ts  to  bring  
a b o u t th e  co n stru c tio n . O n occasion th e  eng ineers’ u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  a r tifa c t will 
le t th em  dow n, an d  th e  en te rp rise  will fail. A classic exam ple o f th is  is th e  d isa s te r o f 
th e  T aco m a  N arrow s B ridge, w here th e  engineers failed to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  a r tifa c t as an  
a irc ra ft w ing as well as a  bridge . T h is  oversigh t m ean t t h a t  th e y  d id  n o t foresee th e  
effects o f a  h igh  w ind on  th e  s tru c tu re  [P et82 , pages 164-165].
T h ro u g h o u t th is  thesis  it  w ill b e  assum ed  th a t  th e  line o f d em arca tio n  is very  th in  an d  
fragile . R a th e r  th a n  a t te m p t  to  de lin ea te  “science” an d  “tech n o lo g y ” , o r “sc ien tis ts” 
and  “tech n o lo g is ts” , we will d is tingu ish  only “scientific a t t i tu d e s ” an d  “technological 
a t t i tu d e s ” to  theories. T h e  fo rm er we will ta k e  to  be P o p p e r ’s ideal o f th e  a t t i tu d e  
u n d erp in n in g  scientific p rac tice , th e  w illingness to  seek re fu ta tio n  of theo ries an d  to  
p ropose  theories w ith  th e  e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  th ey  will be  re fu ted . T h e  la t te r  we will 
consider to  be an  in s tru m e n ta l accep tan ce  of theories, w here re fu ta tio n  will be  ta k e n  
p rim arily  as in d ica tin g  th a t  th e  th eo ry  has been  in ap p ro p ria te ly  app lied , a lth o u g h  th e  
process m ay  well also in d ica te  flaws in  th e  th e o ry  itself. T h is very  sim plistic  d em arca tio n  
has one very  im p o r ta n t im p a c t, how ever, fo r we m u st allow  th a t  “sc ie n tis ts” som etim es 
b ehave  w ith  techno log ical a t t i tu d e s , such as w hen  th ey  a re  designing in s tru m e n ta tio n  an d  
ex p erim en ts , and  also th a t  “tech n o lo g is ts” som etim es beh av e  w ith  scientific a tt i tu d e s . 
In  p a r tic u la r , we will e s tab lish  in  th e  n ex t c h a p te r  th a t  th e  so ftw are  engineer m u s t ad o p t 
a  scientific a t t i tu d e  d u rin g  som e stages of a  ty p ica l p ro je c t, an d  a d o p t a  technological 
a t t i tu d e  d u ring  o th e r stages. T h e  link  b etw een  th ese  tw o stag es  will b e  p rov ided  by  th e  
theories them selves.
T he D evelopm ent of M odern  Technology
In a d d itio n  to  considering th e  d em arca tio n  b e tw een  technology  a n d  science, we can also 
tu rn  to  th e  developm ent of techno logy  for in sig h t. V arious a u th o rs  hav e  n o ted  th a t  
technology  can be considered  to  hav e  p rogressed  th ro u g h  a  n u m b e r o f phases. T h e re  is,
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how ever, som e confusion as to  w h e th e r th ese  phases rep re sen t th e  d eve lopm en t o f society  
as a  w hole, th e  developm ent o f ind iv id u a l technologies, o r th e  d eve lopm en t o f in d iv idua l 
techno log ists . If  we a d o p t th e  first view , th e n  we m ig h t expect all technologies w ith in  
o u r cu ltu re  to  be in  th e  sam e s tag e  o f deve lopm en t, w hereas th e  second view allows for 
d isp a rity  be tw een  differen t technologies a t  a  given tim e . T h e  th ird  view  w ould allow  
in d iv id u a l p ra c titio n e rs  to  evolve th ro u g h  th e  various phases.
T h e  firs t phase  considered  is usually  te rm e d  th e  p rim itiv e  phase , a n d  is sum m ed  up  by  
G asse t
“How does p rim itiv e  m a n  perceive technology? T h e  answ er is easy. He is 
n o t aw are  of it as such; he is unconscious of th e  fac t th a t  am ong  his facu lties 
th e re  is one w hich enables h im  to  refash ion  n a tu re  accord ing  to  his desires.” 
[Ga.s72, page  307]
Som e w ould consider th a t  unperceived  ac tions can n o t be called techno logy , an d  so do 
n o t consider th is  p h ase  a t  all. O ne o f th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  o f th is  p h ase  is th e  lim ita tio n  of 
techno log ica l p rogress in h e ren t in  th e  society. S prague de C am p , in  his w ork on A ncien t 
E ng ineers, observes th a t
“P rim itiv e  peoples live a  h a n d  to  m o u th  existence . .  .T h e re fo re  th e y  can  less 
well afford to  risk  ex p erim en t th a n  m ore  advanced  p e o p le .. .
As a  re su lt, p rim itiv e  societies a re  very  conservative. T rib a l custo m s p rescribe  
ex ac tly  how  ev ery th in g  shall be  done, on p a in  o f th e  g o d ’s d isp leasure . A n 
in v en to r is likely to  b e  liq u id a ted  as a  dangerous d ev ia tio n is t.” [dC77, page  6]
O ne possib le ex p lan a tio n  of th e  so-called so ftw are  crisis is th a t  th e  so ftw are  in d u s try  is 
b eh av in g  like a  p rim itiv e  society , liv ing a  h a n d  to  m o u th  (o r p ro je c t to  p ro je c t)  ex istence 
n o t th ro u g h  necessity  b u t because  of a  desire to  m inim ise overheads a n d  m axim ise pro fits. 
A t th e  sam e tim e, how ever, it  is so p h is tic a ted  enough to  recognise th e  sy m p to m s of 
th e  prob lem . T h e  “so lu tio n ” to  th e  p a ra d o x  th is  causes is to  ra tio n a lise  th e  b eh av io u r, 
e n cap su la tin g  th e  “cu sto m s” in to  m e th o d s  an d  im posing  th ese  m e th o d s  on th e  designers. 
In  th is  w ay th e  engineer cannot accep t re sp o nsib ility  for th e  design. T h is  prov ides a  
refuge from  responsib ility , b u t  locks th e  engineer up  in  it like a  p riso n er. T h is  is tra g ic  
enough , b u t  u n fo rtu n a te ly  m an y  academ ic in s titu tio n s  have a d o p te d  th e se  m e th o d s  as 
co rnerstones of th e  cu rricu lu m , th u s  in s titu tio n a lis in g  th e  s tu d e n ts  an d  p rep a rin g  th em  
for im p riso n m en t.
A longside such  tr e a tm e n t of p rim itiv e  societies, som e a u th o rs  consider m agic  as being 
“ technology  in sem inal fo rm ” [R ap81, page 71], for “b o th  ac tiv ities  . . .  a t te m p t  to  achieve 
a  given goal as re liab ly  an d  sim ply  as possib le” [E1172, page  24]. A lth o u g h  th e re  are  
u n d o u b ted ly  m an y  in te re s tin g  ideas ra ised  by  th is  line of enquiry , it  w ill n o t be  p u rsu ed  
fu r th e r  here , as i t  is n o t o f d irec t re levance to  th e  ta sk  in  h an d .
T h e  n ex t p h ase  of techno logy  is usually  considered as c ra ftsm an sh ip . G asse t, fo r exam ple, 
sum m arises th is  as follows:
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“ . .  . in  c ra ftsm an sh ip  th e re  is no  ro o m  w h a tso ev er for a  sense of in v en tio n .
T h e  a r tis a n  m u s t le a rn  th o ro u g h ly  in  long  app ren ticesh ips '—it  is th e  tim e  of 
m a s te rs  an d  ap p ren tice s— e la b o ra te  usages h an d ed  dow n by long  tra d itio n .
H e is governed  by  th e  n o rm  th a t  m an  m u s t bow  to  tra d itio n  as su ch .” [G as72, 
page  309]
F eib lem an  h as  observed  th a t  in th is  p h ase  o f techno logy  th e re  is a  c lear d is tin c tio n  
b e tw een  c ra ft a n d  science,
“In  th e  M iddle A ges, th e re  w as n a tu ra l  ph ilosophy  an d  c ra ftsm a n sh ip . Such 
science as ex isted  w as in  th e  h a n d s  o f th e  n a tu ra l  p h ilo sophers, a n d  such 
techno logy  as ex isted  w as in  th e  h a n d s  o f th e  c ra ftsm en .” [Fei72, pag e  38].
T h is  h is to rica l division is considered  by  som e to  continue:
“M any  m eth o d o lo g is ts  an d  ph ilosophers of science in sis t t h a t  techno logy  is 
in  p rinc ip le  a  co m position  o f various c ra fts . R egard less o f how  so p h is tic a te d  
th ese  c ra fts  h av e  becom e, th e y  a re  still c ra f ts .” [Sko72, pag e  43]
T h e  th ird  p h ase  can  b e  considered  as m o d e rn  technology:
“T o d ay  th e  engineer em braces as one of th e  m o st n o rm a l an d  firm ly e s ta b ­
lished form s o f a c tiv ity  th e  o ccu p a tio n  o f in v en to r. In  c o n tra s t  to  th e  sav ­
age, he  know s before  he begins to  in v en t th a t  he is cap ab le  o f do ing  so, 
w hich m eans th a t  he h as  ‘tech n o lo g y ’ befo re  he has ‘a  te ch n o lo g y ’ [G as72, 
p ag e  311]
T h is  m o d e rn  p h ase  differs from  th a t  o f th e  c ra ftsm a n  in  th e  e x te n t to  w hich  scientific 
p rincip les are  used.
“ . . .o n ly  te n ta tiv e ly  an d  ra re ly  d id  technology , w ith  its  ro o ts  deep in  th e  
c ra ftsm an sh ip  of th e  earlies t reco rd ed  tim es, o r p e rh ap s  in  th e  even earlie r 
know n techn iques of p a laeo lith ic  h u n te rs  an d  a r tis ts , reach  across b a rrie rs  
o f social class o ccu p a tio n s to  jo in  w ith  science, an d  th e n  only  in  p e rio d s of 
p a r tic u la r  social re q u ire m e n t.” [C oh83, pag e  35].
M illendorfer adds e x tra  reso lu tio n  to  th e  n o tio n  o f m o d ern  techno logy , by  su b d iv id ing  
it  in to  th re e  phases. F irs t  cam e th e  in d u s tr ia l rev o lu tio n , c o n c e n tra tin g  on  th e  m a te r ia l 
p rob lem s o f m an . Second cam e th e  need  to  solve th e  re su ltin g  in fo rm a tio n  b o ttlen eck . 
C u rre n tly  we a re  faced  w ith  th e  th ird  p h ase , th e  need to  reso lve th e  e th ica l questions 
th a t  m o d e rn  techno logy  is posing . [M il76, pages 408-413].
B efore considering  th e  fe a tu re s  of m o d e rn  techno logy  in m ore  d e ta il, how ever, we will 
a p p ro a c h  th e  q u estio n  from  a  sligh tly  d ifferen t angle.
U nselfconscious and Selfconscious Design
O ne o f th e  m o st sign ifican t te x ts  w ritte n  on th e  su b jec t o f design is N otes on the Synthesis  
o f Form  b y  A lexander [Ale64], to  w hich  page  n u m b ers  in  th is  sec tion  refer. A lth o u g h  th is  
w as orig inally  w ritte n  a b o u t design ac tiv ities  in  a rch itec tu re  an d  to w n  p lan n in g , m an y  
of th e  ideas are  tran sfe rab le  to  so ftw are design.
A c e n tra l th em e  of th e  book  is th a t  design s ta r ts  o u t being an  unselfconscious ac tiv ity , 
typ ica lly  in m ore  p rim itiv e  societies, w here  i t  is ca rried  o u t by follow ing ru les o f th u m b , 
o r religious dogm a. M any  o f th ese  ru les a re  d is tilla tio n s of good  p ra c tic e  a rriv ed  a t  over 
cen tu ries  o f rep e titio n . If  so m eth in g  goes w rong  w ith  th e  design, possib ly  because  th e  ru le  
is n o t q u ite  app licab le , th e n  th e re  m ay  well be  specific ac tions la id  dow n to  rem edy  th e  
fa u lt. If  th e re  a re  no a p p ro p ria te  ru les la id  dow n th e  designer can  ta k e  im m ed ia te  ac tio n , 
possib ly  even ran d o m  ac tio n , observe th e  effect, an d  reverse  th e  ac tio n  if necessary. T h e  
designer in th is  s itu a tio n  does n o t explic itly  consider his ac tions, an d  n ev er ge ts  a  chance 
to  co m p are  th em  w ith  th o se  of o th e rs : ac tions are  governed b y  h a b it  o r cond itioned  by  
response.
T h is  class of design, A lexander m a in ta in s , w orks for ce rta in  ty p es  of p rob lem s, an d  is 
s ta b le  even w hen th e  p rob lem s change. O ne o f th e  reasons for th is  is th a t  th e  designer 
experiences failu re firs t-h an d , an d  so can  re a c t accordingly  an d  im m ed ia te ly . T h e  de­
signer is n o t faced  w ith  a  la rg e  n u m b er o f sym p to m s a t  once, b u t  can  t r e a t  each  one 
as it  arises. Such a  sy stem  could well be u n s ta b le , b u t  th e  in -b u ilt t ra d itio n a l m e th o d s  
prov ide a  dam p in g  effect, m ak ing  th e  designer re lu c ta n t to  change ru les th a t  have  s to o d  
th e  te s t o f tim e. As A lexander says,
“R igid tra d itio n  an d  im m ed ia te  ac tio n  m ay  seem  co n trad ic to ry . B u t i t  is 
th e  very  c o n tra s t b e tw een  th ese  tw o w hich m akes th e  process se lf-ad ju s tin g .”
(page  52)
F u rth e rm o re , as th e  designs have  evolved over a  long perio d  o f tim e , th ey  generally  
fit well w ith  th e  p rob lem  because  th e  s tru c tu re  of th e  so lu tion  has evolved alongside 
th e  recogn ition  o f th e  prob lem . C onsequen tly , th e  subsystem s o f th e  so lu tio n  are  likely 
to  m ap  d irec tly  011 to  d is tin c t a reas o f th e  p rob lem , and  so a  n u m b e r of recognisab le 
su b sy stem s can be iso la ted  to  w ork on. T h u s  rem edies to  cure  a  fa u lt in  one su b sy stem  
are  unlikely  to  im p ac t on  o th e r  subsystem s.
W ith  selfconscious design, how ever, th e  s itu a tio n  is different. Now th e  designer recog­
nises th a t  th e  so lu tion  is his p e rso n a l concern , ra th e r  th a n  p a r t  o f tra d itio n . T h is  brings 
w ith  i t  th e  desire to  s ta m p  th e  in d iv id u a l’s p e rso n a lity  o n to  th e  design, b u t  also a  feeling 
of inadequacy , because  com plex p rob lem s are  to o  difficult to  ge t to  grips w ith  ab in i­
tio. To h an d le  th e  com plexity , th e  designer s ta r ts  to  im pose co n cep tu a l o rd e r o n to  th e  
prob lem . T h is o rd er can  now  be com m u n ica ted  an d  ta u g h t, so we hav e  th e  beg innings 
of an  a b s tra c t d iscipline o f design, r a th e r  th a n  th e  passing  on o f c ra ft techn iques. U n­
fo r tu n a te ly , th e re  is no  evidence to  suggest th a t  th e  chosen o rd e r will m ap  well o n to  th e  
designed sy stem , an d  so th e  self conscious designer has sacrificed th e  ab ility  to  re a c t to
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prob lem s by  changes to  well iso la ted  su b sy stem s. F u rth e rm o re , now  th a t  design can  be 
d iscussed , it  can  be  carried  o u t by  g roups of ind iv iduals  on  b eh a lf  o f o th e rs . T h u s  th e  
designer also loses th e  im m ediacy  o f feedback .
A lexander identifies a  c ritica l tra n s itio n  p erio d , w hen a  designer is chang ing  from  u n ­
selfconscious design to  th a t  o f selfconscious design, for here  severa l p rob lem s arise. In  
p a r tic u la r , th e  em ergence is accom pan ied  by  a  loss of innocence. T h e  unselfconscious 
designer can n o t be  gu ilty  o f fa ilu res, o th e r  th a n  by  choosing to  ignore  th e  ru les. T h e  
selfconscious designer, how ever, m u s t m ak e  all th e  decisions, he has lo st his claim  to  
innocence. If  th e  design does n o t w ork th e n  it  is a p p a re n t w ho is to  b lam e. A t th e  
sam e tim e , how ever, th e  designer is try in g  to  h an d le  com plex p rob lem s (o r th e  m ove to  
selfconscious design w ould  p ro b ab ly  n o t h av e  o ccu rred ). C onsequen tly  th e  designer feels 
exposed  and  a t  risk . A lexander no tes  tw o  responses to  th is  s itu a tio n .
T h e  firs t is for th e  designer to  seek refuge in  p re tensions to  genius. B y claim ing  th a t  th e  
ab ility  to  design is in b u ilt, he  can refuse to  discuss th e  processes o f design, claim ing th a t  
it  ju s t  h ap p en s  by  in sp ira tio n . If  th e  in sp ira tio n  fails to  a rriv e , it  is c learly  n o t his fau lt. 
Indeed , he m ay  go fu r th e r , claim ing th a t  an y  a t te m p t to  analyse  th e  design p rocess m ay  
d estro y  it  by  rendering  it  u n ava ilab le  to  in sp ira tio n . A lexander n o tes  th a t
“E norm o u s resis tan ce  to  th e  id ea  of sy s tem a tic  processes o f design is com ing 
from  people w ho recognise co rrec tly  th e  im p o rtan ce  of in tu itio n , b u t  th e n  
m ak e  a  fe tish  of i t  w hich excludes th e  possib ility  of ask ing  reaso n ab le  ques­
tio n s .” (page  9)
T h e  second response  is to  seek refuge in  th e  safe ty  of estab lish ed  sty les , th u s  re tu rn in g  
to  th e  w ay o f follow ing tra d itio n , an d  a llev ia tin g  th e  b u rd en  o f decision.
I t  is in te re s tin g  to  consider C o m p u tin g  in  th is  ligh t. F irs t , we can  observe  th a t  a  g re a t 
deal o f unselfconscious design tak es  p lace, p a rtic u la rly  am o n g st th o se  w ho p ro g ram  com ­
p u te rs  as a  hobby. T hey  do n o t, in  genera l, reflect on w h a t th ey  a re  doing , b u t  a t te m p t 
to  c rea te  p ro g ram s to  solve p rob lem s w hich th ey  experience firs t h a n d . F req u en tly  th ese  
p ro g ram s a re  developm ents of ex isting  sy stem s, such  as b e t te r  gam es, a n d  th e  s ta r tin g  
p o in t for th e  developm ent is experience of these . T h e  designer an d  user are  u sually  one 
an d  th e  sam e p erso n , so th a t  th e  designer can  try  ou t th e  p ro g ram , re a c t im m ed ia te ly  
to  any  fau lts , an d  ac t accordingly . If  an  ac tio n  does n o t w ork , i t  can  b e  u ndone , o r left 
in situ  an d  p ro g ram m ed  a ro u n d . Som e ex trem ely  com plex p ro g ram s can  b e  developed 
in  th is  way, an d  to  th e  designer th ese  will be  “goo d ” p ro g ram s because  th e y  fulfill th e  
perceived  need. O ften , of course, th e  need  is ac tu a lly  forged alongside th e  developm ent 
of th e  so lu tion . T h a t  such p ro g ram m ers  a re  considered  in sp ira tio n a l, a n d  a lm ost d iv ine, 
can b e  seen by th e  com m en ts o f m an y  p a re n ts  w hose children  can  p ro g ram  in  th is  way. 
T h ey  see th e  ac tions as in sp ira tio n a l genius, com ing from  w ith in  th e  child. T h e  child 
is usually  unw illing, or u n ab le , to  discuss ex ac tly  how th e  sy stem  w as developed , o ften  
reso rtin g  to  com m en ts like “I ju s t  d id  i t ” . T h is  a t t i tu d e  is o f p rim a ry  concern  to  anyone 
charged  w ith  th e  ta sk  o f ed u ca tin g  so ftw are  engineers in  h igher ed u ca tio n , fo r it is likely
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to  be th e  d o m in an t a t t i tu d e  am ong  th o se  w ho have any  co m p u tin g  experience en te rin g  
h igher ed u ca tio n  from  schools.
T h e  second reac tio n , seeking refuge in  sty les, can  also be seen am o n g st co m p u tin g  profes­
sionals. In  p a r tic u la r , it  could  b e  considered  th a t  th e  cu rren t fa sc in a tio n  w ith  p ro p rie ta ry  
design m eth o d s is an  a t te m p t  to  find  escapes from  th e  loss o f innocence. If  a  so ftw are 
engineer is using  IE W , for exam ple , an d  th e  design is a  fa ilu re , th e n  it  can  be claim ed 
th a t  th e  m e th o d  is a t fa u lt, n o t th e  designer. A gain  th is  p h enom enon  can b e  observed  
am o n g st s tu d e n ts . O nce th e y  h av e  been  shocked  o u t o f th e ir  p re ten sio n s to  genius, th ey  
o ften  ru n  im m ed ia te ly  to w ard s m e th o d s , w an tin g  to  know  ex ac tly  w h a t sequence of step s  
a  p a r tic u la r  m e th o d  lays dow n for solving th e ir  cu rren t p rob lem . O ne of th e  sad  fac ts  
a b o u t th is  response  is th a t  th e  ex istence of a  s ty le  or m e th o d  as a  refuge from  th e  loss 
of innocence m ay  well d isguise its  p o te n tia l ad v an tag es. So called “fo rm al m e th o d s” an d  
“o b jec t o rien ted  design” , for exam ple, a re  app roaches to  design th a t  b rin g  m an y  benefits. 
If  t re a te d  as sty les for refuge, how ever, th ey  are  b e little d  an d  devalued . M any  o f th e  
critic ism s o f such ap p ro ach es d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th ey  are  being  assessed  as refuges, n o t 
too ls u n d er th e  co n tro l o f th e  designer.
A n o th e r p rob lem  of selfconscious design arises because  th e  designer, faced  w ith  com plex 
p rob lem s, will im pose  fo rm  o n to  th e  p rob lem  accord ing  to  h is to rica l acc iden t. He is likely 
to  see p rev ious p roblem s an d  so lu tions w herever he looks. E ven  th e  lan g u ag e  he uses for 
describ ing  prob lem s will co n ta in  b ias.
“C au g h t in a  n e t of lan g u ag e  o f o u r ow n in ven tion , we o v e re s tim a te  th e  
la n g u a g e ’s im p a rtia lity . E ach  concep t, a t  th e  tim e of its  invention, no m ore  
th a n  a  concise w ay of g rasp in g  m an y  issues, quickly becom es a  p recep t. W e 
ta k e  th e  step  from  descrip tion  to  crite rio n  to o  easily, so t h a t  w h a t is a t  first 
a  useful to o l becom es a  b igo ted  p reo ccu p a tio n .” (pages 69,70)
A lex an d e r’s so lu tion  to  th is  is to  suggest th a t  we can  a b s tra c t aw ay from  th ese  p recon­
cep tions by using m a th e m a tic s . P ro d u c in g  fo rm al m odels o f th e  concep ts we ho ld , he 
claim s, will rem ove th e ir  b ias by  re ta in in g  only th e ir  a b s tra c t s tru c tu ra l  fea tu res . T h is 
is an  in te re s tin g  claim , b u t one th a t  is difficult to  su p p o rt. A lex an d er is in  d an g er of 
com paring  tw o d issim ilar th ings. T h e  q uestion  he should  add ress is w h e th e r a  descrip tion  
is less likely to  be b iased  if it  is expressed  form ally  th a n  w hen it  uses fam iliar te rm s in 
E nglish . W e will re tu rn  to  th is  q uestion  w hen discussing theo ries  in  C h a p te r  F ive. He 
develops th is  id ea  by iden tify ing  tw o  p ro p e rtie s  th a t  his a b s tra c t m odels (w hich  he calls 
d iag ram s) m ay  have. T hey
“ . .  .m a y  have e ith e r or b o th  of tw o  d is tin c t qualities, n o t alw ays equally  em ­
phasised . O n th e  one h a n d  th ey  m ay  sum m arize  aspec ts  o f physica l s tru c tu re  
. . .  O ne th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  d iag ram  m ay  b e  in ten d ed  to  su m m arize  a  set of 
fu n c tio n a l p ro p ertie s  o r co n s tra in ts . . . .T h i s  k ind  of d iag ram  is p rinc ipally  
a  n o ta tio n  for th e  p rob lem , r a th e r  th a n  for th e  fo rm . W e shall call such  a  
d iag ram  a  req u irem en ts  d iag ram . . . .
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W e shall call a  d iag ram  co n stru c tiv e  if  an d  only if it  is b o th  a t  once— if an d  
only if i t  is a  req u irem en ts  d iag ram  an d  a  fo rm  d iag ram  a t  th e  sam e  tim e . ”
(pages 86-87)
H e goes on  to  say
“I t  is th e  aim  o f science to  give such  a  unified d escrip tion  for every  o b jec t 
an d  p henom enon  we know .” (p ag e  90)
T h e  quest for such  co n stru c tiv e  d iag ram s seem s to  be a t  th e  h e a r t  of m o st s tru c tu re d  
design techn iques cu rre n tly  in  vogue. U n fo rtu n a te ly , th ese  techn iques do n o t seem  to  
h a v e  ta k e n  on  b o a rd  th e  need  for th e  d iag ram s to  be sufficiently a b s tra c t ,  r a th e r  th ey  
a t te m p t  to  be d irec tly  re la ted  to  th e  concep ts cu rren tly  held  by  u sers, designers an d  
m an ag ers  alike. F or A lexander, such  techn iques a re  unlikely to  p ro d u ce  good  fits , for 
a lth o u g h  th ey  m ay  well re su lt in  co n stru c tiv e  d iag ram s, th ese  d iag ram s a re  likely to  
reflect th e  preconceived  n o tio n s o f th e  in d iv idua ls involved ra th e r  th a n  th e  tru e  fo rm  of 
th e  p rob lem . T hese  ideas a re  developed fu r th e r  in  C h a p te rs  F ive an d  Six.
A t th e  h e a r t  of th e  design process for A lexander is th e  id ea  th a t  we a re  try in g  to  p roduce  
a  fo rm  th a t  will fit p erfec tly  w ith  its  co n tex t in to  a  s tress-free  ensem ble. He n o te s , in  
Popperia.n  sty le , th a t  th is  really  m eans we should  observe n o t co rrec tn ess  o f fit, b u t  th e  
absence of e rro rs , and  fu r th e r  th a t  th e re  is a  danger th a t  we will c o n c e n tra te  on  th o se  
a reas for w hich su itab le  m etrics ex ist for m easu ring  e rro rs.
F inally , A lexander offers a  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  d em arca tio n  discussion, w hen  he says
“S cien tists  t r y  to  id en tify  th e  co m p o n en ts  o f ex isting  s tru c tu re s . D esigners 
try  to  sh ap e  th e  com ponen ts o f new  s tru c tu re s . T h e  search  fo r th e  rig h t 
com p o n en ts , and  th e  r ig h t w ay to  bu ild  up  th e  form  from  th ese  com ponen ts 
is th e  g re a te s t challenge faced  by  th e  designer.” (page  130)
T he Logic and M ethod  of Technology
In  th is  section  we will exp lore  th e  ex istence  o f a  “logic” an d  “m e th o d ” o f technology  
analogous to  th a t  discussed by  ph ilosophers of science. I t  m u s t be rem em b ered  th a t  
claim s for a logic an d  a m e th o d  o f science are  largely  re fu ted  now , in  favour of th e  view 
th a t  m any  m odels ex is t, all of w hich c o n tr ib u te  to  our u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  scientific 
process.
Logics an d  m eth o d s for techno logy  can  be  d iscussed on a t  le a s t tw o  levels, th e  m icro­
level, c o n cen tra tin g  on how  in d iv id u a l decisions an d  ac tions a re  g ro u n d ed  b u t  m in im ising  
th e  en v iro n m en t w ith in  w hich th e y  ta k e  p lace, an d  th e  m acro-level, c o n c e n tra tin g  on th e  
o rg an isa tio n  of p ro je c ts , inc lud ing  th e ir  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  th e ir  en v iro n m en t, b u t  ignoring  
th e  d e ta ils  of in d iv id u a l decisions. D iscussion of th e  m acro-level will b e  delayed  u n til  
C h a p te r  Six, w here we can  develop th e  su b jec t in  th e  ligh t o f th e  review s of prob lem
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solving an d  d iscourse th e o ry  co n ta in ed  in  th e  n ex t tw o  sections, an d  also cen tre  d iscussion 
a ro u n d  a  p ro p o sed  m odel fo r th e  developm ent process p resen ted  in  th e  n ex t c h a p te r . W e 
will re s tr ic t a t te n tio n  to  th e  m icro-level, a n d  consider th e  w ays in  w hich technological 
ac tio n s, c a p tu re d  in  th e  fo rm  of ru les, a re  g ro u n d ed  in  th e  law s we derive from  scientific 
theories.
B unge identifies four k inds o f ru les th a t  govern  techno log ical ac tion ; ru les o f conduc t 
(such  as social b eh av io u r) , ru les o f th u m b , ru les of sign (such  as th e  g ra m m a r rules 
govern ing  lan g u ag e  an d  th e  sym bolic sy stem s of m a th e m a tic s )  an d  ru les of science. He 
asse rts  th a t
“A ru le  [of science] is g ro u n d ed  if  a n d  only  if  it  is b ased  on  a  se t o f law
form ulas capab le  o f acco u n tin g  for i ts  effectiveness” [B un74, p ag e  68].
H e fu r th e r  a sse rts  th a t  th e  success of m o d ern  technology  can  b e  a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  rep lace­
m en t of ru les o f th u m b  by  scientific rules an d  also to  th e  tre n d  to  derive new  g ro u n d ed  
rules from  scientific theories.
T h e  fac t th a t  m ak ing  “th e  step  from  th e o ry  to  p rac tice  is to  p roceed  from  an  u n d e rs ta n d ­
ing o f th e  a n tic ip a te d  consequences o f a  p a r tic u la r  p ro ced u re  to  a  co n cre te  d irec tive  for 
a c tio n ” has been  n o te d  by  R ap p  [R ap S l, pag e  59]. T h is s tep , how ever, involves ad ­
m ittin g  th e  techno log ist in  a  w ay th a t  ph ilosophers hav e  long  resis ted  w hen  considering  
science. “U n d e rs ta n d in g ” of th e  law  is req u ired  by  th e  tech n o lo g is t, a n d  th e  re su ltin g  
ac tions will be d irec ted  by  th is  su b jec tiv e  u n d e rs tan d in g . In  one sense th is  su b jec tiv ity  
is necessary , for th e  techno log ist m u s t be involved  in  an  ac tio n  fo r i t  to  be considered  
p a r t  o f technology. W e will refer to  th is  as p a r tia li ty  [Bun74, page  72]. In  a n o th e r  sense, 
how ever, we w ould like to  rem ove in d iv id u a l su b jec tiv ity  from  th e  process, rep lac ing  it 
by in te r-su b jec tiv e ly  te s ta b le  s ta te m e n ts , fo r th e n  we can  p rov ide  th e  pub lic  w ith  th e  
confidence in sp ired  by  a  p rofessional com m unity , r a th e r  th a n  a  collection  of h igh  p rie s ts . 
I t  is th e  red u c tio n  of th is  ty p e  o f su b je c tiv ity  th a t  b o th  G ries an d  H o are  a re  ad v o ca tin g  
in th e ir  p u b lica tio n s, b u t w hich N au r seem s to  suggest we can n o t achieve.
In th e  ligh t o f th is  d iscussion, is any  logic o f technology  req u ired  o th e r  th a n  th e  logic 
o f science? T h e  answ er seem s to  be  th a t  th e  logic of science is sufficient for th e  law s 
g ro u n d in g  th e  theo ries, b u t  if  we requ ire  th e  ab ility  to  b e  a n a ly tica l a b o u t th e  process 
o f g ro u n d in g  itse lf  and  also th e  selection  of ru les, th e n  we req u ire  a  logic capab le  of 
encom passing  b o th  scientific law s an d  techno log ica l ac tions. M oore suggests  th a t  we 
also need  to  consider th e  knowledge o f law s, for th e  ex istence o f law s alone is n o t enough  
to  exp la in  ac tions. F u rth e rm o re , we need  to  be aw are  th a t  know ledge is n o t s ta tic , and  
will change as we progress w ith  an y  p a r tic u la r  p rob lem  [Moo85]. T h e  sim pler logics 
of techno logy  o p e ra te  in a  w ay analogous to  th e  sep a ra tio n  o f p ro g ram s an d  d a ta  in 
co m p u te r  sy stem s. T h e  m ore  com plex logics allow  p ro g ram s (ru les) to  be a lte red  as d a ta  
[A lt89]. Since we are  n o t seeking to  be  scientific a b o u t th e  processes of technology , only 
to  allow  techno log ists  to  be scientific in  th e ir  ac tions, we will n o t consider th is  a sp ec t o f 
th e  p rob lem  fu rth e r . W e will re s tr ic t o u r a t te n tio n  to  a  very  sim ple logic re la tin g  ru les
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W e will c en tre  th is  discussion a ro u n d  a  scientific law  o f th e  fo rm  A  ==>• B . W e will use 
B u n g e ’s exam ple  to  p rov ide  a  p a r tic u la r  in te rp re ta tio n , and  call th is  law  L I.
LI If  th e  te m p e ra tu re  o f a  m ag n etized  b o d y  exceeds its  C urie p o in t th e n  it  becom es 
dem agnetized .
T h is  law  is p a r t  o f a  sim plified th eo ry , a n d  ignores m an y  asp ec ts  o f m ag n e tism , such  
as th e  ex istence of p a ra m a g n e tism . W e will assum e th a t  th e  decision to  use th is  th eo ry  
is ju stified  by th e  n a tu re  o f th e  p rob lem  being  considered. T h is  is a  com m only  used 
techno log ica l device:
“T h e  well estab lish ed  an d  logical ac tio n  to  w hich technology  owes i ts  efficiency 
is, as a  ru le , re s tr ic te d  to  only th e  im m ed ia te  technological t a s k [Rap81, 
page  135]
T h e  law  L I  p rovides th e  g roun d in g  for tw o p ra c tic a l rules
R l :  In  o rd e r to  d em agnetize  a  body , h e a t i t  to  above its  C urie p o in t.
R 2 :  To avoid dem agnetiz ing  a  b o d y  do n o t h e a t it  above its  C urie  p o in t.
W e can  sym bolise th ese  as B per A  an d  ->B per ~^A respectively , w here we read  per  as 
“by doing” . T h e  tra n s itio n s  from  A to  A  an d  from  B  to  B  reflect th e  fa c t th a t  A  an d  
B  a re  assertio n s w hereas A  an d  B  a re  ac tions. B unge does n o t m ake  th is  explic it in  his 
n o ta tio n , allow ing c o n tex t to  d isam b ig u a te  m ean ing .
R ules are  n o t t r u th  valued , b u t  th e y  m ay  b e  view ed as effective o r n o t effective2. T h is 
gives rise  to  a  th re e  valued  logic, u tilis ing  values for effective, ineffective an d  u n su re , 
b ecause  know ledge concern ing  th e  occu rrence  of A  and  B  does n o t necessarily  te ll us 
an y th in g  a b o u t th e  effectiveness of th e  ru le. In  p a r tic u la r , if  we do n o t ca rry  o u t A  th e n  
we can  say n o th in g  a b o u t th e  effectiveness of R l .
T his ra ises an  im p o r ta n t  p o in t concern ing  th e  re la tionsh ip  b e tw een  law s a n d  rules. T h e  
effectiveness o f a  ru le  can  te ll us n o th in g  a b o u t th e  “t r u th ” of a  law , a lth o u g h  its  inef­
fectiveness m ay  in d ica te  th e  fa lsity  o f th e  law . T h e  observ a tio n  th a t  an  o ccu rrence  o f A  
is accom pan ied  by  an  occurrence  o f B, for exam ple, does n o t te ll us t h a t  A  =>- B ,  for
th e  law  g ro u n d in g  th is  ru le  m ig h t be A  A B , B  = >  A , (A  A C )  = 4  B  o r an y  one o f an
infin ite  n u m b er of such  co n stru c tio n s . T h is  is sim ply a  re s ta te m e n t o f P o p p e r ’s o b se r­
v a tio n  on  re fu ta tio n . I t  does have  one significant im p lica tion  fo r S o ftw are  E ng ineering , 
how ever, w hich has never been  explicitly  n o ted . T h e  s ta r tin g  p o in t fo r m an y  designs 
in S oftw are E ng ineering  are  n o t law s b u t  ex isting  sets of p ro ced u res , w hich a re  to  be
2O f course, they m ay trivially be encapsulated to  form  assertions which will be truth valued.
to the laws that ground them [Bun74],
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im p ro v ed  u p o n  an d  a u to m a te d . T h is  m eans th a t  th e  S oftw are E ng ineer m u s t m ak e  th e  
tra n s itio n
{ E i ,  E 2, . . . E n }  * { E j ,  E 2, • • •R'm}
n o t
{ L i , L 2, . . .  L n} > { E i»E 2, . . .  E m}
as is o ften  suggested  (possib ly  e rroneously ) fo r tra d itio n a l eng ineering . A  m a jo r  con­
te n tio n  o f th is  thesis is th a t  th e  a p p ro p ria te  ro u te  for a  p rofessional engineer to  ta k e  is, 
in  sim plified fo rm ,
{ E i ,  E 2, . .  .R n} — ► { T i, L 2, . .  -L m} — 5- {EJ,, E J ,,. .  . E ' }
T h e  firs t tra n s itio n  rep resen tin g  th e  scientific ( th eo ry  c o n stru c tio n ) p h ase  o f th e  p rocess, 
an d  th e  second tra n s itio n  th e  engineering  ( th eo ry  im p lem en ta tio n ) p h ase . Feib lem an 
n o tes  th is  p o in t w hen he says
“Technology is m ore  a p t to  develop . . .  law s w hich a re  gen era liza tio n s of p ra c ­
tice  ra th e r  th a n  law s w hich a re  in tu ite d  an d  th e n  applied  to  p ra c tic e .” [Fei72, 
pag e  36]
a lth o u g h  he fails to  discuss w hy g enera lisa tions can  be  d is tingu ished  fro m  in tu ite d  law s: 
genera lisa tio n s w ould  seem  to  involve in tu itio n s  in  precisely th e  sam e w ays as scientific 
th eo ry  bu ild ing . T his id ea  fo rm s th e  basis for th e  m odel of sy stem  design developed in 
th e  n ex t ch ap te r.
T h e  ex istence  o f law  L I  is n o t a  sufficient cond ition  for th e  techn o lo g is t to  be ab le  to  
achieve goal B , for several obstac les m ay  p re sen t them selves. F ir s t ,  a c tio n  A  m ay  n o t be 
achievable w ith  c u rre n t technology. K now ing  “t h a t ” m ay  lead  to  a  know ledge o f “h o w ” , 
b u t th is  should  n o t be confused w ith  th e  ab ility  to  carry  th e  “how ” o u t. T h is  b a rrie r  m ay  
lead  th e  techno log ist to  consider p rob lem s w ith  subgoals o f A , in  o rd e r to  find  su itab le  
an teced en ts  o f n o m o p rag m a tic  s ta te m e n ts , such as A  per C. T h is  shou ld  involve th e  
techno log ist in  seeking co rrespond ing  law s on  w hich to  g ro u n d  th e  ru les , o r possib ly  in  
com m issioning a  sc ien tis t to  find th ese  law s. T h u s  th e  techno log ist uses theories in  th e  
p u rsu it of law  s ta te m e n ts . O nly in  th e  sim plest case will th e  tra n s it io n  above suffice; in  
genera l we m ig h t expect a  sequence o f g ro u n d ed  law s to  be necessary  to  com plete  th e  
tra n s itio n .
{R u R 2, . . . R n } — > { £ 1,X 2 l. . . L m} — >
— > {L'{, L 'i, . . . L ' l } . . . — * {R 'v ,R>T, . . . R ' r }
A second b a rrie r  th a t  m ay  arise  is th a t  law s a re  assoc ia ted  w ith  th eo rie s , an d  theories 
exp la in  only w ell-iso lated  su bsystem s o f th e  rea l w orld . A  th e o ry  m ay  well s ta n d  th e
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te s ts  o f re fu ta tio n  in  a  clinical la b o ra to ry , w here ex p erim en ts  can  be iso la ted  from  en­
v iro n m e n ta l in te rfe ren ce , b u t  u tilis in g  a  law  in  a  p ro d u c tio n  e n v iro n m en t requ ires th a t  
th e  en v iro n m en t c o n s titu te s  an  accep tab le  m odel of th e  theo ry . T h is  is w hy th e  ineffec­
tiveness of a  ru le  does n o t necessarily  re fu te  a  law , b u t m ay  in d ica te  t h a t  th e  scenario  
in  w hich th e  law  is be ing  app lied  is n o t a  sa tis fac to ry  m odel o f th e  th e o ry  being  used . 
M an y  m o d e rn  engineering  p rob lem s a re  rea lly  concerned  w ith  find ing  w ays o f m ak ing  
a  p ro d u c tio n  en v iro n m en t m odel a  th e o ry  ad equate ly . In  co m p u tin g , how ever, we have 
a  un u su a lly  h igh  degree o f co n tro l over o u r im m ed ia te  en v iro n m en t. H ard w are  is sus­
ceptib le  to  in te rfe rence  fro m  p hysica l a c tiv ity , b u t softw are can  usually  be  p ro te c te d . 
Indeed , one of th e  p ro p e rtie s  u sually  asso c ia ted  w ith  “goo d ” so ftw are  is th e  se p a ra tio n  
of m odules in to  w ell-p ro tec ted  u n its . If  G rie s’s law s of p ro g ram m in g  do  n o t ap p ly  th e n  
we can  usually  tra c e  th e  p rob lem  to  e rro rs  in  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  of a n o th e r  technological 
a r tifa c t, only ra re ly  do prob lem s arise due to  to  fac to rs  w hich a re  b ey o n d  o u r im m ed ia te  
con tro l.
3.2 Problem Solving
P ro b lem  solving, like technology , is a n o th e r  a re a  th a t  is fu n d a m e n ta l to  m an y  h u m an  
ac tiv itie s , b u t  h as  never been  s tu d ied  in  a  un ilied  way. H istorically  th e re  a re  tw o s tra n d s  
to  th e  l i te ra tu re  of p ro b lem  solving. F irs t  th e re  is th e  m a th e m a tic a l s tr a n d  discussing how  
m a th e m a tic ia n s  solve prob lem s; th is  is typ ified  by  th e  th e  w orks o f D esca rte s , P o in ca re  
an d  P o ly a . Second th e re  is th e  psychology of p rob lem  solving, w hich  is in tim a te ly  linked  
to  th e  s tu d y  o f th o u g h t itself. T h is  has its  beg inn ings in  ph ilosophy, such  as A r is to tle ’s 
th ree  law s of learn in g  an d  m em ory  th a t  gave rise to  assoc ia tion ism , b u t  b eg an  as an  
e x p e rim en ta l science in  th e  la te  n in e te e n th  c en tu ry  w ith  th e  w ork  o f psycho log ists such 
as Jam es [Jam 90] an d  W u n d t [W un73].
R ecen tly  th e re  has been  a  confluence o f th ese  tw o  s tra n d s , b u t  th is  h as  been  accom ­
pan ied  by th e  developm ent of a  n u m b er of ap p lica tions lead ing  to  a  d ivergence in  th e  
l i te ra tu re . T h e  o rig inal ph ilosoph ical a.nd psychological in te n tio n s  o f increasing  know l­
edge and  u n d e rs ta n d in g  still p e rs is t, b u t  in  a d d itio n  th e re  have  been  developm ents in 
teach in g  p rob lem  solving (b o th  dom ain  in d ep en d en tly  an d  dom ain  specifically ), using th e  
re su lts  of research  to  im prove th e  heu ris tics  on  various p rob lem  d o m ain s, using  p rob lem  
solving as a  s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism  w ith in  ph ilosophy  itself, an d  developing co m p u te r 
system s capab le  of solving p rob lem s. M any  o f th ese  issues will b e  d e a lt w ith  in  d e ta il in  
la te r  c h ap te rs , as th ey  a re  d irec tly  re lev an t to  th e  discussion o f m e th o d s  a n d  im prov ing  
pedagog ical p rac tice . In  th is  sec tion  we will lay  th e  fo u n d a tio n s by  in tro d u c in g  te rm in o l­
ogy an d  discussing som e o f th e  basic  ideas com m on to  all th e  ap p ro ach es. In  p a r tic u la r , 
we shou ld  n o te  th a t  th e  te rm  “prob lem  solving” should  s tric tly  be “p rob lem  a tte m p tin g ” , 
for it  refers n o t only to  successful a c tiv ity  b u t to  all a c tiv ity  w ith  th e  goal o f so lu tion . W e 
will re s tr ic t discussion here  to  in d iv id u a l p rob lem  solving, de lay ing  d iscussion o f g roup  
ac tiv itie s  u n til C h a p te r  Seven.
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A ny discussion o f h u m a n  p ro b lem  solving m u s t lead  us in to  th e  rea lm  of psychology, 
110 m a t te r  how  well disguised th is  excursion  m ay  be. In  seeking to  ask  how  people  solve 
prob lem s we are  effectively ask ing  how  people  th in k  an d  how  th is  th o u g h t p rocess governs 
ac tio n . F or th e  pu rp o ses of th is  th esis , we will a d o p t C la rk ’s view  th a t  i t  is reaso n ab le  to  
p a r ti t io n  th e  consid era tio n  o f h u m a n  th o u g h t in to  tw o p a r ts , th e  “m in d ’s eye view ” and  
th e  “b ra in ’s eye view ” [Cla89]. As C lark  p u ts  i t ,  “T h e  m in d ’s eye view g en era tes  m odels 
b ased  on  o u r in tu itiv e  ideas a b o u t th e  k ind  o f sem an tic  o b jec t over w hich c o m p u ta tio n a l 
o p e ra tio n s  need  to  be  defined .” . T h e  b ra in ’s eye view , on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , seeks m odels 
o f th o u g h t th a t  a re  d irec tly  re la te d  to  theo ries o f th e  w ay th e  physica l b ra in  o p e ra tes .
W e will re s tr ic t a t te n tio n  to  th e  m in d ’s eye view , th u s  igno ring  how  people  ac tu a lly  
th in k , considering only m odels th a t  a rise  o u t o f th e  sem an tic  p ro p e rtie s  o f th e  w orld  
being considered . O ne side-effect o f th is  decision is th a t  we will n o t p a y  m uch  a tte n tio n  
to  connection ist m odels o f th o u g h t, w hich have  largely  arisen  o u t o f neurobiology. W e 
will only consider th e  m ore  tra d itio n a l m odels based  on an  in fo rm a tio n  p rocessing  view 
o f th o u g h t. A lth o u g h  th is  re s tr ic tio n  u n d o u b ted ly  rem oves m u ch  o f in te re s t  from  th e  
d iscussion, th e  s ta te  o f th e  a r t  in  th e  philosophies of science an d  engineering , is still 
b ased  largely  011 in fo rm atio n  p rocessing  m odels u tilis ing  von N eu m an n  a rc h ite c tu re s , as 
a re  th e  cu rren t design m e th o d s  in  S oftw are E ngineering . I t  is ce rta in ly  in te re s tin g  to  
ask w h a t a  connection ist design m e th o d  m ig h t look like, o r w h e th e r a  life cycle m ig h t 
be rep laced  by  a  life ne tw o rk , b u t  re lu c ta n tly  th ese  questions hav e  to  be  deferred  u n til a  
la te r  d a te .
T h e  decision to  a d o p t only a  tra d itio n a l m in d ’s eye view does in v ite  one m a jo r  critic ism , 
how ever, nam ely  th a t  we are  em b rac in g  “folk psychology” . W e a re , i t  m ig h t be  said , 
accep ting  ou r in tu itiv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of people  in  te rm s of ac tio n s such  as w an tin g , 
hop ing , believing, an d  also accep ting  th e  concept o f a  s ta te  o f m ind . In  m an y  w ays folk 
psychology is analogous to  H ayes’s N aive P hysics [IIay78] [Hay85] th a t  allow s us to  ex ist 
in  th e  rea l w orld . In  th is  case, how ever, we a re  able to  ra tio n a lise  p eo p le ’s observable  
b eh av io u r in  te rm s o f conven ien t devices such  as belief.
T h e  ad o p tio n  of folk psychology has been  criticised  on m an y  occasions. C hu rch lan d  
[Chu81] an d  S titch  [Sti83], fo r exam ple , ra ise  th e  following o b jec tio n s. F ir s t ,  folk p sy ­
chology fails to  explain  b eh av io u r o u ts id e  of ce rta in  norm s. I t  is cu ltu ra lly  specific an d  
does n o t add ress p rob lem s such  as m adness, senility , o r th e  b eh av io u r o f very  young  
ch ildren . T h is  o b jec tio n  need  n o t concern  u s, for we are  in te re s te d  in  a  re s tr ic te d  d o ­
m ain  o f ap p lica tio n , a n d  ou r p rob lem  solvers com prise a  fa irly  hom ogeneous professional 
body . W e m ay  well fail to  ad d ress  issues such  as th e  b eh av io u r o f th e  p sy ch o tic  so ftw are 
engineer w ho de libera te ly  se ts  o u t to  sab o tag e  a  p ro je c t, b u t i t  w as never o u r in te n t 
to  cover such m a tte rs . T h e  second o b jec tio n  is th a t  folk psychology is a  sterile  theo ry . 
I t  does n o t lead  on to  bo ld  con jec tu res a n d  possib le re fu ta tio n . T h is  is u n d o u b ted ly  a  
sign ifican t critic ism  for psycho log ists, b u t  we are  using th e  th e o ry  as an  in s tru m e n ta l 
s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism  for a  d iscussion. T h e  th ird  ob jec tio n  is th a t  folk psychology  fails 
to  p rov ide  a  th eo ry  th a t  cu ts  th e  w orld  a t  its  n a tu ra l  jo in ts , th u s  i t  does n o t in te g ra te  
well w ith  th e  physica l sciences, an d  in  p a r tic u la r  w ith  biology an d  th e  n eu ra l sciences.
64
A gain , such  in te g ra tio n  is o u ts id e  o f o u r re m it, so th e  critic ism  need  n o t concern  us here . 
O f m ore  significance, how ever, is th e  o b serv a tio n  th a t  folk psychology  does a p p e a r  to  cu t 
S oftw are  E ngineering  a t  its  “a rtific ia l jo in ts ” . C oncep ts such  as m em ory , in fo rm atio n  
p rocessing , an d  req u irem en ts  (w an ts  o r ob liga tions) are  p re sen t in  b o th  th e  p rob lem s as 
p re sen ted  an d  also in  th e  so lu tions as im p lem en ted . T h is is n o t su rp ris in g  since Softw are 
E ngineering  is an  a r tifa c t th a t  h as  a risen  rap id ly  u n d er th e  influence of h u m an s w ho 
h av e  accep ted  folk psychology unselfconsciously, an d  it  has n o t y e t reach ed  th e  s tag e  of 
m a tu r i ty  w here such  in h e ren t a ssu m p tio n s have  been  w idely c ritic ised . T h e  p osition ing  
o f th e se  artific ia l jo in ts  m ay  n o t be  accep ted  fo r ever, of course: questio n s such as how  
life cycle m odels re la te  to  th e  design o f n eu ra l n e tw orks, fo r exam ple , m ay  well cause 
rad ica l re th in k in g  o f th e  w ay we p a r ti t io n  th e  engineering process.
C lark  [C la89, pages 37-59] p resen ts  a  com prehensive case fo r using  folk psychology in 
c ircu m stan ces w here th ese  o b jec tio n s can  be  overcom e. He concludes th a t
“T h u s  co n stru ed , folk psychology is designed to  be in sensitive  to  any  differ­
ences in  s ta te s  in  th e  head  th a t  do n o t issue in  differences o f q u ite  coarse­
g ra in ed  beh av io u r. I t  p ap e rs  over th e  differences b e tw een  ind iv id u a ls  an d  
even over differences betw een  species. I t  does so because  its  p u rp o se  is to  
p rov ide  a  g enera l fram ew ork  in  w hich gross p a tte rn s  in  th e  b eh av io u r of 
m an y  o th e r  w ell-ad ap ted  beings m ay  b e  identified  an d  exp lo ited . T h e  fa ilu re  
o f folk psychology to  fix on , say, neuropliysio logically  w ell-defined s ta te s  of 
h u m a n  beings is th u s  a  v ir tu e , n o t a  v ice.” [page 48]
O ne fu r th e r  critic ism  th a t  m ig h t b e  levelled ag a in s t ou r ad o p tio n  o f folk psychology in 
th is  thesis  is th a t  o u r goal of im prov ing  ed u ca tio n a l p rac tice  m eans t h a t  we should be  
in te re s te d  in how  people ac tu a lly  solve prob lem s, n o t m erely  in  a b s tra c t  m odels, because  
we w an t to  change th e  rea l w orld . T h is is an  in te re s tin g  critic ism  because  it  ra ises 
th e  q uestion  as to  how  im p o rta n t an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  w ay th e  b ra in  w orks is to  
te ach e rs . C erta in ly  w e w ould expec t m o to r  m echanics to  h av e  som e u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
how  a  car w orks before th e y  a t te m p t  to  im prove perfo rm ance, so w hy  n o t expect teach ers  
to  u n d e rs ta n d  how  th e  b ra in  w orks. In  th e  p a s t ,  te ach e rs , o f necessity , hav e  tre a te d  
th e  b ra in  like a  b lack  b o x  in to  w hich  so m eth ing  is to  be im p lan ted . T h is im p lan tin g  
h as  ta k e n  place w ith o u t co n sid era tio n  o f th e  in te rn a l w orking o f th e  b o x , m ain ly  using 
tr ie d  an d  t ru s te d  techn iques, occasionally  influenced by  c u rre n t psychological theories. 
If  th is  s itu a tio n  w ere to  change rad ically , so th a t  teach e rs  becom e n e u ra l engineers, th e  
consequences w ould be  so fa r  reach ing  for ed u ca tio n  th a t  th is  thesis  w ould  becom e to ta lly  
irre lev an t, consequen tly  such  an  e v en tu a lity  will n o t be considered  here . I t  is a t  th is  s tag e , 
o f course , th a t  th e  tru e  re la tio n s  b e tw een  S oftw are E ngineering  an d  E d u c a tio n  w ould  
becom e ap p a ren t!  T h e  req u irem en ts  o f e d u ca tio n  could be  specified by  a  c lien t, designed 
a n d  im p lem en ted  by  a  “te a c h e r” , using  a  p e rso n  as th e  ta rg e t m ach ine . As H uxley an d  
O rw ell, am o n g st o th e rs , have  n o te d , th e  techn ica l p rob lem s posed  by  such  a  scenario  
w ould  be  th e  le a s t o f o u r w orries. W e will re tu rn  to  th is  q uestion  in  C h a p te r  Seven.
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W h a t is a P rob lem ?
A nalysis o f th e  concep t o f a  p rob lem  is a n o th e r  com plex ta sk , an d  one th a t  we will avoid  
h ere  by  accep tin g  M ay e r’s use o f th e  te rm . He describes th re e  c h a rac te ris tic s  th a t  all 
p rob lem s possess [M ay83, page  4]
1. G w e n s- th e  in fo rm a tio n , s ta te s  o f o b je c ts , e tc . in h e ren t in  th e  p ro b lem  as posed .
2. (jo a /s-re flec t a  desired  s ta te  in  w hich  th e  prob lem  can  be  consiered  solved. C on­
scious th o u g h t m u s t b e  involved  in  reach ing  th e  goal s ta te  from  th e  given s itu a tio n .
3. O bstacles-the  th in k e r  m u s t n o t a lread y  know  th e  exact ro u te  fro m  th e  givens to  th e  
goals, b u t  m u s t use th e  facilities a t  his o r h e r d isposal to  n a v ig a te  ro u n d  obstacles.
A n  im p o r ta n t  p o in t to  n o te  is th a t  p rob lem s m u st involve conscious th o u g h t. B rea th in g , 
fo r exam ple , does n o t pose a  p rob lem  unless th e  obstac les p re sen t req u ire  th o u g h t to  
overcom e th em . Follow ing on fro m  th is  is th e  o bserva tion  th a t ,  if  w e accep t M ay e r’s 
c rite r ia , a  p rob lem  fo r one person  m ay  n o t be a  p rob lem  for som eone else. T h e  ta sk  o f 
finding a  chess defence in  response  to  a  p a r tic u la r  opening  m ay  p re sen t a  p rob lem  to  a  
novice, b u t  b e  a  sim ple m em ory  exercise to  a  m a s te r . T h o m as n o tes  t h a t  we should  also 
include th e  desire to  overcom e obstac les an d  hence achieve som e goal in  o u r defin ition  of 
a  p rob lem . He observes th a t  “th e  four-co lour th eo rem  w as never “a  p ro b lem ” ; i t  w as a  
p ro b lem  only  fo r som e peop le” [Tho89, pag e  318].
W ith in  such a  defin ition , a  n u m b er of tax o n o m ies of p rob lem s h av e  been  suggested . 
R e itm a n  [Rei65], for exam ple , classifies p rob lem s accord ing  to  th e  degree of precision 
p re sen t in  th e  s ta te d  g ivens an d  goals. T h e  c u rre n t s ta te  o f C o m p u tin g  is such th a t  
technology  can only be used  to  solve problem s w here b o th  th e  g ivens a n d  th e  goals are  
very  specific an d  expressed  in very  sim plistic  te rm s . M ost c lien ts ’ p rob lem s, how ever, 
a re  p resen ted  w ith o u t th is  degree o f p recision , an d  th e  ta sk  o f th e  so ftw are  engineer 
can  be  view ed as tran sfo rm in g  th e  orig inal p rob lem  fo rm u la tio n  in to  one th e  techno logy  
can  h and le . T h is  ta sk  will usually  involve tra n s la tio n , in te rp re ta tio n , re s tr ic tio n  an d  
re fin em en t, am o n g st o th e r  devices.
P e a r l p re sen ts  a  classification  based  on  th e  ty p e  of goal g iven. A  goal p re sen ted  as 
a  sim ple se t m em bersh ip  (such  as th e  e igh t queens p rob lem ) gives rise  to  a  satisficing 
p rob lem . A goal w hich requ ires finding th e  su p rem u m  of som e o rd e red  set gives rise to  
a n  o p tim isa tio n  prob lem . A  goal th a t  involves finding values fro m  a  g iven set w ith in  
som e n e ig h b o u rh o o d  of th e  su p rem u m  is called a  sem i-op tim isa tion  p rob lem . T h is class 
can be fu r th e r  su b d iv ided  in to  n ea r-o p tim isa tio n  p rob lem s, w here th e  value fo u n d  m u st 
fall within, th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d , an d  ap p ro x im a te -o p tim isa tio n  p rob lem s, w here th e  value 
fo u n d  m u s t fall w ith in  th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  w ith  som e given p ro b ab ility . C learly  S oftw are 
E ng ineering  involves prob lem s o f all o f th ese  k inds. C orrec tness, for exam ple , is generally  
p resen ted  as a  satisfic ing  p rob lem , w hereas efficient im p lem en ta tio n  is u sually  a  sem i­
o p tim isa tio n  prob lem . O ne p o in t we shou ld  n o te  here  is th a t  o p tim isa tio n  is carried  o u t 
over som e set (w hich we will call th e  sa tis fac tio n  se t) . If a  p rob lem  involves b o th  k inds
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of goals (such  as finding a  co rrec t an d  efficient im p lem en ta tio n ) th e n  th e  sa tisfac tio n  
p ro b lem  logically tak es  p recedence over th e  o p tim isa tio n  prob lem . T h e re  a re  a  n u m b er 
o f possib le  techn iques we can  use to  com bine th ese  p rob lem  ty p e s , such  as find ing  a  
c h a ra c te ris tic  co rrec t so lu tion  an d  th e n  app ly ing  tra n sfo rm a tio n s  to  find  a  sem i-op tim ised  
so lu tio n , finding th e  satisfic ing  se t a n d  deriv ing  an  a p p ro p ria te  se lec to r fu n c tio n , o r using  
th e  o p tim isa tio n  p rob lem  to  guide th e  search  for so lu tions to  th e  sa tis fac tio n  p rob lem , 
th u s  allow ing us to  c o n s tru c t su b se ts  o f th e  sa tis fac tio n  se t. I t  is difficult to  u n d e rs ta n d , 
how ever, w h a t i t  w ould  m ean  to  tack le  th e  o p tim isa tio n  p rob lem  firs t: find ing  th e  b es t 
w rong answ er seem s po in tless.
A  n u m b e r o f o th e r  classifications h av e  been  suggested . B h ask ar a n d  S im on hav e  d is tin ­
gu ished  b e tw een  sem an tica lly  rich  a n d  sem an tica lly  im poverished  p rob lem s depend ing  on 
th e  degree o f re levan t know ledge th e  solver possesses a b o u t th e  p ro b lem  dom ain  [BS77]. 
M unson  identifies a  sp e c tru m  o f p rob lem  ty p es  for pedagogical p u rp o ses  [M un88].
open -ended  = >  egg race  = >  cu rricu lum  ded ica ted  closed
O pen-ended  p rob lem s have a  v a rie ty  o f accep tab le  so lu tions due to  loosely defined goals. 
E gg  race  p rob lem s have a  v a rie ty  of so lu tions, b u t  qu ite  specific goals. C u rricu lu m  ded ­
ica ted  p rob lem s a re  set w ith  g ivens, goals an d  obstac les th a t  a re  in tim a te ly  tied  to  th e  
in te n tio n s  o f th e  teach er. C losed p rob lem s have specific goals an d  also a  very  re s tr ic te d  
n u m b e r of accep tab le  so lu tions. I t  is also com m on to  d istingu ish  b e tw een  ad v e rsa ry  and  
n o n -ad v ersa ry  prob lem s. In  ad v e rsa ry  p rob lem s th e re  is a  ra tio n a l o p p o n en t try in g  to  
defea t th e  p rob lem  solver. W e w ill assum e th a t  th e  so ftw are  eng ineer is never faced 
w ith  p rob lem s of th is  k ind , a lth o u g h  th is  is an  oversim plification . P ro b lem s m o tiv a ted  
by m ilita ry  app lica tions an d  a t te m p ts  to  es tab lish  secu rity  system s m ay  all be  carried  
o u t in  hostile  en v iro n m en ts . E ven  sy stem  design in  th e  com m ercial sec to r m ay  som e­
tim es a p p e a r  to  th e  engineer to  be ad v ersary , p a rticu la rly  w hen  th e  u sers o r clien ts feel 
th re a te n e d  by  th e  p ro jec t!  W e will re tu rn  to  th e  n o tio n  o f “th r e a t” in  C h a p te r  Seven.
W e can  also iden tify  a  p rob lem  classification  d e te rm in ed  by  th e  so ftw are  engineering 
so lu tions th ey  give rise to . L ehm an  [Leh80] iden tified  th ree  ty p es  o f p ro g ra m , an d  Pfleeger 
e x ten d ed  th is  classification  to  system s [Pfl87, pages 375-379]. W e will ex ten d  th e  id ea  
still fu r th e r , an d  use th e  classification for th e  problem s them selves. L ike all classifications, 
o f course , th is  is ail a b s tra c tio n , an d  th u s  sim plifies th e  s itu a tio n  a n d  c rea tes  b o u n d aries  
w here convenien t ra th e r  th a n  w here ac tu a lly  p resen t.
A n S-Problem  is one th a t  we can  solve exactly , and  for all tim e . F o r exam ple , th e  ta sk  
of in v e rtin g  a  m a tr ix  is an  S -P ro h lem . T h e  defin ition  of m a trices  a n d  th e ir  inversion  is 
unlikely  to  change. T h e  im p lem en ta tio n  of th e  so lu tion  m ay  well change w ith  technology, 
o f course, b u t  th e  specification  o f an  accep tab le  so lu tion  to  th e  p ro b lem  is in v a ria n t.
I t  is o ften  possib le , how ever, to  u n d e rs ta n d  a  prob lem  well en ough  to  know  exactly  
w h a t needs to  b e  done to  solve i t ,  b u t  to  realise  th a t  im p lem en tin g  th e  so lu tio n  is n o t 
feasib le using  cu rre n t technology . C onsequen tly  we do n o t specify an  e x ac t so lu tion  to  
th e  p rob lem , b u t  we a b s tra c t  from  th e  p rob lem  a  sim pler m odel th a t  we can  solve, in
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th e  e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  a  so lu tion  to  th is  sim pler case will be an  accep tab le  ap p ro x im a tio n  
to  th e  so lu tion  of th e  orig inal p rob lem . Such a  p rob lem  w e will call a  P -P roblem , as 
its  so lu tio n  is based  on  a  practical a b s tra c tio n . T h e  classical exam ples o f such  p rob lem s 
a re  u sually  fou n d  in  A rtific ia l In telligence, such  as th e  design o f chess p lay ing  system s. 
T h e  sim plified m odel o f th e  p rob lem  we devise can b e  tre a te d  as a  S -P ro b le m , so we 
could  consider th e  ta sk  o f m odel selection  as g iving rise  to  a  sequence o f S -P ro b lem s 
th a t  develops alongside technology.
S -P ro b le m s an d  P -P ro b le m s  a re  b o th  posed  in  an  app lica tio n  do m ain  th a t  is ta k e n  as 
fa irly  s ta tic . T h a t  is, we assum e th a t  th e  th e o ry  of m a trice s  an d  th e  ru les o f chess a re  
fixed. F or m an y  p rob lem s, how ever, th is  a ssu m p tio n  of an  in v a ria n t p ro b lem  dom ain  is 
a  gross sim plification . T h e  ta sk s  o f p rov id ing  an  accep tab le  m a n ag em en t in fo rm atio n  
sy stem  or designing a  rea l-tim e  co n tro l sy stem  for a  developing p la n t a re  exam ples of 
co n tinuously  chang ing  p rob lem s. T h ese  involve th e  design o f system s th a t  to  be  embedded 
w ith in  an  obviously  chang ing  w orld . W e will refer to  such p rob lem s as E -P roblem s . 
T h ese  give rise to  th e  com plexities o f so ftw are m a in ten an ce , w here a  sy s tem  has to  be 
m a in ta in e d  as a  so lu tion  to  th e  c u rre n t s ta te  o f th e  problem .
A final classification  is th a t  b e tw een  ro u tin e  p rob lem s, requ iring  “rep ro d u c tiv e  th in k in g ” , 
an d  n o n ro u tin e  p rob lem s, requ iring  “p ro d u c tiv e  th in k in g ” [W er59j. T h e  p o in t is o ften  
m ade  th a t  teach in g  em phasizes rep ro d u c tiv e  th in k in g  by se ttin g , a n d  assessing, ro u tin e  
p rob lem s [D un45], b u t i t  is clear th a t  m an y  p rob lem s en co u n te red  by  so ftw are  engineers 
a re  n o n ro u tin e . O ne view o f so-called design  m eth o d s (o r m ethodo log ies) is th a t  th ey  
seek to  p rov ide  ro u tin es  for n o n ro u tin e  prob lem s. I t  will be  a rg u ed  th a t  th is  ap p ro ach  is 
doom ed  to  fail unless th e  m e th o d  also serves to  ed u ca te  th e  p rob lem  server. I t  will fu r th e r  
be a rg u ed  th a t  in  g enera l th is  is an  ineffective an d  inefficient ap p ro ach  to  ed u ca tio n .
M odels of Ind iv idual P rob lem  Solving
O ne o f th e  c e n tra l questions of psychology is how  people ac tu a lly  th in k  w hen th ey  are  
solving prob lem s. T h is has re su lted  in  a  n u m b er o f m odels o f th in k in g , th e  m a jo r  classes 
o f w hich, using  M ay er’s head ings [M ay83], a re  briefly review ed below . T h is  top ic  is 
clearly  re lev an t to  th e  ta sk  o f im prov ing  pedagog ical p rac tice , b u t  it  is also re levan t 
to  th e  questions of m e th o d s  an d  th eo ries , fo r th e  view we ta k e  o f  th in k in g  affects th e  
p ro p e rtie s  we requ ire  in  design m e th o d s  an d  specification  techn iques.
A s s o c ia t io n i s m
A ssociation ism  has its  ro o ts  in  A ris to tle ’s th re e  law s of lea rn ing  a n d  m em ory  th a t  seek to  
exp la in  th o u g h t in  te rm s  o f ideas an d  associa tions betw een  th em . T h e  th re e  ty p es  of as­
socia tions iden tified  w ere th o se  o f space an d  tim e , s im ila rity  an d  c o n tra s t . T h is  id ea  w as 
developed by  Locke an d  H obbs in  th e  sev en teen th  an d  e ig h teen th  cen tu rie s  to  include th e  
n o tio n s  o f a to m ism  (ideas a re  a to m s linked  by  asso c ia tio n s), m ech an isa tio n  (m ovem ent 
b e tw een  ideas is d e te rm in ed  a u to m a tica lly  by  th e  s tre n g th s  o f th e  a sso c ia tio n s), em p iri­
68
cism  (all ideas an d  associa tions a rise  from  sensory  p e rcep tio n s), an d  im ag ery  (since each  
id ea  is th e  re su lt o f sensory  p e rcep tio n , m ovem ent b e tw een  ideas m u s t b e  u n d e rs ta n d a b le  
in th ese  te rm s , such  as a  v isual im age).
T h o rn d ik e ’s w ork  o n  ca ts  in  puzzle boxes w as ta k e n  as endorsing  assoc ia tion ism , for 
he fo u n d  th a t  c a ts  re sp o n d  to  p rob lem s by  a  process o f tr ia l  an d  e rro r  [ T h o ll j .  W ith  
p rac tice , ce rta in  unsuccessfu l responses becom e less com m on a n d  th e  m ore  successful 
a re  tr ie d  earlie r in  th e  process. T h is su p p o rte d  th e  m odel o f p rob lem  solving th a t  h a d  
th e  p rob lem  s itu a tio n  ( th e  s tim u lu s) asso c ia ted  w ith  a  n u m b er o f responses (o r p rob lem  
solving b eh av io u rs), w ith  th e  responses o rd e red  by  som e n o tio n  of s tre n g th . U nder th is  
m odel, lea rn in g  is largely  a  m a t te r  o f a d ju s tin g  s tre n g th s  in  th e  lig h t o f experience.
In  its  p u re  fo rm , th e  asso c ia tio n is t m odel fails to  explain  th e  w ays in  w hich  in sig h t can  
lead  s tra ig h t to  a  co rrec t resp o n se  w ith o u t such a  p e rio d  o f lea rn ing . T o overcom e th is  
deficiency, th e  n o tio n  o f covert responses w as ad d ed , allow ing u n d e te c ta b le  responses to  
occur as th e  resu lt o f m ind  ex p erim en ts  u n til  th e  correct response  w as iden tified  an d  
perfo rm ed  overtly . A  g re a t deal o f re sea rch  has been  conducted  to  d e te c t th ese  supposed  
covert responses, an d  i t  has been  suggested  th a t  th ey  m ig h t b e  lo ca ted  in  th e  m uscles or 
th e  b ra in , b u t 110 conclusive evidence h as  been  p resen ted .
O ne of th e  im p o r ta n t re su lts  to  com e o u t o f th e  a ssoc ia tion ist m odel o f p rob lem  solving 
is th e  id ea  of a  p rob lem  solving se t. I t  is clear th a t  a  so lver’s asso c ia tio n  h ie ra rch y  will 
b e  d e te rm in ed  by  p a s t experience, b u t  less obvious th a t  th e  h ie ra rch y  will b e  d o m in a ted  
by  experiences ju s t  p rio r to  th e  ta sk . T h is  has been  ta k e n  to  im ply  th a t  severa l h ie r­
arch ies m ay  ex ist, an d  recen t experience m ay  be th e  p rim e d e te rm in a n t in  selecting  th e  
a p p ro p ria te  h ie ra rch y  [Ma.155, pag e  281]. Such a  set is useful in  solving re p e titiv e  ro u tin e  
p rob lem s, b u t  m ay  prove a  m a jo r  h u rd le  in  tack lin g  n o n ro u tin e  p rob lem s. M any  o f th e  
heu ris tics  suggested  for im prov ing  p rob lem  solving p erfo rm ance  a re  a t te m p ts  to  rem ove 
th is  p rob lem  solving se t w hen tack lin g  n o n ro u tin e  problem s.
Gestaltism
T h e  G e s ta ltis ts  c o n c e n tra te  on  an  o rg an isa tio n a l view of p rob lem  solving. F o r th e m , a  
prob lem  is solved by ach iev ing  a  s tru c tu ra l  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  g ivens an d  th e  w ays in 
w hich th ey  m ay  be reorgan ised  to  m eet th e  goals. T h e  u n it o f th o u g h t has th u s  sh ifted  
from  being  an  associa tion  to  being  a  s tru c tu ra l  o rg an isa tio n , an d  a c tiv ity  fro m  being  tria ls  
of responses to  tr ia ls  o f reo rg an isa tio n . I t  shou ld  be n o ted , how ever, th a t  associa tion ism  
co n cen tra tes  on  expla in ing  rep ro d u c tiv e  p rob lem  solving, w hereas G es ta ltism  is p rim arily  
concerned  w ith  p ro d u c tiv e  p rob lem  solving. T h e  sy m p to m s o f p ro b lem  solving se t a re  
also recognised in  G esta ltism , b u t  here  th e y  a re  explained  in te rm s  o f fu n c tio n a l fixedness. 
If  a  com p o n en t becom es, in  th e  m ind , b o u n d  in to  a  p a r tic u la r  ro le  in  a  p rob lem , th e n  th e  
solver has difficulty in  seeing reo rg an isa tio n s in w hich th e  com p o n en t a d o p ts  a  rad ica lly  
d ifferen t role.
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Meaning Theory
In  G esta ltism , th e  o rg an isa tio n  o f a  p rob lem  s itu a tio n  is in h e re n t in  th e  com ponen ts 
of th e  p rob lem , an d  th e  solver is seeking re la tionsh ips in te rn a l to  th e  p rob lem . In  th e  
m ean in g  th eo ry  m odel, how ever, th e  solver is seeking to  a ssim ila te  th e  p re sen ted  p rob lem  
to  sc h e m a ta  a lready  held  in  m em ory . U n d er th is  view , solving p rob lem s involves n o t 
only reo rg an isa tio n  to  m a tc h  an  ex isting  schem a, b u t  also in te rp re ta t io n  of th e  p resen t 
p rob lem  in  te rm s of th e  co m p o n en ts  o f th e  schem a.
T h e re  is evidence th a t  clues g iven reg a rd in g  p rob lem  s itu a tio n s  sign ifican tly  a lte r  th e  
assim ila tio n  process. B ran sfo rd  an d  Jo h n so n  [BJ72], fo r exam ple , fo u n d  th a t  th e  com ­
prehension  of te x t  w as g rea tly  im proved  by  th e  p rovision  of a  tit le  for th e  piece before 
read in g , b u t  p rov id ing  a  t i t le  a f te r  read in g  led to  little  im p ro v em en t. M ayer [May75] 
app lied  a  sim ilar ex p erim en t to  th e  lea rn in g  o f a  p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e , th e  re su lts  of 
w hich  a re  d iscussed in  a  la te r  ch a p te r . T h e re  is also evidence th a t  im ag ery  p lays a  sig­
n ifican t p a r t  in  th e  a ssim ila tion  process. T ra n s la tio n  o f “b e t te r ” in to  sp a tia l te rm s of 
“ab o v e” , for exam ple , seem s to  lead  to  an  im provem en t o f p rob lem  solving perfo rm an ce  
[DLH65]. I t  is fu r th e r  suggested  th a t  in te g ra te d  im ages lead  to  b e t te r  p erfo rm an ce  th a n  
piecew ise re p re se n ta tio n  of p rob lem  com ponen ts.
A usubel [Aus68] an d  G reeno  [Gre73] iden tify  tw o  d ifferent k inds o f schem a. M eaningfu l 
(o r p ro p o sitio n a l) sch e m a ta  c o n ta in  concep ts, w hereas ro te  (o r a lg o rith m ic) sc h e m a ta  
c o n ta in  rules for o p e ra tin g  on  concep ts. A ssim ila tion  in to  ro te  sc h e m a ta  seem s to  lead  
to  a  b e tte r  p rob lem  solving p erfo rm an ce  on rep ro d u c tiv e  p rob lem s, b u t  to  p o o re r p e rfo r­
m ance on p ro d u c tiv e  prob lem s. A ssim ila tion  in to  m eaningfu l sc h e m a ta , how ever, leads 
to  b e t te r  perfo rm an ce  on p ro d u c tiv e  p erfo rm an ce, b u t n o t such  a  good  rep ro d u c tiv e  
p rob lem  solving perfo rm ance.
T h is  evidence suggests t h a t  th e  in itia l p e rcep tio n  of a  p rob lem  is crucia l in  de te rm in in g  
p ro b lem  solving p erfo rm ance  for d ifferen t k inds o f p roblem s. T h is  is c learly  of significance 
to  th e  ta sk  o f teach in g  p rob lem  solving, b u t it  is also im p o r ta n t for th e  a c tiv ity  of w ritin g  
specifications. I t  has been  n o te d  th a t  m ak ing  prob lem s descrip tions co n cre te  in  d ifferent 
w ays leads to  different m e th o d s  o f so lu tion , indeed , m an y  o f th e  heu ris tic s  suggested  
for im prov ing  p rob lem  solving p e rfo rm an ce  a re  based  on th e  id ea  o f find ing  a p p ro p ria te  
rep re se n ta tio n s  an d  im ages. If  we accep t th a t  specifications of req u irem en ts  an d  designs 
a re  b o th  s ta te m e n ts  of p rob lem s to  be solved th e n  we should  expec t t h a t  different w ays of 
p resen tin g  a  specification  will lead  to  d ifferen t so lu tions o f th e  p rob lem . T h is  observ a tio n  
causes us to  ask  w h a t it  m eans to  suggest th a t  “specifications shou ld  specify w h a t an d  n o t 
how ” , an d  w h e th e r such an  o b jec tiv e  is achievable. T h is  q uestion  is d iscussed in  C h a p te r  
F ive, w here we will t r e a t  th eo ry  p re sen ta tio n s  as th e  basis o f p rob lem  descrip tions.
O ne of th e  m a jo r  ap p lica tions of research  on  m ean ing  th eo ry  as a  m o d el of p rob lem  
solving has been  in  cu rricu lum  deve lopm en t, an d  has given rise to  th e  cu rre n t tre n d  
for lea rn in g  by discovery, lead ing  to  a ssim ila tion  in to  m eaningfu l s tru c tu re s , ra th e r  th a n  
lea rn in g  by exposition , lead ing  to  a ssim ila tion  in to  ro te  s tru c tu re s . Such  an  a p p ro ach , 
it  is claim ed, leads to  tra n sfe ra b le  skills. A lth o u g h  th e re  is evidence to  su p p o rt som e of
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th e  princip les b eh ind  th is  claim  [EN69] [GB61] [RS68], th e  claim  is as y e t u n su p p o rte d  
by em pirica l te s tin g . W e will p roceed , how ever, on  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  such a  claim  is 
ju stified .
T h e  cu rre n t s ta te  o f psychology is such  th a t  th e re  is s till no  re a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
sch em a ta . I t  has been  su ggested  th a t  a  schem a can  be considered  as a  h ie ra rch y  con­
ta in in g  slo ts in to  w hich concep ts can  be  f itte d . K in tsch  [Kin74] a n d  M eyer [M ey75], for 
exam ple , suggest th a t  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f E nglish  sentences is ca rried  o u t by  assim ila­
tion  in to  sc h e m a ta  re la ted  to  th e  g ra m m a r o f th e  language, w ith  th e  deep s tru c tu re  of 
th e  te x t  d o m in a tin g  th e  h ierarchy . R u m e lh a rt [Rum75] an d  T h o rn d y k e  [Tho77] ex ten d  
th is  id ea  to  w hole te x ts , by  suggesting  th a t  th e  lis ten e r m akes use o f a  s to ry  g ra m m a r 
com prising  a  se ttin g , a  th em e , a  p lo t, an d  a  reso lu tion .
I t is in te re s tin g  to  sp ecu la te  w h e th e r sim ilar s tru c tu re s  ex ist for u n d e rs ta n d in g  descrip ­
tions of in fo rm atio n  system s. F o r exam ple , a  fa irly  com m on n o tio n  in  fo rm al specifica­
tions of in fo rm a tio n  system s is th a t  o f a  s ig n a tu re , so i t  m ig h t b e  suggested  th a t  th is  is 
one co m p o n en t of such  a  s itu a tio n  g ra m m a r. A n obvious c a n d id a te  for a  w hole g ra m m a r 
is th a t  o f th e  von  N eu m an n  a rc h ite c tu re . M an y  descrip tions of in fo rm a tio n  system s cen­
tr e  on  concep ts such as d a ta f lo w , m em ory  an d  p rocessors, an d  it  seem s likely th a t  m an y  
read ers  of specifications s tru g g le  to  fit w h a t th ey  a re  read ing  in to  th is  classical s itu a tio n  
g ra m m a r.
Information Processing Model
T h e  final m odel we will consider has arisen  o u t o f th e  co n ju n c tio n  o f Psycho logy  and  
C o m puting : th e  in fo rm atio n  p rocessing  m odel. T h is m odel has been  developed for tw o 
p u rposes. F irs t , to  fac ilita te  th e  a u to m a tio n  of th e  reason ing  p rocess, a n d  second to  allow  
psychologists access to  an  a u to m a te d  m odel o f th e  h u m a n ’s processes for e x p e rim e n ta ­
tio n . U nlike th e  prev ious m odels, how ever, th is  one m akes no rea l a t te m p t  to  exp la in  th e  
th o u g h t processes involved  in  solving p rob lem s, b u t ra th e r  to  p rov ide  a  s tru c tu r in g  m ech­
anism . In s te a d  o f c o n c e n tra tin g  on th e  processes involved, th e  in fo rm a tio n  processing  
m odel considers th e  p a th  to  th e  so lu tion  o f a  p rob lem  as a  n u m b e r of in fo rm a tio n  s ta te s  
th a t  m u s t be passed  th ro u g h , s ta r t in g  w ith  a  s ta te  rep resen tin g  th e  given p rob lem , an d  
end ing  w ith  a  s ta te  rep resen tin g  an  accep tab le  so lu tion . In  genera l, a  com m on rep resen ­
ta tio n  is used for all th e  p rob lem  s ta te s , an d  th e  to ta li ty  of th ese  s ta te s  is referred  to  as 
th e  p rob lem  space. T h e  p rob lem  solving ta sk  is th u s  reduced  to  a  s ta te -sp a c e  trav e rsa l 
exercise.
Several s tra teg ie s  ex ist for trav e rs in g  th e  p rob lem  space. T h e  lea s t so p h is tic a ted  is one of 
t r ia l  an d  e rro r, w here legal tra n sfo rm a tio n s  a re  applied  to  each  c u rre n t s ta te  to  g en e ra te  
a  chain  o f s ta te s  in  th e  h o p e  th a t  th e  goal s ta te  will even tually  be reached . V ery naive 
hack ing  m ay  be seen as a  tr ia l  an d  e rro r p rocess, w here changes a re  m ad e  a t  ran d o m  in 
th e  hope th a t  th e  p ro g ram  will ev en tu a lly  w ork , a lth o u g h  th e  p ro b lem  space  for m ost 
rea l designs is so com plex th a t  t r ia l  and  e rro r  is really  n o t possible. M ore so p h is tica ted  is 
a  p rocess of hill-clim bing, w here only tra n sfo rm a tio n s  th a t  lead  “to w a rd s” th e  goal s ta te
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a re  applied . A lth o u g h  th is  m ay  seem  in tu itiv e ly  m ore  a t tra c t iv e  th a n  tr ia l  and  e rro r , 
th e re  is th e  d anger th a t  hill-clim bing m ay  lead  to  local m ax im a , from  w hich fu r th e r  
p rog ress is im possible. R efinem ent can  b e  m odelled  by  a  fo rm  o f hill-clim bing, w here 
th e  p rob lem  s ta te  is p rogressively  tra n sfo rm e d  from  a  specification  to  an  ex ecu tab le  
p ro g ram . T h e  goal s ta te  fo r th e  refinem en t process is usually  ta k e n  to  b e  co rrec t code, 
th a t  is efficiently im p lem en ted  on a  specified ta rg e t  m ach ine , w here  efficiency has a  
v a rie ty  of possib le in te rp re ta tio n s . T h e  l i te ra tu re  on refinem ent to  d a te  h as  co n c e n tra ted  
on  co rrec tness an d  im p lem en t ab ility  on  seq u en tia l m ach ines, w ith  som e a t te n tio n  to  
efficiency o f s to rag e  an d  a lg o rith m  p erfo rm an ce. A lth o u g h  hill-clim bing m ay  lead  to  local 
m ax im a , m ost p rob lem s tack led  b y  refinem ent a re  ap p ro x im a te  o p tim isa tio n  p rob lem s, 
an d  th e  local m a x im a  a re  ta k e n  to  fall w ith in  th e  accep tab le  n e ig h b o u rh o o d . N o research  
seem s to  have  been  carried  o u t in to  th is  a ssu m p tio n . R efinem ent is also lim ited  in  th e  
p rob lem  a reas  i t  can  tack le , fo r a p p ro p ria te  tra n sfo rm a tio n s  need  to  b e  defined for each 
re p re se n ta tio n  dom ain , an d  cu rren tly  th e re  a re  no su itab le  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  for dom ains 
involv ing  rea l-tim e  c o n s tra in ts , fau lt- to le ran ce , d is tr ib u tio n  of processing  an d  s to rag e , 
h u m an -co m p u te r  in te rfaces , an d  m an y  o th e r  fea tu res  requ ired  o f system s.
A  m ore so p h is tica ted  tech n iq u e  is m eans-end  analysis. H ere th e  p ro b lem  solver identifies 
n o t only th e  goal o f th e  exercise b u t  also th e  obstac les s tan d in g  in  th e  w ay of achieving 
th em . O vercom ing  th ese  obstac les is th e n  ta k e n  as estab lish ing  a  new  se t o f goals w hich, 
if m e t concu rren tly , will lead  to  th e  so lu tion  o f th e  o rig inal p rob lem . M eth o d s of func­
tio n a l an d  d a ta  decom position  can  b e  seen as m eans-end  analysis , effectively d ivid ing  
th e  p ro b lem  up  in to  subprob lem s.
3.3 Discourse Theory
T h e  final b o d y  of know ledge in  w hich we will analyse  S oftw are E ng ineering  is th a t  o f 
d iscourse theory . Like th e  ph ilosophy of techno logy  an d  p ro b lem  solving, th is  b o d y  of 
know ledge is still very m uch  in  a  p re p a ra d ig m a tic  stage: th a t  is , th e re  a re  no  generally  
accep ted  fram ew orks w ith in  w hich to  ev a lu a te  new  ideas. T h e  discip line is s till a t  th e  
stag es  of p roposing  such  fram ew orks, an d  try in g  to  su p p o rt th ese  w ith  th e  sam e su b ­
s ta n tiv e  fac ts  th a t  th e  fram ew orks a re  try in g  to  explain . Som e asp ec ts  o f d iscourse have  
ce rta in ly  been  explored  an d  reached  a  level o f m a tu r ity , b u t w hen  th is  h ap p en s  th e  top ic  
ten d s  to  hav e  been  rem oved  from  th e  d om ain  o f discourse th e o ry  per se an d  subsum ed  
u n d e r m ore  m a tu re  disciplines. Logic, fo r exam ple, has its  ro o ts  in  d iscourse, b u t in  th e  
early  p a r t  o f th is  c en tu ry  i t  b ecam e a  focus of a t te n tio n  in  ph ilosophy  d e p a rtm e n ts , and  
la te r  in  m a th e m a tic s  d e p a rtm e n ts . S im ilarly  th e  lite ra ry  a sp ec ts  o f d iscourse te n d  to  
h av e  been  subsum ed  u n d e r l i te ra tu re .
T h e re  is no d o u b t th a t  S oftw are E ng ineering  can  be  considered as a  process of d iscourse. 
F rom  its  earliest beg inn ings, C o m p u tin g  has a d o p te d  m uch  o f th e  c u ltu re  an d  te rm i­
nology of d iscourse. W e sp eak , fo r exam ple, o f p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag es, specification  
lan g u ag es, sy n ta x , sem an tic s , an d  in te rp re ta tio n . E arly  m odels o f co m p u te r system s
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w ere b ased  on th e  ideas of layers of language. M ore recently , th e  ro le  of lingu istic  sys­
tem s h as  been  recognised  as fu n d a m e n ta l to  th e  process of so ftw are design  [TM 87j. O ne 
of th e  p ro b lem s, how ever, is to  recognise t h a t  th is  process o f d iscourse  h as  to  b e  view ed 
ho listica lly  in itia lly , w hich m eans th a t  we w an t to  consider d iscourse th e o ry  a t  a  s tag e  
p rio r  to  th a t  a t  w hich sign ifican t co m p o n en ts  w ere tra n sfe rre d  to  o th e r  d iscip lines. W e do 
n o t w a n t to  consider “l i te ra te  p ro g ram m in g ” [K nu84], fo r exam ple , by  analogy  to  English  
L ite ra tu re , b u t as an  equally  valid  ap p lica tio n  of a  fu n d a m e n ta l th e o ry  to  a  p a r tic u la r  
dom ain . Less obviously, science to o  h as  its  ro o ts  in  d iscourse, an d  m an y  o f th e  p rob lem s 
we h av e  observed  in  a tte m p tin g  to  app ly  th e  P h ilo sophy  o f Science to  C o m p u tin g  m ig h t 
h av e  been  avoided if a  genera l th e o ry  o f scientific d iscourse h a d  p receded  th a t  o f th e  
theo ries o f th e  n a tu ra l  sciences.
In  th e  d iscussion th a t  follow s, a t te n tio n  has been  re s tr ic te d  to  ju s t  one th e o ry  o f d iscourse, 
th a t  o f K inneavy  [Kin84]. T h e  p rim a ry  reason  for th e  selection  o f th is  p a r tic u la r  th e o ry  
is th a t  i t  seem s to  have been  developed  largely  by  co nsidera tion  o f th e  com m on g ro u n d  
w ith  o th e r  th eo ries , an d  K inneavy  co n s ta n tly  re in te rp re ts  his s ta te m e n ts  in  te rm s  of 
o th e r  view s o f d iscourse. T h u s  anyone w ishing to  develop th e  d iscussion  w ith  a lte rn a tiv e  
theo ries of d iscourse should  have  li ttle  tro u b le  in  so doing.
K inneavy’s T heory  of D iscourse
B efore ou tlin in g  th e  s tru c tu re  o f th e  th eo ry , we m u st delim it th e  scope o f th e  concep t 
of d iscourse. T h e  te rm s “co m m u n ica tio n ” , “rh e to r ic ” , “com po sitio n ” , a n d  m an y  o th e rs , 
have  all been  used  to  d en o te  w h a t K inneavy  m eans by  “d iscourse” . l ie  re s tr ic ts  a t te n ­
tio n , how ever, to  full te x t  s itu a tio n s . T h a t  is, he is n o t concerned  w ith  frag m en ts  of 
sen tences, o r single u tte ra n c e s . T h e  back b o n e  o f his th eo ry  is a  c lassification  o f d ifferen t 
ty p es  o f discourse in to  a  coheren t fram ew o rk , to g e th e r w ith  th e  o rg an isa tio n a l s tru c tu re , 
ch a rac te ris tic s , an d  u nderly ing  logic for each  ty p e . W e will briefly review  th e  w hole 
th eo ry , an d  th e n  e x tra c t ju s t  one ty p e  o f d iscourse for a  m ore  d e ta iled  analysis.
The Underlying Model
K inneavy  ad o p ts  a  fa irly  conven tiona l s ta r t in g  place for his th eo ry , b y  accep ting  as given 
th e  com m u n ica tio n  trian g le  show n in  F igu re  3.1.
T h is  m odel has been  used in one fo rm  o r a n o th e r since th e  very  beg inn ings o f stud ies in 
discourse. A ris to tle  a d o p te d  th e  tr ian g le  as a  basis for th e  analysis o f rh e to ric , C a rn ap  
uses it  fo r his w ork on  sem an tics a n d  p rag m a tic s , C a rn ap  a n d  S h an n o n  use sim ilar 
m odels for th e ir  w ork on in fo rm atio n  th eo ry , (w ith  th e  ad d itio n  o f e x tr a  concep ts such  
as encoders, decoders an d  noise). I t  has also been  w idely a d o p te d  fo r th e  te ach in g  of 
com m u n ica tio n  skills an d  lite ra ry  criticism .
U sing th is  m odel, K inneavy  s tru c tu re s  th e  consid era tio n  o f co m m u n ica tio n  in to  s tu d y  of 
th e  signal, syn tactics ; s tu d y  o f th e  correspondence  b etw een  signal a n d  reference, sem an-
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F ig u re  3.1: T h e  C om m u n ica tio n  T riangle
tics] an d  s tu d y  of th e  uses to  w hich com m u n ica tio n  is p u t ,  pragmatics. His th e o ry  of 
d iscourse  is concerned  p rim arily  w ith  p ra g m a tic s , an d  includes sem an tic s  an d  sy n tac tic s  
only  w here th ey  im pinge u p o n  th is . K inneavy  th u s  forges a  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  discourse 
th e o ry  an d  lingu istics, th e  la t te r  c o n c e n tra tin g  on  th e  sy n ta x  an d  sem an tic s  of d iscourse.
The Arts and Media of Discourse
K inneavy  uses th e  te rm s “a r ts ” an d  “m ed ia” to  d istingu ish  b e tw een  th e  signal (eg. th e  
w ritte n  w ord  or th e  spoken  w ord ) an d  th e  channel (eg. th e  n ew sp ap er or th e  rad io  p ro ­
g ram m e). He excludes from  his a r ts  th e  ac t o f th in k in g , a sse rtin g  th a t  th in k in g  pervades 
th e  w hole o f com m unica tion  b u t is n o t itse lf  sim ply  one of th e  skills t h a t  enables d is­
course. He asse rts  th a t  a t te m p ts  to  include th in k in g  as an  a r t  o f d iscourse  is to  triv ia lise  
i t ,  an d  usually  reflects a  fu n d a m e n ta l flaw  in  th e  underly ing  m odel w hich is being used , 
nam ely  th e  om ission of th o u g h t from  th e  m odel in  a  m ore sign ifican t ro le. His a rg u m en t 
is is th a t  th e  om ission of a  tre a tm e n t of th o u g h t in  language teach in g , for exam ple, is a  
fu n d a m e n ta l e rro r, caused  by  th e  sep a ra tio n  o f language  teach in g  from  discourse. T h is  is 
a  very  su b tle , b u t pow erful, a rg u m e n t, an d  one th a t  we should  rem em b er w hen  we com e 
to  discuss th e  teach in g  o f top ics such  as specification  languages, w here a  critic ism  can  
be levied th a t  th e  skills o f using  n o ta tio n s  are  o ften  iso la ted  from  th e  th o u g h t processes 
th a t  shou ld  p e rv ad e  th e  w hole ac tiv ity .
O ne of th e  lim ita tio n s  of K in n eav y ’s co n sid era tio n  of a r ts  and  m ed ia , how ever, is th a t  
he re s tr ic ts  a tte n tio n  to  th e  w ritte n  an d  spoken  w ord. T h is  is u n d e rs ta n d a b le , since in  
1971 these  w ere ta k e n  as th e  p rim a ry  m odes of d iscourse, b u t  an  in te re s tin g  ex tension  to  
his d iscussion w ould include h y p e r te x t, w here th e  s tru c tu re  of th e  d iscourse is in h e ren t 
in  th e  a r t  to  a  g re a te r  e x te n t th a n  in conven tional w ritte n  te x ts , a n d  also sym bolic 
sim u la tio n s, w here th e  logic of th e  te x t  is p resen ted  explicitly , fo r exam ple , as a  set of 
rew rite  ru les. R a th e r  less u n d e rs ta n d a b le  is K in n eav y ’s om ission of d raw ing  from  th e
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a r ts  o f discourse. W e will inc lude  these , as m an y  of th e  d iscourse processes in  m o d ern  
S o ftw are  E ng ineering , rig h tly  or w rongly, a re  founded  u p o n  p ic to ria l a r ts ,  o ften  using 
th e  m ed ia  of co m p u te r screens.
Modes of Discourse
To perfo rm  a d e q u a te  a b s tra c tio n  o f te x ts  fo r d iscussion, K inneavy  recom m ends th a t  we 
ignore th e  su b je c t m a t te r  o f th e  te x t ,  such as “th is  is a  physics b o o k ” , an d  m ove tow ard s 
a  m ore  generic classification , “ th is  is a  descrip tio n  of so m eth in g ” , o r “th is  is a  s to ry  
a b o u t so m eth in g ” . He refers to  th ese  classifications as th e  m odes of d iscourse, o r m ore 
trad itio n a lly , th e  form s of discourse. B a in , in  1867, iden tified  fo u r such  m odes: n a rra tio n , 
a rg u m e n ta tio n , exposition  an d  descrip tion . K inneavy  ad o p ts  th e  te rm s  “n a r ra t io n ” , 
“c lassification” , “d esc rip tio n ” an d  “ev a lu a tio n ” for th ese  fou r m odes. I t  is im p o r ta n t to  
realise  th a t  K inneavy  is se p a ra tin g  th e  m odes o f d iscourse from  th e  p u rp o se  of u tilising  
th e  m ode. A n ev a lu a tio n , fo r exam ple , could  be used  to  te a se  o u t a  descrip tio n , to  
p e rsu ad e  som eone to  b u y  a  p ro d u c t, o r to  a c t as a  scientific p roof. M an y  “sto rie s” in  
E ng lish  l i te ra tu re  hav e  been  w ritte n  w ith  aim s fa r  beyond  th e  am u sin g  o f an  audience 
w ith  a  y a rn .
D escrip tions in  S oftw are E ng ineering  a re  used  for several p u rposes. A  sy stem  specifica­
tio n , for exam ple, is usually  w ritte n  using  a  descrip tive  m ode. I t  m ay  h av e  as its  aim  
th a t  o f p e rsu ad in g  a  client to  p u rch ase  th e  system . A  specification  m ay  also be used , 
how ever, to  in fo rm  an  engineer of w h a t is to  be  b u ilt, or to  convince an  en g in eer’s peer 
g roup  th a t  th e  specified sy stem  h as p a r tic u la r  desirab le  p ro p e rtie s . I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  
realise th a t  th e  aim s o f th e  d iscourse, as well as th e  m ode, give rise to  its  p ro p ertie s . For 
exam ple , one of th e  m a jo r  critic ism s of fo rm al n o ta tio n s  as a  basis for specifications is 
th a t  th ey  in h ib it th e  conveying o f in fo rm a tio n  to  a  client, w ho is unlikely  to  be conver­
sa n t w ith  th e  n o ta tio n  being used . T his critic ism  is based  on th e  fa llacy  of in ferring  an  
aim  o f d iscourse sim ply from  th e  m ode, for th e  aim  of descrip tive  d iscourse m ay  n o t be 
in fo rm a tio n  passing . To u n d e rs ta n d  th is  m ore  fully we m u st consider th e  possib le aim s 
o f d iscourse.
The Aims of Discourse
K inneavy  identifies th e  aim s o f d iscourse by  co nsidera tion  of th e  fea tu re s  o f th e  com m u­
n ica tio n  trian g le , s tress in g  th a t  th ese  aim s a re  rare ly  found  in  iso la tio n  b u t th a t  m ost 
d iscourse has a  p rim a ry  aim  th a t  can  be  classified in to  one o f th re e  k inds. C o n cen tra tio n  
on th e  encoder or decoder gives rise to  tw o  kinds o f people discourse: if th e  encoder is 
em phasised , th e n  th e  a im  is said  to  b e  expressive, if  th e  decoder is em phasised , th en  
th e  a im  is sa id  to  be persuasive. W h en  th e  focus o f a tte n tio n  is 011 th e  rea lity  to  w hich 
th e  d iscourse refers, how ever, r a th e r  th a n  th e  people involved, th e n  th e  a im  is said  to  
be reference. M oreover, each  of th e se  a im s has its  ow n no rm s w ith in  w hich  d iscourse is 
ev a lu a ted . T h u s  ad v ertis in g , w hose p rim ary  aim  is p ersuasive , shou ld  be  ev a lu a ted  as
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sucli, even if  a  secondary  a im  is to  in fo rm  p o te n tia l  custom ers o f th e  a t t r ib u te s  o f a  p ro d ­
u c t, an d  is th e re fo re  one of reference. A pply ing  th e  no rm s o f science, w here reference is 
p a ra m o u n t, to  ad v ertis in g , w here p e rsu asio n  is th e  aim , is to  com plete ly  m iss th e  p o in t 
of th e  d iscourse.
D iscourse  of all th ree  k inds can  be  fo u n d  in  S oftw are E ngineering . E xpressive  d iscourse 
is n o t obvious in  th e  d iscip line, a lth o u g h  it  seem s likely th a t  m an y  o f th o se  w ho p ro g ram  
for fun  do so because  th e y  a re  expressing  them selves th ro u g h  th e ir  p ro g ram s, ju s t  as 
p o e ts  seek to  do th ro u g h  th e ir  p o e try . C erta in ly  th e  im pression  g iven by  m an y  system s 
p ro g ram m ers  is th a t  th e y  t r e a t  “th e ir” code as ex tensions o f th em selv es , rem ain in g  u n ­
w orried  by  th e  existence o f anyone else w ho can  u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t th e y  have  w ritte n . 
K idder quo tes a  professional p ro g ram m er as say ing
“I loved w ritin g  p ro g ram s. I  could  co n tro l th e  m achine. I  could  m ak e  i t  ex­
press m y  ow n th o u g h ts . I t  w as an  expansion  of th e  m in d  to  hav e  a  c o m p u te r .”
[K id82, page  90]
W e shou ld  n o t pass value ju d g em en ts  on th is  a c tiv ity  per se, b u t  we can  observe th a t  
p rob lem s a re  likely to  occur if th e  sen d e r’s a im s a re  d ifferent to  th o se  of th e  rec ip ien t. 
E xpressive discourse is q u ite  re sp ec tab le  in  co m p u te r a r t  an d  m usic , an d  th e re  is no 
reaso n  to  deny  anyone th e  p leasu re  of expressing  th o u g h ts  in  an y  m ed iu m , b u t  we m u st 
recognise th e  lim ita tio n s  of expressive d iscourse, an d  ensure  th a t  p ro fessional so ftw are  
engineers a re  aw are o f th e m  to o .
P e rsu asiv e  discourse is p resen t in  m o st sales ac tiv ities , an d  also in  m an y  p ro je c t m a n ­
ag em en t techn iques. I t  m ay  also p lay  a  p a r t  in  th e  w riting  o f u ser m an u a ls , w here th e  
aim s o f d iscourse can  be  q u ite  com plica ted . M any  people assum e th a t  m an u a ls  a re  in ­
ten d ed  to  be  in fo rm ativ e . M odern  m a n u a l w rite rs , how ever, hav e  also a d o p te d  th e  aim  
o f p e rsu ad in g  th e  users th a t  th e  p ro d u c t is “g o o d ” , an d  also th a t  anyone  can  lea rn  to  
use it . T h e  h y p e rc a rd  U ser’s G uide, for exam ple , in form s its  read e r th a t
A ny piece of in fo rm a tio n  in  H y p e rC a rd  can  connect to  an y  o th e r  piece of 
in fo rm a tio n , so you  can  find o u t w h a t you  need  to  know  in  as m u ch  or as 
little  d e ta il as you  n eed .” [A pp87, page  xvi]
A tru ly  w ondrous p ro d u ct!
A n o th e r p lace w here persuasive  d iscourse can  o ften  be found  is in  th e  d iscourse su rro u n d ­
ing peer review  of system s. M any  so ftw are engineers confuse th e  tru e  a im s of ac tiv ities 
such  as sy stem  w alk -th ro u g h s w ith  th o se  of convincing colleagues th a t  a  sy s tem  is cor­
rec t. T h e  tru e  aim  o f a  w a lk -th ro u g h  shou ld  be to  try  to  find fau lts  w ith  th e  system  
(a  scientific a im  in th e  tra d itio n  o f P o p p e r) . P e rsu ad in g  colleagues th a t  th e  sy stem  is 
fau lt-free  achieves n o th in g  o f scientific value unless th e  designer has been  scientifically  
h o n es t, by assisting  in  th e  process of seeking o u t re fu ta tio n s . T h is  confusion of aim s 
is o ften  a t tr ib u ta b le  to  p ro jec t m an ag em en t m e th o d s, such as th e  im p o sitio n  of d e a d ­
lines w ith o u t genuine q u a lity  m ilestones a sso c ia ted  w ith  th e m , an d  also to  th e  loss of
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innocence described  earlier. E ng ineers m u s t now  ta k e  respo n sib ility  for th e ir  ac tio n s, 
consequen tly  th e ir  re p u ta tio n s , an d  possib ly  th e ir  career p rogressions, a re  a t  s ta k e  w hen 
th e ir  w ork is su b jec ted  to  review . T h e  te m p ta tio n  to  p ro te c t th is  r e p u ta tio n  is o ften  to o  
g re a t, an d  th e  risks o f be ing  fo u n d  o u t q u ite  sm all. M ost com panies a re  n o t p re p a re d  to  
sp en d  resources in  tra c k in g  dow n th e  cu lp rit w hen  an  e rro r  is d e tec ted : freq u en tly  even 
th e  m a te ria l cause of th e  e rro r  is nev er iden tified , only th e  sy m p to m s a re  add ressed . I t  
is only w ith  th e  rea lisa tio n  th a t  sa fe ty  c ritica l system s are  being  designed using  these  
a t t i tu d e s  and  app roaches th a t  th e  serious deficiences w ith  th is  w ay  o f proceed ing  a re  
being recognised  by  th e  so ftw are  in d u s try  a t  large.
I t  is also possib le th a t  som e engineers re g a rd  sy stem  specifications as p e rsu asiv e  d iscourse, 
in th e  sense th a t  th e  specification  shou ld  p e rsu ad e  th e  im p lem en to r to  c o n s tru c t th e  
sy stem  th e  specifier h a d  in  m ind . A n o th e r view  is q u ite  different to  th is , nam ely  th a t  
th e re  shou ld  be no e lem ent o f persu asio n  a t  all. T h e  im p lem en to r shou ld  read  th e  
specification  sim ply as a  piece o f reference d iscourse, an d  should  b e  free to  im p lem en t any  
sy stem  th a t  m ee ts  th e  specification . T h is  is an  in te re s tin g  issue, for m o s t specifications 
ac tu a lly  hav e  b o th  a im s, as we shall see below .
W e should  n o te  in  passing  th a t  H oare  an d  N au r b o th  ap p e a r to  h av e  been  engaging  in  
persuasive  d iscourse in  th e  p ap e rs  discussed earlier. M oreover, m an y  of th e  p u b lica tions 
in  th e  l i te ra tu re  of S oftw are E ng ineering  a re  o f th is  k ind . S c ien tists , o stensib ly  a t  le a s t, 
p re sen t theo ries w ith o u t a p p ea rin g  to  p e rsu ad e  read ers  th a t  th e  theo ries  should  b e  b e ­
lieved: i t  is th e  evidence th a t  causes th e  read e r to  believe th e  th eo ry , a n d  th is  evidence 
shou ld  b e  p resen ted  honestly . M an y  p u b lica tio n s in  S oftw are E ng ineering , how ever, a p ­
p e a r to  be selling an  idea , n o ta tio n , m e th o d , o r m achine. T h e  v ir tu e s  a re  ex pounded  in  
full d e ta il, th e  lim ita tio n s  are  freq u en tly  o m itte d  a lto g e th e r. T h is  is a  c u ltu ra l p rob lem  
for th e  discip line, fo r even  th o se  a u th o rs  w ho are  extolling  th e  v ir tu es  of a  scientific 
a p p ro ach  a d d  to  th e  b o d y  o f unscien tific  l i te ra tu re  asso c ia ted  w ith  th e  su b je c t. T h is  is 
o ften  cited  by  o p p o n en ts  of scientific ap p ro ach es as in co n sis ten t, fo r th e y  have  failed to  
g rasp  th e  d is tin c tio n  b etw een  scientific d iscourse an d  discourse (o f any  ty p e )  about sci­
ence. A lth o u g h  th is  does n o t give rise to  an  inconsistency  by  th e  p ro p o n e n ts  o f scientific 
ap p ro ach es, it  does te n d  to  d ilu te  th e  scientific l i te ra tu re  still fu r th e r . T h is  p ro b lem  does 
n o t arise  to  th e  sam e e x te n t in o th e r  sciences, w here th e  unscien tific  d iscussion has been  
p a r titio n e d  off as philosophy.
M ost o f th e  d iscourse  used  in  th e  tech n ica l asp ec ts  o f Softw are E ng ineering , how ever, has 
reference as its  p rim a ry  aim . F o r th is  reaso n , w e will focus a t te n tio n  in  th e  n ex t section  
on  a  m ore  deta iled  d iscussion of reference d iscourse.
R eference D iscourse
R eference discourse, a lth o u g h  su b serv ien t to  th e  cen tra l a im  o f re fe rring  to  rea lity , can 
be considered  as being o f th re e  k inds, depend ing  on  th e  p e rcep tio n  o f rea lity  being  used .
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I n f o r m a t i v e  D is c o u r s e :  If  re a lity  is perceived  as know n, an d  th e  d iscourse  is conveying 
fac ts  a b o u t th is  rea lity , th e n  th e  aim  of th e  discourse is in fo rm ativ e .
S c ie n t i f ic  D is c o u r s e :  If  th is  in fo rm atio n  is forged in to  a  co h eren t sy stem , an d  p re ­
sen ted  in  such  a  w ay th a t  a  d e m o n s tra tio n  o f its  va lid ity  is possib le , o r even  ac­
com panies th e  in fo rm a tio n , th e n  th e  aim  o f th e  discourse is scientific.
E x p l o r a t o r y  D is c o u r s e :  I f  th e  re a lity  is n o t know n, b u t  is be ing  looked  for, th e n  th e  
discourse is exp lo ra to ry .
T h is  classification  ap p ea rs  to  be  u n ique  to  K in n eav y ’s th e o ry  o f d iscourse , b u t tu rn s  
o u t to  be ex trem ely  usefu l in  discussing S oftw are E ng ineering , w here a ll th re e  kinds of 
reference discourse a re  read ily  discernible.
S c ie n t i f ic  D is c o u r s e
W e h av e  a lread y  d iscussed m an y  o f th e  a t tr ib u te s  o f scientific d iscourse d u rin g  ou r t r e a t ­
m en t o f th e  P h ilo sophy  o f Science. W e shou ld  n o te , how ever, th a t  K inneavy  assum es 
th a t  th e re  is such  a  th in g  as “science” , r a th e r  th a n  various sciences each  giving rise  to  
d ifferen t ty p es  of d iscourse. In  tre a tin g  th e  sam e rea lity , th e  various scientific disciplines 
will ce rta in ly  b rin g  differen t p a rad ig m s to  b e a r, an d  in te rp re t re su lts  accord ingly , b u t 
th e  re su ltin g  d iscourse p rocesses, typ ica lly  th e  pub lished  p ap e rs , will conform  to  ce rta in  
accep ted  no rm s, such as th e  sty le  of p re se n ta tio n  an d  th e  red u c tio n  o f th e  ro le  o f th e  
sc ien tis t. F raw ley goes so fa r  as to  say  th a t  “science is d iscourse” [Fra86, page  68], a  
view th a t  F ey erab en d  d isp u tes , observ ing  th a t  th is  is a  lim ited  view o f science as involv­
ing only th ird  w orld  en titie s  a n d  ignoring  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f th e  second w orld  [Fey70a, 
page  28].
If  we accep t scientific d iscourse, in  th is  sense, in to  Softw are E ng ineering  th e n  we a re  
accep ting  a  se t o f no rm s for th is  d iscourse process. A ccep tance  o f th ese  n o rm s is by no 
m eans un iv ersa l even am o n g st sc ien tis ts . M edaw ar, for exam ple , q u estions th e  value of 
th e  accep ted  sty les in  scientific d iscourse [M ed64]. F ey erab en d  goes fu r th e r , an d  calls 
in to  q uestion  m an y  of th e  n o rm s of science itse lf  [Fey87].
O ne im p o r ta n t  questio n  concern ing  scientific discourse is w h e th e r it  shou ld  seek to  ex­
p la in  rea lity , o r sim ply to  describe it . T h e  view th a t  scientific d iscourse shou ld  only 
describe w as p rev a len t u n til  th e  tu rn  o f th e  cen tu ry , an d  can  be fo u n d , fo r exam ple , in 
th e  w ritings o f P ea rso n  [P e a l l ] .  C u rre n t th in k in g , how ever, is th a t  scientific discourse 
m u s t seek to  exp lain  as well as to  describe, i t  m u s t th erefo re  seek to  p re se n t theories , n o t 
ju s t  fac ts , o r, a t  le a s t, to  p resen t fac ts  w ith in  th e  fram ew ork  of som e a lread y  p resen ted  
theory . E x ac tly  w h a t c o n s titu te s  an  a p p ro p ria te  th eo ry  for th is  p u rp o se  we will discuss 
la te r . K inneavy  also no tes  th a t  th e re  is n o th in g  in th e  n a tu re  o f th eo rie s  th a t  ru les ou t 
any  o f th e  modes of discourse. Scientific d iscourse can  be n a rra tio n , descrip tio n , eva lua­
tio n  o r classification , each  o f w hich can  be based  on  underly ing  th eo ries . T h is endorses 
th e  view  o f m an y  p ro p o n en ts  o f fo rm al m e th o d s  in  S oftw are E ng ineering , w ho claim  th a t
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fo rm al specifications, a lth o u g h  d escrip tive , shou ld  be scientific as well as in fo rm ativ e . 
W e shall ad d  to  th is  th e  claim  th a t  th ey  shou ld  be  ex p lo ra to ry  as well.
T h e  logics suggested  as u n d e rp in n in g  scientific d iscourse a re  well d o cu m en ted  elsew here. 
T h ey  h av e  generally  been  d educ tive  logics, w hich o p e ra te  a t  th e  sy n ta c tic  level of dis­
course , an d  in d u c tiv e  logics, w hich a re  sem an tic . K inneavy  raises th e  questio n  o f a  
p ra g m a tic  level o f logic, w hich  seeks to  p rov ide  fo u n d a tio n s for th e  uses o f scientific 
discourse. T his w ould  seek to  c a p tu re  a sp ec ts  o f th e  p ro o f such  as how  it  changes th e  
d eco d e r’s beliefs. Logics w ith  d ialogue in te rp re ta tio n s , such as th e  in fin ite  value logic L a 
o f Lukasiew icz, m ay  p rov ide  a  basis fo r fu r th e r  research  in  th e  a re a  [Gil81].
T h e  inclusion  of p rag m a tic s  in to  p ro o f allow s us to  elevate  th e  d iscussion  of p ro o f above 
th e  “how ” (th e  sy n ta c tic  de ta ils  o f th e  fo rm al sy stem ) an d  th e  “w h a t” ( th e  sem an tic  
deta ils o f th e  in te rp re ta tio n )  to  consider th e  “w h y ” (th e  reason  for ta k in g  p a r tic u la r  in ­
te rp re ta tio n s , an d  w hy a  p ro o f is o f an y  value in  a  p a r tic u la r  c o n te x t, for exam ple). In  
tra d itio n a l scientific d iscourse, such discussion is ra re ly  carried  o u t. M ost scientific p a ­
p e rs , for exam ple , set o u t w h a t is to  be p roved  w ith o u t ju s tifica tio n , an d  discuss th e  p ro o f 
as i f  th e  m e th o d  w ere ta k e n  for g ra n te d . S oftw are E ngineering , how ever, has n o t evolved 
th ro u g h  such a  scientific cu ltu re , consequen tly  m an y  Softw are E ng ineers freq u en tly  do 
ra ise  such  issues. Faced  w ith  th e  ex istence  o f sy s tem atic  fram ew orks fo r th e  discussion 
o f sy n tac tic s  an d  sem an tics , b u t no  su itab le  fram ew ork  for d iscussing p ra g m a tic s , th ese  
so ftw are  engineers u n d e rs ta n d a b ly  o ften  slip back  in to  a  rigorous discussion of easier as­
p ec ts  o f th e  p rob lem , or co n ten t them selves w ith  a  non-scientific  tre a tm e n t  of th e  h a rd e r 
ones. T h e re  have  recen tly  been  a t te m p ts  to  change th is  s ta te  o f affairs. W ork  b y  C o­
hen  an d  P i t t ,  for exam ple , seeks to  discuss p ro o f ob liga tions in  S oftw are  E ng ineering , 
an d  to  re la te  p ro o f m echan ism s an d  in te rp re ta tio n s  to  th e  use o f fo rm alism s in  S oftw are 
E ng ineering  [C P90b][C P90c][C P90a]. T his w ork is still in  its  in fancy , b u t som e very  
in te re s tin g  ideas a re  p u t fo rw ard  th a t  a re  considered  la te r  in  th is  thesis .
T h e  tra d itio n a l view of logics is th a t  th e ir  use is cu ltu ra lly  in d ep en d en t. T h is  view  is 
no  longer given th e  sam e credence, how ever, an d  it  is now  accep ted  th a t  a lth o u g h  th e  
u n ity  of scientific logic m ay  well be  an  ideal, we m u s t accep t th a t  sc ien tis ts  m ay  have 
to  w ork w ith in  an  ex isting  cu ltu re , w hich em bodies its  ow n logic, w hilst m oving  tow ard s 
th is  ideal.
T h is  p re sen ts  us w ith  a n o th e r  p ro b lem , for, w hilst physicists hav e  well e s tab lish ed  se ts  o f 
n o rm s, developed an d  passed  on p rim arily  th ro u g h  a  m a tu re  academ ic  discipline, Soft­
w are  E ng ineering  has a  v a rie ty  of “logics” in use. M any S oftw are E ng ineers le a rn t th e ir  
tra d e  th ro u g h  ap p ren ticesh ip s, an d  hence p icked up  a  c ra ft cu ltu re , som e a re  m a th e ­
m a tic ian s , som e are  e lec trical engineers, som e are  classics scholars: th e  lis t is endless. 
F u rth e rm o re , m an y  of th e  en v iro n m en ts  w ith in  w hich S oftw are E ng ineering  is p rac tised  
p ro v id e  th e ir  ow n logics: th e  logics of com pany  econom ics and  o f re sea rch  council fu n d ­
ing being  tw o exam ples th a t  h av e  sign ifican t im p ac t on th e  w ays in  w hich S oftw are 
E ng ineers w ork. T h is d iversity  of b ack g ro u n d s ensures th a t  S oftw are E ng ineers do n o t 
b lind ly  accep t p a r tic u la r  logics as u n d erp in n in g  th e ir  scientific d iscourse . As th e  disci­
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pline develops, how ever, we a re  increasing ly  being  expec ted  to  develop c u ltu ra l norm s. 
U n fo rtu n a te ly  th is  developm ent is o ften  in te rp re te d  as th e  need  fo r a  seem ingly ad hoc 
selection  from  th e  n o rm s cu rren tly  rep resen ted .
Informative Discourse
T h e  aim  o f in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse is th a t  o f conveying in fo rm a tio n  to  th e  rec ip ien t, who 
is th u s  allow ed to  in tru d e  in to  th e  process. T h is  in fo rm atio n  m ay  b e  conveyed by  a t  least 
th ree  asp ec ts  o f th e  d iscourse,
• T h e  s tru c tu re  of th e  d iscourse m ay  convey in fo rm atio n : th e  o rd e rin g  of concepts, 
for exam ple, m ay  b e  ta k e n  as p rov id ing  a  s tru c tu re  w ith in  w hich  th ey  shou ld  be 
in te rp re te d .
• T h e  co m p o n en ts  o f th e  d iscourse will them selves convey in fo rm atio n .
• T h e  su b jec tiv e  b ack g ro u n d  of th e  rec ip ien t will p rov ide  in fo rm a tio n  th a t  m ay  be 
invoked by  th e  d iscourse.
T h e  sy n ta x  an d  sem an tics of in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse will n o t be d iscussed  here , as th e y  are  
well covered in th e  l i te ra tu re  of lingu istics, b u t  th e  p rag m atics  o f in fo rm ativ e  discourse 
does req u ire  a  b rie f d iscussion. T h e  p rag m a tic s  o f in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse h as  to  consider 
in fo rm atio n  tra n s fe r  to  a  rea l, ra th e r  th a n  idealised , receiver. S em antica lly , fo r exam ple , 
a  tau to lo g ica l expression  carries 110 in fo rm atio n . P rag m atica lly , how ever, i t  m ay  convey 
in fo rm a tio n  if  th e  rec ip ien t w as u n aw are  o f th e  ta u to lo g y  a t th e  tim e  o f rece ip t. T h e  
p ra g m a tic s  of in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse, th e re fo re , needs to  a d o p t a  d ifferen t m e th o d  of 
m easu ring  in fo rm atio n  c o n ten t from  th a t  o f in fo rm atio n  theo ry . K inneavy  suggests th a t  
su rp rise  value shou ld  be  used . T h e  ta u to lo g y  h  P  <=> P  is o f l i t t le  su rp rise  to  m ost 
people  w ho u n d e rs ta n d  th e  n o ta tio n , w hereas m ore  com plex tau to lo g ies  m ay  well be 
su rp ris in g , and  hence m ore  in fo rm ative .
T h is  in tru s io n  of th e  rec ip ien t in to  th e  d iscourse process is in s ta rk  c o n tra s t to  th e  s itu a ­
tio n  w ith  scientific discourse, w here sc ien tis ts  in ten tio n a lly  t r y  to  m in im ise th e  in tru s io n  
o f people. In  w riting  a  specification  as a  piece of in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse, there fo re , th e  
w rite r  should  be cogn izan t o f th e  p o te n tia l  readersh ip ; in  w ritin g  a  specification  to  ac t 
as a  scientific th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n , how ever, scientific sty le  d ic ta te s  th a t  th e  read ersh ip  
shou ld  n o t be undu ly  considered . T h is  ra ises th e  q uestion  as to  w h e th e r one specification  
can hav e  b o th  aim s. W e will sidestep  th is  q uestion  by  suggesting  th a t  th e  concept o f a  
specification  is n o t as cen tra l to  sy stem  design as is cu rren tly  im plied  by  m o st m odels of 
th e  design process. In  fa c t, it  will b e  suggested  th a t  specifications shou ld  be  d ep en d en t 
u p o n  theo ries, an d  th a t  th ese  theories can  h av e  m an y  p re se n ta tio n s , som e of w hich will 
be a im ed a t  scientific d iscourse, som e a t  in fo rm ativ e  discourse, an d  som e a t  ex p lo ra to ry  
d iscourse. T h is  sh ift from  specification  to  exp lica tion  is essen tia l if  S oftw are E ng ineering  
is to  a d o p t th e  ra tio n a lis t ap p ro ach  o f m o d ern  science.
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T h e  s tru c tu re  o f in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse can n o t be given by  th e  fac ts  to  b e  p re sen ted  alone, 
w hich a re  iso la ted , b u t only from  som e e x tra -fa c tu a l source. In  scientific d iscourse, 
th e  s tru c tu re  is o ften  d ic ta te d  b y  th e  logic being  used  to  su p p o rt th e  a rg u m en ts . In  
in fo rm a tiv e  d iscourse th e re  a re  severa l possib le  sources for th e  d iscourse  s tru c tu re . I t  
could  be supp lied  by  som e th e o re tic a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  fac ts , e ith e r  held  by  th e  
w rite r  o r assum ed  by  th e  read e r. I t  could  b e  p rov ided  by  th e  ad o p tio n  o f la rg e  scale 
m e ta p h o r  in  th e  d iscourse, w here th e  in fo rm a tio n  to  be conveyed is p re se n te d  in  th e  o rd er 
d ic ta te d  by th e  m e ta p h o r. B o th  o f th e  above s tru c tu r in g  tech n iq u es im p ly  a  s tru c tu re  
in to  w hich th e  read e r can  assim ila te  in fo rm a tio n  as it  is received. A n o th e r com m on 
s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism  is th a t  o f p resen tin g  in fo rm atio n  accord ing  to  som e concept o f 
im p o rtan ce . A gain  th is  involves th e  a d o p tio n  o f a  theo ry , in  th is  case an  axiological 
theo ry . T h is  a p p ro ach  is o ften  used  to  m o tiv a te  th e  read er. In  te rm s  of assim ila tion  
s tru c tu re , how ever, th e  read e r is left to  devise th is  as in fo rm atio n  a rriv es , an d  one hopes 
th a t  th e  im p o rta n c e  h ie ra rch y  devised by  th e  w rite r  will m ap  in  som e sensible w ay to  
a  possib le assim ila tion  s tru c tu re . A n a re a  w here th is  freq u en tly  fails to  occur is w hen 
c u ltu ra l b o u n d aries  are  be ing  crossed. S oftw are E ngineers carry in g  o u t req u irem en ts  
analysis , for exam ple , a re  o ften  p re sen ted  w ith  in fo rm atio n  seen as im p o r ta n t  by  th e  
u sers, b u t need  to  seek o u t th e  in fo rm a tio n  th e y  need to  s ta r t  th e  p rocess o f bu ild ing  a  
su itab le  a ssim ila tion  s tru c tu re . O ne o ften  used  m easu re  of im p o rta n c e  is th a t  o f su rp rise  
value, p resen tin g  th e  m o st su rp ris in g  fac ts  firs t (a  com m on jo u rn a lis tic  device). W h ere  
com pleteness an d  ease of re fe rra l is im p o r ta n t ,  som e fo rm  o f m echan ica l o rdering  m ay  
be used , such  as a lp h ab e tica l o r da te lin e  orderings.
Exploratory Discourse
K in n eav y ’s decision to  id en tify  e x p lo ra to ry  discourse as d is tin c t from  scientific d iscourse 
is u n u su a l. M ost views o f science include b o th  discovery an d  v erifica tion , th e re fo re  i t  
m ig h t seem  th a t  scientific d iscourse should  include discourse w ith  ex p lo ra to ry  aim s. In  
p ra c tic e , how ever, th e  views of th e  e x p lo ra to ry  process a re  u sua lly  re s tr ic te d  to  th e  
re su lts  o f th e  p rocess, th e  co n jec tu res, an d  because  th e  ph ilosophy  o f science h as  tr a d i­
tionally  been  p h ra sed  in  te rm s o f in d iv id u a l sc ien tis ts , ra th e r  th a n  te a m s of sc ien tis ts , 
th e  d iscourse  processes lead ing  up  to  th ese  resu lts  has been  m arg ina lised . P o p p e r, fo r 
exam ple , has his Logic of Scientific D iscovery, w hich covers th e  p re se n ta tio n  of conjec­
tu re s , th e  selection be tw een  rival th eo ries , an d  th e  a tte m p te d  re fu ta tio n  o f theo ries. His 
a cco u n t does n o t ex ten d  back  to  th e  jo ttin g s  o f sc ien tis ts  w here half-fo rm ed  con jec tu res 
a re  be ing  assessed, w here te rm s a re  being  refined in  m ean ing , o r w here  th e  sc ien tis t is 
p lay ing  w ith  ideas in  very  “unscien tific” w ays, w aiting  for in sp ira tio n . I t  is considered  
useful for th e  p u rp o se  o f th is  thesis  to  h av e  a  ca teg o ry  of pre-scientific  (in  th e  P o p p e ria n  
sense) d iscourse th a t  can  b e  considered  p a r t  o f th e  scientific p rocess, a n d  K in n eav y ’s ex ­
p lo ra to ry  d iscourse fits  th e  bill well. T h is ty p e  of discourse ac tu a lly  fits  m ore  n a tu ra lly  
in to  L a k a to s’s view of Science, w here anom alies an d  co n trad ic tio n s  fo rm  an  accep ted  
p a r t  of science w ith in  research  p rog ram m es.
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T h e  logic o f ex p lo ra to ry  d iscourse is h a rd  to  identify . W e can use d ed u c tio n , fo r exam ple, 
to  explore  th e  consequences of ad o p tin g  ce rta in  view s, th u s  em bedd ing  scientific d iscourse 
in to  th e  ex p lo ra tio n  p rocess, b u t  th e  m o tiv a tio n  th a t  leads us to  select w h a t consequences 
to  exp lo re , an d  th e  ju s tif ica tio n  o f th is  choice, is founded  in  th e  logic of ex p lo ra tio n . 
K e ltn e r suggests th a t  th e  logic o f discussion is one of p rob lem  solving [Kel57, pages 32- 
34], b u t  th e re  is m ore  to  ex p lo ra tio n  th a n  ju s t  discussion. O ne o f th e  m a jo r  differences 
b e tw een  e x p lo ra to ry  an d  scientific d iscourse is th a t  w hen exp lo ring  w e m ay  p roceed  in  
th e  full know ledge th a t  o u r theories a re  co n trad ic to ry , suspend ing  d isbelief in  o rd e r to  
ga in  fu r th e r  in sigh ts in to  th e  p rob lem  being  ap p ro ach ed . In  science, how ever, ded u c tio n  
based  on  in co n sis ten t p rem ises is ra re ly  in ten tio n a lly  carried  o u t. A n o th e r  difference is 
th a t  in ex p lo ra to ry  d iscourse it  is q u ite  com m on to  accep t te n ta tiv e , o r even am biguous, 
sem an tics , re ly ing  u p o n  th e  d iscourse process to  iden tify  th e  a reas  th a t  need  refinem ent. 
W e m ay  also use m e ta p h o rs , analogies a n d  m odels w idely to  p rov ide  sh a red  fram ew orks 
for d iscussion of novel ideas. P ossib le  can d id a te s  for logics to  u n d e rp in  ex p lo ra to ry  
d iscourse include th o se  based  on s ta tis tic s  o r fuzzy m a th e m a tic s  [SchSl].
T h e  s tru c tu re  o f e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse is h a rd  to  generalise. I t  is likely to  be m ore 
f ra g m e n ta ry  th a n  in fo rm ativ e  or scientific discourse, an d  also to  h av e  a  la rg e  n u m b er 
o f “if  . . .  th e n  . . . ” ty p e  s tru c tu re s , b u t  basica lly  th e re  a re  as m an y  w ays o f s tru c tu r in g  
ex p lo ra tio n s as th e re  a re  w ays of th in k in g . W e can , how ever, observe  th a t  th e re  is likely 
to  be a  fu n d a m e n ta l difference b etw een  ex p lo ra to ry  an d  scientific d iscourse s tru c tu re s . 
T h e  s ta r tin g  p o in t fo r scientific d iscourse is u sually  a  theory . T h is th e o ry  is th e n  used  
to  derive re fu tab le  s ta te m e n ts . In  ex p lo ra to ry  discourse, how ever, w e a re  p re sen ted  w ith  
an  ad hoc collection of fac ts  to  be u n d e rs to o d  an d  explained . O ne w ay  o f do ing  th is  is to  
c o n s tru c t a  dedu c tiv e  sy stem , a  th eo ry , th a t  is based  upo n  a  few e stab lish ed  fac ts , an d  
from  w hich th e  o th e r  fac ts  can  be derived . T h is is a  crea tive  process: we m u st design 
a  th eo ry , b u t  like all design “ th e  c rea tiv e  p rocess is som etim es im m easu rab ly  fac ilita ted  
by bo rrow ing  suggestions from  a n o th e r  dedu ctiv e  or in d u c tiv e  sy s tem  w hich seem s to  
hav e  s im ila rity  to  th e  one u n d e r co n stru c tio n . Such a  borrow ed  sy stem  is a  ‘m o d e l’. ” 
(page  144). For i t  to  be useful, we m u s t a lread y  be fam ilia r w ith  th e  m odel we a re  
bo rro w in g , for w e w an t to  tra n s fe r  d e ta ils  from  one dom ain  to  th e  o th e r.
“T h is  tra n sfe r  can  be in severa l d irec tions. T h e  m odel can  help  to  secure a  
re la tive ly  u n s tru c tu re d  dom ain , o r sim plify a  dom ain , o r com plete  a  dom ain , 
o r exp lain  a  dom ain , o r concretize  a  to o  a b s tra c t dom ain , o r a b s tra c t  a  to o  
co n cre te  d o m ain , o r enab le  a  d om ain  to  g e t a  com plete  p ic tu re  o f its  ow n 
fram ew ork , o r allow  ex p e rim e n ta tio n  w here th e  dom ain  does n o t p e rm it i t . ”
(page  144)
T h e  use o f m odels in  e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse is clearly  analogous to  th e  s tru c tu r in g  m ech­
anism s suggested  in  th e  prev ious sec tion  for p rob lem  solving. I t  also tu rn s  o u t to  be 
analogous to  th e  use of th eo ry  b u ild ing , for th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s  a re  ju s t  m odels. W e 
will re tu rn  to  th is  issue in C h a p te r  F ive, w here we will seek to  reconcile n o tions such  as 
th eo ry , m odel an d  analogy.
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In  p ra c tic e , ex p lo ra to ry , scientific an d  in fo rm ativ e  discourse a re  n o t u sua lly  sep a ra te ly  
observab le  in  th e  scientific p rocess. T h ey  m erge as exp lo ra tions lead  to  a  te n ta tiv e  
h y p o th es is , w hich is g rad u a lly  firm ed  u p , co m m u n ica ted  as in fo rm a tio n , an d  su b m itte d  
to  pub lic  a tte m p ts  a t  re fu ta tio n . A  useful in sigh t m ay  h e  gained  h e re  b y  a p p ea l to  th e  
l i te ra tu re  o f n eu ra l n e tw o rk s, fo r th e  process o f tra in in g  a  n e tw o rk  can  b e  fa c ilita ted  
by  th e  use of s im u la ted  annealing . W e s ta r t  th e  netw o rk  ru n n in g  in  i ts  tra in in g  m ode 
w ith  a  h igh  te m p e ra tu re  ( th a t  is, a  la rg e  a m o u n t o f no ise), a n d  g rad u a lly  cool i t  dow n 
as lea rn in g  tak es  p lace. T h is  a t te m p ts  to  overcom e th e  p rob lem s asso c ia ted  w ith  th e  
n e tw o rk  s tab ilis ing  in  a  local m in im u m  s ta te , ra th e r  th a n  co n tin u in g  to  seek b e t te r  
so lu tions [AM 90, pages 112-130]. T h is  can  be  illu s tra te d  g raph ica lly  as in  F ig u re  3.2.
In a warm system, 
noise perturbs solutions, 
and local minima may 
be avoided.
In a cool system, 
solutions may settle 
in a local mimimum
F ig u re  3.2: W arm  an d  C ool L earn ing
Sim ilarly  we can  see e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse  as th e  ac tiv ity  o f th e  w a rm  learn in g  ph ase , 
w here noise is de lib e ra te ly  allow ed in to  th e  sy stem , n o t only because  we do n o t know  how  
to  exclude i t ,  b u t  also becau se  it  helps us to  find  b e tte r  so lu tions. O nce we believe we 
h av e  tra in e d  ourselves ( th a t  is, we h av e  fo u n d  o u r th e o ry ) , we seek to  exclude noise by  
a d o p tin g  in fo rm ativ e  o r scientific d iscourse, co n ten t to  sit in  a  s ta b le , if  local, m in im um . 
T h is  n o tio n  o f s im u la ted  annea ling  will recu r in  various guises th ro u g h o u t th e  thesis.
3.4 Summary
T his c h a p te r  h a s , o f necessity , been  ra th e r  frag m en ta ry , for it  has su rveyed  a  n u m b e r 
o f d isp a ra te  bodies of know ledge, an d  no su itab le  s tru c tu re  ex ists  fo r reconcilia tion  of 
th e  issues ra ised . T h e  n e x t c h a p te r  seeks to  p rov ide  such a  s tru c tu re  su itab le  for th e  
lim ited  aim s of th is  research . T h e  m a te r ia l covered in th is  c h a p te r  fo rm s a  resou rce  to  
be d raw n  u p o n  by  su b seq u en t ch a p te rs , a n d , in  p a r tic u la r , i t  h as  e s tab lish ed  som e useful 
te rm inology .
A re c u rre n t th em e th ro u g h o u t th is  c h a p te r  h a s  been  th e  re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  th e  person  
an d  h u m a n  ac tiv ity , w h e th e r it  be  designing, solving prob lem s, o r engag ing  in  discourse.
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T his is u n d o u b ted ly  one of th e  m o st com plica ted  issues being  ad d ressed  in  th is  thesis , 
and  is th e  focus o f C h a p te r  Seven. In  1981, T w eney  et al m ad e  th e  p o in t th a t  “ th e  
psychology of scientific th in k in g  is com ing in to  ex istence” [T D M 81, pag e  1]: th is  c h a p te r  
m ay  be view ed as p rov id ing  a  n u m b e r o f research  p rog ram m es th a t  i t  can  pu rsue .
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C hapter 4
A Model of System Design
“D iscovery consists o f seeing what everybody has seen and thinking what 
nobody has thought”
Albert Szent-G ydrgyi
T h e  p rev ious tw o ch ap te rs  have  co n ta in ed  w ide-ranging  discussions d raw n  from  several 
d iscip lines. A lth o u g h  th ese  d iscussions have  all been  m o tiv a ted  by  th e  ta sk  of achieving 
a  b e t te r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of S oftw are E ng ineering , an d  have  been  ca rried  o u t using  well- 
estab lish ed  fram ew orks from  th ese  d iscip lines w here possib le, th ey  u n d o u b te d ly  a p p e a r 
to  lack  coherence an d  s tru c tu re . In  th is  c h a p te r  th e  in te n tio n  is to  s ta r t  pu lling  these  
s tra n d s  to g e th e r. I t  shou ld  be  s tressed  th a t  no a t te m p t will be m ad e  to  do th is  a t  a  deep 
th eo re tica l or ph ilosoph ical level, a  ta sk  fa r  b eyond  th e  scope of th is  th esis , b u t r a th e r  
a  m odel o f sy stem  developm ent will b e  p ro p o sed  w ith in  w hich th e  ro le  o f th e  various 
top ics discussed can  be identified . B road ly  speak ing , th e  p roposed  m odel should
• a d m it th e  discussion o f a  scientific basis fo r C o m p u tin g  in  th e  sense of P o p p e r.
•  e s tab lish  w here th e  m ore  tra d itio n a l engineering  aspec ts  o f S oftw are  D esign can  be 
lo ca ted , and  how  th e  technological basis for a  design fits in.
•  iden tify  th e  p rin c ip a l a reas of reference discourse in th e  process.
•  recognise th e  c e n tra l ro le  of p rob lem  solving in  th e  w hole su b je c t o f so ftw are sy stem  
design.
In  ad d itio n  to  fa c ilita tin g  th e  s tru c tu r in g  of th e  thesis  itself, th e  m odel shou ld  also b e  
useful for teach ers  o f C o m p u tin g  as a  s tru c tu r in g  m echanism s fo r p re sen tin g  m a te ria l, 
an d  consequen tly  for lea rn ers  as a  p ro v id er of sch em a ta  in to  w hich m a te r ia l m ay  be 
assim ila ted . I t  is n o t in te n d e d , how ever, th a t  i t  should  also h e  usefu l for th o se  charged  
w ith  th e  ta sk  of m an ag in g  o r acco u n tin g  la rg e  developm ent p ro je c ts , o r th o se  try in g  to  
design C A SE  tools or so ftw are  fac to ries. T h e  re la tionsh ips b e tw een  b e tw een  th is  m odel 
an d  o th e r  k inds o f m odel, inc lud ing  p lan n in g  m odels such as life cycles, will b e  discussed 
in  C h a p te r  Six.
I t  is in te n tio n a l th a t  th is  m odel is developed  a ro u n d  very  sim ple ideas, an d  n o t used  to  
exp lain  all th e  deta ils  o f “re a l” p ro je c ts . T h e re  a re  several ra tio n a lisa tio n s  for th is:
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•  T h e  ideas will scale u p , fo r la rg e  p rob lem s are  ju s t  an  ag g reg a te  o f lo ts  o f sm all 
p rob lem s.
•  In  rea l p rob lem s, m an ag em en t p lays a  d o m in an t ro le, o ften  o bscu ring  th e  tech n ica l 
p rocesses th a t  a re  ta k in g  place.
• R eal p ro je c ts  a re  p a r t  o f th e  so ftw are  crisis. W h a t is needed  is a  sim pler m odel 
from  w hich im p ro v ed  w ays o f p roceed ing  can  be  found .
T h ese  a re  ju s t  ra tio n a lisa tio n s , how ever, an d  th e  h o nest reaso n  for th is  decision is a  
b elief th a t  we shou ld  te a c h  th ro u g h  sim plified m odels. A ll o th e r  discip lines accep t such 
m odels w ith o u t question . P hysics h as  i ts  frictionless p lanes, p o in t m asses, an d  infin ite  
w ires, fo r exam ple, an d  ch em istry  h as  idea l gases. M ost engineering  discip lines sit u p o n  
such sciences, and  hence build  u p o n  th ese  sim plified m odels. C o m p u tin g  seem s to  b e  
un ique  in  its  b izarre  p u rsu it o f “re a lity ” from  day  one. T h is  m ay  b e  due in  p a r t  to  
an  ir ra tio n a l response  to  th e  po litica l p ressu re  to  prov ide v o ca tio n a l tra in in g , b u t th e  
consequences are  fa r  reach ing . F or exam ple , we h av e  p u t co m p u te r sy stem s in to  schools 
th a t  d e m o n s tra te  all th e  in tr ic a te  fea tu re s  o f rea l m ach ines1, we h a v e  used  bad ly  de­
signed , if  p o p u la r , p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  to  in tro d u ce  s tu d e n ts  to  p ro g ram m in g , and  
we h av e  used  design m e th o d s  th a t  a re  ill-founded , u n s ta b le  an d  d escribed  in  v a s t a rray s  
o f m an u a ls  to  in tro d u ce  th e  concep ts o f design. T hese  decisions seem  on  a  p a r  w ith  
filling ch em istry  lab o ra to rie s  w ith  chem icals th a t  a re  fu ll o f im p u ritie s , because  th a t  is 
how  th e y  are  usually  found  in m o st in d u s tr ia l processes.
T h e  suggestion  is also m ad e  th a t  teach in g  v ia  sim plified m odels, fa r  from  m ak ing  th e  
s tu d e n ts  less effective in  h an d lin g  rea l p rob lem s, offers th e  only h o p e  we hav e  o f allow ing 
inexperienced  engineers to  a p p ro ach  rea l prob lem s in  sensible w ays. T h is  w ill b e  discussed 
la te r  in  th e  thesis , b u t l i ttle  scientific su p p o rt will be  given, for C ognitive  Science is 
n o t y e t developed sufficiently to  p rov ide  firm  em pirica l evidence. T h is  suggestion  is a  
prax io log ica l re -s ta te m e n t o f th e  p rincip le  o f cu rricu lum  inversion  [C0I186].
4.1 An Overview of the Model
T h e  p rop o sed  m odel arose  from  N a u r’s suggestion  th a t  we should  t r e a t  p ro g ram m in g  as 
a  process o f th eo ry  bu ild ing  [N au85], to g e th e r  w ith  B u rs ta il an d  G o g u en ’s d iscussion of 
p u tt in g  theo ries to g e th e r  to  m ak e  specifications [BG77]. W e will ex te n d  th e se  ideas to  
suggest th a t  S oftw are E ng ineering  can  be  considered  to  be b ased  on  a  process o f th eo ry  
(p re se n ta tio n )  eng ineering , w here th e  ta rg e t  th e o ry  p resen ta .tions h av e  ce rta in  specific 
p ro p e rtie s  re la tin g  to  ex ecn tab ility . T h e  id ea  th a t  we consider th e  a r tifa c ts  o f all s tages 
of design as theo ries allow s us to  a d m it scientific ideals a t  all s tag es , a lth o u g h  we m u st
5We should distinguish between the computer as a vehicle for delivering pedagogical material, like 
television, and the computer as an artifact of study. It is not being suggest that televisions should not be 
used because they are complicated, but that they should not be used to introduce electricity to primary 
school pupils!
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acknow ledge th a t ,  d u rin g  th e  co n stru c tio n  an d  com m unica tion  o f th ese  th eo rie s , th e  
m odes of d iscourse being  u sed  m ay  n o t be  scientific, b u t ex p lo ra to ry  o r in fo rm ativ e .
I t  is usefu l to  consider th e  th eo ries invo lved  in  th e  process o f so ftw are  sy stem  design 
as be ing  of a  n u m b e r of k inds, d e te rm in ed  b y  th e  p rim ary  source o f th e  theo ry . T h is 
c a teg o risa tio n  is, o f course, on ly  a p p ro x im a te , an d  no  claim  is m ad e  th a t  i t  is exhau stiv e .
P h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l  t h e o r i e s :  th ese  arise  from  th e  dom ain  o f th e  p ro b lem  being solved. 
In  a  stock  co n tro l sy stem , for exam ple , th e  law s of supp ly  an d  d em an d  m ig h t be 
considered  p a r t  o f th e  phenom enological theo ry , as m ig h t th e  law s u nderly ing  th e  
c o m p an y ’s policy  on  buy ing  ah ead . A  th e o ry  th a t  is p rim arily  phenom enological 
will serve as a  s ta te m e n t o f req u irem en ts  for o u r sy stem  design ac tiv ity .
I n t u i t i v e  t h e o r i e s :  th e se  a re  considered  as arising  from  com m on sense. T h ey  a re  th e  
so r t of theories d iscussed in  naive  physics and  folk psychology, an d  can  be seen 
as u n d erp in n in g  th e  ac tions o f m an y  users an d  p u rch ase rs  o f so ftw are  system s, 
a lth o u g h  th ey  a re  likely to  rem ain  u n s ta te d .
M a t h e m a t i c a l  t h e o r i e s :  th ese  a re  theo ries th a t  effectively define m a th e m a tic a l te rm s , 
such  as g roup  th e o ry  o r se t theo ry . In  solving m a th e m a tic a l p rob lem s, th ese  will 
also be phenom enological theories.
C o m p u t e r  S c ie n c e  t h e o r i e s :  th ese  a re  th e  theo ries govern ing  th e  b eh av io u r of a r ­
tifac ts  s tu d ied , o r designed , in  C o m p u te r  Science. T h e  th e o ry  o f p ro g ram m in g  
languages, so rtin g , d a ta  ty p es an d  logic design m ig h t all be  considered  to  fall in to  
th is  category . T hese  can  be considered  defin itional o r in s tru m e n ta l on occasions. A 
th e o ry  o f P asca l, fo r exam ple , m ig h t be used  to  define th e  lan g u ag e  in  a  p a r tic u la r  
co n te x t, o r to  reason  a b o u t P asca l p ro g ram s, hence i t  m ay  som etim es be  considered  
m a th e m a tic a l o r phenom enological.
T h e  essence of th e  m odel is th a t  we ta k e  a  p rob lem  s itu a tio n  an d  c o n s tru c t a  (p rim arily ) 
phenom enological th eo ry  o f a  system ,g iv ing  rise to  schem as th a t  will solve th e  p rob lem  
[P ut74]. T h is  th e o ry  m ay  be p resen ted  in  te rm s o f o th e r  phenom enolog ical, in tu itiv e , 
m a th e m a tic a l, o r C o m p u te r  Science theo ries. W e th e n  tra n sfo rm  ou r th e o ry  p re se n ta ­
tio n  in to  one h av in g  b eh av io u ra lly  equ ivalen t schem as (w here th is  equivalence has to  he  
defined), expressed  in  te rm s  of th e  th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s  of ex isting  c o m p u ta tio n a l a r t i ­
fac ts . T h e  a rg u m en t th a t  p ro g ram s can  be  considered  as th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n s  will n o t 
be ex p an d ed  here , b u t  an  excellent reh ea rsa l o f th e  a rg u m en t can  b e  fo u n d  in  H o a re ’s 
p re se n ta tio n  to  th e  R oyal Society  [Hoa85].
T h e  n o tio n  of a  p ro g ra m  as a  th e o ry  is also easier to  accep t if  we a d o p t D ijk s tra ’s view 
th a t  th e  su b je c t o f in te re s t to  co m p u te r sc ien tis ts  is c o m p u ta tio n , n o t th e  co m p u te r 
[Dij89], fo r th e n  we can  see p ro g ram s as theories govern ing  p a r tic u la r  co m p u ta tio n s . 
A d d itio n a l su p p o rt for th e  id ea  can  be  found  in th e  sem inal w ork o f M iller, G a la n te r  a.nd 
P r ib ra m , w ho w rite
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“A p lan  is, fo r an  o rg an ism , essen tia lly  th e  sam e as p ro g ram  fo r a  co m p u te r.
. . . w e  re g a rd  a  c o m p u te r’s p ro g ra m  th a t  sim u la tes ce rta in  fe a tu re s  o f an  
o rg an ism ’s b eh av io u r as a  th e o ry  a b o u t th e  o rg an ism ’s p lan  th a t  g e n e ra ted  
th e  b eh av io u r.” [M G P60, pag e  17]
E vidence to  suggest th a t  e x p e rt p ro g ram m ers  te n d  to  view p ro g ram s in  te rm s  o f p lans 
h as also been  offered by  R ist [Ris86].
T h is tra n s fo rm a tio n  process m ay  m ak e  use o f techn iques for g ra d u a l tra n s la tio n  (re ­
fin em en t), o r involve leaps o f th e  im ag in a tio n . In  e ith e r case, how ever, th e  onus is on 
th e  designer to  a t te m p t  re fu ta tio n  o f th e  th e o ry  a t  all s tages w here i t  is p re sen ted  in  a  
scientific ( ra th e r  th a n  in fo rm ativ e  o r ex p lo ra to ry ) form . Such re fu ta tio n s  m ay  m an ifest 
them selves as inconsistencies in  th e  th eo ry , o r as a  fa ilu re  to  co rresp o n d  w ith  th e  fac ts , 
an d  it  is up  to  th e  designer to  decide how  to  co n stru c t a  new  th e o ry  to  cope w ith  th e  
p rob lem . In  p rac tice , o f course, m an y  o f th e  theories used will b e  tr e a te d  as in s tru m e n ta l, 
an d  hence re fu tab le  only  in  ex trem e  cases.
T h is  m akes so ftw are  d evelopm en t a  process of self-conscious design. A n  en d o rsem en t o f 
th is  view is expressed  by  N eu m an n  w hen  he w rites “S oftw are E ng ineering  is a  state o f  
m ind  a tta in a b le  by  th o u g h tfu l an d  farsee ing  peop le” [Neu85], A t each  s ta g e  th e  designer 
m u s t b e  prepa.red to  p re sen t th e  c u rre n t th e o ry  in  such a  form  th a t  i t  is am enab le  to  
re fu ta tio n . A tte m p ts  to  escape  from  th e  loss of innocence by  p re ten sio n s to  genius 
a re  non-scientific , as th e  genius will n o t co n tem p la te  active ly  seeking o u t re fu ta tio n s . 
A tte m p ts  to  escape  by  a d o p tio n  o f classical sty les o r m e th o d s a re  also non-scien tific , in  
P o p p e r ’s sense, because  th ey  ta k e  as ax io m atic  a  la rg e  b o d y  of a ssu m p tio n s  an d  p ro te c t 
th em  from  re fu ta tio n . I t  shou ld  b e  n o te d , how ever, th a t  th e  w hole o f m o d ern  science 
can  be deem ed a  refuge in  sty le: F ey erab en d , fo r exam ple, no tes  t h a t  th e  ad o p tio n  of a  
w este rn  ra tio n a lism  brings w ith  it  a  n u m b e r o f h idden  assu m p tio n s th a t  a re  n o t open  to  
d e b a te  w ith in  science itse lf  [Fey87]. T h e  th eo ry  p re sen ta tio n s  p lay  th e  ro le  o f d iag ram s in 
A lex an d e r’s philosophy. O u r m ove to w ard s co m p u ta tio n a lly  b iased  th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s  
can  b e  re-expressed  as th e  need  to  m ove to w ard s co n stru c tiv e  d iag ram s. T h is  m eans 
th a t  we m ove fro m  being  able to  discuss only th e  fu nc tion  of a  sy s tem  to  being  able to  
discuss b o th  its  fu n c tio n  an d  its  fo rm , an d  in  th e  case o f so ftw are th is  fo rm  corresponds 
to  th e  con figu ra tion  o f c o m p u ta tio n a l ob jec ts .
T h e  m odel also allows us to  a b s tra c t  aw ay from  ce rta in  aspec ts  o f th e  desired  b eh av io u r 
of th e  sy stem  a t  p a r tic u la r  s tag es  of th e  design. T h e  process o f th e o ry  co n s tru c tio n  is 
in h e ren tly  one of a b s tra c tio n , an d  we can  decide to  delay th e  in tro d u c tio n  of c e rta in  facets 
o f th e  design u n til la te r  s tag es in  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  process. T h is delay ing  o f d e ta il is 
w idely accep ted  in  th e  pedagog ical p rac tices  of science teach in g , as d e m o n s tra te d  by  
th e  ad o p tio n  of “school science” w ith  its  sim ple, idealised , m odels, as a  p recu rso r to  
“re a l” science, w ith  its  m ore  com plex, b u t  s till idealised , m odels. T h e  sim plified th eo ry  
p re sen ta tio n s  are  still view ed as p re se n ta tio n s  o f th e  sam e th eo ry , how ever, fo r we do n o t 
th in k  o f school science as p roposing  differen t theo ries, o r o f p ropo sin g  w rong  theo ries. 
T h is  discussion will be p u t  on  a  firm er foo ting  in  th e  n ex t c h a p te r , w hen  we will discuss
In  o u r sy stem  design ta s k , m em ory  c o n s tra in ts , fo r exam ple , a lth o u g h  know n a t  th e  o u t­
se t, can  be  ignored  in  o u r th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  u n til  a  su itab le  o p p o r tu n ity  is a rriv ed  a t  
fo r th e  concep t to  b e  p resen ted . A lth o u g h  w e w e m ay  choose to  ignore  som e in fo rm atio n  
in o u r cu rre n t th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n , i t  shou ld  b e  rem em bered  th a t  th is  in fo rm a tio n  p o ­
te n tia lly  still influences th e  tra n sfo rm a tio n s  we m ake. T h u s  som e in fo rm a tio n  s ta r ts  off 
a t  a  m eta-level govern ing  th e  design a n d  selection o f o u r th eo ries , b u t  m ay  m ig ra te  dow n 
in to  th e  th eo ry  itse lf  as th e  design p roceeds. Som e in fo rm atio n  m ay  never be expressed  
fo rm ally  in  o u r p re se n ta tio n , b u t  will rem ain  reflected  in  th e  choices o f p re se n ta tio n  we 
m ake. T h is close re la tio n sh ip  th a t  ex ists  b e tw een  m eth o d  an d  th e o ry  will be  developed 
in  several w ays in  th e  re s t o f th e  th esis , an d  is a  re c u rre n t th e m e  a t  all level o f th e  
discussion.
In  th is  m ode of w orking, th e  so ftw are  engineer behaves in  m an y  w ays like a  p u re  sc ien tis t, 
p u tt in g  fo rw ard  theories w ith  a  view  to  h av in g  th em  re fu ted . T h e re  is, o f course, a  
com plica tion : science is a lw ays assum ed  to  b e  founded  on  honesty . P o p p e r  ad m its  th a t  
science, as he views it , is b ased  on th e  p rem ise  th a t  no sc ien tis t w ould  ever falsify (in  
th e  fra u d u le n t sense) re su lts , o r in ten tio n a lly  express a  th eo ry  am biguously  so th a t  th e re  
are  escapes from  re fu ta tio n s . T h is  is a  scientific attitude. C e n tra l to  I io a re ’s a p p ro ach  is 
th e  n o tio n  th a t  S oftw are E ng ineers m u s t b u ild  such  an  a t t i tu d e . T h ro u g h o u t th is  thesis 
it  will be  tre a te d  as ax io m atic  th a t  such  an  a t t i tu d e  is b o th  desirab le  an d  a tta in a b le  
w ith in  th e  profession, b u t no  ju stif ic a tio n  will be  given. A tte m p tin g  such  a  ju stifica tio n  
leads us in to  th e  rea lm s of e th ics, and  questions th e  very  fab ric  of so c ie ty 2. T h e  read e r 
shou ld  be  aw are, how ever, th a t  th is  a ssu m p tio n  is crucial to  all t h a t  follow s, an d  th a t  th e  
pedagog ical discussions a re  im plic itly  founded  on th e  ad d itio n a l a ssu m p tio n  th a t  s tu d e n ts  
accep t th is  code o f b eh av io u r o r th a t  it  can  be developed in  th e m . A ll ed u ca tio n  has 
such  h id d en  agendas, an d  teach ers  a t  all levels h av e  im plicitly  accep ted  resp o n sib ility  for 
developing su itab le  e th ica l values in  th e ir  pup ils. U n fo rtu n a te ly  th e  p ro d u cer-co n su m er 
m odel o f ed u ca tio n  is som etim es in te rp re te d  as an  excuse fo r ab an d o n in g  th e  teach in g  
of th e se  values in  favour of d irec tly  app licab le  skills. I t  w ould b e  iron ic  if th is  sh ift w ere 
to  cause th e  a b a n d o n m en t o f th e  very  values necessary  for sign ifican t im p ro v em en ts  in  
so ftw are  p ro d u c tio n .
4.2 The Source of Phenomenological Theories
W e need  to  consider very  carefully  w h a t o b jec ts  a re  being d iscussed by  phenom enolog ical 
theo ries. T h e  lay  p e rso n ’s view o f  n a tu ra l  science is th a t  it  is concerned  w ith  o b jec ts  th a t  
can  be considered  to  ap p e a r n a tu ra lly  in  th e  w orld . M odern  science, how ever, is very  
h a rd  to  exp lain  w ith  such in tu itio n s , an d  recen t philosophies of science have  te n d e d  to
2This should not be taken as an endorsement of the view that students should not spend time dis­
cussing such issues. The author was shocked to discover recently that, on surveying 45 final year Computer 
Science Degree students, 39 of them had never thought there were any question of morality in releasing 
software knowing it to have bugs in it.
a suitable refinement of the notion of “theory” .
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m ove aw ay from  th e  p re -o ccu p atio n  w ith  observ a tio n  of th e  n a tu ra l  w orld , an d  a t te m p te d  
to  p ro v id e  n o tio n s o f “th e o ry ” th a t  p e rm it a  sep a ra tio n  o f th e o ry  fro m  n a tu re . B efore 
considering  th is  su b jec t fu r th e r  in  th e  n ex t c h a p te r , we will discuss how  theo ries m igh t 
arise in  S oftw are D esign.
O ne view  of S oftw are E ng ineering , som etim es cited  as a  reason  for n o t a d o p tin g  scientific 
p rac tices , is t h a t  it  is concerned  n o t w ith  th e  n a tu ra l  w orld , b u t w ith  m an -m ad e  in fo r­
m a tio n  s tru c tu re s . T h e re  a re  a  n u m b er o f w ays in  w hich th ese  in fo rm a tio n  s tru c tu re s  
m ay  be  m an ifest. T h ey  m ay  be em bedded  in  ex isting  system s, e ith e r  h u m a n  or realised  
by  som e o th e r  a r tifa c t, o r th e y  m ay  be co n ta in ed  im plicitly  in  som e p rob lem  th a t  we a re  
se ttin g  o u t to  solve ab initio.
T h e  ta sk  of designing a  co m p u te r-b ased  sy stem  to  rep lica te  th e  ac tio n s of an  ex isting  
h u m a n  sy stem  is qu ite  easy  to  express in  te rm s o f th eo ry  bu ild ing . H ere we a re  reverse- 
engineering  a  so lu tion  to  a  p rob lem  th a t  has a lread y  been solved once, in  o rd e r to  re ­
im p lem en t it  in  a  different technofogy. T h u s  w e a re  p rov ided  w ith  a  m odel u p o n  w hich 
to  ex p erim en t an d  from  w hich to  generalise a  theo ry . In  th e  m a jo r ity  o f cases th e  
th eo ry  u n d erp in n in g  th e  o rig inal sy stem  is n o t available to  us explic itly , how ever, for 
usually  th e  h u m a n  sy stem  has evolved over a  perio d  of tim e , o ften  th ro u g h  a  process 
o f unselfconscious design, a n d  th e  im p lem en to rs  have never really  n eeded  to  express th e  
so lu tion  in  a  ra tio n a l way. M oreover, th e  people  w ho im p lem en t th e  ex isting  sy stem  
freq u en tly  also a c t as users o f th e  sy stem , solving difficult p rob lem s as th ey  arise. T h is  
p rovides a  flexible an d  e x p e rt sy stem , b u t  unselfconsciously. I t  also confuses th e  system  
b o u n d aries . Such an  ap p ro ach  u sually  m eans th a t  th e  system  d o c u m e n ta tio n  a n d  th e  
desig n er’s p e rcep tio n s, do n o t reflect th e  sy stem  as it  ac tu a lly  ex ists  to  solve th e  prob lem . 
T h a t  is, th e  “designers” hav e  no  rea l th e o ry  as to  w hy th e  sy stem  o p e ra te s  as i t  does. 
S te w a rt an d  S tew art i llu s tra te  th is  p o in t w ith  th e ir  deligh tfu l acco u n t of th e  cuddly  
to y  q u a lity  in sp ec to r, w hose d escrip tion  o f his jo b  was p h ra sed  in  te rm s of re jec ting  
th e  “m a rd y  b u g g er” . T h e  in sp ec to r w as u n ab le  to  a rtic u la te  ex ac tly  w h a t c o n s titu te d  
a  ‘m a rd y  b u g g er” , h u t  a f te r  careful analysis using  a  K ellian re p e r to ry  g rid  techn ique  
[Kel55], it  w as estab lish ed  th a t  to  avoid being  so classified a  to y  h a d  to  hav e  th e  spacing  
be tw een  eyes an d  nose th e  sam e as th a t  b e tw een  nose an d  m o u th , an d  also th e  pupils of 
th e  eyes h a d  to  be  cen tra lly  lo ca ted  [SS82], c ited  in  [Jan87 , page  485].
T h e  th eo ry  o f an  ex isting  sy stem  m ay  be h a rd  to  e x tra c t, b u t we sho u ld  bew are  o f th e  
naive  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  because  ac tio n  is tak in g  place th e re  m u st a lread y  be a  th eo ry , o r 
a t le a s t a  p lan , to  e x tra c t a t  all. S uchm an  suggests th a t  i t  is only th e  w este rn  desire for 
ra tio n a lisa tio n  th a t  leads us to  assum e ac tio n  should  be u n d erp in n ed  by  well th o u g h t-o u t 
p lans. She develops th e  n o tio n  of s i tu a te d  ac tio n s as govern ing  m e th o d , an d  re legates 
p lans to  p o s t-ra tio n a lisa tio n s , o r resources to  be  d raw n  u p o n  as o r ie n ta tio n  aids w hen 
prob lem s arise  [Suc87]. P a rn a s  an d  C lem ents express a  sim ilar view  in  th e  co n tex t o f 
sy stem  design, defending th is  p o s t-ra tio n a lisa tio n  as a  w orthw hile  a c tiv ity  [PC85]. A t 
th is  p o in t it is im p o r ta n t to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  s ta tu s  of th e  th e o ry  o u r engineer is try in g  
to  c o n s tru c t. W e are  n o t suggesting  th a t  th is  phenom enological th e o ry  is govern ing  
th e  ac tio n s o f people in  th e  ex isting  h u m a n  system , and  th e  ta sk  is one o f discovery.
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R a th e r  w e a re  a sse rtin g  th a t  we need  to  c o n s tru c t a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  as th e  basis o f a  
p lan  govern ing  th e  ac tions o f a  m ach ine. C u rre n t technology  requ ires such  a  p lan , for 
co m p u te r  system s are  still p ro g ram m ed , an d  a re  n o t capab le  o f s itu a te d  ac tions to  th e  
sam e e x te n t as h u m an s. I t  m ig h t h e  suggested  th a t  th is is n o t because  o f a  lim ita tio n  
of p rocessing  pow er, b u t o f in te rface: th e  m ach ine  does n o t hav e  access to  th e  sam e 
w ea lth  o f d e ta il a b o u t each  s itu a tio n  th a t  is available to  th e  h u m a n  p rob lem  solver. 
F u rth e rm o re , we a re  n o t endorsing  th e  cognitive  science view th a t  h u m a n  ac tio n  m ay  be 
studied  by  bu ild ing  co m p u tab le  theo ries assum ed  to  lie b e n e a th  ac tio n s , r a th e r  we a re  
a sse rtin g  th a t  one way to  s im u la te  th ese  ac tions is to  c o n s tru c t a  co m p u tab le  theory . 
T h u s  o u r th eo ry  build ing  is genuinely  a  process o f design an d  n o t discovery.
T h is  also raises th e  questio n  as to  w h e th e r o u r  th eo ry , once designed , shou ld  b e  e x p o rted  
to  th e  ap p lica tio n  dom ain  th ro u g h  th e  u ser in te rface . S uchm an  m akes th e  p e r tin e n t 
o b serv a tio n  th a t  once designed, co m p u te r-b ased  system s could ac tu a lly  in s tru c t th e  users 
in  th e  th eo ry  u n d erp in n in g  th e ir  design [Suc87, page  17]. T h is concords w ith  th e  id ea  
th a t  so ftw are  engineering a n d  ed u ca tio n  hav e  m an y  sim ilarities, fo r once ed u ca ted  we 
expec t o u r pupils to  be ab le  to  in s tru c t o th e rs . W e will n o t p u rsu e  th is  question  fu r th e r  
in  th is  thesis , b u t  i t  shou ld  be n o ted  how  n a tu ra lly  questions like th is  arise  in  th e  con tex t 
o f th e  p ro p o sed  m odel.
O n occasion, th e  m e th o d  th a t  th e  h u m a n  is using for solving a  p ro b lem  m ay  be difficult 
to  devise by discussion w ith  th e  ind iv id u a l alone. F ly ing  h e licop te rs, for exam ple , is 
an  a c tiv ity  w here m an y  of th e  p ilo t’s ac tio n s are  carried  o u t by  “feel” , in  reac tio n  to  
th e  b eh av io u r of th e  m ach ine . A u to p ilo t design to  d a te  has n o t a t te m p te d  to  exploit 
th is  “feel” , b u t h as  so u g h t decisions based  upo n  th e  th eo ry  of fligh t, th e  cu rre n t m ission 
en v iro n m en t, and  various m easu rab le  p a ra m e te rs . R ecent research  suggests  th a t  an  
a lte rn a tiv e  s tra te g y  m ig h t be  to  a t te m p t  sim u la tio n  of h u m a n  ac tio n  b y  tre a tin g  th e  
p ilo ts  as em pirical o b jec ts , an d  devising a  th e o ry  th a t  explains th e ir  ac tions in  te rm s of 
th e  sense d a ta  availab le to  th em . T h is can  be  achieved by  a  process of ru le  in d u c tio n . 
T h is th e o ry  can  th e n  be tra n sfo rm e d , typ ica lly  by a  process o f “c lean ing  u p ” , w here th e  
sup erio r speed o f a  c o m p u te r is exp lo ited  to  m ake  th e  sam e decisions, b u t  fa s te r . E vidence 
suggests th a t  th is  techn ique  can  keep th e  con tro lled  device w ith in  t ig h te r  o p e ra tin g  
envelopes [Mic90].
D esigning a  co m p u ter-b ased  so lu tion  to  a  p rob lem  cu rren tly  solved b y  a n o th e r  a r tifa c t, 
r a th e r  th a n  a  p e rson , such  as designing a  m icroprocessor sy stem  to  rep lace  th e  m ech an ­
ical co n tro l u n it in  a  w ashing  m ach ine , is usually  a  r a th e r  sim pler ta sk . H ere th e  reverse  
engineering  is m ore  tra d itio n a l, an d  in  ad d itio n  we m ay  be allow ed access to  th e  specifi­
ca tio n  o f th e  o rig inal u n it. T h e  usefulness o f th is  specification will la rgely  be d e te rm in ed  
by th e  e x te n t to  w hich it  c ap tu re s  th e  th e o ry  of th e  a rtifa c t in  iso la tio n  from  th e  th eo ry  
of th e  technology  in  w hich th e  a r tifa c t is cu rren tly  im p lem en ted . If  th e  specification  
is expressed  solely in  te rm s o f d raw ings of cogs and  m o to rs , fo r exam ple , i t  m ay  b e  of 
l i tt le  value for th is  pu rpose: if it  is expressed  in  m ore  a b s tra c t concep ts i t  is likely to  be  
o f m ore  im m ed ia te  use. In  effect, we do n o t w an t a  co n stru c tiv e  d ia g ra m  b u t  a  purely  
fu n c tio n a l one.
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In  b o th  o f th e  above cases we h av e  an  ex isting  o b jec t th a t  can  b e  em pirica lly  observed . 
F req u en tly , how ever, w e are  called u p o n  to  solve p rob lem s th a t  have  h ith e r to  been  left 
unso lved . In  th is  case we have no  sy stem  to  observe em pirically . Loosely we can  im ag ine 
th a t  we a re  try in g  to  c o n s tru c t a  th e o ry  o f “w h a t th e  custom er w a n ts” . In  o rd e r to  discuss 
th is  we need to  have  a  m odel of th e  design p rocess th a t  ad m its  theo ries  o f a rtifa c ts  to  
be c o n s tru c te d  as well as o f th o se  th a t  a lready  ex ist. W e will do th is  by  ad o p tin g  a  
s tra te g y  suggested  by  S im on in  his w ork  on  th e  Sciences o f th e  A rtific ia l [Sim69] an d  
also A lexander in  his w ork  on  a rc h ite c tu re  [Ale64]. B o th  a u th o rs  suggest th a t  we can 
view an  a r tifa c t in  tw o  w ays: as a n  o b jec t o r as an  in te rface . If  w e hav e  access to  
th e  “hole” in to  w hich th e  sy stem  is to  fit, th e n  w e can  ex p erim en t em pirica lly  w ith  th e  
in te rface  su rro u n d in g  th is  hole.
T h is  is also th e  kernel o f th e  slogan  th a t  we shou ld  s ta r t  off b y  specifying th e  “w h a t” n o t 
th e  “how ” . T h is  slogan  is n o t very  helpfu l, how ever, unless we a re  p re p a re d  to  discuss 
o u r in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  “w lia tn ess” an d  “how ness” of a  system . W e will in te rp re t th e  
slogan  as m ean ing  th a t  we shou ld  seek to  express w h a t we w an t th e  sy s tem  to  be  in  te rm s  
of fu n c tio n  observed  across som e in te rface  before  expressing w h a t w e w an t th e  system  
to  b e  in  te rm s of its  fo rm . T h is does ra ise  th e  q uestion  as to  how  easily fu n c tio n  can  be 
expressed  w ith o u t im p lica tions for form : a  questio n  th a t  we will r e tu rn  to  in  th e  n ex t 
ch ap te r .
T y p ica l o f th e  confusion th a t  th is  slogan  causes is th e  prob lem  faced  by  a  designer w ho is 
to ld  a t  th e  o u tse t th a t  a  p a r tic u la r  p ro g ram m in g  language  m u s t be  used . T h is m ay  occur, 
for exam ple , w here a  new  p ro g ram  is to  be ad d ed  to  an  ex isting  su ite , an d  th e  custom er 
w an ts  to  use ex isting  s ta ff  to  m a in ta in  th e  new  p ro g ram  w ith o u t an y  a d d itio n a l s ta ff 
developm en t. T h is req u irem en t to  use a  p a r tic u la r  language  is th e n  p a r t  o f th e  w h a t, n o t 
th e  how , because  it  is visible, to  m a in ten an ce  staff, across th e  in te rface . If  th e  custom ers 
m ak e  no such s tip u la tio n  th en  th e y  have  no rig h t to  delve in to  th e  sy stem  to  observe 
th e  lan g u ag e  a fte r  i t  has been  co n s tru c te d , an d  o b jec t to  th e  d esig n e r’s choice. T h e  
p o in t to  n o te  here  is th a t  if a n  im p lem en ta tio n  language o r ta rg e t  m ach in e  is specified, 
im p lic itly  or explicitly , by  th e  cu sto m er th e n  i t  will influence th e  design in  th e  sam e w ay 
as th e  m ore  conven tiona l fu n c tio n a l a t tr ib u te s . T h e  designer m ay , o f course, choose to  
delay  inclusion  of such  deta ils  in  th e  th eo ry  u n til  a  la te r  s tag e  in  th e  design process, 
th u s  allow ing th is  influence to  be  show n by  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  selection , ra th e r  th a n  
w ith in  th e  p re se n ta tio n  itself. T h e  slogan, in  th is  case, carries an  im plied  m ethodo log ica l 
m essage reg a rd in g  th e  o rdering  o f fu n c tio n a l a ttr ib u te s . As we shall see, how ever, th is  
m essage is inco n sis ten t.
W e can  view th is  process of u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  hole in  a t  le a s t fou r w ays. F irs t w e could 
consider th a t  th e  custom ers an d  users a re  th e  tru e  ob jec ts  o f o u r em p irica l s tu d y , and  
th a t  we a re  try in g  to  c o n s tru c t a  th e o ry  o f th e ir  beliefs a b o u t th e  o b je c t th a t  will fill th e  
hole. In  genera l, how ever, no single ind iv id u a l will suffice for th is  s tu d y , an d  so we m u st 
s tu d y  a  ne tw ork  o f in te ra c tin g  ind iv idua ls. E ach  in d iv idua l will h av e  a  d ifferen t se t of 
beliefs. T h e re  is no  p rob lem  w ith  beliefs be ing  logically in co n sis ten t p rov ided  th e y  a re  
k ep t w ith in  d ifferent sy stem s, b u t  befo re  th e  engineer can  fo rm  a  unified th eo ry , w ith in  a
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sy stem  sim ple enough  to  co m p u te  w ith  o n  cu rre n t technology, th e se  inconsistencies will 
h av e  to  be resolved. T h is can  h e  ach ieved  e ith e r  by  genuinely  p e rsu ad in g  in d iv idua ls  
to  change th e re  beliefs, o r b y  p e rsu ad in g  th em  to  ac t ag a in s t th e ir  beliefs. In  p rac tice , 
m an y  of th e  inconsistencies observed  a re  th e  re su lt of th e  in te rp re ta tio n  of te rm s , ra th e r  
th a n  in co n sis ten t views of th e  w orld .
T ra d itio n a l views of Science can n o t easily  cope w ith  such o b jec ts  o f s tu d y . I t  is usually  
assum ed  th a t  exp erim en ts  are  re p e a ta b le , fo r exam ple , b u t if  we are  dealing  w ith  belief 
sy stem s we m u st accep t th a t  such  re p e titio n  can n o t be relied  u p o n , fo r th e re  is no 
ob lig a tio n  for beliefs to  rem ain  c o n s ta n t in  a  chang ing  w orld. I t  is also assum ed  th a t  
th e  sc ien tis t a t te m p ts  to  m in im ise in te rfe ren ce  w ith  th e  w orld  being  observed . R esolving 
inconsistencies in  th e  n a tu ra l  w orld  by  “p e rsu ad in g ” o b jec ts  to  b eh av e  d ifferen tly  has a  
d is tin c tly  unscien tific  feel! P sycho log ists  a re  well aw are  of th e  p rob lem s th is  a ssu m p tio n  
o f non-in te rfe rence  b rings, b u t  w here th e  engineer has th e  ad d itio n a l m o tiv e  of w an tin g  to  
seek consistency, th is  non -in te rfe rence  is itse lf  paradox ica l. T h is  view  is now  considered  
ra th e r  naive, an d  it  is genera lly  accep ted  th a t  a t th e  very  lea s t “needs an a ly sis” should  
rep lace  “w an ts  analysis”3 in  th e  hope  th a t  needs will be less in co n sis ten t th a n  w an ts .
T h e  second w ay o f view ing th e  p rocess allows us to  consider an  o b je c t o f s tu d y  th a t  does 
n o t change, an d  is hence m ore am enab le  to  scientific app roaches. W e can  consider th e  
users a n d  cu sto m er as in s tru m e n ts  fo r o b serv a tio n  of an  u n ch an g in g  hole. Inco n sis ten ­
cies an d  changes over tim e  can  now  be  seen as ca lib ra tio n  prob lem s. W e can  a t te m p t  to  
ca lib ra te  th ese  in s tru m e n ts  by  b ring ing  th e m  in to  c o n tac t w ith  co n cre te  exam ples, in tro ­
ducing  com m on term ino logy  an d  ex p ec tin g  com m on answ ers. T h is is th e  ap p ro ach  used 
for m an y  years a t th e  R oyal O b se rv a to ry  in  G reenw ich, w here observers w ere all te s te d , 
giv ing rise  to  th e  “p e rso n a l e q u a tio n s” t h a t  w ere used to  co u n te r in d iv id u a l differences 
w hen  using  th e  te lescope [G re84, pages 210-216]. T hese  eq u a tio n s w ere b ased  on  s ta t is t i ­
cal techn iques, w hich could a t te m p t  to  co rrec t for re la tiv e , b u t n o t ab so lu te , e rro r. T h e  
a ssu m p tio n  w as m ad e  in  th is  a p p ro ach  th a t  p e rcep tio n  m echan ism s a re  fa irly  sim plistic , 
and  hence sim ple s ta tis tic s  w ould  serve to  co m p en sa te  for differences. W e m u s t accep t, 
how ever, th a t  observ a tio n  is th e o ry  lad en  an d  seek to  reconcile th e  conflicting theories 
th a t  give rise to  th e  inconsistencies. T h is  w ould  ap p e a r to  lead  to  a  c ircu lar p rob lem , 
unless we a re  p rep a red  to  b reak  th e  circle by  th e  d ic ta to ria l im p o sitio n  of ex isting  th e o ­
ries for th e  o b serva tion . Such an  ap p ro ach  w as com m on in  th e  early  days of in fo rm atio n  
sy stem  design, an d  led , n o t surprising ly , to  considerab le user re s is tan ce . M oreover, th e  
im p o sitio n  of a  th eo ry  usually  leads to  th e  w rong prob lem  being  so lved , as th e  engineer 
forces an  in a p p ro p ria te  p e rcep tio n  o f th e  p rob lem  on th e  user.
T h e  th ird  w ay of view ing th e  p rob lem s is to  consider th e  a r tifa c t an d  its  en v iro n m en t as 
fo rm ing  th e  desired  system . In  p rac tice , th is  is usually  done for so ftw are  sy stem s, w here
3Again we miglit note the irony of the situation when asked to educate engineers within a system 
that is being forced to deliver “what the consumer wants”. The inconsistencies that such wants analysis 
present (such as the conflicting wants of students, parents, employees and government) are surely reflected 
in the number of acl hoc solutions, and subsequent problems, of the education system. We might further 
reflect that if such an education leads graduates to accept the values inherent in the system, then the 
system might be acting against the education of engineers fitted to solve the software crisis.
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fu n c tio n a lity  is expressed  in  te rm s o f th e  ru n n in g  p ro g ram , even  if  th e  ta rg e t  m ach ine  
is n o t p a r t  o f th e  designed a r tifa c t. T h is  is sim ply explained  in  o u r m odel, fo r we use 
theo ries of p ro g ram  execu tion  in  o u r p re se n ta tio n , im p o rtin g  as in s tru m e n ts  theories 
o f th e  execu tion  en v iro n m en t. T h e  ap p ro ach  is also qu ite  com m on in  co n tro l sy stem s, 
w here th e  specification  is w r it te n  in  te rm s  o f how  th e  con tro lled  p la n t is to  beh av e , n o t 
how  th e  co n tro l p ro g ram  is to  beh av e . W e could ex ten d  th is  id ea , how ever, an d  include, 
say , users as p a r t  o f th e  system . W e m ig h t, the re fo re , ta k e  o u r sy s tem  b o u n d a ry  as th e  
function ing  of a  d e p a rtm e n t w ith in  a  c o rp o ra te  s tru c tu re . In  th is  case, o u r design ta sk  
can be seen as th e  solving of an  in te rface  eq u a tio n  [Shi86]:
S  = ( E \ X ) \ I
w here S  is th e  to ta l  sy stem , E  is th e  en v iro n m en t, I  is th e  se t o f in te rn a l com m u n ica tio n s, 
an d  X  is th e  p a r t  o f th e  sy stem  we are  to  design. T h is view m ig h t be  p lausib le  fo r a  
co n tro l sy stem , b u t if E  involves a  su b s ta n tia l  h u m an  elem ent i t  is unlikely  th a t  its  
b eh av io u r will rem ain  c o n s ta n t w ith  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of X  in to  its  en v iro n m en t. T h e  
only w ay th is  view w ould  w ork is if  we could d ic ta te  th e  h u m a n  b eh av io u r. C u rre n t 
th in k in g  in  IIC I is com ing a ro u n d  to  th e  view th a t  th is  is n o t only  und esirab le , b u t  
im possib le . E ven  if  we do accep t th is  view for a  p a r tic u la r  p ro b lem , o f course, we still 
hav e  to  find a  w ay o f co n s tru c tin g  a  th e o ry  o f S.
T h e  fina l w ay we will consider o f view ing th e  p rob lem , w hich we sha ll a d o p t in  w h a t 
follow s, is th a t  th e  custom ers and  users should  be  allow ed to  becom e p a r t  o f th e  design 
te a m , w ho b ring  w ith  th e m  ex isting  theo ries  th a t  th ey  use for in te rp re tin g  observations. 
T h e  ta sk  of th e  S oftw are E ng ineer is to  co o rd in a te  th e  te a m  on  a  re sea rch  p ro g ram m e 
o f un ifica tion , genera lisa tio n  an d  refinem en t. T h is  allows us to  w eaken th e  m ax im  “th e  
cu s to m er is alw ays r ig h t” by  using  P o p p e r ’s a sse rtio n  th a t  anyone w ho holds theories 
m ay  well be  w rong, cu sto m ers  included . I t  is th e  d u ty  of th e  so ftw are  engineer fo rm u la te  
th e  th e o ry  in  such  a  w ay th a t  re fu ta tio n  is possib le , to  m an ag e  th e  re fu ta tio n /re v is io n  
cycle, an d  to  m ove th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  to w ard s  an  im p lem en tab le  fo rm . In  a  sense, 
th e  so ftw are  engineer is p lay ing  th e  ro le o f te ach e r here , he lp ing  th e  cu sto m er to  u n ­
d e rs ta n d  th e  system . T h is  id ea  th a t  users an d  custom ers should  becom e m o re  involved 
in th e  design process is cu rren tly  being  ad v o ca ted  by th e  p ro p o n e n ts  of a  n u m b e r of 
new  developm ent “m ethodo log ies” . O ne side-effect o f th is  is to  em phasise  th a t  sy stem  
design is n o t usually  technologically  n e u tra l: by being forced to  questio n  th e ir  ex isting  
th eo ries , m an y  users an d  m an ag ers  hav e  discovered inconsistencies in  ex isting  com pany  
p ro ced u res , s tru c tu re s  an d  policies. T h is again  raises th e  questio n  o f honesty , fo r th e  
ap p ro a c h  can  only really  w ork  if everyone involved  accep ts scientific s ta n d a rd s : a  ju n io r 
m em b er of stafF w ho is n o t p rep a red  to  re fu te  th e  th eo ry  o f a  d irec to r, for exam ple, o r 
a  d irec to r w ho refuses to  lis ten  to  an y  re fu ta tio n s  o f a  su b o rd in a te , is n o t conform ing  to  
th ese  s ta n d a rd s 4. T h e  m an ag em en t s tru c tu re  an d  ethos in m an y  com panies is likely to
4We should not assume, however, that scientists automatically conform to these standards either.. 
The history of science offers many examples of junior researchers having their ideas ignored by those in 
charge of their research programmes.
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cause th is  a p p ro ach  to  flounder.
W hichever w ay we choose to  view  th e  p rocess, we can  see th e re  a re  p rob lem s. I t  is no t 
enough  fo r th e  so ftw are engineer to  want to  beh av e  scientifically. I f  we a d o p t view one, 
th e re  is n o t y e t sufficient u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  w ays in  w hich beliefs change for th is  to  
be done. If  we a d o p t view tw o, th e n  we m u st accep t th a t  w e a re  w ork ing  w ith  unre liab le  
in s tru m e n ts . V iew th re e  p re sen ts  us w ith  b o th  of th ese  p rob lem s, an d  also th e  ta sk  of 
solving th e  in te rface  eq u a tio n . If  we a d o p t view fou r, th e n  we m u s t accep t th a t  i t  is 
n o t enough  for th e  so ftw are  engineer to  w an t to  b ehave  scientifically, b u t th e re  m u s t 
be a  co rrespond ing  w illingness on  th e  p a r t  o f th e  custom ers an d  users. T h is  ra ises th e  
q uestion  of th e  cu s to m ers’ a n d  u se rs ’ p ercep tio n s o f th e  so ftw are  engineering  process. 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th ese  a re  likely to  be fo rm ed  on  th e  basis o f experiences a n d  sto ries , o ften  
ap o c ry p h a l, of co m pu ting  d isaste rs . I t  is h a rd  to  p e rsu ad e  peop le  th a t  th e  process is 
scientific, w ith  th e  h igh ideals th is  en ta ils , w hen th e y  have  p e rcep tio n s th a t  include th e  
engineer as a  d ic ta to r , o r as a  h igh  p rie s t, o r as a  b ack -s tree t t ra d e r . U ser ex p ec ta tio n s , 
th erefo re , m u s t b e  seen as a  co n tr ib u tin g  fa c to r  to  th e  softw are crisis. A ttr ib u tio n  of 
b lam e is an  u n co n stru c tiv e  en te rp rise , b u t  if th is  in te rp re ta tio n  of affairs is co rrec t, th en  
th e  crisis can  clearly  only be  resolved over a  n u m b er of years as ex p ec ta tio n s  change. 
H o a re ’s im p lica tio n  th a t  so ftw are  engineers can  change th e ir  s ta tu s  fro m  h igh  p rie s ts  to  
sc ien tis ts  by  th e ir  ow n actions is p e rh ap s  a  l i tt le  naive. If  th e  m asses still want h igh 
p rie s ts , o r co n tin u e  to  see h igh p rie s ts , th e n  th ey  can  m ake such a  tra n s it io n  very  h a rd . 
N a u r ’s view th a t  th e  s ta tu s  m u s t be b o th  deserved  and  conferred  seem s m ore  ten ab le . 
T h is  o b serv a tio n  is a  reflection  o f K a n t’s p o in t th a t  a r t  requ ires observers sufficiently  
cu ltu red  to  ap p rec ia te  it  as such [K a n l l j :  so ftw are  system s requ ire  u sers a n d  clients w ho 
are  ab le  to  perceive th e m  as engineered  a rtifac ts .
4.3 The Refutation of Phenomenological Theories
W h a t does it m ean  to  re fu te  o r accep t a  phenom enological th eo ry ?  A ccord ing  to  P o p p e r, 
we accep t a  th eo ry  “only in  th e  sense th a t  we select i t  as w o rth y  to  be  su b je c te d  to  fu r th e r  
critic ism , an d  to  th e  severest te s ts  we can  design” ; any  th eo ry  th a t  su rv ives, how ever, “is 
th e  b es t th eo ry  . .  .o f  w hich we know ” [Pop59, page  419]. A m a jo r  critic ism  o f P o p p e r  
has been  his in ab ility , o r re lu c tan ce , to  exp lain  w h a t he m eans b y  “b e s t” in  th is  co n tex t. 
O n th e  su rface, he  can n o t m ean  “m o st likely to  be tru e ” , for b o ld e r, less p ro b ab le , 
theo ries a re  considered  b e t te r  th a n  p ro b ab le  ones. In  fa c t, how ever, P o p p e r ’s ph ilosophy  
is concerned  w ith  th e  co n s tru c tio n  o f theo ries, n o t th e ir  use.
W h en  we consider th e  construction  o f theo ries, th e re  is a  clear d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  P o p p e r 
an d  th e  in d u c tiv is ts . T h is d is tin c tio n  seem s to  d isap p ear w hen we consider th e  selection 
of theo ries for som e use o u ts id e  o f science. P o p p e r does n o t concern  h im self d irec tly  
w ith  such uses of theo ries, seeing th e  th eo ry  as an  end in  itself. If  we p u sh  th e  p o in t, 
how ever, an d  in sist th a t  theories m u st b e  capab le  o f ap p lica tio n  to  p rob lem s ou ts id e  
of science, th e n  P o p p e r  is recom m ending  th e  selection of th e  th e o ry  th a t  evidence to
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d a te  has failed to  re fu te , in  sp ite  o f re a l a t te m p ts . T h e  in d u c tiv is t is recom m end ing  th e  
th e o ry  th e  evidence su p p o rts . T h e  difference a t  th e  level o f selection  w ould  a p p e a r  to  
be one o f term inology . W e w ould  a rg u e , how ever, th a t  th e re  is still a  m a jo r  difference in  
a t t i tu d e . T h e  in d u c tiv is t am asses d a ta ,  th e n  seeks to  lit  a  th eo ry . T h e  p u re  re fu ta tio n is t 
con jec tu res a  th e o ry  to  exp lain  som e m in im al se t o f phenom ena , th e n  seeks evidence th a t  
will re fu te  i t ,  p ro b ab ly  hop ing  (if hope  is allow able to  a  sc ien tis t)  th a t  th e  re fu ta tio n  will 
fail.
T h ese  tw o  ap p ro ach es to  th eo ry  co n stru c tio n  can  be  considered  as g iv ing rise  to  a lte r­
n a tiv e  s tra teg ie s  for “req u irem en ts  an a ly sis” . In d u c tiv ism  gives rise to  th e  n o tio n  th a t  
req u irem en ts  analysis s ta r ts  b y  th e  process o f req u irem en ts  c a p tu re , w here d a ta  is col­
lec ted , th en  m oves to  forge th is  d a ta  in to  a  generalised  th eo ry  u p o n  w hich th e  design is 
based . T h is p rocess m ay  still be  driven  by  th eo ry , for th e  choice o f w h a t d a ta  to  collect, 
unless tru ly  ra n d o m , m ay  be d e te rm in ed , o r ra tio n a lised , by  som e p lan  or th eo ry  held 
by  th e  sc ien tis t. R e fu ta tio n ism , how ever, leads to  th e  view th a t  c e r ta in  fac ts  will be  
m ad e  availab le as received know ledge in  th e  p rob lem  s itu a tio n , b u t  th e n  a  th e o ry  will be 
co n s tru c ted . A d d itio n a l in fo rm atio n  will th e n  be sough t o u t in  a t te m p ts  to  re fu te  th e  
th eo ry , th u s  th e  th eo ry  co n stru c tio n  drives th e  req u irem en ts  c a p tu re  r a th e r  th a n  follow­
ing on  from  it. I t  shou ld  be stressed  here  th a t  we are  n o t suggesting  th e  th e o ry  will be 
c o n s tru c te d  in all its  g lory  before th e  re fu ta tio n  is so ugh t. T h e  early  s tag es  o f th eo ry  
co n stru c tio n  will be  e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse, an d  it  is likely th a t  d u rin g  th is  s tag e  m an y  
possib le  sources of re fu ta tio n  will be iden tified , ad d itio n a l in fo rm a tio n  will be so u g h t, 
an d  if  a  re fu ta tio n  seem s likely th e  th e o ry  will be  m odified. T h u s  th e  d o cu m en ted  resu lt 
of b o th  th e  in d u c tiv is t an d  re fu ta tio n a lis t app roaches are  likely to  converge to  scientific 
discourse expressed  in  in d u c tiv is t te rm s.
O ne o b jec tio n  to  th e  ad o p tio n  of a  re fu ta tio n is t s tra te g y  is th a t  th e  process will never 
sto p . T h e  engineer will keep a tte m p tin g  re fu ta tio n s , th u s  im prov ing  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
th e  req u ired  sy stem , b u t never ac tu a lly  bu ild ing  it . I t  is a t  th is  s ta g e  t h a t  th e  th e  m ax im  
“th e  cu sto m er is alw ays r ig h t” can safely be invoked , b u t a t  th e  m e t a-scientific  level. T h e  
cu sto m er is n o t r ig h t in  th e  sense th a t  his o r h er views a re  tru e , b u t  in  th a t  he or she has 
the right to  call a  h a lt to  th e  p rocess o f th e o ry  co n stru c tio n . T h e  cu s to m er is p ay in g  n o t 
for t r u th  b u t  for tim e  an d  ex p ertise . T herefo re  a t  any  s tag e  th e  eng ineer can  be to ld  to  
s to p  th e  re fu ta tio n  process an d  to  p roceed  w ith  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  p hase: in  essence, to  
s to p  being  a  sc ien tis t, bu ild ing  th eo ries , an d  to  becom e an  engineer using  th em . A n o th e r 
o b jec tio n  m ay  be th a t  in  m ost sy stem  design ac tiv ities  a  pu re ly  re fu ta tio n a lis t s tra te g y  
is n o t an  o p tio n , fo r th e  th eo ry  m ay  d rift w ildly aw ay from  th e  ta sk  in  h a n d . In  C h a p te r  
Six we will suggest th a t  ad o p tin g  L a k a to s’s “research  p ro g ram m es” [Lak70] prov ides a 
way to  reconcile re fu ta tio n  w ith  p rogress to w ard s a  loosely defined goal.
O nce th e  e x p lo ra to ry  p h ase  o f th e o ry  co n stru c tio n  has been ca rried  o u t, a  clear c o n tra c ­
tu a l  b o u n d a ry  m u st be d raw n  b e tw een  th e  cu sto m er an d  th e  engineer [Coh82]. System s 
th a t  fail to  conform  to  th e  th e o ry  as e s tab lish ed  a t  th is  cu t-o ff p o in t a re  n o t accep tab le , 
b u t if th e  cu sto m er sudden ly  realises th a t  th e  th eo ry  as agreed  is in a d e q u a te , th a t  is 
n o t th e  en g in eer’s failing. A  p rofessional engineer, o f course, has th e  resp o n sib ility  to
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offer good  advice to  th e  cu sto m er as to  w hen  a  su itab le  s tag e  has been  reach ed  for th e  
accep ting  of a  th eo ry . W h en  a  th e o ry  becom es to o  com plex fo r th e  cu sto m er to  follow 
in  an  a b s tra c t  fo rm , ce rta in  schem as o f th e  th eo ry  m ay  be  tra n sfo rm e d  for use w ith in  
an  idealised  w orld  as p ro to ty p e s . T h ese  give th e  cu sto m er a  chance  to  re fu te  th e  th eo ry  
by  d irec t experience r a th e r  th a n  by  h av in g  to  im agine th e  system . T h ey  also serve as 
p a r t ia l  ex istence  proofs for a sp ec ts  o f th e  sy stem , a lb e it in  an  idealised  w orld .
T h e re  a re  ce rta in  ex trem e  fo rm s th a t  can  be  observed  in th is  a sp ec t o f th e  m odel. T h e  
cu sto m er m ig h t, for exam ple , p re sen t th e  engineer w ith  a  lis t o f o b se rv a tio n  s ta te m e n ts , 
an d  n o t w ish to  engage in  any  fu r th e r  th e o re tic a l discussions. In  th is  case an y  th eo ry  
th a t  is n o t re fu ted  by  th e  g iven s ta te m e n ts  will suffice. Such an  a p p ro a c h  is sensible 
only for tr iv ia l sy stem s, and  even th e n  usu a lly  requ ires th e  engineer to  use considerab le  
com m on sense an d  also som e dom ain  specific know ledge if th e  c u s to m e r’s needs a re  to  be 
satisfied . A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e  cu sto m er m ay  view th e  design p rocess as e te rn a l, b u t ask  th e  
engineer to  pe rfo rm  im p lem en ta tio n s  b ased  on  p a rtia lly  p resen ted  th eo ries  on th e  w ay 
th ro u g h . L arge o p e ra tin g  system s a re  o ften  designed in  th is  way, w here m an y  versions 
of th e  sy s tem  are  re leased , even  th o u g h  th e  engineer a lread y  know s th a t  th e  th eo ry  th ey  
are  b ased  on has been  re fu ted , an d  acknow ledges th e  fac t by  a  lis t o f know n bugs an d  
“fe a tu re s” . T h e  cu sto m er, like th e  engineer, has to  weigh u p  m an y  fac to rs  in  decid ing 
w hen to  accep t a  theo ry , an d  th is  decision is in  no w ay a  p a r t  o f th e  theo ry . Such an  
ap p ro ach  is ce rta in ly  necessary  for th e  so lu tion  o f E -P rob lem s.
N o te  th a t  n o t all p red ic tio n s arising  from  a  th eo ry  are  sufficient to  re fu te it. P o p p e ria n  
re fu ta tio n  requ ires a  b asic  sen tence  to  be derived , th a t  is, one th a t  expresses an  observable  
fac t. T heo ries, how ever, in  genera l com prise genera lisa tions. T h e  conven tional w ay 
in  w hich to  view th e  d e riv a tio n  o f basic  s ta te m e n ts  from  theo ries is to  assum e som e 
w orld , expressed  in  te rm s  o f au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts , an d  ap p ly  th e  th e o ry  to  th is  w orld , 
th u s  p ro d u c in g  specifics from  genera lities . T h e  p red ic tions, th e re fo re , a re  b ased  u p o n  a  
con ju n c tio n  o f th e  th eo ry  w ith  th e  aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts . A  p rob lem  o f te rm ino logy  arises 
here , for sc ien tists  usually  use th e  te rm  “th e o ry ” to  deno te  th is  co n ju n c tio n , ra th e r  th a n  
th e  p h ilo so p h ers’ p u re  theo ry . T h is allows th e  sc ien tist to  p ro d u ce  law s w hich i t  is claim ed 
will be tru e  w ith in  th is  idealised  w orld , an d  claim  th em  as p ro d u c ts  o f th e  theo ry .
T h ese  au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  a re  crucial in d e te rm in ing  th e  system  b o u n d a ry , fo r th ey  
de te rm in e  th e  re levan t asp ec ts  o f th e  w orld  in  w hich th e  system  is to  o p e ra te . A system  
being  designed to  h an d le  perso n n e l in fo rm atio n , for exam ple , m ig h t be b ased  on  an  
au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n t th a t  all em ployees hav e  a t  m o st tw o in itia ls . T h e  engineer and  
cu s to m er m ay  b o th  know  th is  to  be false, hav ing  m et an  em ployee called C u th b e r t 
Jaco b  E a rn e s t B o ttle tliw a ite . A ccep tance  o f th e  auxilia ry  s ta te m e n t will allow  law s to  
be derived , b u t  a t  th e  expense o f genera lity . If  C u th b e r t  is to  be  h an d led  by  th is  sy stem , 
a  w ay needs to  b e  fo u n d  of rem oving  one of his in itia ls  ( th u s  m ak in g  h im  conform  
to  th e  system ) o r a  p a tc h  m u s t b e  p rov ided  to  th e  sy stem  ( th u s  rescu ing  th e  th eo ry  
by  ad hoc m ean s). A ccep tance  of aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  form s p a r t  o f th e  c o n tra c tu a l 
b o u n d a ry , an d  m an y  exam ples of sy stem  m ain ten an ce  arise as exam ples o f changes to  
th e  au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts . I t  shou ld  be n o ted  th a t  aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  a,re accep ted  in  th e
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full know ledge th a t  th e y  a re  n o t un iversa lly  tru e . T h ey  are  in s tru m e n ta l, a n d  re fu ta tio n  
of th e  th eo ry  is only a tte m p te d  in  w orlds in  w hich th e  aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  hold.
T h e re  is no  clear d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  and  th o se  co n ta in ed  in  th e  th e ­
ory. A t one ex trem e, all au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  could be ab so rb ed  in to  th e  th eo ry  p ro p e r, 
in  w hich  case th o se  t h a t  a re  n o t t ru e  will lead  to  im m ed ia te  re fu ta tio n . A t th e  o th e r 
ex trem e , a  th e o ry  could  b e  reduced  to  th e  ru les of som e logic, an d  all o th e r  s ta te m e n ts  
could be tre a te d  as aux iliary , in  w hich case re fu ta tio n  is n o t possib le. T h e  tra n s itio n  
from  softw are  design as science to  so ftw are  design as engineering can  be  considered  as 
th e  change in  s ta tu s  o f s ta te m e n ts  fro m  th e o re tic a l to  auxiliary , th a t  is, from  s ta te m e n ts  
th a t  ra tio n a lise  th e  w orld  to  s ta te m e n ts  th a t  define th e  w orld  o f a p p lica tio n  agreed  in  th e  
c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d ary . M oreover, th e  s ta tu s  o f th ese  auxilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  can n o t change 
in th e  subseq u en t tra n sfo rm a tio n s  t h a t  ta k e  place except w ith  th e  c u s to m e r’s ag reem en t: 
re fu ta tio n s  found  in  sy stem  te s tin g  shou ld  n o t lead  to  changes in  th e  specification , only 
th e  p ro g ram . T h is  a sp ec t o f P o p p e r ’s exposition  does n o t lit well w ith  th e  ta sk  in  h a n d , 
an d  is one of th e  reasons fo r m oving  on to  consider a  m ore  refined n o tio n  of “th e o ry ” in 
th e  n ex t ch ap te r .
T h is  view of th e  design process allows us to  p lace  a  d ifferent in te rp re ta t io n  011 th e  p h rase  
“all r ig h t in  th eo ry , b u t in  p rac tice  . . If  we accep t th is  s ta te m e n t a t  face value we 
a re  allow ing com parison  o f th e o ry  an d  p rac tice , th u s  a d m ittin g  th e m  as sim ilar enough 
to  b e  com pared : an  a p p ro ach  w hich R yle denies, claim ing it  is a  ca tego rica l e rro r to  
ca rry  o u t such a  com parison  [Ryl49]. T o  avoid th is  p rob lem  we will in te rp re t “in  th e o ry ” 
an d  “in  p ra c tic e ” as sh o r th a n d  w ays o f describ ing  dom ains o f ap p lica tio n : th u s  claim ing 
so m eth in g  is all r ig h t in  theo ry , b u t  n o t in  p rac tice  is a  w ay o f say ing  th a t  th e  aux ilia ry  
s ta te m e n ts  a d o p te d  by th e  th eo rise r do n o t ho ld  in  th e  w orld  being  w orked  in  by  th e  
p ra c titio n e r.
4.4 Schemas
T heories a re  usually  linked w ith  th e  n o tio n  of exp lan a tio n . T h e  m odel of e x p lan a tio n  
th a t  we will ad o p t is th a t  described  by  H em pel as th e  D eductive-N om ological m odel ( th e  
D -N m odel) [IIem 65]. R y an  describes th e  ru les of th is  m odel as follows:
“a  successful ex p lan a tio n  has to  obey th re e  req u irem en ts . T h e  firs t is th e  
fo rm al req u irem en t th a t  th e  s ta te m e n ts  lay ing  dow n th e  law s an d  in itia l con­
d itions should  en ta il th e  s ta te m e n t lay ing  dow n th e  conclusion; th e  second 
is th e  m a te r ia l req u irem en t th a t  th e  prem ises should  be tru e — or m ore  cau ­
tiously  th a t  th ey  shou ld  be well c o rro b o ra ted ; th e  la s t is a  consequence of 
th ese  req u irem en ts , th a t  th e  explicansshou ld  be em pirically  te s ta b le , b y  being  
o pen  to  re fu ta tio n  shou ld  it  p red ic t w h a t is n o t th e  case.” [R ya84, pages 52- 
53]
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T h is  asso c ia tio n  o f theo ries  w ith  ex p lan a tio n  h as led to  one of th e  c ritic ism s of th e  th eo ry  
b u ild ing  view  of p ro g ram s, nam ely  th a t  th e  p rin c ip a l p u rp o se  o f p ro g ram s is to  co m p u te  
values an d  n o t to  p rov ide  ex p lan a tio n s  [Jo h 88]. T h is  critic ism  arises n a tu ra lly  o u t o f 
a d o p tio n  o f P o p p e r’s philosophy, for ex p lan a tio n  in  a  ho listic  sense is th e  only p u rp o se  
p ro p o sed  for a  th eo ry  in  th is  philosophy, hence th e  reason  fo r re fu ta tio n  o f th e  w hole th e ­
ory  if any  p red ic tio n  does n o t accord  w ith  th e  fac ts . K uhn  has p o in te d  o u t, how ever, th a t  
ho listic  ex p lan a tio n  is only th e  p rin c ip a l p u rp o se  o f th eo ry  in  th e  (u n u su a l)  rev o lu tio n ary  
phase  o f science, an d  th a t  P o p p e r “h as  ch a rac te rised  th e  e n tire  scientific en te rp rise  in 
te rm s th a t  app ly  only to  its  occasional re v o lu tio n a ry  p a r ts ” [K uh70a, page  6]. K u h n  
m a in ta in s  th a t  scientific theo ries  in  n o rm a l science are  used  fo r solving “puzzles” , such 
as p red ic tin g  re su lts  given som e in itia l cond itions, or de te rm in in g  in itia l cond itions to  
exp la in  som e observed  re su lt. A n im p o r ta n t p o in t to  n o te  h ere  is th a t  “re fu ta tio n ” d u r­
ing th is  n o rm a l science is unlikely  to  re su lt in  re jec tion  of th e  th eo ry , r a th e r  th ey  will be 
a t t r ib u te d  to  e rro rs  on  th e  p a r t  o f th e  sc ien tis t w hich will, hopefully , lead  to  lea rn in g  by  
th e  sc ien tis t. O nly w hen cum u la tiv e  effects o f “re fu ta tio n ” a re  n o te d  by  a  co m m u n ity  a t  
la rge  will th e  th eo ry  be re jec ted , an d  c o rp o ra te  learn in g  ta k e  place.
T h e  use o f theories in  puzzle solving leads us to  conclude th a t  theo ries  a re  n o t, as 
Jo h n so n  suggests , used  only  to  p rov ide  p ro p o sitio n s, h u t also to  yield values in  th e  form  
o f ca lcu la tions of in itia l cond itions an d  consequences. I t  can alw ays b e  a rg u ed , o f course, 
th a t  such  values can  be  expressed  im plic itly  w ith in  p ropo sitio n s, such  as “th e  requ ired  
values o f th e  in itia l cond ition  is x ”, b u t th e n  Jo h n so n ’s o b jec tio n  to  p ro g ram m in g  as 
th eo ry  bu ild ing  also dissolves, for we can  sim ply em bed  every  p ro g ra m  w ith in  a  su itab le  
p ro p o sitio n a l form . M oreover, even if  we accep t Jo h n so n ’s p o in t t h a t  p ro g ram s a re  n o t 
theo ries, th is  does n o t deny th a t  p ro g ram m in g  can  be seen as a  process o f th e o ry  bu ild ing , 
for we can  escape by  observ ing  th a t  p ro g ram s a re  n o t th e  only p ro d u c ts  of p ro g ram m in g . 
T h is  is th e  p o in t th a t  N au r m akes so forcefully.
T h ese  different w ays of using  theories h av e  been  te rm ed  “sch em as” b y  P u tn a m , w ho 
iden tified  th re e  p rin c ip a l fo rm s [Put74]. W e can  illu s tra te  th ese  schem as by  appea ling  
to  P y th a g o ra s ’s th eo rem , as p a r t  o f th e  em pirical th eo ry  o f tr ia n g u la r  o b jec ts  (w hich  is 
how  P y th a g o ra s  first conceived i t ,  befo re  th e  th e o ry  becam e in s tru m e n ta l) . W e will call 
th e  f irs t o f th ese  th e  re fu ta tio n a l schem a. I t  allows us to  m ak e  a  p red ic tio n  based  on a  
held  th e o ry  an d  a  se t o f aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts .
Theory  , auxiliary S ta tem ents
Prediction
As a  re su lt o f app ly ing  th is  schem a, i t  is th e  th e o ry  th a t  m ay  change. If  we observe, for 
exam ple , th a t  a  tr ian g le  w ith  sides 6 ,7  an d  8 fo rm  a  r ig h t-an g led  trian g le , th e n  we can 
p red ic t th a t  62 -j- 72 =  82, w hich it  d o esn ’t ,  of course. C onsequen tly  w e need  to  re fu te  
th e  th eo ry  (in  th is  exam ple  it  is m ore likely we w ould rescue th e  th eo ry  by  in v es tig a tin g  
th e  w orld  in  w hich th is  tr ian g le  ex is ts , an d  im pose  auxilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  to  exclude i t) .
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T h e  second schem a, w hich we will call th e  e x p lan a to ry  schem a, allow s us to  estab lish  
w h a t in itia l cond itions m u s t have  held  for som e fa c t to  b e  exp la ined  by  a  theo ry .
Theory  , ????
Fact to be explained
In  th is  case, th e  fac t c an n o t be false, an d  th e  th e o ry  will n o t b e  im m ed ia te ly  re fu ted  if 
th e  fac t c an n o t be explained . If  we observe , th erefo re , th a t  32 +  42 =  52 we can  explain  
th is  by s ta tin g  th a t  th e re  m u s t h e  in  o u r auxilia ry  s ta te m e n ts  so m eth in g  to  ad m it a  
tr ian g le  w ith  sides 3, 4 an d  5 as rig h t-an g led . T h e re  m ay, o f course, b e  m an y  possible 
ex p lan a tio n s  of any  given fac t. T h e  ex istence  o f m u ltip le  ex p lan a tio n s m ay  give rise to  
th e  q u est for a  genera lisa tio n  o f th e  th eo ry  to  p rov ide  links b e tw een  th e  ex p lan a tio n s.
T h e  final schem a P u tn a m  considers allow s us to  co m p u te  values g iven  a  th e o ry  an d  
au x ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts , an d  is effectively expressing  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  law s an d  
ru les th a t  we considered  earlier. W e will call th is  th e  c o m p u ta tio n a l schem a.
Theory , auxiliary sta tem ents  
????
T his  schem a gives rise to  m an y  possib le co m p u ta tio n s , o f course: w e sho u ld  n o t confuse 
th e  schem as w ith  th e ir  p a r tic u la r  use. W e m ig h t, fo r exam ple , use P y th a g o ra s ’s th eo rem  
to  co m p u te  one side of a  rig h t-an g led  tr ian g le  given th e  o th e r tw o  sides. T h is  is a  purely  
in s tru m e n ta l use o f th e  theo ry . W e shou ld  n o te  here  th a t  if  we em b o d y  a  th e o ry  of 
p ro p o sitio n s, for exam ple , in  o u r th eo ry  th e n  ou r calcu la tions m ay  look like p red ic tions 
(for exam ple , we m ig h t co m p u te  th e  p ro p o sitio n  x  =  y). I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  recognise th e  
d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  th e  use of logic to  express theo ries, an d  th e  th e o ry  of logic itself.
T h is  c o m p u ta tio n a l schem a gives rise  to  specific form ulae. D ijk s tra  n o tes  th a t  view ing 
p ro g ram s as fo rm ulae  has m an y  corollaries:
“F ir s t ,  it p u ts  th e  p ro g ra m m e r’s ta sk  in  th e  p ro p e r persp ec tiv e : he  h as  to  
devise th a t  fo rm ula . Second, i t  explains w hy th e  w orld  o f m a th e m a tic s  all 
b u t  ignored  th e  p ro g ram m in g  challenge: p ro g ram s w ere so m u ch  longer th a n  
fo rm ulae  it  w as used to  th a t  i t  d id  n o t even recognise th e m  as such . N ow , 
back  to  to  th e  p ro g ra m m e r’s jo b . He has to  derive th a t  fo rm ula ; he has to  
derive th a t  p ro g ram . W e know  o f only one reliable w ay of doing th a t ,  viz by 
m eans of sym bol m a n ip u la tio n . A n d  now  th e  circle is closed. W e co n stru c t 
our m a th e m a tic a l sym bol m an ip u la tio n s  by  m eans of sym bol m a n ip u la tio n s .” 
[Dij89, page  1401]
D ijk s tra  fails to  observe , how ever, th a t  a  fo rm al sy stem  m u s t b e  fou n d  w ith in  w hich th e  
circle can  be c ircu m n av ig a ted . T h is , w e w ould  a rgue , is th e  fo rm alisa tio n  o f th e  th eo ry  
we a re  bu ild ing .
T h e re  a re  tw o d is tin c t o bserva tions th a t  w e can  m ake a t  th is  p o in t. T h e  firs t is th a t  
co m p u te rs  can  be used  to  im p lem en t all th re e  possib le schem as. T h e  co m p u te rised  explo­
ra tio n  o f th e  four-co lour p rob lem , for exam ple , w as an  a t te m p t a t  re fu ta tio n . D iagnostic
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system s som etim es a t te m p t  an  im p lem en ta tio n  o f an  e x p lan a to ry  sch em a  (a lth o u g h  m ore  
com m only, a  th e o ry  of fa ilu re  will b e  c o n s tru c te d ). B o th  of th ese  schem as, how ever, fre­
q u en tly  involve h ighly  com plex  search  s tra te g ie s , a n d  so a re  m ore  com m only  fou n d  u n d er 
th e  head in g  of A rtific ia l In te lligence ra th e r  th a n  Softw are E ng ineering . T h e  c o m p u ta ­
tio n a l schem a is s till th e  m o st com m only  im p lem en ted  one a t  p re se n t, a n d  hence we will 
c o n c e n tra te  on i t  here.
T h e  second o b serv a tio n  is th a t  th e  so ftw are  engineer will u se  all th re e  ty p es  of schem a 
d u rin g  th e  course o f so ftw are  design. R e fu ta tio n a l schem as will be  u sed  in  fo rm ing  th e  
th e o ry  o f th e  sy stem  u n d e r con sid era tio n . E x p la n a to ry  schem as will b e  u sed  p a rticu la rly  
d u rin g  ex p lo ra to ry  discourse, w here te n ta t iv e  theories a re  held , a n d  th e  engineer is a t ­
te m p tin g  to  see if  th e  th eo ry , to g e th e r  w ith  th e  given aux ilia ry  s ta te m e n ts , is sufficient 
to  exp la in  th e  requ ired  ph en o m en a . T h e  c o m p u ta tio n a l form  will b e  u sed  w ith  ex isting  
theo ries  of th ird  w orld  o b jec ts  such  as p ro g ram m in g  languages a n d  d a ta  s tru c tu re s  in  
c ircu m n av ig a tin g  D ijk s tra ’s circle.
C ausey  has critic ised  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of schem as on th e  g ro u n d  th a t  once you  s ta r t  
to  analyse  th em  carefully  you rap id ly  d iscover th e  need  for m ore  an d  m ore  schem as to  
exp la in  th e  a c tu a l b eh av io u r o f sc ien tis ts  [C au77, page 456]. W e sha ll ta k e  th is  critic ism  
as a  w arn in g , an d  use o u r schem as only  as ra tio n a lisa tio n s  for th e  p lan s  govern ing  th e  
b eh av io u r o f m achines.
4.5 Proof Obligations
T h ere  a re  c e rta in  p ro p e rtie s  th a t  w e requ ire  o f b o th  our th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s , an d  also th e  
tra n s itio n s  th a t  can ta k e  place b etw een  p a irs  o f p re sen ta tio n s . T h ese  a re  n o t in d e p e n d e n t, 
for it  is th e  need  to  p reserve  p ro p e rtie s  th a t  gives rise  to  th e  tra n s it io n a l req u irem en ts . 
I t  is a  consequence of a d o p tin g  selfconscious design th a t  th e  eng ineer m u s t iden tify  
th e  p ro o f ob liga tions in h e ren t an y  an y  a p p ro ach  ad o p ted , b e  aw are  of possib le w ays 
in w hich th ese  ob liga tions m ig h t be  d ischarged , an d  select th e  m o st a p p ro p ria te  w ay 
for ca rry in g  th is  o u t. R efuge in s ty le  is p a rtic u la rly  dangerous here , fo r by  a d o p tin g  a  
pre-defined  m e th o d  th e  engineer o ften  relinquishes co n tro l over th ese  p ro o f  ob liga tions, 
usually  w ith o u t realising  i t . T h e  responsibility for d ischarg ing  th e  ob lig a tio n , how ever, 
m ust s till re s t w ith  th e  engineer, an d  th e  fac t t h a t  a  chosen to o l m akes id en tifica tio n  and  
d ischarge  of ob liga tions difficult is no  excuse, fo r th e  m e th o d  w as selected . If  th e  m e th o d  
is im posed , by  cu sto m er or h igher eng ineering  au th o rity , th e n  th e  engineer is p rov ided  
w ith  a  refuge from  th e  loss o f innocence.
A  sy s tem a tic  iden tifica tio n  o f p ro o f o b liga tions, b o th  those  in h e re n t in  th e  p rocess of 
th eo ry  b u ild ing , an d  th o se  consequen tia l on  th e  choice o f p re se n ta tio n  tech n iq u es, has 
n o t y e t ta k e n  place in  S oftw are E ng ineering . C ohen  an d  P i t t  h av e  s ta r te d  th is  process, 
an d  hav e  suggested  a  n u m b er of ob liga tions th a t  can  be iden tified , a n d  w ays in  w hich 
d ischarge can  be achieved [C P90b][C P90c][C P90a]. O nly g enera l p ro p e rtie s  will be dis­
cussed here: th o se  p ro p e rtie s  re la tin g  to  specific sty les of specification  o r im p lem en ta tio n
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will be discussed in the next chapter.
O bligations for a Single T heory Presentation
T h e  re fu ta tio n  o f a  phenom enological th e o ry  is an  ind ica tio n  th a t  i t  is n o t fit fo r pu rpose . 
T h is  n o tio n  o f fitness fo r p u rp o se  is com m on in  engineering, a n d  cap tu re s  th e  idea  o f a  
sy stem  solving a.11 iden tified  p ro b lem . A p p lica tio n  of th is  id ea  to  S o ftw are  E ngineering  
has been  discussed in  m o re  d e ta il elsew here [Loo91]. In  o u r m odel, how ever, th e re  a re  in 
g enera l tw o o r m ore  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  th a t  need  to  be  considered . T h e  p henom eno­
logical th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  will, p resum ab ly , have  been  deem ed fit fo r p u rp o se  by  th e  
cu sto m er a u th o r ity  (by  fa ilu re  to  re fu te ) , an d  will th u s  fo rm  a  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d ary . 
T h e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  em bod ied  in  th e  delivered  system  m u s t also b e  fit for purpose: 
indeed , th is  is th e  only  one th a t  really  concerns th e  user. C learly , one w ay  th is  could be 
done is to  a t te m p t  re fu ta tio n  o f th e  delivered p re se n ta tio n . Since we h av e  an  agreed  con­
t r a c tu a l  b o u n d a ry , w e do n o t need  to  involve th e  cu sto m er in  th is , we can  sim ply  su b jec t 
th e  final version  to  th e  sam e b o d y  o f te s ts  th a t  failed to  re fu te  th e  phenom enological 
th eo ry . T h e  cu sto m er, how ever, m ay  also in sis t on accep tan ce  te s ts  befo re  agreeing  th a t  
th e  c o n tra c t has been  m e t. Logically, th is  a p p ro ach  is perfec tly  accep tab le . T estin g  is 
o ften  b e littled , b u t th is  m u st be done on m ethodo log ica l g ro u n d s, n o t logical. Indeed , 
one o f th e  a rg u m en ts  o ften  p ro p o sed  ag a in s t te s tin g  is th a t  i t  can n o t show  th e  absence 
of bugs. T h is  is tru e , b u t  only te s tin g  can  show  fitness fo r p u rp o se , fo r dedu c tiv e  p ro o f 
can n o t show  th e  co rrec tness o f theories! T h e  key is, o f course, to  allow  th e  te s tin g  of 
th e  phenom enological th e o ry  th a t  has a lread y  been  carried  o u t to  p e rc o la te  th ro u g h  th e  
p rocess, so th a t  w e do n o t need  to  re te s t  a t  every  stag e  of th e  design  process.
O ne o f th e  m ethodo log ica l a rg u m en ts  ag a in s t te s tin g  d u ring  th e  la te r  s tag es  o f design is 
th a t  th e  th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n s , once em bod ied  in  code, becom e difficult to  reason  a b o u t. 
T h is  m eans th a t  i t  is very  h a rd  to  find th e  severe te s ts  deductive ly , a n d  o ften  te s tin g  
becom es m ore  o f a  s to c h a s tic  process. M oreover, once we have  im p lem en ted  only specific 
schem as, we usually  lose th e  ab ility  to  re fu te  genera l cases by  find ing  co u n te r exam ples 
logically: ra th e r  we end  up  a t te m p tin g  to  p rove  th em  exhaustive ly , o r m ore  p robab ly , 
assum ing  a  p rinc ip le  o f in d u c tio n . Tools m ay  offer su p p o rt to  th is  ac tiv ity , by  “s tu d y in g ” 
th e  code an d  in ferring  sensible te s ts , b u t  u ltim a te ly  we a re  still looking  for needles in 
h ay stack s .
T h e  rea l m ethodo log ica l p rob lem  w ith  te s tin g  a t th is s tag e , how ever, is th a t  we a re  
try in g  to  solve th e  w rong p rob lem . I f  we do succeed in re fu ta tio n  th e n  e ith e r o u r in itia l 
phenom enological th eo ry  has also been  re fu ted  (in  w hich case th e  c o n tra c t h as  to  be 
changed  o r, m ore likely, re in te rp re te d )  o r th e  em bodied  p re se n ta tio n  is n o t a  p re se n ta tio n  
o f th e  phenom enolog ical theo ry .
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C orrectn ess and R efin em en t b etw een  P resen ta tio n s
H oare  an d  G ries tack le  th is  p rob lem  by  suggesting  th a t  we a t te m p t  to  en su re  th a t  o u r de­
livered  sy stem  em bodies th e  sam e th e o ry  as th a t  a lready  agreed  in  th e  c o n tra c t. T h ey  are  
suggesting  th a t  we use co m p u tin g  theo ries  in s tru m e n t ally, to  to  p rove  a  correspondence  
b etw een  tw o th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s . T h ey  a re  p roposing  a  m e ta - th e o re tica l ap p ro ach . In  
p a r tic u la r , th ey  are  p ropo sin g  a  m athem atico -sc ien tific  ap p ro ach , w here  w e ta k e  a  fo rm al 
th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  in  w hich we deduce a p p ro p ria te  theo rem s a b o u t o u r specifications 
an d  p ro g ram s (w e will a d o p t th e se  te rm s to  avoid  confusion b e tw een  th e  levels o f th eo ry  
p re sen t h ere ).
T h is  ap p ro ach , how ever, requ ires th re e  cond itions to  be m e t. F ir s t ,  we m u s t hav e  a  
fo rm al p re se n ta tio n  of th e  specification . Second, w e requ ire  a  fo rm al p re se n ta tio n  o f th e  
im p lem en ta tio n . T hese  tw o  cond itions a m o u n t to  th e  observ a tio n  th a t  we m u s t be able 
to  fo rm alise  o u r d om ain  o f in te re s t (in  th is  case a  p a ir  o f th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s)  before 
we can  reason  form ally  a b o u t it; th is  will be  considered fu r th e r  in  th e  n ex t section . 
T h ird , we need  a  logic, an d  asso c ia ted  heu ris tics , for deducing  a t  le a s t th e  co rrec tness 
p ro p e r ty  th a t  if  o u r specification  h as  n o t been  re fu ted  by  a  set o f ex p erim en ts  th e n  o u r 
im p le m e n ta tio n  will n o t be re fu ted  b y  th e  sam e se t. In  fac t, th is  co n d ition  is n o t as 
obvious as it sounds, fo r it  m ean s th a t  th e  system  m ay  be  a  p re se n ta tio n  o f a  m ore  
pow erfu l th eo ry  th a n  th a t  in h e ren t in  o u r specification . W e a re  in s is tin g  th a t  given a  
specification  th e o ry  Ts an d  an  im p lem en ta tio n  th eo ry  T* th e n  T,- =>■ T s r a th e r  th a n  
Ti = T s . F or a  m o re  d e ta iled  acco u n t o f th e  decision to  accep t im p lica tio n  ra th e r  th a n  
equivalence, see [Hoa85]. A specification  m ay  requ ire  som e p ro p e rtie s  fo r ju s t  positive  
in teg e rs , w hereas th e  im p lem en ta tio n  can  prov ide schem as th a t  w ork  for all in teg ers . If  a  
cu sto m er is selling th is  p ro d u c t on , an d  in ten d s  releasing  a  m ore  expensive version  th a t  
w orks for all in teg e rs , th e n  clearly  th e  delivered  system  will n o t b e  fit fo r p u rp o se , as it  
will n o t accord  w ith  m a rk e tin g  s tra te g y , a lth o u g h  it  m ay  be “c o rre c t” . In  th is  case, we 
h av e  failed to  specify th e  sy stem  tig h tly  enough: it  is p a r t  o f th e  defined b eh av io u r o f th e  
sy stem  th a t  it  should  n o t resp o n d  to  n eg a tiv e  in teg e rs , o r ra th e r ,  shou ld  re sp o n d  w ith  a  
nu ll response! S im ilar a rg u m e n ts  can be p u t  fo rw ard  concerning e rro r  hand ling : e rro rs  
clearly  can n o t be unforeseen even ts (o therw ise  we could n o t p ro g ra m  in  w ays to  han d le  
th e m ), th e re fo re  th ey  m u st be  foreseen. If  th ey  a re  foreseen, w hy are  th e y  different to  any  
o th e r  ev en t th a t  m ay  occur? W e are  im p o rtin g  p a r t  of th e  phenom enological v o cab u la ry  
in to  th e  theo ry . E rro rs  a re  ju s t  a  p a r tic u la r  class of in p u ts  th a t  need  to  be  h and led : th e ir  
s ta tu s  as erro rs  is irre lev an t a t  b e s t, b u t  q u ite  likely m isleading.
C o rrec tness is a  sa fe ty  p ro p e rty , b u t  th e re  a re  also liveness co n sidera tions th a t  need  
to  b e  m e t. E very  re levan t schem a in  th e  specification  m u st also b e  co m p u tab le  w ith in  
th e  im p lem en ta tio n . A n ex p erim en t th a t  is inconclusive in  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n , b u t 
conclusive in  th e  specification  reduces th e  liveness of th e  im p lem en ta tio n . T h e  classic 
exam ple  of th is  is n o n -te rm in a tio n : p rocedu res in  p ro g ram s th a t  fail to  te rm in a te  will 
never refute  th e  theo ry , b u t will ren d e r th e  a r tifa c t unfit for p u rp o se  if th e  specification  
relies on such a  sch em a em bodied  in th e  p rocedu re . T h is a m o u n ts  to  th e  s ta te m e n t th a t
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ou r theo ries m u s t be sufficiently  scientific, in  th e  P o p p e rian  sense.
C learly  we requ ire  som e ad d itio n a l p ro p e rtie s  o f o u r m e ta -th eo ry , such  as its  soundness, 
re la tiv e  to  som e in ten d ed  class o f in te rp re ta tio n s . W e w ould also like com pleteness. In  
p rac tice , how ever, we can  only  ask  for com pleteness if ce rta in  exp ressib ility  c o n s tra in ts  
a re  m e t by  th e  lan g u ag e , an d  also if  w e allow  oracles from  th e  specifica tion  an d  im ple­
m e n ta tio n  dom ains to  p rov ide  tau to lo g ies  fo r use in  derivations.
T h e re  a re  severa l genera l s tra teg ie s  th a t  can  be a d o p te d  in  solving th is  p rob lem  of p rov ing  
correspondence. T w o im p o r ta n t  classes can  loosely be called g en e ra tio n  techn iques an d  
verifica tion  techn iques.
In  a  g en era tio n  techn ique , we seek to  g e n e ra te  a n  im p lem en ta tio n  from  a  specification . 
W e m ig h t, for exam ple , seek to  tra n sfo rm  o u r specification in to  an  equ iva len t p resen ­
ta tio n : effectively th is  is using  a  c o m p u ta tio n a l schem a in  o u r m e ta - th e o ry  to  co m p u te  
a  new  p re se n ta tio n  given an  ex isting  one. R a th e r  th a n  a t te m p t  a  s tr ic t  equivalence, 
how ever, it  is com m on to  seek a  refinem ent [Mor90] (o r re ifica tio n [Jo n86]), fo r th is  is 
sufficient to  m eet ou r cond ition  concern ing  re fu ta tio n . In  a d d itio n  to  tran sfo rm in g  it 
is also com m on to  ad d  e x tra  in fo rm atio n  to  th e  new  p re se n ta tio n  in  som e fo rm  or a n ­
o th e r. O bviously  th is  e x tra  in fo rm atio n  in  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  can n o t b e  show n to  arise 
from  th e  specification , in  w hich it  w as a b se n t, so we should  expec t to  h av e  to  te s t  th ese  
p ro p e rtie s  w ith  a  view to  re fu ta tio n , unless we can  prove n o n -in te rfe ren ce  w ith  th e  p h e ­
nom enological theory .
A ra th e r  p a r tic u la r  in s tan ce  o f th is  gen era tiv e  process is p rov ided  by  th e  use of co n stru c ­
tive  logic to  g en e ra te  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  as p a r t  o f an  ex istence p ro o f  a sso c ia ted  w ith  
th e  specification . T h e  exem plar o f th is  is th e  use of M a.rtin-Lof ty p e  theory[M L 82],
V erification  techn iques use a  co m p u ta tio n a l schem a in  our m e ta -th e o ry , b u t  th is  tim e  one 
th a t  accep ts tw o p re sen ta tio n s  an d  p roduces th e  p ro o f of a  th eo rem  w hich  we can  in te r ­
p re t  as a  s ta te m e n t of co rrec tness, e ith e r using  equivalence o r re finem en t. T h is  ap p ro ach  
is o ften  critic ised , as th e  ta sk  o f p ro d u cin g  th e  p ro o f is usually  le n g th y  an d  com plex. 
T h is o b se rv a tio n  is based  on  a  m isu n d e rs tan d in g  o f th e  scientific p rocess, how ever, for 
th e  p ro o f will ac tu a lly  be g en e ra ted  by  an  ex p lo ra to ry  process d u rin g  th e  course o f p ro ­
g ra m  co n stru c tio n , an d  n o t g en e ra ted  a f te r  th e  ev en t. I t  is th e  scientific re fo rm u la tio n  of 
th e  p ro o f th a t  m ay  ap p e a r com plex an d  leng thy , w hen view ed holistically , b u t it  can  be 
a rg u ed  th a t  th e  step s  involved are  no m ore  com plex th a n  th e  ta sk  o f w ritin g  th e  p ro g ram . 
If  we w an t a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  of co rrec tness m ad e  public , an d  if we w a n t i t  to  conform  
to  s ta n d a rd  scientific ideals, th e n  we m u st accep t th e  consequences. T h e  view ing o f th e  
process as an  ex tension  of e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse also allows us to  see th a t  th e  p ro o f can 
help us to  w rite  th e  p ro g ram , for we can  exp lo re  ah ead , see w h a t in te rm e d ia te  resu lts  
a re  req u ired  for th e  p ro o f to  succeed, and  engineer ou r th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  accordingly.
T h e  ad o p tio n  o f th e  m ath em atico -sc ien tific  ap p ro ach , w ith  its  in s tru m e n ta l use of th e ­
ories, am o u n ts  to  reducing  claim s a b o u t specifications and  im p lem en ta tio n s  to  claim s 
a b o u t th e  dom ains in  w hich th ey  a re  to  o p e ra te . W e deduce th a t  th e  p ro g ra m  is co rrec t 
w ith  re sp ec t to  a  specification  by assum ing  p ro p ertie s  o f th e  en v iro n m en ts  in  w hich th ey
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a re  to  be  in te rp re te d . Som e o f th e se  claim s will be  re s tr ic te d  to  im p le m e n ta tio n  d eta ils , 
such  as th e  assu m p tio n  th a t  a  p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  will be  im p lem en ted  to  conform  to  
its  H oare  logic. O th e rs  will b e  claim s th a t  m u s t hold  a b o u t b o th  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  and  
specification  dom ains (such  as p ro p e rtie s  o f n a tu ra l  n u m b ers). I t  m ig h t b e  a rg u ed  th a t  
such  claim s shou ld  hav e  been  iden tified  in  th e  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d a ry  fo r th e  specification  
d o m ain , an d  so can  be  ta k e n  in stru m en taJly , b u t  in  p rac tice  th e  p ro o f is likely to  th ro w  
np  lem m as th a t  hav e  been  ta k e n  im plicitly . M any  of th ese  lem m as w ill fo rm  p a r t  of 
com m on sense theo ries, b u t i t  is suggested  th a t  th e  engineer ensures th a t  th is  sense is 
indeed  com m on 011 b o th  sides o f th e  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d ary . A n exam ple  o f such a  case5 
is th e  lem m a th a t  if  m  bu ild ings c o n ta in  b e tw een  th e m  n room s th e n  m  < n. T h is  is 
n o t a lw ays th e  case, fo r a  bu ild ing  th a t  is ex ten d ed  m ay  hav e  ju s t  one room  a fte r  th e  
ex tension , b u t th e  ex tension  itse lf  m ay  be  considered  as a  s e p a ra te  bu ild ing . T h u s  tw o 
bu ild ings m ay  co n ta in  ju s t  one ro o m . In  th e  course of a  design ac tiv ity , one so ftw are 
engineering  c o n su ltan t d iscovered  th a t  a  p a r tic u la r  com pany  used  th re e  different no tions 
of th e  te rm  “bu ild ing” in  its  acco u n tin g  p ro ced u res . Ind iv iduals in  th e  com pany  could 
variously  consider a  single s tru c tu re  to  com prise  any  n u m b e r o f “bu ild in g s” . W ith o u t 
th is  analysis, we a re  faced  w ith  th e  B iblical p a ra d o x  “In  m y F a th e r ’s house  th e re  are  
m an y  m an sio n s” [John , X IV , 2],
T h e re  a re  m an y  possible can d id a tes  for theo ries w ith in  w hich co rrec tness p roofs can 
b e  ca rried  o u t. T h is  is n o t su rp ris in g , for we w ould  expec t d ifferen t theo ries  to  arise 
fro m  different pa irings o f specification  a n d  im p lem en ta tio n  sty les a n d  fo rm alisa tions. 
T y p ica l of th e  classes of theo ries fo r seq u en tia l sy stem s are  H oare  logics[H oa89], p red ica te  
tra n sfo rm  techn iques [Dij76], re finem en t calculi [M or90], a lgebra ic  ap p ro ach es based  on 
m orp liism s [EM 85], d e n o ta tio n a l sem an tics  [Sto77], and  te rm  rew ritin g  system s [EM 85]. 
T h e  co rrec tness of co n cu rren t sy stem s has been  tack led  using  fo rm alism s such  as M ilner’s 
CCS [MilSOb], U N IT Y  [C M 88] an d  te m p o ra l logic [Hai82].
A s well as d iscussing p a r tic u la r  tech n iq u es, i t  is possib le to  a t te m p t  a  g enera l th eo ry  
of co rrec tness issues, by  c o n s tru c tin g  y e t a n o th e r  layer o f th eo ry . T h e  m o st p rom ising  
can d id a te  for form alising  th is  th e o ry  to  d a te  has been  ca teg o ry  th eo ry , w hich h as  been  
used  ex tensively  to  explain  co rrec tness a sp ec ts  o f th e  th e o ry  bu ild in g  ap p ro ach  w hen 
expressed  in  a lgebra ic  te rm s [Bur80]. T h is fo rm alisa tio n  adds l i ttle  to  o u r discussion 
of cu rricu lum  design, an d  will be inaccessib le to  m o st p ra c titio n e rs , a n d  so will n o t be 
inc luded  here.
W e shou ld  n o t assum e th a t  th e  ad o p tio n  of m a th em a tic s  in  o rd e r to  ca rry  o u t proofs 
of co rrec tness is un iversa lly  accep ted  by  th e  so ftw are  engineering co m m u n ity  a t  large. 
A lth o u g h  m an y  years  have  passed  since th e  fam ous “d e b a te ” b e tw een  D e M illo et al an d  
D ijk s tra  [DLP77] [Dij78], th e re  is s till a  long  w ay to  go before th e  co m m u n ity  is ab le  to  
em b race  fo rm al co rrec tness proofs as a  v iab le  o p tio n . R eac tio n  to  th e  im p o sitio n  of such 
ap p ro ach es for th e  developm ent o f sa fe ty  c ritica l sy stem s, for exam ple , show s clearly  
th a t  th e re  is s till a  wide gu lf b e tw een  th o se  p rac tis in g  so ftw are eng ineering  in  th e  large,
5Tliis example was provided during discussions at the ISTIP89 conference.
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an d  th o se  d e m o n s tra tin g  th e  techn iques in  th e  sm all. T h e  key to  b ridg ing  th is  gap  m u st 
lie w ith  th e  ed u ca tio n  of so ftw are engineers, b o th  in  th e  con tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  o f tho se  
c u rren tly  p rac tic in g , an d  also th e  in itia l ed u ca tio n  o f tho se  a b o u t to  e n te r  th e  profession.
4.6 The Formalisation of Theories
A  to p ic  o f co n tinuous d e b a te  in  S oftw are E ng ineering  is th e  degree o f fo rm alisa tio n  th a t  
shou ld  be  u sed  in  o u r th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s . T h is d eb a te  is ju s t  a  p a r tic u la r  in s ta n tia tio n  
of th e  discussions on  th e  fo rm alisa tio n  of theories found  in  th e  P h ilo sophy  of Science. 
T h e re  is litt le  to  be gained  b y  re p e a tin g  all o f th is  discussion here , b u t  we shou ld  m ake  
a  few  sa lien t p o in ts  th a t  a re  necessary  for o u r ta sk  o f cu rricu lum  design.
F ir s t ,  we m u st n o te  th a t  th e re  is a  difference b e tw een  form alisation  a n d  axiom atisation. 
T h e  la t te r  we will ta k e  to  b e  th e  p re se n ta tio n  of a  th eo ry  as a  fo rm al sy stem , w ith  th e  
aim  o f ca rry ing  o u t pu re ly  sy n ta c tic  d eductions. F o rm alisa tio n , on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , w hilst 
inc lud ing  ax io m a tisa tio n , also includes th e  sem an tic  techn iques o f u sing  m a th e m a tic a l 
m odels to  reaso n  a b o u t system s. P re d ic a te  calculus, for exam ple , p rov ides a  pu re ly  
fo rm al sy stem , th a t  can  be used  ax iom atica lly , b u t  if  we allow th e  im p o r ta tio n  o f sem an tic  
re su lts  such  as tau to lo g ies  a n d  equivalences we do n o t need  to  w ork en tire ly  w ith in  
th e  ax io m atic  fram ew ork6. I t  is im p o r ta n t to  n o te  th a t  we can  accep t fo rm alisa tio n  
w ith o u t in sisting  upo n  ax io m a tisa tio n  in  all cases. M any o f th e  a rg u m e n ts  offered ag a in s t 
so-called fo rm al m e th o d s  a re  valid only ag a in st ax io m atisa tio n s  in h e re n t in  p a r tic u la r  
app ro ach es.
F o rm alisa tio n  is n o t a  p re -req u is ite  o f science, only of th e  m a th em atico -sc ien tific  a p ­
p ro ach : th e  logic we need  for re fu ta tio n  can  be th e  logic o f any  scientific discourse, 
fo rm al o r in fo rm al. I t  m ig h t b e  a rg u ed  th a t  in te r-su b jec tiv e ly  te s ta b le  re fu ta tio n s  a re  
m ore easily  fo u n d  using  fo rm al p re se n ta tio n s , b u t  th is  is a  m eth o d o lo g ica l concern , n o t 
a  logical p re -requ isite . Indeed , th e  desirab ility  o f fo rm alisa tio n  in  science is by  no  m eans 
u n iversa lly  accep ted .
Suppes, a  su p p o rte r  o f forma.lisa.tion, a sse rts  th a t  “th e  u ltim a te  reaso n  for fo rm alisa tio n  is 
th a t  i t  p rov ides th e  b es t o b jec tiv e  w ay w e know  to  convince an  o p p o n e n t of a  concep tu a l 
cla im ” [Sup68, page  663], D ijk s tra  m akes a  s im ilar claim  in  defence o f fo rm alisa tio n  in  
Softw are  E ngineering :
“E v en tu a lly  a  nice fo rm al tr e a tm e n t is alw ays th e  m o st concise w ay o f c a p tu r ­
ing o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  and  th e  m o st effective w ay of conveying th e  a rg u m en t 
w ith  all its  convincing pow er to  som eone else.” [Dij78, page  15].
B o th  of th ese  claim s are  unscientific , in  th e  sense of being u n re fu tab le . T h ey  b o th  h inge 
on te rm s such as “u ltim a te ” , “ev en tu a lly ” , “b e s t” an d  “nice” . In  a d d itio n , th e y  b o th
6The fact that completeness and consistency allow us to formalise these semantic importations does 
not make our formalisation axiomatic. In this case the two approaches are equivalent in power.
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in tro d u c e  th e  receivers in  th e  d iscourse p rocess, an d  ye t say  n o th in g  a b o u t th em . I t 
seem s unlikely  th a t  th ese  claim s can  b e  su b s ta n tia te d  if re a d  as u n iversa lly  quan tified  
over all in d iv idua ls, an d  in  th e  absence o f  th e  req u ired  p ro p e rtie s  of th ese  receivers th ey  
really  say  very  little . T h e  im p o rta n c e  o f th e  claim s, how ever, becom es a p p a re n t if we 
consider th em  as m e thodo log ica l dogm a, for th e n  we m u st ask  how  claim s can  be b ro u g h t 
a b o u t. W h a t a re  th e  p ro p e rtie s  o f “nice fo rm al tre a tm e n ts ” ? W h a t m u s t we in still in  
so ftw are  engineers d u ring  th e ir  fo rm a tiv e  ed u ca tio n  so th a t  th e y  a re  su itab le  receivers 
o f such  discourse, and  how  do we achieve th is  so th a t  th e y  can  use m a th e m a tic s  for 
scientific an d  e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse as well?
E ven  if  we accep t th a t  u n d e r c e rta in  c ircu m stan ces th e re  m ay  be ad v an tag es  in  fo rm ali­
sa tio n , th ese  ad v an tag es m ay  be ou tw eighed  b y  th e  d isad v an tag es, especially  if we a d o p t 
ax io m a tisa tio n . H em pel, fo r exam ple , a sse rts  th a t :
“W h a te v e r ph ilosoph ical illu m in a tio n  m ay  be  o b ta in ab le  by  p re se n tin g  a  th e ­
o ry  in  ax io m atic  fo rm  will com e only from  a x io m a tisa tio n  o f som e p a r tic u la r
an d  a p p ro p ria te  k ind , ra th e r  th a n  ju s t  any  ax io m atisa tio n  o r even  an  espe­
cially econom ic or e legan t o n e .” [H em 70, page 52]
T h a t  is to  say, in  choosing how  to  ax io m atise , w e need  to  m ak e  th e o re tic a l decisions in 
p erfo rm in g  o u r a b s tra c tio n . A nalysis carried  o u t w ith in  th e  chosen a x io m a tisa tio n  will 
reflect th ese  decisions, as well as th o se  in h e ren t in  th e  fo rm alisa tio n  itself. T h is  echoes 
th e  m ore  g enera l p o in t m ad e  earlie r, th a t  decision to  delay  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f fu n c tio n a l 
a t tr ib u te s  in to  a  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  can  still influence th e  design by  choice o f p re se n ta ­
tio n . W h a t H em pel fails to  observe , how ever, is th a t  in fo rm al p re se n ta tio n s  suffer from  
th e  sam e p rob lem . T h e  choice o f n a tu ra l  language , for exam ple , forces ce rta in  concep ts 
on an  au th o r: ce rta in  A frican  tr ib a l languages, fo r exam ple, lack  m a n y  of th e  concep ts 
fu n d a m e n ta l to  w este rn  cu ltu re . T h e  fac t th a t  th is  choice is u sua lly  m ad e  unselfcon­
sciously ten d s  to  obscure  th e  prob lem . Indeed , one of th e  ad v an tag es  o f fo rm alisa tio n  
is th a t  i t  m akes th is  p rob lem  exp lic it, b u t  only  if th e  engineer considers th e  m e th o d  of 
fo rm alisa tio n  as a  design decision.
K y b u rg  p u ts  fo rw ard  th e  suggestion  th a t  th is  p rob lem  can  be  reso lved  by  observ ing  
th a t  th e  th e  choice of ax io m a tisa tio n  sy stem  an d  th e  expression  of th e  th e o ry  a re  n o t 
sep a rab le  concerns [Kyb68]. T h e  choice o f sy stem  will ac tu a lly  be  m ad e  d u ring  a tte m p ts  
to  ax iom atise : in  essence, ex p lo ra to ry  d iscourse will tak e  p lace d u rin g  w hich no  fixed 
ax io m atic  sy stem  is be ing  a d o p te d , p rio r to  in fo rm ativ e  an d  scientific discourse. If  we 
fail to  reflect th is  ex p lo ra tio n  d u rin g  su b seq u en t d iscourse, th e n  we a re  in ten tio n a lly  
a b s tra c tin g  aw ay fro m  th e  logic o f scientific discovery. C ritic ising  fo rm alisa tio n  per se 
for a  conscious a b s tra c tio n  seem s u n reasonab le .
A n o th e r critic ism  is m ad e  by  S chw artz , w ho questions th e  ro le of m a th e m a tic s  in  science 
in  his p a p e r  “T h e  P ern ic ious Influence o f M a th em atics  on Science” . A lth o u g h  he is 
a d o p tin g  a  d e lib era te ly  p ro v o ca tiv e  s tan ce , he does m ake th e  o b se rv a tio n  th a t
“G ive a  m a th e m a tic ia n  a  s itu a tio n  th a t  is in  th e  leas t b it ill-defined-lie  will
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firs t m ake  it  well defined .” [Sch62, page  357].
T h e  d an g er he sees in  th is  is th a t  a ssu m p tio n s  m ad e  fo r th e  convenience of th e  m a th e ­
m a tic ian  becom e p a r t  o f th e  th eo ry , an d  m oreover th e  sc ien tis t m ay  com e to  accep t th ese  
sim plifications as p a r t  o f th e  theo ry . H e goes on  to  say
“T h e  physic ist r ig h tly  d read s precise a rg u m e n t, since an  a rg u m e n t w hich is 
only  convincing if  precise  loses all i ts  force if th e  assu m p tio n s on  w hich i t  is 
b ased  are  sligh tly  ch an g ed .” [Sch62, page  357]
T h e  physic ist is seeking g en era lisa tions. T h e  so ftw are engineer, how ever, is seeking only 
sufficient g en era lisa tio n  to  cover an  identified  p rob lem  dom ain , a n d  requ ires no  m ore . If 
th e  fo rm alisa tio n  is to o  specific th e n  we ru n  th e  risk  of o u r ap p ro ach  n o t being  scien­
tific (for th e  ta sk  in  h a n d ) , fo r th e  th eo ry  will be p ro te c te d  from  re fu ta tio n  by  auxilia ry  
s ta te m e n ts  p rev en tin g  us from  ex p erim en tin g  in  v ast a reas o f th e  p ro b lem  dom ain . As 
a  tech n o lo g is t, how ever, th e  engineer know s th a t  th e  co m p u te r will re a c t in  a  very  p re ­
cise w ay: we accep t th a t  th e  p ro g ram  will b eh av e  in undefined w ays if we v io la te  ou r 
p reco n d itio n s (so m uch  so th a t  p rofessional engineers will a d o p t defensive p ro g ram m in g  
stra teg ie s  to  lim it d am ag e  shou ld  i t  o ccu r). In  th is  case, fo rm alisa tio n  p re sen ts  no  p ro b ­
lem  th a t  isn ’t  in h e ren t in  th e  design ta sk . T h is  is a  b a lance  th a t  th e  engineer m u st 
achieve.
Z em anek observes th a t  th e  ta sk  of fo rm alisa tio n
“s ta r ts  in  th e  m iddle: we a re  b o rn  in to  an  en v iro n m en t [in which] th e re  a re  
suggested  an d  even self-suggesting fo rm al n o tio n s, b u t  a t  th e  beg in n in g  o f any  
in v es tig a tio n , such n o tio n s a re  n o t precise enough. T h e ir fu r th e r  developm ent 
freq u en tly  leads to  a  k ind  o f se p a ra tio n -e v en  of tw o  hostile  un iverses, th e  
in fo rm al and  th e  fo rm al un iverse . In  o rd e r to  avoid  fric tion , ten sio n  an d  figh ts, 
it  is necessary  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  v irtu es  an d  lim ita tio n s  of fo rm alisa tio n  an d  
how  its  em bedd ing  in  th e  rea l e ssen tia l in fo rm al w orld  can  b e  done w ith o u t 
h a rm .” [Zem75, page  118].
In  o rd e r to  achieve th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  we will develop a  m ore  deta iled  acco u n t of “th e o ry ” 
in  th e  n ex t c h a p te r , one th a t  a d m its  discussion o f th is re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  universes. 
T h is  acco u n t will also allow  us to  discuss th e  w ays in  w hich ax io m a tisa tio n , m odel-based  
fo rm alisa tio n , an d  th e  use of analogies fit in to  o u r m odel o f design.
T h is  leads us to  co n jec tu re  a  h eu ris tic  to  accom pany  th e  m odel, th a t  th e re  m u st be 
a  tre n d  from  th e  less fo rm al to  th e  m ore fo rm al as th e  design of a  so ftw are system  
proceeds. W e are  n o t going so fa r  as to  say  th a t  fo rm alism s shou ld  be used  a t  th e  
o u tse t in  co n s tru c tin g  o u r th eo ry , o r th a t  th e y  should  only be in tro d u c e d  a t  th e  s tag e  
of w ritin g  code in  an  accep ted  p ro g ram m in g  language. W e m u st accep t th a t  th e re  is a  
need  to  b a lance  th e  ad v an tag es and  u ltim a te  necessity  of fo rm alisa tio n  w ith  th e  possible 
re s tric tio n s  it  m ay  p lace  on th e  p rob lem  being  solved and  th e  m e th o d s  being  used. T h is
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ju d g em en t m u s t rem ain  th e  p re ro g a tiv e  of th e  engineer concerned: p re ju d g in g  th e  issue 
allow s th e  engineer to  avoid  loss o f innocence, a n d  is as flaw ed as te lling  a  d o c to r w h a t 
d rugs to  p rescribe  before  th e  p a tie n t h as  been  seen. F o rm alisa tio n  m u s t be  seen as a  to o l 
th a t  can  b e  used: th e  “can ” is im p o r ta n t here , fo r ju s t  as th e  eng ineer shou ld  n o t be 
allow ed to  escape  th e  loss of innocence th ro u g h  im posed  dogm a, so th e  ro u te  of igno rance  
shou ld  b e  denied. C hoosing n o t to  use fo rm alisa tio n  because  of in a b ility  to  h an d le  th e  
to o l is on a  p a r  w ith  th e  surgeon  w ho chooses n o t to  o p e ra te  becau se  he is un ab le  to  use 
a  scalpel. O ne can n o t question  th e  decision n o t to  o p e ra te , b u t  one m ig h t questio n  th e  
r ig h t of th e  in d iv id u a l to  th e  t i t le  “su rg eo n ” .
T h e  fa c t th a t  we m u st m ove from  th e  in fo rm al to  th e  fo rm al, an d  th a t  th is  m ove is forced 
u p o n  us n o t by ideology, o r even  m ethodo logy , b u t  by  th e  n a tu re  of th e  a r tifa c ts  con­
cerned , should  be n o ted . If  we ignore co m p ara tiv e ly  m inor p rob lem s such  as com ponen t 
fa ilu re  an d  in te rfe ren ce  from  e x te rn a l devices, an d  co n cen tra te  on  an  idealised  m ach ine , 
th e  co m p u te r em bodies th e  a to m ic  w orld  of early  W ittg e n s te in ’s T ra c ta tu s . T h e  b e ­
h av io u r o f th e  idealised  m ach ine  depends only  on tho se  b it p a t te rn s  in  its  m em ory , an d  
th o se  in  its  en v iro n m en t to  be p re sen ted  on its  in p u t lines. T hese  b its  a re  in te rp re te d  in 
b it-fu n c tio n a l fash ion , analogous to  th e  t r u th  fu n c tio n a lity  o f p ro p o sitio n a l logic. T h e  
em erg en t b eh av io u r of th e  m ach ine  is d e te rm in ed  com pletely  by  th e se  values (even if it 
is som etim es conven ien t to  view  th e  p rocess as n o n -d e te rm in is tic  b y  a b s tra c tin g  aw ay 
from  d e ta il) . M oreover, it  is th is  p ro p e r ty  o f th e  m ach ine  th a t  allow s th e  m a th em atico - 
scientific a p p ro ach  to  h e  used  so successfully in  o u r p rob lem  dom ain . T h e  ru les govern ing  
th e  b it-fu n c tio n a lity  of th e  sy stem  m u st be  know n, since th ese  w ere th e  driv ing  force b e ­
h in d  th e  design o f th e  m ach ine  itself. T h e  civil eng ineer’s b ridge  c a n n o t b e  so easily 
se p a ra te d  from  its  en v iro n m en t: its  b eh av io u r is n o t sim ply th a t  em erg ing  from  consid­
e ra tio n  of its  co m ponen ts to g e th e r  w ith  th e  in p u ts  m odelled  by  th e  engineer. F ac to rs  to o  
com plex to  m odel m u st b e  ta k e n  in to  acco u n t by  th e  inclusion of sa fe ty  fea tu re s , using  
experience an d  ju d g e m e n t7.
W e m u s t b ew are , how ever, o f th e  fallacy  o f m oving  th is  a to m ism  from  th e  ta rg e t  m ach ine  
to  th e  p rob lem  dom ain . Seeking to  see th e  w orld  a t  large in  such  sim plistic  te rm s is 
unlikely to  be feasib le, le t alone p ra c tic a l o r helpful. T h e  challenge facing  th e  softw are 
engineer is to  iden tify  a p p ro p ria te  w ays o f m ak in g  th is  possib le fo r p a r tic u la r , h ighly 
re s tr ic te d , p rob lem  dom ains. T h is  challenge is forced u p o n  us by technology , b u t  th e re  
is no need  to  re s tr ic t o u r ex p lo ra tio n  o f th e  p rob lem  d om ain  to  th eo ries expressib le in  
these  te rm s , an d  110 need  to  d ic ta te  w hen  th e  m ove to  fo rm alisa tio n  shou ld  ta k e  place;
W e m u s t also bew are  o f th e  fallacy  o f eq u a tin g  fo rm alisa tio n  w ith  cooling, in  th e  sense of 
exclud ing  noise. I t  is perfec tly  feasible to  th in k  in  very  w arm  te rm s  w ith  m a th e m a tic s , 
if we a re  sufficiently  flu en t, an d  p re p a re d  to  use ex p lo ra to ry  d iscourse. I t  is also q u ite
rIn fact, computers are not as easily isolated as we might like to think. A well known brand of ioniser, 
marketed as ideal to combat fatigue from using computer VDU screens, has the interesting effect of 
causing the Macintosh Computer to “type by itself”. This phenomenon, a wonder to behold, has never 
been modelled in any specification, formal or otherwise, that the author has seen! It is convenient, and 
not too misleading, however, to proceed for these discussions as if total separation can be achieved. The 
task of achieving this separation will be left to the electrical engineer.
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easy to  th in k  in  very  cool te rm s  w ith  n a tu ra l  language. I t  is , w e w ould  a rg u e , th is  false 
asso c ia tio n  of cooling w ith  fo rm alisa tio n  th a t  leads to  th e  u n p ro d u c tiv e  divisions b etw een  
th e  so-called fo rm alis ts  an d  th e  n o n -fo rm alists .
4.7 Summary
In  th is  c h a p te r  we hav e  in tro d u c e d  a  sim ple m odel for th e  p ro d u c tio n  of so ftw are  system s. 
T h is  m odel h as  as its  basis th e  id ea  th a t  sy stem  design is p rim arily  th e  developm ent o f 
theo ries. T h e  ad o p tio n  o f theo ries  as th e  cen tra l th em e  o f th e  p rocess is n o t obvious. W e 
could  h av e  considered  using  specifications o r p ro g ram s as th e  un ify ing  th em e , b u t  th e n  
we w ould  hav e  h a d  to  forgo th e  benefits  o f access to  o th e r  bodies o f know ledge o u ts id e  
o f com p u tin g .
W e shou ld  n o te , how ever, th a t  th is  m odel is n o t in ten d ed  to  c a p tu re  on ly  “g o o d ” design 
p rac tices . I t  can  equally  well describe th e  process of s ittin g  a t  a  te rm in a l an d  solving 
a  p ro b lem  d irec tly  in to  assem bly  language . H ere th e re  is only one th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n . 
T h e  phenom enological th eo ry  is expressed  d irec tly  in te rm s o f a  very  co m p u ta tio n a lly  
b iased  system : th e  d iag ram  is co n stru c tiv e , in  th a t  th e  fu n c tio n  of th e  a r tifa c t can  be 
deduced  fro m  th e  p ro g ram  an d  a  sufficient know ledge of th e  th eo ry  of th e  p ro g ram m in g  
lan g u ag e , b u t  th e  m ode o f expression  is likely to  obscure th e  fu n c tio n  o f th e  system .
Like all m odels, th is  one is n o t in ten d ed  to  be a  perfect reflection  o f w h a t ac tu a lly  
h ap p en s  w hen so ftw are design is tak in g  p lace. M ore im p o rta n tly , i t  is n o t in ten d ed  as 
an  exem plar of w h a t shou ld  ta k e  place. In  rea lity , all p ro je c ts  a re  likely to  p rogress in 
d ifferen t w ays. O ccasionally  an  excellent fit w ith  th e  m odel m ig h t b e  observed . M ore 
o ften  th in g s  will be n o te d  th a t  conflict w ith , o r a re  ignored  by, th e  m odel. T h e  im p o r ta n t 
th in g , how ever, is th a t  we h av e  estab lish ed  a  m odel so th a t  conform ance an d  d ev ia tion  
can  b e  discussed.
T h ro u g h o u t th e  re s t o f th is  thesis  th e  m odel ou tlin ed  above will b e  refined  an d  used 
as a  basis for d iscussing asp ec ts  o f th e  cu rricu lum . I t  is c rucial, how ever, th a t  th e  role 
o f th e  m odel should  be ap p rec ia ted . T h e  discourse co n ta in ed  in  th is  th esis  is largely  
ex p lo ra to ry , an d  n o t scientific. T h e  discussions it  co n ta in s, the re fo re , a re  enab led  by  th e  
m odel, an d  do n o t re s t upo n  it as a  p rem ise. R efusal to  accep t th e  m odel shou ld  lead  
to  p rog ress, as reasons are  g iven, an d  deve lopm en t, as new  m odels a re  p roposed . R a th e r  
th a n  a t te m p t  to  re fu te  th e  m odel here , how ever, we will d e p a rt from  P o p p e r  an d  ask  th e  
read e r to  use i t ,  w a rts  an d  all. T h is  a d o p tio n  is likely to  lead  th e  read e r to  a  ca ta lo g u e  
o f d isag reem en ts by  th e  end  of th e  thesis: such  is th e  n a tu re  of e x p lo ra to ry  d iscourse.
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C hapter 5
Theories, Models and Analogies
“We have found  that where science has progressed the farthest, the m in d  has 
but regained from  nature that which the m ind  has pu t into nature. We have 
found  a strange foo tprin t on the shores o f  the unknown. We have devised  
profound theories, one after another, to account fo r its origins. A t  last, we 
have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foo tprin t. A n d  
Lo! it is our ow n .”
A u rth u r Eddington
In  th is  c h a p te r  we will seek to  refine o u r n o tio n  o f “th e o ry ” , an d  to  in tro d u c e  th e  ideas of 
m odels a n d  analogies. T h is  is a  n o n -tr iv ia l u n d e rta k in g , an d  we will b e  h igh ly  selective 
in  th e  view s we p resen t: no  gen era l su rv ey  of th e  issues invo lved  can  b e  u n d e rta k e n  
in  a  d o cu m en t o f th is  size. W e will n o t consider, fo r exam ple , w ider uses o f th e  te rm  
th eo ry , such  as “th e  th e o ry  o f p hysics” , w hich  a re  in te n d e d  to  d en o te  a  w ide ran g e  of 
co n cep ts , inc lud ing  a  n u m b e r o f m o re  localised  theo ries. T h is  is th e  u sag e  G ries in ten d s  
w hen  he  refers to  “th e  th e o ry  o f p ro g ra m m in g ” . W e will c o n c e n tra te  on  in d iv id u a l 
th eo rie s  th a t  a re  in te n d e d  to  refer to  a  localised  c lu ste rin g  o f p h en o m en a , an d  th a t  will 
serve as specifications o r p ro g ram s. I t  shou ld  be s tre ssed  th a t  th e re  is n o  ex p e c ta tio n  
of answ ering  th e  questio n  “w h a t is a  th e o ry ? ” . T h is h as  exercised  th e  m inds o f th e  
g re a te s t  ph ilosophers of science fo r g en e ra tio n s , as ev idenced  by  th e  fam o u s sym posium  
held  in  1969 an d  th e  d eb a te s  t h a t  hav e  follow ed it  [Sup77], an d  th e re  is no  p o in t even 
th in k in g  we m ig h t com e u p  w ith  an  answ er. In  fa c t, th e  c u rre n t view  seem s to  b e  th a t  
we m u s t accep t m an y  d ifferen t n o tio n s  o f th eo ry ; all useful in  th e ir  w ays, b u t  possib ly  
irreconcilab le .
In  p u rsu it o f o u r ta sk , we req u ire  a  view  o f th e o ry  th a t  is pow erfu l en o u g h  to  encom pass 
th e  re su lts  o f a  w ide ran g e  o f ac tiv itie s  u n d e rta k e n  by  so ftw are eng ineers. H u m an s, w ho 
will be w ork ing  w ith  th e se  th eo rie s , a re  flexible enough  to  cope w ith  such  a  com plex 
d om ain . W e also req u ire  a  n o tio n  o f th e o ry  th a t  can  sensibly  b e  em b ed d ed  in  a  m ach ine . 
T h e  c u rre n t s ta te  o f techno logy  suggests  th a t  th is  will need  to  b e  a  fa r  m o re  rig id  ty p e  
of th eo ry . A n th ro p o m o rp h ica lly , w e m ig h t say  th a t  if  th e  m ach in e  is to  “u n d e rs ta n d ” 
th a t  i t  is be ing  p re sen ted  w ith  a  th eo ry , th e  n o tio n  of th e o ry  invo lved  m u s t be  rig id ly  
defined a n d  q u ite  sim ple. O u r c o m p u te r’s view , fo r exam ple, m u s t a d m it fo rm alisa tio n , 
w hereas th e  en g in ee r’s earlie r view s need  n o t. T h u s , as we p roceed  w ith  o u r developm en t
111
L
process, n o t only  m u s t o u r  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  becom e m ore  fo rm al, b u t  th e re  is also th e  
p o ssib ility  th a t  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  te rm  “th e o ry ” m u st becom e m o re  sim plistic  an d  
precise. In  a d d itio n , we m u st accep t th e  sh ift in  th e  s ta tu s  o f o u r th eo ry . A t th e  o u tse t, 
th e  th e o ry  is te n ta tiv e , as th e  engineer explores th e  p rob lem  an d  a t te m p ts  to  c o n s tru c t a  
su itab le  p re se n ta tio n  as th e  basis of c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d aries . T h e re  is every  e x p ec ta tio n  
th a t  th e  th e o ry  will b e  re fu te d , coupled  w ith  th e  hope th a t  such  re fu ta tio n s  will lead  to  an  
im p ro v ed  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  p rob lem . A s th e  design process d raw s to  a  close, how ever, 
th e  th e o ry  becom es in s tru m e n ta l an d  is accep ted  as “sufficiently t r u e ” by  th e  custom er. 
T h e re  is no need  th ere fo re , fo r th e  final p re se n ta tio n s  to  be efficient aids to  u n d e rs tan d in g , 
o r to  fac ilita te  re fu ta tio n . O f course , if  th e  cu s to m er subseq u en tly  decides to  n eg o tia te  
a  new  c o n tra c t, a n d  th e  engineer decides th a t  som e co m ponen ts o f th e  design, such  as 
p a r ts  o f th eo ries , can  be  reu sed , th e n  a  lack  o f e x p lan a to ry  pow er in  an  im p lem en ta tio n  
will be  a  d raw b ack , an d  th e  engineer m ay  w an t access to  o th e r  p re se n ta tio n s  used  d u ring  
th e  design process. For th is  reaso n , i t  is som etim es suggested  th a t  we shou ld  n o t lose 
th is  e x p lan a to ry  pow er as a  design p roceeds, b u t  em bed  ex p lan a tio n s  in to  code in  th e  
fo rm  of com m ents.
J u s t  as o u r engineers m u s t choose p ro g ram m in g  languages for im p lem en ta tio n , so to o  
th ey  m u s t choose a p p ro p ria te  n o tio n s of th eo ry , an d  su itab le  p re se n ta tio n  m e th o d s , for 
use d u rin g  th e  design s tag es . Im position  o f any  “m eth o d o lo g y ” relieves th e  engineer 
of th is  responsib ility ; igno rance  o f su itab le  too ls an d  techn iques ren d ers  th e  engineer 
in cap ab le  of d ischarg ing  th is  resp o n sib ility  ad eq u a te ly  an d  professionally .
W e will s ta r t  o u r discussions b y  p re sen tin g  a n  overview  of th e  p ro p e rtie s  we m ig h t expect 
theo ries to  possess. W e will th e n  p re sen t tw o  views o f theo ries, f irs t, th e  received view , 
an d  th e n  th e  sem an tic  concep tion . T h e  fo rm er is no longer w idely accep ted  in  th e  
P h ilo sophy  of Science because  it  leads to  m an y  p rob lem s th a t  in  tu rn  lead  to  a  convo lu ted  
process o f shoring  up  th e  view , an d  in h ib itin g  app licab ility . W e w ill a t te m p t  to  apply  
i t  to  th e  la t te r  s tages of design , how ever, firs tly  to  see if  th e  critic ism s still apply , an d  
secondly because  m an y  references to  th e o ry  in  th e  Softw are E ng ineering  l i te ra tu re  a re  
based  on  th is  view . T h e  received view does n o t ad m it discussion o f th e  earlie r stages 
of design, for precisely th e  reasons i t  h as  lo st accep tan ce  in th e  P h ilo sophy  o f Science, 
an d  so th e  sem an tic  concep tion  of theo ries will be  in tro d u ced . T h is  seem s to  fit m ore  
n a tu ra lly  w ith  th e  m odel o f design o u tlin ed  in  th e  p rev ious c h a p te r , an d  also allows 
discussion of concep ts such as “m odel” an d  “ana lo g y ” , a  discussion necessary  for ou r 
pedagog ical pu rposes.
O nce w e have d iscussed th eo ries generally , w e will briefly review  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  
techn iques th a t  a re  com m only  u sed  in  S oftw are E ngineering . T h is will n o t b e  a n  ex h au s­
tiv e  tr e a tm e n t,  since m uch  o f th is  m a te r ia l can  be  found  elsew here, b u t  we will a t te m p t 
to  show  how  th e  techn iques can  b e  d iscussed w ith in  th e  sem an tic  co ncep tion  o f theo ries. 
W e will also in tro d u c e  th e  p ro o f ob liga tions th a t  accom pany  th e  use o f th e se  techn iques 
w hen  used  as p a r t  of a  th eo ry  co n stru c tio n  process.
I t  is a p p ro p ria te  a t  th is  p o in t to  rem ind  th e  read e r th a t  we a re  n o t a tte m p tin g  to  define
112
te rm s , fa r less to  d ic ta te  how  th e y  shou ld  b e  used  w ith in  S oftw are E ng ineering . O ur 
in te n tio n  is sim ply to  com e to  a  b e t te r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of w h a t c o n s titu te s  a  th eo ry , and  
how  theo ries can  b e  u sed  by  b rin g in g  th e m  in to  c o n tac t w ith  p rob lem s. I t  is possib le, 
indeed  likely, th a t  b y  th e  end  o f th is  c h a p te r  th e  read e r will feel less co m fo rtab le  w ith  th e  
te rm s  th a n  before  read in g  it! T h is  is a  reflection  o f challenges being  m a d e  to  th e  in tu itiv e  
n o tio n  o f th e o ry  cu rren tly  held: no  apo logy  is m ad e  for th is . I t  is an  im p o r ta n t  p a r t  of 
ou r ta s k  to  challenge c u rre n t ed u ca tio n a l p rac tice , an d  if th is  involves d is tu rb in g  in tu ­
itive ly  held  n o tio n s, so b e  i t .  W e w ould  h ope , o f course, th a t  as well as be ing  d es tru c tiv e , 
by  p ropo sin g  th e  sem an tic  concep tion  o f th eo rie s , a  fram ew ork  will be p rov ided  w ith in  
w hich th e  read e r can su b seq u en tly  re c o n s tru c t an  im p ro v ed  u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h is  recon­
s tru c tio n  can  only  be  in it ia te d  here , how ever, an d  n o t com pleted . M oreover, th e  read e r 
will p ro b ab ly  w a n t to  exp lo re  o th e r  view s of th e o ry  befo re  a tte m p tin g  to  re c o n s tru c t 
w ith in  th is  view.
5.1 Properties of Theories
R yle bu ilds a  pow erful analogy  betw een  theo ries an d  p a th w ay s  [Ryl49, pages 272-275]. 
W e will ad o p t th is  analogy , an d  ex ten d  it . T o have  a  th eo ry , acco rd ing  to  R yle, is to  
be aw are  o f a  p a th w a y  from  place to  p lace in  such  a  w ay as to  b e  ab le  b o th  to  use th e  
p a th ,  an d  also to  exp lain  its  w h e reab o u ts  to  o th e rs . D u ring  th e  e x p lo ra to ry  p h ase  of 
th e o ry  bu ild ing , th e  p a th w ay  is be ing  co n s tru c ted , an d  th e  bu ilder m u s t b e  p re p a re d  to  
s ta m p  np  an d  dow n th e  p a th  to  e s tab lish  i t . P a th s  m ay  s ta r t  o u t ,  th e n  becom e bogged 
dow n, or ru n  up  ag a in st obstac les th a t  c an n o t be  overcom e: in  such  cases th e y  m ay  be 
a b an d o n ed , b u t  p ro b ab ly  only if a  b e tte r  p a th  can  be found . O nce a  p a th  h as  been  
estab lish ed , by sufficient s tam p in g , i t  can  b e  m ap p ed  o u t an d  m ad e  availab le  for o th e rs  
to  use. I t  no longer needs to  be estab lish ed , a lth o u g h  a  new  user m ay  need  th e  m ap  to  
m ak e  use o f it  u n til  fam ilia rity  is achieved. I t  becom es an  in s tru m e n t, r a th e r  th a n  an  
a r tifa c t u n d e r co n stru c tio n . I t  m ay  still u n expec ted ly  subside u n d e r use, o f course, and  
th e n  e ith e r be  a b an d o n ed , o r need to  b e  shored  u p  before i t  can  be  used  again . U sers 
m ay  co n tin u e  to  w alk  subsided  p a th s  a t  th e ir  ow n risk , o f course.
In  c o n s tru c tin g  a  com plex o f pa,ths i t  will a lm o st ce rta in ly  be m o re  conven ien t if ex isting  
p a th s  can  be used  in s tru m en ta lly . T h is  m ig h t include co n stru c tio n s th a t  will becom e 
re d u n d a n t once th e  com plex  of p a th s  has been  b u ilt: th e  logistics o f m a jo r  roadw orks 
show s th is  clearly. W e m ig h t also w an t to  include ex isting  p a th s  in to  o u r n e tw o rk . T im s 
o u r th e o ry  bu ilder is also a  th e o ry  u ser, b o th  in  te rm s of s tru c tu re  a n d  also in fra s tru c ­
tu re , so o u r so ftw are engineer needs to  be a  ram b le r as well as a  p a th b u ild e r . E ven  if th e  
engineer has a  clear goal in  m in d , th e  analogy  of ram bling  seem s m ore  a p p ro p ria te  th a n  
o rien teerin g , because  ro u te s  using  ex isting  p a th w ay s  are  likely to  b e  m o re  efficient i f  th ey  
can  be found , even if  less d irec t. T h e  re-use of ex isting  co m p o n en ts  seem s a p p ro p ria te  
to  th e o ry  bu ild ing  as well as p ro g ram m in g . Som m erville uses a  sim ilar ana logy  w hen he 
ta lk s  a b o u t th e  engineer n av ig a tin g  in  in fo rm a tio n  liyperspace  [Som87]. W e a re  ex te n d ­
ing  th e  id ea  to  a  theory hyperspace, because  we w an t to  include exp lica tio n  alongside
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W lia t p ro p e rtie s  do we expec t th e se  th eo ries  to  h a v e 1? F ir s t ,  we n o te  th a t  we usually  
ad m it th e  p o ssib ility  o f a  th eo ry  being  false. W e w ould  n o t no rm ally  call th e  s ta te m e n t 
“P a ris  w as th e  C a p ita l o f F ran ce  in  1989” a  th e o re tic a l s ta te m e n t as i t  is ju s t  a  s ta te m e n t 
of fa c t. A  th eo ry  th a t  com prises ju s t  a  collection  o f fac ts  w ould  n o t n o rm ally  be  accep ted  
as a  th eo ry  in  th e  conven tional sense. Som e theo ries  have  becom e so fam ilia r w ith  
in s tru m e n ta l use, how ever, th a t  i t  seem s im possib le  th a t  th e y  a re  w rong: possib ly  we 
now  ta k e  th e m  as defin itional. W e will s till accep t th ese  as th eo rie s , b u t  in sis t th a t  a t 
leas t a  g lim m er of d o u b t ex ists , even  if  th e  u se r ra re ly  m akes th is  d o u b t exp lic it. E qually , 
how ever, we usually  e n te r ta in  th e  belief th a t  o u r th e o ry  m ay  be  tru e . In  sh o rt, we accep t 
th a t  o u r th e o ry  is a  con jec tu re .
W e also expec t ou r theo ries to  lead  to  a  b e t te r  “u n d e rs ta n d in g ” . T h is  m ay  m ean  several 
th in g s , such  as th e ir  ac tin g  as ex p lan a tio n s  o f som e p h en o m en a , ac tin g  as in te rp re ta tio n s  
in to  a  b e t te r  u n d e rs to o d  d o m ain , p rov id ing  a  calculus fo r p red ic tio n , o r exposing  s tru c ­
tu re . O ne im p o r ta n t  a sp ec t o f th is  increased  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is th e  use  o f m ech an is tic  
ex p lan a tio n s . T h is  is a  vague, b u t  im p o r ta n t ,  id ea , as G regory  observes:
“M ost curiously , it  is difficult to  find  o u t ju s t  w h a t sc ien tis ts  o r ph ilosophers 
(o r indeed  th e  com m on m an ) ta k e  ‘m ach in e ’ to  m ean , an d  y e t m ech an is tic  ex­
p la n a tio n s  a re  generally  supposed  to  b e  th e  m o st, o r even th e  only, accep tab le  
k ind  of ex p lan a tio n  in  science.” [G re84, pag e  73]
G regory  goes on  to  to  d is tingu ish  b e tw een  th e  m ach ine , w hich em bodies p u rp o se  or 
fu n c tio n , an d  th e  m echan ism s i t  co n ta in s , w hich em b o d y  only cau sa lity , a lth o u g h  th ey  
m ay  assum e func tions w hen used . U sing th is  term ino logy , we can  s ta te  o u r th eo ry  
bu ild ing  aim  as finding a  m ech an istic  ex p lan a tio n , o r th eo ry , w ith  th e  p u rp o se  of using 
p a r tic u la r  schem as, w here th e  m echan ism s u p o n  w hich  th e  m ach ine  depends a re  p rov ided  
by  o u r co m p u tin g  devices. T h is  m ech an is tic  ex p lan a tio n  alone m ay  n o t b e  sufficient, 
how ever, for if we w ish o u r th e o ry  to  evolve w e m ig h t requ ire  ex p lan a tio n s  o f a  h igher 
o rd e r, w here th e  m echan ism s a re  easier to  reaso n  a b o u t. M oreover, we a re  likely to  
c o n s tru c t such ex p lan a tio n s  en route to  o u r final im p lem en ta tio n .
W e also ex p ec t a  th eo ry  to  te ll us w h a t is th e  case: to  m ak e  som e asse rtio n s or p ro p o ­
sitions. T h is  is n o t enough , how ever, fo r we usually  expect som e coherence to  these  
assertio n s. A  ra n d o m  collection  o f p ro p o sitio n s is n o t n o rm ally  th o u g h t of as a  theo ry . 
W e m ig h t, o f course, d iscover som e m odel for th e  collection, an d  p ro c la im  th is  collec­
tio n  as a  th e o ry  o f th is  m odel. In  genera l, how ever, we will n o t call so m eth in g  a  th eo ry  
unless we have som e id ea  b o th  th a t  th e re  is a  m odel, an d  also t h a t  we know  roughly  
w h a t i t  is. T h is  is a  re s ta te m e n t o f one of o u r p ro o f  ob liga tions, nam ely  th a t  all theories 
m u st be co n sis ten t o therw ise  no  such m odel will ex ist. N ote  th a t  aga in  th is  p resupposes 
selfconscious a c tiv ity 2. In co n sis ten t theo ries pose no problem s fo r th e  un se lf conscious
’This section draws heavily on Aclunstein [Ach68, pages 122-129].
2 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between consistency, completeness and selfconsciousness,
specification and implementation.
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designer, w ho will sim ply  proceed  in ig n o ran ce  u n til p rob lem s a re  n o ticed , th e n  resolve 
th e m  locally. Som e of th e  a sse rtio n s in o u r th e o ry  will hav e  d ifferen t s ta tu s  from  o th e rs . 
M oreover, som e assertions will p ro b ab ly  n o t b e  m ad e  explicitly , b u t  will accom pany  ou r 
choice o f p re se n ta tio n  tech n iq u e . A d o p tio n  o f equality , fo r exam ple , will p ro b ab ly  n o t 
be accom pan ied  by  th e  ax iom s fo r equivalence re la tio n s, b u t  th ese  will b e  used; sim ilarly  
ax iom s fo r our dedu c tiv e  a p p a ra tu s  an d  som e o f ou r d a ta  ty p e s  will b e  assum ed . In  
essence, we will ad o p t a  re sea rch  p ro g ram  [Lak70], an d  w ork w ith in  th is . A s-w ell as ou r 
assertio n s being  p a r t  o f th e  th eo ry , w e also expec t som e fo rm  o f logical closure, allow ing 
th eo rem s p rovab le  w ith in  o u r a d o p te d  logic to  b e  accep ted  as p a r t  o f th e  theo ry .
W e also have th e  e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  o u r th e o ry  has som e p u rp o se , in  th e  sense th a t  it 
helps us to  m eet som e iden tified  goal. T h u s  a  ran d o m  collection o f a sse rtio n s, even  if 
c lu ste red  a ro u n d  som e p h enom enon , will n o t com prise a  theo ry . M oreover, th e  a rb itra ry  
co n ju n c tio n  of tw o  theories will n o t, in  genera l, com prise a  theo ry . T h e  co n junc tion  of 
th e  th eo ry  of n a tu ra l  n u m b ers  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  th eo ry  o f th e  d igestive  sy stem  in  dogs 
will n o t com prise  a  th e o ry  unless we a re  se ttin g  o u t to  s tu d y  som eth in g  like th e  s ta te m e n t 
th a t  dogs’ d igestion  tim es a re  re la te d  to  th e  F ibonacci sequence.
A ch inste in  also suggests th a t  we shou ld  ex p ec t a  th eo ry  to  be m ax im al, in  th e  sense th a t  
if we a lread y  hav e  a  gen era l th e o ry  we w ould  n o t usually  call th e  re s tr ic te d  app lica tio n  
o f th a t  th eo ry  a  th e o ry  in  its  ow n r ig h t. W h ils t th is  seem s sensible w hen  view ed as 
re s tr ic tio n , i t  is less obvious th a t  we w ould req u ire  som eth ing  to  lose its  s ta tu s  as a  
th e o ry  due to  subseq u en t genera lisa tio n  o r en rich m en t. W e will n o t in sis t on theories 
be ing  m ax im al, fo r m an y  o f o u r specification  techn iques a re  b ased  u p o n  a  process of 
e n rich m en t, an d  it  is conven ien t to  th in k  of th e  bu ild ing  blocks as theo ries  th ro u g h o u t. 
W e do n o t only w a n t ou r th e o ry  of n a tu ra l  n u m b ers  to  becom e only a  p a r t  o f th e  th eo ry  
o f s tack s  o f n a tu ra l  n u m b ers  shou ld  we p resen t one; we also w an t i t  to  p reserve  its  
in d iv id u a l id en tity .
5.2 The Received View of Theories
T h e  “received view ” is th e  n am e  given to  th e  view of theories generally  held , in  som e 
fo rm  o r a n o th e r , u n til  th e  second h a lf  o f th is  cen tu ry . T h is view  h as developed  th ro u g h  
a  n u m b e r of re fo rm u la tio n s, each  one try in g  to  overcom e som e o f th e  p rob lem s being 
ra ised  by  th e  prev ious version. T h e  received view is accom panied  by  th e  asse rtio n  th a t  
all theo ries can  be rep re sen ted  in  a  canon ical fo rm  (n o t necessarily  th a t  they are all 
p re se n te d  in  th is  w ay). S uppe develops various versions o f th is  canon ica l fo rm  th a t  have 
b een  accep ted  du ring  its  developm en t. P re se n te d  below  is his fo rm u la tio n  of th e  final 
version  g iven m u ch  credence in  th e  l i te ra tu re  [Sup77, pages 50-53]. He n o tes  th a t  a  
th eo ry , accord ing  to  th e  received view , com prises:
see [Smu87].
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•  A  firs t o rd e r (possib ly  m o d a l) lan g u ag e , L , an d  calculus, K ,  in  te rm s  o f w hich th e  
th e o ry  is p resen ted .
• T h e  c o n s ta n ts  in  th e  lan g u ag e  w hich a re  p a rtitio n e d  in to  tw o  classes, V o , co n ta in ­
ing th e  observab le  te rm s , a n d  V t , co n ta in in g  th e  th eo re tica l, o r non-observab le , 
te rm s.
• L  an d  K  give rise  to  th re e  sub languages an d  claculi as follows
— L o , w hich co n ta in s  V q , b u t  no  quan tified  form s o r m o d a litie s , a n d  no  te rm s  
in  V t - K o is ju s t  th e  re s tr ic tio n  o f K  to  L o ,  w here any  te rm s  arising  n o t in  
V o  a re  defined exp lic itly  in  K o -  F u rth e rm o re , K o  m u s t ad m it a t le a s t one 
m odel.
— L'0 ex ten d s L o  by  allow ing quan tifiers  an d  m odalities. K'0 is th e  re s tr ic tio n  
o f K  to  L'0
— L t  is a  re s tr ic tio n  o f L  to  rem ove th o se  te rm s in  Vo- K t  is a  re s tr ic tio n  of 
K  to  L t -
L  is n o t sim ply  th e  co n ju n c tio n  o f th ese  sub languages, how ever, becau se  th e re  will 
u sually  be m an y  m ixed te rm s.
•  L o  is given a  sem an tic  in te rp re ta tio n  in  w hich
— T h e  d om ain  com prises observab le  ev en ts— all o b jec ts , p ro p e rtie s  an d  re la tio n s 
in  th is  dom ain  m u s t be  d irec tly  observable.
— V alues of all variab les u sed  in  L o  m u s t b e  in te rp re ta b le  as expressions in  Lo-
T hese  in te rp re ta tio n s  o f L o ,  an d  hence o f K o ,  a re  p a r tia l  in te rp re ta tio n s  of L  and  
K ,  an d  will becom e in te rp re ta tio n s  o f L'0 an d  K'0  w hen  su itab le  in te rp re ta tio n s  of 
logical te rm s  a re  added .
•  T h eo re tica l te rm s  a re  p a rtia lly  in te rp re te d  by  th eo re tica l p o s tu la te s  (ax iom s in 
w hich only  te rm s from  V t  occur) an d  a  fin ite  se t o f co rrespondence  ru les, C , 
w hich involve te rm s  from  V t  an d  V o , b u t  no  ad d itio n a l, ex tra -lo g ica l, te rm s.
B efore considering  th e  em pirica l significance of th e  received view , le t us observe  th a t  
th e re  is a  d eg en era te  case o f in te re s t. If  Vo  is em p ty , th e  th e o ry  ceases to  be scientific, 
in  th e  sense th a t  clearly  no  o bserva tions can  be  m ad e  to  re fu te  i t . O u r te rm s  will all 
be g round less, an d  we a re  co m m itted  to  w ork ing  pure ly  theo re tica lly . In  th is  case, we 
a re  w ork ing  in  a  d om ain  th a t  m a th e m a tic ia n s  an d  logicians call m odel th e o ry  [Bri77]. 
T h is  sense o f “th e o ry ” is a d o p te d  b y  fo rm alis ts  in  C o m p u te r Science, p a r tic u la r ly  th o se  
in te re s te d  in  a lgebra ic  m e th o d s  [BG77]. I t  does n o t allow us to  d iscuss how  theo ries  are  
g ro u n d ed  in  o b serv a tio n s, how ever, so w h a t p u rp o se  can  i t  serve? T h e  answ er is th a t  
once we hav e  m ad e  o u r phenom enological th e o ry  in s tru m e n ta l, re fu ta tio n  ceases to  be 
an  issue, so w e can  consider all te rm s  as th e o re tic a l w ith o u t concern . T h e  th e o ry  can  
alw ays b e  re - in te rp re te d  to  inc lude  o b se rv a tio n  te rm s , a n d  th u s  p ro v id e  a  g ro u n d in g  a t
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a  la te r  s tag e , such  as m ig h t occur d u rin g  accep tan ce  te s tin g . T h is  is also th e  reaso n  th a t  
H oare  can  em b ark  on th e  m ath em atico -sc ien tific  m e th o d . T h e  th e o ry  h as  been  m ad e  
an a ly tic  r a th e r  th a n  sy n th e tic , to  a d o p t K a n t’s te rm s [K an29j. W e will n o t endorse  
th e  view  th a t  an a ly tic  theo ries  a re  m ean ing less, how ever, sim ply  th a t  th e ir  m ean ing  
com es from  th e  re la tio n sh ip s  im posed  b e tw een  th eo re tica l en titie s . In  p a r tic u la r , we can  
p rov ide  a  m ean ing  in  te rm s  o f o th e r  th e o re tic a l ob jec ts . T h u s  w e can  in te rp re t theories 
as a lg eb ras , or classes o f a lg eb ras , sim ply  by  seeking o u t s tru c tu re s  w ith  co rrespond ing  
re la tio n sh ip s  b e tw een  te rm s , th a t  is, by  iden tify ing  m orph ism s b e tw een  th e  s tru c tu re s . 
O nce o u r th e o ry  is ta k e n  as in s tru m e n ta l, the re fo re , we can  u tilise  m a th e m a tic a l m odels 
w ith  im pun ity . W e shou ld  observe th a t  th is  need  n o t only b e  d u rin g  th e  la te r  s tag es  of 
design , for we m ig h t well consider theo ries  in s tru m e n t ally d u rin g  e x p lo ra to ry  discourse 
(d u rin g  what i f . . .  ty p e  d iscussions).
Let us suppose  th a t  we w a n t to  co n tin u e  to  th in k  of ou r theories as em pirica l, in  th e  sense 
th a t  we w an t som e correspondence  b e tw een  th e ir  te rm s  an d  observables in  th e  d om ain  of 
ap p lica tio n . How easily can  th is  h e  done w ith  th e  received view? W e shou ld  n o te  th a t  one 
of th e  reasons for th e  a b a n d o n m en t o f th e  received view w as a  feeling th a t  th is  q uestion  is 
in h e ren tly  u n an sw erab le  in  tru e  scientific p rac tice , using  th e  g iven canon ical fo rm , so we 
shou ld  n o t expec t any  decisive answ ers here . I t  seem s th a t  a  n u m b e r o f fa irly  a rb itra ry  
choices h av e  to  b e  m ade. In  p a r tic u la r , how  m ig h t we d istingu ish  b e tw een  observables 
an d  unobservab les?  W e will consider ju s t  one sim ple exam ple to  il lu s tra te  how  th is  m ig h t 
be done, th e n  m ove on to  a  rich er m odel w here th e  prob lem s do n o t arise.
C onsider a  th eo ry  of s tack s. F irs t , le t us n o te  th a t  such  a  th e o ry  is n o t rea lly  a  th eo ry  
o f s tack s, in  th e  sense th a t  i t  tells us how  a  c lu ste r o f stack s m ig h t b eh av e  collectively, 
r a th e r  i t  is a  th e o ry  o f “s tack n ess” . I t  exp o u n d s those  p ro p e rtie s  we m ig h t expec t o f 
an  o b je c t th a t  we are  h ap p y  to  call a  s tack . Since we need  sncli a  th eo ry , an d  a re  n o t 
h ap p y  ju s t  to  observe stack n ess  as p rim itiv e , we can  a rg u e  th a t  s tack n ess  can n o t b e  an  
o bservab le  concept: th e re fo re  an y  expressions th a t  deno te  s tack s ( th a t  is , o b jec ts  we are  
a sse rtin g  to  h av e  th e se  p ro p e rtie s) m u s t be  th eo re tica l te rm s. F o r th e  sake  o f exam ples, 
le t us suppose  th a t  we a re  in te re s te d  only in  s tack s of n a tu ra l  n u m b ers . A re  te rm s in ­
volving only n u m b ers  th eo re tica l o r observable? W e m ig h t consider th a t  n u m b ers  a re  
p rim itiv e  enough  for o u r cu s to m er, w ho is o u r a rch e ty p ica l observer, to  observe  d irectly . 
W e could , of course, n o te  th a t  n u m b ers  h av e  th e ir  ow n th eo ry , an d  i t  is a  s tra n g e  n o tio n  
o f th e o ry  th a t  allows n u m b ers  to  be  observable , b u t  s tack s to  b e  th e o re tic a l sim ply 011 th e  
basis on cu sto m er experience. T h is  is precisely th e  prob lem  th a t  faced  philosophers of 
science, b u t  th ey  p h ra sed  i t  in  te rm s o f in s tru m e n ta tio n , r a th e r  th a n  cu sto m ers . T h ings 
observed  th ro u g h  com plex in s tru m e n ta tio n  (w ith  co rrespond ing  th eo ries) w ere consid­
ered  th eo re tica l; th in g s  observed  by  eye w ere observable , even th o u g h  th e  eye could be 
considered  an  in s tru m e n t o f ob serv a tio n .
If  we accep t th a t  stackness is a  th e o re tic a l concep t, how ever, w hereas n u m b ers  a re  ob ­
servable  te rm s , th e n  we can  exp lain  som e o f th e  in te re s tin g  fea tu re s  of a b s tra c t  d a ta  
ty p es  q u ite  coheren tly . W e can  consider an  o b jec t h idden  inside a  b o x , w ith  a  lim ited  
n u m b e r of ac tions th a t  can  be  p erfo rm ed , an d  a  n u m b er of observables availab le  to  us
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v ia  ex p e rim en ta l m e th o d . C onsider th e  th e o ry  o f s tackness, expressed  in  O B J, show n in  
figure 5.1
OBJ
STACK / NAT BOOL
SORTS
Stack
OPS
newStack: 
push: 
top: 
delete: 
isEmpty:
VARS
s :Stack 
n:Nat
EQNS
JBO
-> Stack
Nat Stack -> Stack
Stack -> Nat
Stack -> Stack
Stack -> Bool
(top(push(n,s))=n)
(delete(push(n,s))=s) 
(isEmpty(newStack)=T) 
(isEmpty(push(n,s))=F)
F ig u re  5.1: A  T h eo ry  of S tacks
W e can n o te  th a t  th e  te rm  delete(s) is a  th eo re tica l te rm . I t  is g round less, unless we 
ad d  a  co rrespondence  ru le  re la tin g  i t  to  observables. T h is  is done w ith  th e  eq u a tio n  
delete(push(n , s )) = s. W e shou ld  n o te , how ever, th a t  we are  o b ta in in g  only  a  p a r tia l  
in te rp re ta tio n  o f “s tack n ess” : w e a re  co n stra in in g  th e  m ean ing  o f th e  te rm  to  o b jec ts  
th a t  hav e  ce rta in  p ro p e rtie s  p e rta in in g  to  observables, b u t  we do  n o t h av e  com plete  
know ledge o f w h a t is ac tu a lly  inside th e  box . W e can  ad d  m ean ing  to  o u r th eo ry , w ith  
m ore  co rrespondence  ru les, such  as g ro u n d in g  th e  te rm s deno tin g  s tack s  in  te rm s  of lis ts , 
for exam ple , b u t we expec t th is  ex tension  to  b e  conservative. N o te  also th a t  te rm s th a t  
a re  u n g ro u n d ed  by  any  ru les, such  as delete(new stack) ) , rem ain  m ean ing less. I f  w e w ish 
to  be able to  observe som e b eh av io u r co rrespond ing  to  such te rm s , we m u s t p rov ide  a  
sem an tics . T h e n , o f course, it  w ould  cease to  be m eaningless, for o u r th e o ry  o f stackness 
w ould  be asse rtin g  th a t  de le ting  th e  to p  of an  em p ty  s tack  is w as a  m ean ing fu l th in g  to  
do.
If  we w ish to  consider th e  design process in  te rm s of th e  received view , we can  a t te m p t 
som eth in g  along th e  follow ing lines. F irs t , we build  a  th eo ry  w ith  observables th a t  
co rresp o n d  to  th e  c u s to m e r’s p e rcep tio n  o f observables in th e  p ro b lem  (o b jec ts  such  as 
invoices, p ay ro ll n u m b ers  o r sensor read in g s). W e th e n  a t te m p t to  re fu te  th is  th eo ry  by 
ap p ea l to  scientific p rac tice , using  only  th e  observables we h av e  estab lish ed . W e th e n  
p ro d u ce  a  new  th eo ry  in  w hich w e allow  only observables availab le  to  som e m ach ine  
(typ ica lly  a  high-level v ir tu a l m ach ine , ra th e r  th a n  a  p rim itiv e  b it-fu n c tio n a l one), an d  
w here all th eo re tica l te rm s  a re  g ro u n d ed  in  te rm s  of these . T h u s  w e express stackness in
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te rm s  o f a rray s  an d  p o in te rs , for exam ple , as well as th e  o p e ra tio n s  we w ish to  perfo rm . 
T h ese  will be  th eo re tica l te rm s  if  th e  th e o ry  is view ed by  th e  u ser (for a rra y s  an d  p o in te rs  
will n o t be  observable) b u t  observable  te rm s for th e  m ach ine. T h e  m ach in e  will th e n  
conform  to  th is  th eo ry , t re a tin g  assertio n s as in s tru c tio n s , accord ing  to  som e m e ta -th eo ry . 
In  O B J, for exam ple, th e  eq u a tio n s will b e  in te rp re te d  as le ft-rig h t rew rite  ru les.
Such a  d iscussion is o f l i ttle  benefit to  th e  so ftw are engineer faced  w ith  th e  ta sk  of 
designing a  sy stem , how ever, for th e  view  being  ta k e n  of theories is to o  fa r  rem oved  from  
th e  in tu itiv e  req u irem en ts  we have  la id  dow n fo r th e m . T h e  received view  is an  ex trem e  
one, in te n d e d  to  p rov ide  a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  in  te rm s  of a  canon ical fo rm . T h is canonical 
fo rm  does n o t seem  to  sit well w ith  S oftw are E ngineering , unless we re s tr ic t  a t te n tio n  
to  th e  in s tru m e n ta l use o f th eo rie s , in  w hich case it  degenera tes to  m a th e m a tic a l m odel 
th eo ry . R a th e r  th a n  a t te m p t  to  rescue th e  received view , w e will tu r n  o u r a tte n tio n  to  
th e  sem an tic  concep tion  o f th eo rie s , w hich has been  developed in  m o re  recen t tim es to  
overcom e th ese  lim ita tio n s .
5,3 The Semantic Conception of Theories
Ju s t as th e  received view w as p roposed  an d  rev ised  over a  n u m b er o f y ea rs , so to o  th e  
sem an tic  concep tion  is m ore  a  p ro g ram m e o f ideas th a n  a  s ta t ic  en tity . W e will n o t 
a t te m p t  an  h is to rica l reco n s tru c tio n  o f th is  ap p ro ach , b u t  s im ply  p re sen t one o f th e  
m ore  recen t expositions o f i t  [Sup89]. C e n tra l to  th e  sem an tic  co ncep tion  o f theories 
is th e  c rea tio n  o f an  a d d itio n a l lay er b e tw een  theories an d  “re a lity ” th a t  will allow  us 
to  ta lk  o f idealised  m odels o f th e  b eh av io u r o f rea l system s. T h e  a d v a n ta g e  for us is 
th a t  cu s to m e rs’ p rob lem s a re  freq u en tly  a lread y  posed  in  te rm s  o f such  m odels, for th e ir  
in fo rm a tio n  system s an d  co n tro l sy stem s a re  defined in  te rm s o f a b s tra c tio n s . C u stom ers 
a re  n o t n am es an d  accoun t n u m b ers , b u t  flesh an d  b lood , a n d  co n tro lled  p la n t is n o t 
ju s t  a  set o f fu n c tions, b u t m e ta l an d  p lastic . A lth o u g h  th e  case fo r u tilis in g  idealised  
w orlds has to  be  m ad e  q u ite  carefully  for natural sc ien tis ts , th is  case is u nnecessary  for 
in form ation  sc ien tis ts , as th e  d iscip line itse lf  is in h e ren tly  concerned  w ith  a  layer above 
rea lity . No ju s tifica tio n  of th e  ap p ro ach  need  be  given o th e r  th a n  th e  ju s tifica tio n  for 
in fo rm a tio n  science itse lf, a n d  th a t  will be  ta k e n  as self-evident.
T h e  sem an tic  concep tion  ad m its  a  w ide-ranging  discussion of m odels, a n d  allows for 
severa l p re se n ta tio n s  o f th e  sam e th eo ry . I t  also allows us to  discuss th e  fa c t t h a t  m odels 
an d  theories a re  n o t cleanly d istingu ishab le . V ery o ften  a  th e o ry  is in te rp re te d  as a  m odel, 
an d  a  m odel is ta k e n  as iden tify ing  a  theo ry . T h is  accords w ith  scientific p rac tice : m an y  
scientific theories are  posed  as m odels, an d  m an y  theories end  up  being  used  as m odels. 
W h ereas  th e  received view ra tio n a lises  th is  confusion o u t o f th e  d iscussion , by  considering  
only re s tr ic te d  canonical rep re se n ta tio n s , th e  sem an tic  concep tion  b rings such  issues to  
th e  fore, w hich is fa r  m ore  useful fo r o u r pedagogical purposes.
C e n tra l to  th e  sem an tic  concep tion  is th e  view  th a t  theories a re  n o t lingu istic  en titie s  
(as  in  th e  received view ) b u t  ex tra lin g u is tic . T h ey  m ay  be fo rm u la ted  or p re sen ted  in
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a  n u m b e r of d ifferen t lingu istic  sy stem s, b u t  changes o f fo rm u la tio n  do n o t change th e  
underly ing  theo ry . W ith  th is  change o f em phasis , theories can  now  b e  view ed as m odels 
for th e ir  lingu istic  fo rm u la tio n s. T h ese  m odels can  be  th o u g h t o f as fo rm al s tru c tu re s  
ac tin g  as in te rp re ta tio n s  o f various th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s , an d  th e se  p re se n ta tio n s  need  n o t 
be equ iva len t. W e can  h av e , for exam ple , p a r t ia l  fo rm u la tions o f th eo rie s , re su ltin g  in  a  
n u m b e r o f p re se n ta tio n s  o f d ifferen t a sp ec ts  o f th e  theory . In  th is  w ay we can  u tilise  C C S, 
V D M  a n d  O B J to  p resen t specifications o f a  sy stem , an d  th ese  specifications will n o t be 
eq u iva len t, y e t we can  still accep t th a t  we a re  bu ild ing  ju s t  one theo ry . In  a rc h ite c tu ra l 
te rm s , th e  th e o ry  c ap tu re s  w h a t th e  bu ild ing  is to  be , b u t it  m ay  be fo rm u la ted  using  
various techn iques such  as d raw ing  elevations, specifying services, an d  p rov id ing  energy  
eq u a tio n s. T h e  th e o ry  is co n s tra in ed  by  th e  to ta l i ty  o f th ese  fo rm u la tio n s. T h eo ry  th u s  
becom es a  unify  force in  o u r design.
R a th e r  th a n  deal w ith  th e  b eh av io u r o f rea l system s directly , th e  sem an tic  conception  
suggests we consider a b s tra c t  “physica l sy s tem s” , th a t  a re  idealised  versions o f rea l w orld  
ph en o m en a . W e will use th e  te rm  “idealised  sy stem s” ra th e r  th a n  “p h ysica l sy stem s” 
h e re , for i t  seem s co u n te r-in tu itiv e  to  in tro d u c e  th e  te rm  “ph y sica l” in  re la tio n  to  in fo r­
m a tio n  system s. W e iden tify  th e  in te n d e d  scope o f th e  theo ry , an d  th e n  e x tra c t ju s t  tho se  
p a ra m e te rs  in w hich we a re  in te re s te d 3. T h is m akes th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  useful p rob lem s 
can  be tack led  by  considera tion  o f beh av io u rs  governed by  ju s t  th o se  p a ra m e te rs , an d  
th a t  for th e  p u rp o se  o f solving th e se  p rob lem s th e  effects o f all o th e r  p a ra m e te rs  a re  
negligible. T h is  is precisely  w h a t h ap p en s  w hen physic ists consider fric tion less p lanes, 
p o in t m asses an d  perfec t spheres. I t  is also w h a t h ap p en s w hen th e  so ftw are  engineer 
assum es th a t  em ployees can  be considered  as personnel n u m b ers , o r th a t  sensor read ings 
a re  ju s t  rea l n u m b ers . W e can n o t subseq u en tly  ask how  m an y  to es  an  em ployee h as, o r 
how  long  th e  sensor read in g  tak es  to  stab ilise . T h e  idealised  sy stem  can  be com pletely  
c h a rac te rised  by  th e  values o f th e  iden tified  p a ra m e te rs  a t  any  g iven  tim e . W e will con­
sider these  p a ra m e te rs  to  c o n s titu te  th e  s ta te  of th e  system : th e n  th e  b eh av io u r o f an  
idealised  system  can  be rep re sen ted  as a  se t o f sequences o f s ta te s . T h e  b eh av io u r of an  
idealised  system  u n d er a  g iven se t o f in itia l cond itions will co rresp o n d  to  a  su b se t o f th e  
b eh av io u r, com prising  ju s t  one sequence if  th e  sy stem  is de te rm in is tic .
T h e  ta sk  of ou r th e o ry  is to  co n stra in  th e  b ehav iou rs of idealised  system s so th a t  th ey  
co rresp o n d  to  how  rea l w orld  p h en o m en a  w ould  beh av e  if b eh av io u r w ere d e te rm in ed  
only  by  th e  p a ra m e te rs  reflected  in  th e  idealised  s ta te . Im plic it in  th is  is th e  n o tio n  th a t  
th e  th e o ry  identifies w h a t configura tions o f s ta te  are  possib le, an d  also w h a t s ta te s  can  
re su lt from  a  g iven s ta r tin g  s ta te , th e  la t te r  being  de te rm in is tic  o r lio n -d e te rm in istic . 
T h is  clearly  fits very  n ea tly  w ith  o u r a sse rtio n  th a t  it  is useful to  consider p ro g ram s 
as theo ries, as a  s ta n d a rd  view o f p ro g ram s is th a t  th ey  d e te rm in e  m ach in e  b eh av io u r 
th ro u g h  sequences o f s ta te s .
T h is co n stra in in g  is ach ieved  by tak in g  th e  th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  as d e te rm in in g  a  class of
3 Analysis of this process is termed measurement theory, and will not be considered further here: more 
details can be found in [Rob79].
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idealised  sy stem s, an d  im posing  som e s tru c tu re  on  th em . T h is  s tru c tu re  can  b e  view ed in  
a  n u m b e r o f w ays, typ ica lly  as re la tio n a l, se t th e o re tic  or s ta te - tra n s it io n a l m a th e m a tic a l 
o b jec ts . In  fa c t, th ese  a re  su rface  differences, fo r th e  th re e  views a re  easily  reconciled. 
T h eo ry  p re sen ta tio n s  can  b e  co n stru ed  as com prising  a  n u m b e r o f law s, co n stra in in g  
th e  b eh av io u r o f th e  idealised  system . T hese  law s m ig h t h e  given as laws o f succession , 
describ ing  how  th e  s ta te s  a re  re la te d  over tra n s itio n s , laws o f  coexistence, describ ing  how  
s ta te s  m ay  be reg a rd ed  as equ iva len t, o r laws o f  interaction , describ ing  how  th e  sy stem  
behaves in  te rm s  o f o th e r  theo ries. T hese  th re e  ty p es  o f law s can  b e  seen as closely 
re la te d  to  s ta te  based , a lgebra ic  a n d  p rocess b ased  specifications respectively .
W e shou ld  observe th a t  o u r th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  ad m its  am plified  usage , th a t  is, i t  is 
capab le  o f re ferring  to  m ore  th a n  one th in g . T h is  is necessary  b ecau se  we w ish o n r 
asse rtio n s to  refer n o t only to  one o r m ore  idealised  sy stem , b u t  also to  b e  in te rp re ta b le  
as th e  th e o ry  itse lf, or as re a l w orld  ph en o m en a . W e expect to  be  ab le  to  in te rp re t a  
p re se n ta tio n  as law s govern ing  s ta te  tra n s itio n s , co n s tra in ts  on  sets o f s ta te s , o r a ssertions 
a b o u t th e  rea l w orld . A  th eo ry  o f s tack s , the re fo re , should  be in te rp re ta b le  as specifying 
re la tio n s b e tw een  s ta te s  th a t  m u s t ho ld , tra n s itio n s  th a t  a  ty p ica l o b je c t m ig h t undergo  
if  it  is indeed  a  s tack , an d  w h e th e r a  rea l w orld  o b jec t is stack-like. W e also  accep t th a t  
on r p re se n ta tio n s  can  b e  p a r tia l , in  th e  sense th a t  th ey  m ig h t refer on ly  to  som e o f th e  
p a ra m e te rs  in  o u r idealised  w orld .
W e shou ld  p o in t o u t a t  th is  s ta g e  th a t  th e  sem an tic  concep tion , as genera lly  p resen ted , 
assum es th a t  sy stem s vary  w ith  tim e . T h is is u n d e rs tan d ab le , becau se  m o st physica l 
sy stem s are  th o u g h t of in th is  way. F o r o u r p u rp o ses , how ever, in tro d u c in g  tim e  m ay  be  
an  un n ecessary  d is tra c tio n , for we a re  freq u en tly  in te re s te d  in  tra n s itio n s  th a t  arise as 
re su lts  o f even ts such as issu ing  com m ands. T h is  need n o t p resen t us w ith  a  p rob lem , for 
we can  observe th a t  w h a t th e  physic ist th in k s  o f as “tim e” is really  n o th in g  m ore  th a n  
a  sequence o f ev en ts , typ ica lly  clock ticks, so we can  in te rp re t o u r sequence o f even ts as 
deno tin g  th e  passage  o f tim e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , we can  em bed  o u r sequence o f ev en ts  in to  th e  
s ta te  o f th e  idealised  sy stem , th e n  re ly  on  th e  passage  o f tim e  to  invoke th e ir  execu tion . 
T h u s  we can  in te rn a lise  o r ex te rn a lise  th e  even ts d riv ing  o u r sy stem . M oreover, even ts 
them selves m ay  be  considered as ta k in g  p a ram e te rs : th ese  p a ra m e te rs  m ay  be  k e p t in  
th e  s ta te ,  o r each  p a ra m e te r  can  be considered  as defining a  d ifferent ev en t. B y  a  sim ilar 
a rg u m e n t we can  in te rn a lise  o r ex te rn a lise  o u r p ro g ram s an d  d a ta .
L et ns i llu s tra te  th is  view so fa r , as it  m ig h t app ly  to  th e  “p ro g ram m in g ” end  o f th e  design 
p rocess, by using  a  sim ple co m p u te r a rc h ite c tu re , L an d in ’s SE C D  m ach in e  [Lan64]. W e 
observe th a t  th e  a b s tra c tio n  o f th e  m ach ine  to  a  s ta te  com prising  a  s ta c k , a n  en v iro n m en t, 
a  co n tro l lis t, an d  a  d u m p , is in h e re n t in  th e  p rob lem . O n r idealised  sy s tem  is th u s  p re sen t 
in  th e  p rob lem  s itu a tio n . W e will see la te r  th a t  th e re  are  severa l p rob lem s th a t  can  give 
rise  to  th is  a b s tra c tio n . W e could , o f course, seek to  re fo rm u la te  th e  th e o ry  u tilis ing  a 
d ifferen t s ta te  m odel. W e will s ta r t  w ith  a  genera l th eo ry  o f th e  m ach in e  itself. T h is 
com prises law s of succession such  as
(S )  (E )  ( L D C  x . C)  (D )  — ► ( x . S)  ( E)  ( C)  (D )
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in d ica tin g  how  in d iv id u a l tra n s itio n s  occu r over a  clock tick  (n o te  t h a t  we h av e  in te r ­
nalised  o u r p ro g ram ). I t  defines a  re la tio n  b e tw een  pairs  o f s ta te s . W e could  equally  well 
ju s t  consider an  SED  m ach ine , w ith  ev en ts  such  as
( S)  (E  )( D)  m*(X.S) (E )  (D)
W e also have  law s o f equivalence, such  as th o se  g iving th e  a lg eb ra  o f o b je c ts  on  th e  stack .
((3  +  4 ) .5 )  (E ) (C )  (D )  =  (7  .S )( E) ( C )  (D )
T h e  re la tio n a l s tru c tu re  forged  b y  th is  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  is o u r th eo ry . T h e  p resen ­
ta t io n  also gives rise  to  a  n u m b e r o f theory induced idealised  sy stem s, th a t  is, a  set 
o f possib le execu tion  sequences. W h a t a re  we c a p tu rin g  w ith  th ese  in duced  system s? 
T h e re  a re  severa l th in g s  we m ig h t b e  try in g  to  theo rise  a b o u t. L et us assum e th a t  we 
a re  try in g  to  c a p tu re  th e  execu tion  o f L ISP  S-expressions, w hich a re  th u s  ta k e n  as th ird - 
w orld em pirica l o b jec ts . W e need  to  show  th a t  a  su itab le  co rrespondence  ex ists b e tw een  
th ese  expressions an d  s ta te s  iden tified  in  th e  idealised  system . E ach  S -E xpression  to  be 
ev a lu a ted  needs to  be reflected  by  a  s ta te  o f th e  SEC D  m ach ine , to g e th e r  w ith  su itab le  
closures an d  n am e  b indings in  th e  en v iro n m en t: th is  is th e  ta sk  o f th e  com piler. E ach  
s ta te  w ith  S T O P  a t th e  h ead  o f its  co n tro l lis t can  be asso c ia ted  w ith  a  re su lt, held 
on th e  s tack . S ta te s  w ith  co n tro l lis ts  n o t rep resen tin g  S -E xpressions, such  as will arise 
a fte r  p a r t ia l  ev a lu a tio n , can  sim ply  b e  given th e  sem antics “ev a lu a tin g ” . A ny  s ta te  w ith  
an  e m p ty  s ta c k , an d  S T O P  a t  th e  h ead  o f th e  co n tro l list will rep re sen t th e  nu ll exp res­
sion. R e fu ta tio n  o f o u r th e o ry  a t  th is  s tag e  w ould m ean  finding an  S -E xpression  th a t  
is p ro p e rly  com piled to  SE C D  code, b u t  executes incorrectly . A n idealised  sy stem  now  
co rresponds to  th e  ev a lu a tio n  o f a  p a r tic u la r  S-E xpression. T h u s  o u r th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  
gives us as possib le m odels a t  least:
•  T h e  th e o ry  w hich is th e  re la tio n a l s tru c tu re  of all possib le m ach in e  s ta te s . In  
p a r tic u la r , we can  alw ays p re sen t tills  as an  a lgebraic  s tru c tu re , using  se t- th eo re tic  
te rm s .
•  T h e  b eh av io u r of idealised  m achines.
•  T h e  re p re se n ta tio n  of p h en o m en a  such as th e  execu tion  o f S -E xpressions.
W e can observe here  th a t  o u r th e o ry  also ad m its  as a  phenom enological m odel th e  arch i­
te c tu re  o f an  im p le m ta tio n  of th e  SE C D  m ach ine . T h u s , v ia  th e  th eo ry , we can  c rea te  
m orp h ism s betw een  a  piece o f h a rd w a re  an d  th e  execu tion  o f Lisp S -E xpressions. T h is is 
th e  key to  im p lem en ta tio n . T h e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  ap p ro ach  applies n o t only  to  Softw are 
E ng ineering , b u t  also to  h a rd w a re  design. A d o p tio n  o f th is  m odel o f th e  design process, 
th e re fo re , will enab le  us to  in te g ra te  th e  cu rricu lum  across a  w ide ran g e  of top ics, from  
th e  “so fte r” a sp ec ts  o f sy stem  design, w here e x p lo ra to ry  discourse is be ing  used  to  con­
s tru c t  th eo ries , to  th e  “h a rd ” a re a  of logic design. T h e  to o ls , techn iques an d  m odes of
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discourse used  m ay  b e  d ifferen t, b u t  w e hav e  found  a  un ify ing  th em e  fo r th e  discip line, 
as ad v o c a te d  by  G ibbs a n d  T ucker [G T 86].
T h e  th eo ry  o u tlin ed  above  is a  th e o ry  o f SE C D  p ro g ram s, b u t  in  w h a t sense is an  
in d iv id u a l “p ro g ra m ” , ju s t  one co n tro l lis t an d  asso c ia ted  b ind ings a n d  closures, a  th eo ry ?  
Q u ite  sim ply, i t  is a  re s tr ic tio n  o f th e  above  th eo ry . In  genera l, a  p ro g ra m  will ad m it 
m a n y  beh av io u rs  o f phenom enolog ical sy stem s d ep en d en t on  in p u t d a ta  (w e will consider 
d a ta b a se s  w ith  p e rs is te n t d a ta  as e x te rn a l to  th e  system : th e y  could equally  well be 
considered  p a r t  o f th e  p ro g ra m ), th u s  a  p ro g ram  is a  th e o ry  d e te rm in in g  a  re s tr ic te d  
class of th e o ry  induced  idealised  sy stem s, a n d  hence a  re s tr ic te d  class o f phenom enological 
sy stem s, o r co m p u ta tio n s . N o te  th a t  in  o rd e r to  ta k e  th is  view , we have  v io la ted  th e  
m ax im al n o tio n  o f theo ries, th a t  is, we w an t b o th  th e  th e o ry  o f a ll P a sc a l p ro g ram s 
an d  also th e  th e o ry  of ju s t  one P a sc a l p ro g ram  to  coexist. W e could  ta k e  o th e r  view s, 
in sisting , for exam ple , th a t  o u r p ro g ram  is an  auxillia ry  s ta te m e n t, o r even th a t  o u r 
p ro g ra m  is a  s ta te m e n t in  a n o th e r  th e o ry — th e  ex p erim en ta l s itu a tio n — a n d  use law s of 
in te ra c tio n  to  define our b eh av io u rs . Such app roaches seem  artific ia l, how ever, so w e will 
ab an d o n  th e  m ax im al view  o f theories.
T h e  given exam ple  m odels an  in h e ren tly  fu n c tio n a l phenom enon  in  te rm s  o f s ta te  t r a n ­
sitio n s, using  law s o f consequence an d  coexistence. W e should  s tre ss  th a t  th is  w as only 
a n  exam ple , an d  several sty les o f th e o ry  fo rm u la tio n  exist fo r ta ck lin g  d ifferen t k inds of 
p rob lem s. W e could fo rm u la te  a  th e o ry  o f “s tack n ess” for exam ple  by  law s o f coexistence 
(a  ty p ica l a lgebra ic  specifica tion), b y  law s o f consequence re la tin g  p re  an d  p o s t s ta te s  
im p lic itly  (as in  Z or V D M ), o r explic itly  (as in  P a sc a l) , o r even b y  c o n s tru c tin g  a  s ta te  
as a  n u m b e r of in te ra c tin g  cells, each  o f w hich h as  its  ow n th e o ry  ( as in  C C S).
5.4 Theory Presentations
C o n stru c tin g  a  th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  requ ires a t  least th e  follow ing tw o  steps:
•  Id en tifica tio n  o f a  su itab le  s ta te -sp ace  to  ac t as th e  th eo ry . T h is  involves analysis 
o f th e  p rob lem  to  ensu re  th a t  on ly  sensible ab s tra c tio n s  a re  ta k in g  place.
♦ F o rm u la tio n  o f law s to  re s tr ic t th e  space  to  those  s ta te s  o f in te re s t  only, an d  build  
th e  re la tio n a l s tru c tu re  be tw een  th e se  s ta te s .
W e will delay  discussion of selecting  a  su itab le  s ta te  space, an d  tu rn  to  ask  w h a t we expect 
o f a  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  language . C learly  w e need  a  lan g u ag e  pow erfu l enough  to  a sse rt 
p ro p e rtie s  o f o u r phenom enological sy stem , by  c a p tu rin g  p ro p e rtie s  an d  re la tio n s. A  first 
o rd e r logic will usually  suffice fo r th is , a lth o u g h  we m ig h t w a n t to  inc lude  m odalities, 
to  allow  th e  m odelling  o f th e  passing  o f tim e  w ith o u t in tro d u c in g  quan tified  in te rva ls  
explicitly , fo r exam ple. W e will, in  genera l, also requ ire  ex tra -log ica l fe a tu re s , such  as th e  
a b ility  to  m a n ip u la te  fun c tio n s an d  re la tions. W e will im p o rt th ese  in to  o u r p re se n ta tio n  
lan g u ag e  as req u ired , ju s t  as th e  physic ist feels free to  u tilise  d ifferen tia l eq u a tio n s, fo r 
exam ple , w ith o u t fo rm u la tin g  an  ax io m atic  tre a tm e n t every  tim e.
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W e will now  briefly consider p a r tic u la r  sty les o f th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n , an d  th e  p ro o f  obli­
g a tio n s th e ir  a d o p tio n  p laces on  th e  engineer.
Laws of C oexistence
T h e  sty le  o f p re se n ta tio n  using  law s o f coexistence to  form  equivalence classes o f te rm s 
is usually  te rm e d  “a lgebraic  specification” in  Softw are E ngineering . T h is  fo rm alisa tio n  
is founded  on  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  o f variab les as com ponen ts o f o n r s ta te  space, an d  
o p e ra tio n s  as s ta te  tra n s itio n s . E ach  class is in ten d ed  to  refer to  a  p a r tic u la r  s itu a tio n  
in  o n r phenom enolog ica l sy stem , b u t  we need  to  ad o p t a  m e ta th e o re tic a i view  here , 
reg a rd in g  how  o u r equivalences a re  to  b e  u n d e rs to o d . W e could  a d o p t th e  view th a t  
only te rm s  in d ica ted  as equ ivalen t by  th e  th eo ry  a re  to  b e  ta k e n  as such  (a n  in itia l 
v iew ), o r we could accep t th a t  ev e ry th in g  is equ ivalen t unless th e  th e o ry  forces te rm s to  
b e  n on -equ ivalen t (a  final v iew ), o r we could  a d o p t a  m ix tu re  of th e  tw o . T h e  ad v an tag e  
o f ad o p tin g  an  in itia l view is th a t  we can  use a  th eo rem  o f u n iv ersa l a lg eb ra  to  th e  effect 
th a t  all a lgebra ic  s tru c tu re s  in te rp re te d  as in itia l o b jec ts  o f som e e q u a tio n a l th e o ry  are  
isom orph ic  to  th e  te rm  a lg eb ra  o f th a t  th eo ry , an d  consequen tly  to  each  o th e r  [EM 85, 
p ag e  86]. T h is  will allow  us to  m a n ip u la te  th e  th eo ry  via its  te rm  a lg eb ra , o r any  o th e r  
in itia l m odel, ra th e r  th a n  using  th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  directly . I t  is th is  p ro p e r ty  th a t  
allows us to  use se t a lg eb ra  r a th e r  th a n  se t th eo ry  in  m ost m a th e m a tic a l co n tex ts . W e 
will assum e in itia l sem an tics in  all th a t  follows.
I t  is u su a l to  expect th a t  eq u a tio n a l specifications should  posses th e  p ro p e r ty  th a t  all 
te rm s  shou ld  rew rite , u n d er th e  equivalence re la tio n s, to  som e canon ica l fo rm , for th is  
allows us to  use th e  q u o tien t a lg eb ra  in  describ ing  phenom enological sy stem s. If  we 
accep t th is  as a  p ro o f o b liga tion , i t  will b e  d ischarged  by  s tru c tu ra l  in d u c tio n  over th e  
language  used  in  th e  p re se n ta tio n .
In  ad d itio n , we have  th e  p ro o f o f consistency  as an  ob liga tion . T h is  can  be  d ischarged  
by  find ing  a  n o n -triv ia l m odel. C learly  th e  te rm  a lg eb ra  is such  a  m odel, b u t  w e will 
in sis t th a t ,  th e re  a re  a t  leas t tw o  d is tin c t te rm s  in  th e  q u o tien t a lg eb ra , an d  th a t  110 tw o  
canon ical te rm s a re  forced  to  be  equa l by  th e  theory .
C om pleteness reduces to  th e  o b liga tion  to  p rove  th a t  all te rm s  th a t  shou ld  be in  th e  
sam e equivalence class a re  so p laced . C learly , show ing phenom enolog ical com pleteness 
can  only  b e  done by  a t te m p te d  re fu ta tio n , o r by  ex h au stiv e  te s tin g , b u t  w e can  in sist 
th a t  so m eth in g  is said  a b o u t all possib le  m ean ingfu l co n stru c tio n s in  th e  idealised  sys­
tem . T h is  am o u n ts  to  th e  o b liga tion  th a t  th e re  should  be  a  set o f eq u a tio n s  govern ing  
th e  b eh av io u r of all accessors to  th e  s ta te , one for each  possib le c o n s tru c to r . S tacks, for 
exam ple , can  be c o n s tru c ted , in  canon ical fo rm , by  newstack  an d  push. T h u s  we expect 
tw o eq u a tio n s govern ing  th e  b eh av io u r of each  accessor, if to ta l ,  o r one fo r each  p a r tia l  
accessor (such  as delete , w hich is undefined  fo r new stack). If  we w ish  to  c a p tu re  nonde- 
te rm in is tic  sy stem s algebraically , how ever, we need  to  revise th is  n o tio n  o f com pleteness. 
F or a  d e ta iled  discussion of n o n d e te rm in ism  an d  a lgebraic  specifications see [M at90].
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If  we s tru c tu re  o u r idealised  sy stem  in to  severa l subsystem s, w e m ig h t find  som e obli­
g a tio n s  as re su lt o f law s o f in te ra c tio n . T y p ica l o f th e  ob liga tions th a t  m ig h t arise  here  
are  proofs o f conservative  ex ten sio n  arising  as a  re su lt of en rich m en ts , a n d  proofs o f ty p e  
com p atib ility , in  in s ta n tia tio n s  o f generics.
Laws of C onsequence
If  we p resen t theories using  p rim arily  law s o f consequence th e n  we h av e  a  d ifferen t m a n ­
ife s ta tio n  o f p ro o f ob liga tions. F irs t ,  we hav e  to  show  th a t  o u r a ssu m p tio n  th a t  tim e  
can  b e  m odelled  by  sequences o f ev en ts  is w ell-founded, th a t  is, th a t  su itab le  sequences 
ex ist. In  p a r tic u la r , we m u s t show  th a t  every  ev en t can  resu lt in  an  accep tab le  s ta te . In  
a  tra d itio n a l p re -p o s t cond ition  specification , th is  is d ischarged  by  show ing  th a t  th e re  
ex ists  a t  le a s t one assignm en t of co rrec tly  ty p e d  p a ra m e te rs  such  th a t
(pre  — condition  A invariant) = +  invariant
T his  p rev en ts  an  open-ended  sequence, w here th e  final “ev en t” does n o t re su lt in  a  s ta te  
w ith in  th e  th eo ry , th a t  is, i t  show s te rm in a tio n  is possib le for every  ev en t.
I t  is also sensible to  show  th a t  all ev en ts  a re  necessary , th a t  is, t h a t  th e re  ex ists  a t  
le a s t one possib le  s ta te  from  w hich an  even t can  occur. W e m ig h t a rg u e  for a  s tro n g er 
cond itio n , n am ely  th a t  th is  one s ta te  m u s t b e  reachab le  fo r som e execu tio n  sequence. 
T h is  cond ition  is, in  genera l, to o  s tro n g  to  b e  provable .
W e also h av e  o u r consistency  req u irem en t, w hich  am o u n ts  to  th e  a sse rtio n  th a t  th e re  
ex ists  a t  least one s ta te  th a t  satisfies th e  th eo ry . A gain  th is  is n o t a  very  s tro n g  cond ition , 
fo r a  s ta te  th a t  m eets th e  req u irem en t for th e  th eo ry , b u t  from  w hich no  tra n s itio n  is 
defined is a  ra th e r  sterile  th eo ry , b u t  se ttin g  p ro o f  cond itions th a t  a re  to o  s tro n g  renders 
th e  m ee tin g  of ob liga tions im possib le .
Laws of Interaction
Law s o f in te ra c tio n  a re  clearly  o f g re a t significance for ou r p u rp o ses , fo r th e y  will c a p tu re  
th e  w ays in  w hich th e  theories of m echan ism s inside our m ach ine  in te ra c t  to  im p lem en t 
ou r th e o re tic a l schem as in  m echan istic  w ays. T h e  law  of com position  in  a  H oare  logic, 
fo r exam ple , could be  view ed as law s o f in te ra c tio n  b e tw een  th e  th eo rie s  o f tw o  different 
p ro g ram m in g  co n stru c ts . A  m ore  likely use o f law s o f in te ra c tio n , how ever, is th e  p a r ­
titio n in g  o f s ta te , giving rise  to  severa l idealised  su b system s, each  described  by  its  ow n 
th eo ry , w here th e  to ta l  idealised  sy stem  is th e  em ergen t b eh av io u r o f th e  in te ra c tio n s  o f 
th ese  su b system s.
T h is  ra ises th e  im p o r ta n t  questio n  as to  how  we view th e  re la tio n sh ip s b e tw een  ou r 
m echan ism s an d  o u r m ach ines. W e could accep t th e  “g host in  th e  m ach in e” view , w hich 
suggests th a t  every  m echan ism  h as p a r t  o f th e  essence o f th e  m ach ines in  w hich  i t  could 
be  used . T h u s  every  assignm en t s ta te m e n t w ould  hav e  to  c o n ta in  som e o f th e  essence
125
o f p ay ro ll sy stem s, so rtin g  a lg o rith m s, an d  so on. T h is has th e  a t t r a c t io n  th a t  u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  of th e  w hole requ ires n o th in g  m o re  th a n  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  p a r ts :  w hen  
th e  m echan ism s a re  b ro u g h t to g e th e r  th e  essence of th e  sy stem  is w hole, an d  th e  gh o st 
em erges. T h is seem s difficult to  accept! T h e  a lte rn a tiv e , how ever, is to  accep t th a t  th e  
w hole m ach ine  is m ore  th a n  ju s t  th e  sum  o f its  p a r ts . T h e  law s o f in te ra c tio n  c o n tr ib u te  
to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  m ach ine  as a  whole. If  we accep t th is  m o re  likely scenario , 
th e n  we m u st also accep t th a t  teach in g  d e ta ils  o f m echan ism s will n o t be  sufficient to  lead  
to  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f how  th ese  m echan ism s m ig h t be used  in  im p lem en tin g  m achines. 
S tu d e n ts  will n o t le a rn  to  design system s sim ply  by  lea rn ing  about m echan ism s such  as 
p ro g ram m in g  languages.
T h e  iden tifica tio n  an d  d ischarge  o f p ro o f ob liga tions here  is m u ch  m o re  com plica ted . W e 
h av e  p ro o f ob liga tions p e r ta in in g  to  in d iv id u a l theo ries, o f course , such  as consistency, 
b u t also ob liga tions re la tin g  to  th e  g lobal th e o ry  a n d  th e  in te ra c tio n  effects. Space does 
n o t p e rm it a  full discussion o f th ese , b u t  for an  in tro d u c tio n  to  th e  su b je c t, see [CP90a].
Structuring Presentations
O ne fu r th e r  ex p ec ted  a sp ec t o f o u r p re se n ta tio n  language  is its  a b ility  to  s tru c tu re  ou r 
th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  in  som e way. T h is , u n fo rtu n a te ly , is n o t ad eq u a te ly  reflected  in  
discussion o f th e  sem an tic  concep tion . Law s of in te ra c tio n , in te n d e d  p rim arily  to  allow  
discussion o f th e  use o f ex p erim en ta l m e th o d s , w ith  equ ip m en t th a t  h as  its  ow n theo ry , 
can  b e  used  to  discuss som e of th e  req u ired  p ro p e rtie s , b u t in  a  very  “f la t” fash ion . Law s 
o f in te ra c tio n  are  in ten d ed  to  discuss th e  s itu a tio n  w here a  th e o ry  shares p a ra m e te rs  
w ith  a n o th e r  theo ry , or forces fu n c tio n a l dependencies on a n o th e r  th eo ry . I t  does n o t 
allow , for exam ple , a  th e o ry  to  be p a ram e te rised  by  a n o th e r theo ry .
F raw ley  has carried  o u t som e in itia l w ork in  th is  a re a  for n a tu ra l  sciences by  s tu d y in g  
d iscourse processes am o n g st sc ien tis ts , an d  a tte m p tin g  to  id en tify  a  n u m b e r o f p rim itiv e  
te rm s , w ith  th e  in te n tio n  o f bu ild ing  a  co m p u ta tio n a l m odel o f scientific d iscou rse[F ra86, 
pages 78-89]. His w ork leads to  th e  suggestion  th a t  science is u n d e rp in n ed  by  a  con­
tin u a lly  chang ing  sem an tic  n e t, a n d  th a t  th is  n e t can be reduced  to  a  c o m p u ta tio n a l 
sem an tic  fo rm alism . Scientific p rogress co rresponds to  changes in  th e  s tru c tu re  o f th e  
sem an tic  n e t. In  th is  view , th e  n a tu re  of a  p ro g ram  as a  th eo ry  can  be in v e rte d  to  give 
th e  s ta te m e n t th a t  a  th e o ry  is a  p ro g ram .
T heories en co u n te red  in  S oftw are E ng ineering  a re  becom ing  increasing ly  com plex. T h is 
com plex ity  causes no p rob lem s fo r th e  logic of o u r m odel, b u t  th e  p ra g m a tic s  do need 
fu r th e r  co n sidera tion . F or pure ly  scientific discourse, s tru c tu re  is a  convenience b u t  n o t 
a  necessity : we could  t r e a t  all o f o u r proofs as fla t s tru c tu re s , o r even  include lem m as 
a n d  ex isting  th eo rem s in  ad hoc w ays. S im ilarly  p ro g ram s w ritte n  in  th is  w ay cause 
no p rob lem s for th e  m ach ines th ey  ru n  on. If  we consider in fo rm a tiv e  o r ex p lo ra to ry  
d iscourse , how ever, w ith  h u m a n  receivers, th e n  th e  need for s tru c tu re  becom es obvious. 
T h e  p ro p e rtie s  we requ ire  o f th e  p re se n ta tio n  can  only really  b e  decided w hen we fix 
a  p u rp o se  for th e  d iscourse , b u t typ ica lly  we req u ire  rec ip ien ts o f th e  d iscourse  to  gain
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som e u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  sy stem , o r p a r ts  o f th e  system . Such u n d e rs ta n d in g  is unlikely 
to  com e w ith  a  p re se n ta tio n  th a t  is sim ply  a  collection of u n s tru c tu re d  re la tio n s and  
p red ica tes . W e m u st im pose  s tru c tu re  on  o u r p re sen ta tio n : in  a  sense, we m u st b u ild  a  
th eo ry , o r a t  leas t a  m odel, o f o u r th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s .
T h e  need  to  im pose  s tru c tu re  does arise  in  n a tu ra l  sciences, b u t  th e re  i t  is h an d led  al­
m o st exclusively by  ap p ea l to  th e  term ino logy  o f th e  d iscipline (ca teg o risa tio n s) o r by  
ap p ea l to  m a th e m a tic s . P h y sic is ts , fo r exam ple , m ake ex tensive  use o f s ta te s  expressed  
in  te rm s  o f v ec to rs , m a trice s  an d  ten so rs , w hich a re  ju s t w ays o f bu ild in g  h igher o rd e r 
m a th e m a tic a l s tru c tu re s , an d  th e n  m ake  free use of th e  p ro p e rtie s  of th ese  s tru c tu re s , 
such  as ten so r calculus o r m a tr ix  a lgeb ra . S im ilar s tra teg ie s  a re  used  by  th e  Softw are 
E ng ineer, b u t in  g enera l th e  s tru c tu re s  used  h av e  n o t ye t becom e p a r t  o f a  m a th e m a tic a l 
c u ltu re . In  p a r t  th is  is because  o f th e  y o u th  o f th e  d iscip line, b u t  i t  is also due  to  th e  
fac t th a t  th e  la te r  s tag es  o f design are  influenced by  th e  need  to  seek s tru c tu re s  availab le  
in  p ro g ram m in g  languages. T h u s  a  p a rtia lly  o rd ered  se t in  a  phenom enolog ical “specifi­
c a tio n ” m ay  tu rn  in to  a  lis t in  a  “ design” , an d  a  linked lis t im p lem en ted  w ith  p o in te rs  
in  an  “im p le m e n ta tio n ” , as th e  th e o ry  is p resen ted  in  m ore refined  an d  d e te rm in is tic  
fo rm s. T h e  so ftw are  engineer also h as to  deal w ith  p roblem s th a t  have  fa r  m ore  com plex 
s ta te -sp aces  th a n  does th e  n a tu ra l  sc ien tis t. A s a  resu lt o f th is  th e  theo ries are  m ore  
com plex , an d  m ore  s tru c tu re  is needed  in  th e ir  p re sen ta tio n . As D ijk s tra  has observed ,
“T h e  p ro g ram m er has to  be  ab le  to  th in k  in  te rm s o f co n cep tu a l h ierarch ies 
th a t  a re  m u ch  deeper th a n  an y  single m in d  ever needed  to  face befo re ,” 
[Dij89, page  1400]
T h e  fa c t th a t  th e  req u ired  s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism s are  freq u en tly  n o t p a r t  o f m a th e ­
m a tic a l cu ltu re  m eans t h a t  th e  so ftw are engineer needs to  w orry  a b o u t w here to  get 
th e  s tru c tu re s  from , a  p rob lem  n o t usually  facing th e  physic ist. Som e s tru c tu re s  com e 
w ith  th e  a d o p tio n  of specification  languages, such  as th e  schem as of Z, ex tension  an d  
co m b in a tio n  o p e ra to rs  in  C L E A R , an d  th e  ag en t co n stru c to rs  an d  co m b in a to rs  of C CS. 
F req u en tly , how ever, engineers need  to  design th e ir  ow n s tru c tu re s  to  m ee t th e ir  p ercep ­
tio n s o f th e  p ro b lem , in  w hich case th e y  need  to  p rov ide  th e  theories o f th ese  s tru c tu re s  
explicitly . M oreover, th e y  m ay  perceive a reas  o f regu la rity , lead ing  to  th e  re-use o f cer­
ta in  s tru c tu re s . In  th is  case, th ey  e ith e r hav e  to  bu ild  a  th e o ry  o f such  re-use, o r select 
p re se n ta tio n  languages th a t  a lread y  offer such a  capab ility , such as th e  im age fac ility  in 
O B J3  [G W 88], p a ra m e te rs  in  schem as, o r in h e ritan ce  in  E IF F E L  [M ey88]. W e should  
n o te  th a t  th e  engineer is in te re s te d  in  re-use in  a t least th re e  dim ensions:
♦ R e-use b e tw een  p rob lem s, using p re sen ta tio n s  found  in  designing one system  w hen 
designing sim ilar sy stem s, a t  th e  level o f b o th  specification  co m p o n en ts  an d  p ro ­
g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  code
♦ R e-use w ith in  a  p re se n ta tio n , c a p tu rin g  reg u la rity  in th e  s ta te  space.
♦ R e-use betw een  p re se n ta tio n s  d u rin g  th e  design p rocess, w here m orp h ism s allow 
s tru c tu re s  to  b e  tran sfo rm ed  ra th e r  th a n  th ro w n  away.
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W e will exp lo re  re-use in  m ore  d e ta il in  th e  n ex t section , w here we consider th e  ro le  o f 
analog ies in  o u r m odel.
F in d in g  su itab le  s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism s in  th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n s , a t  all levels fro m  spec­
ifica tions, code an d  even u se r guides (w here  h y p e rte x t is be ing  exp lo red , fo r exam ple), 
is a  m a jo r  th ru s t  o f C o m p u te r  Science research . To d a te , how ever, m o s t o f th e  research  
h as  been  very  localised , focussing on  p a r tic u la r  specification sty les o r p ro g ram m in g  la n ­
guages, for exam ple , a n d  little  w ork  h as  b een  done on  g enera lisa tions a n d  tran sfe ren ce  
b e tw een  dom ains. O ne ad v an tag e  o f th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view is th a t  i t  m akes exp lic it a r ­
eas o f sh a red  concern , so th a t  we can  id en tify  areas of p o te n tia l techno logy  tra n sfe r . T h is 
is clearly  o f g re a t benefit in  cu rricu lu m  design, w here m a jo r  econom ies can  be m ad e  if 
lessons le a rn t in  code design, fo r exam ple , can  be app lied  to  w ritin g  u ser d o cu m en ta tio n .
5.5 Analogies
L earn ing  to  solve p rob lem s, an d  th e  use of experience in  solving novel p rob lem s, b o th  
need  to  m ak e  use o f th e  tra n s fe r  o f know ledge from  one dom ain  to  a n o th e r . T h is  tra n sfe r  
can  b e  called m an y  th in g s , inc lud ing  m e ta p h o r , analogy  o r a b s tra c tio n . In  all o f th ese  
we can  express th e  process th a t  is ta k in g  p lace in  te rm s  o f a  ta rg e t  d om ain  ( th e  dom ain  
o f rea l in te re s t) , a  source dom ain  (w hich is a lready  u n d e rs to o d  to  som e e x te n t) , an d  a 
m a tch in g  sy stem  fo r bu ild ing  correspondences b etw een  th e  tw o. I t  is w idely accep ted  
th a t  m a tch in g  system s can  o p e ra te  on tw o  levels, m a tch in g  surface s im ila rities , such as 
colour an d  size, o r m a tch in g  deep sim ilarities, such  as th e  re la tio n sh ip s  ho ld ing  b etw een  
a t tr ib u te s . T hese  tw o  dim ensions can  be used  to  give th e  very  ro u g h  ca teg o risa tio n  of 
th e  various te rm s used  to  den o te  th e  p rocess o f transference  show n in  F ig u re  5.2 [G en89, 
P ag e  207].
W e will re s tr ic t a t te n tio n  p rim arily  to  analogies, fo r ou r aim  is to  d iscuss engineering , and  
w e assum e th a t  th e  engineer will requ ire  access to  re la tio n a l p ro p e rtie s  v ia  deep s tru c tu ra l  
m ap p in g s in  o rd e r to  reason  a b o u t system s. Indeed , one of th e  signs o f ex p ertise  in  
p rob lem  solving w ith in  a  g iven d om ain  is th e  ab ility  to  see p rob lem s from  th a t  dom ain  
in  te rm s of deep s tru c tu re  [Ske82]. M e tap h o r an d  o th e r devices m ig h t p lay  a  p a r t  in 
e x p lo ra to ry  discourse in  suggesting  w here to  look for th is  s tru c tu re , o r even  in  in fo rm ativ e  
d iscourse in  u ser m an u a ls , b u t  we wiE n o t consider th ese  here.
M edin  an d  O rth o n y  [M 089] discuss th e  p rob lem s th a t  arise in  m a tch in g . In  p a r tic u la r , 
th ey  n o te  th a t  even surface m a tch in g  is o ften  a  m an ifes ta tio n  of deep s tru c tu ra l  p ro p ­
e rties. T h ey  assert th a t  we a re  usuaUy only in te re s te d  in  m a tch in g  p ro p e rtie s  th a t  we 
perceive to  be b o u n d  in to  deeper s tru c tu ra l  re la tionsh ips w ith in  th e  d o m ains. W e w ould 
n o t, for exam ple , usuaUy base  an  analogy  b e tw een  su itcases a n d  ten n is  baUs on  th e  
fac t th a t  b o th  item s hav e  no  ears. T h e re  is unhkely  to  be an y  deep s tru c tu ra l  re la tio n s 
involv ing  th e  p resence o f ears in  o u r  p e rcep tio n  o f e ith e r o b je c t. W e m ig h t, how ever, 
observe th a t  b o th  o b jec ts  are  capab le  o f b ouncing  if d ro p p ed , o r th a t  th e y  b o th  enclose 
space in som e way. T h e  views we ta k e  wiE be  driven  by  p u rp o se  [K T 89, P ag e  76]. T h is
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crea tes  a  link betw een  analogies an d  th eo ries , for b o th  are  based  u p o n  coherence, p u r­
pose, an d  perceived  s tru c tu ra l views. V iew ed procedura lly , we can observe  th a t  th e  ta sk  
o f bu ild ing  a  th eo ry  m ig h t well be fac ilita ted  by first observ ing  som e analogy  betw een  
tw o dom ains, p rov ided  th a t  th e  analogy  is based  on sufficiently deep s tru c tu re . If  we 
m an ag e  to  see a  prob lem  in te rm s  o f som e analogy, w hich is sufficiently  deep for a  good 
re la tio n a l s tru c tu re  to  be m a tch ed , th en  we m ay  be able to  ca rry  across a  p a r tia l th eo ry  
p re se n ta tio n  of asp ec ts  o f th e  source dom ain  so th a t  it provides a  p a r tia l  p re sen ta tio n  of 
a sp ec ts  o f th e  ta rg e t dom ain . Sim ply seeing a  m e tap h o r w ould n o t be sufficient.
T h is gives rise to  a  p o te n tia l confusion, how ever, for we we now  have b o th  a  s ta te  space 
and  a  source dom ain  p lay ing  very sim ilar roles. W hen  we view so m eth in g  as an  idealised 
sy stem , w hy is th is  a  th eo ry  ra th e r  th a n  an  analogy? If we rep re sen t th e  w orld as a  
re la tio n a l s tru c tu re  of s ta te s , w hy are  we n o t bu ild ing  an  analogy  w ith  th e  th ird  w orld 
o b je c t com prising  th e  th eo ry  of re la tions?  W e are  in grave d an g er of p lay ing  nom inalist 
gam es here , for, as A nderson  an d  T ho m p so n  observe, a b s tra c tio n  (w hich  is w h a t gives 
rise to  ou r idealised  sy stem ) is “an  analogy  in w hich th e  m odel is an  a b s tra c t  descrip tion  
ra th e r  th a n  a  physical o b je c t” [AT89, P ag e  294]. If we w an t to  consider th e  a lg eb ra  of 
se ts  as an  a b s tra c t d escrip tion , th en  th in k in g  in te rm s of sets is a b s tra c tio n , if we w an t to  
th in k  of it as a  th ird  w orld  o b je c t, th en  we are  using analogy. T h e  d is tin c tio n  is decidedly 
vague. In essence, b o th  analogy  an d  a b s tra c tio n  a re  in stances o f th e  sam e process: finding
m atch in g s  b e tw een  a  source an d  ta rg e t  dom ain . T h e  im p o r ta n t difference is th a t  b e tw een  
ana logy  an d  m e ta p h o r , w hich  is b ased  on th e  degree of deep s tru c tu re .
W e shou ld  n o te  th a t  th is  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  a b s tra c tio n  a n d  ana logy  is b y  no  m eans 
obvious. D ijk s tra , fo r exam ple , seem s to  d iffe ren tia te  b e tw een  th e  tw o  te rm s  in  qu ite  
fu n d a m e n ta l w ays, w hen  he w rites
O ne of [the] ch a rac te ris tic s  [of th e  m idd le  ages] w as th a t  ‘reaso n in g  by  an a l­
o g y ’ w as ra m p a n t;  a n o th e r  c h a ra c te ris tic  w as a lm ost to ta l  in te llec tu a l s ta g ­
n a tio n , an d  we now  see w hy  th e  tw o  w en t to g e th e r .” [Dij89, P a g e  1399]
I t  seem s unlikely  th a t  D ijk s tra  is suggesting  th a t  fo rm alisa tio n  will lead  to  in te lle c tu a l 
s ta g n a tio n . He goes on  to  say, how ever,
“I t really  helps to  view a  p ro g ram  as a  fo rm u la” [Page 1409]
w hich  seem s very  m u ch  like an  ap p ea l to  analogical reason ing . In  fa c t, w h a t D ijk s tra  is 
really  w arn ing  ag a in st is th e  use o f u n w a rra n te d  analogies in  reason ing , b u t he fails to  
develop any  so rt o f acco u n t as to  w h a t c o n s titu te s  an  a p p ro p ria te  use  o f analogy , leav ing  
th e  read e r w ith  th e  n o tio n  th a t  fo rm alisa tio n s a re  good , an d  all o th e r  analogies a re  b ad .
W e can  now  see th a t  view ing th e  w orld  in  te rm s  of d ifferent analog ies, o r a b s tra c tio n s , 
w ill give rise to  d ifferent th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s , b o th  because  d ifferen t p a r t ia l  views will 
b e  ta k e n , an d  also because  different law  fo rm u la tio n s a re  likely. I f  we see th e  w orld  in 
te rm s  o f a lg eb ras , fo r exam ple , we will a b s tra c t  aw ay from  th o se  face ts  o f o u r p ro b lem  
w hich h in d er th is  view , an d  p resen t th e  th e o ry  in  te rm s of law s o f coexistence. If  we 
see i t  in  te rm s  of K ah n  N ets , how ever, we will seek o u t processes a n d  express th e  th e o ry  
n o t p rim arily  in  te rm s  o f law s o f consequence an d  coexistence a b o u t th e se  processes, 
b u t  law s o f in te ra c tio n  betw een  th e m . T h u s  th e re  is a  ten sio n  b e tw een  o n r choice o f 
specification  sty le  an d  o u r view o f th e  w orld: V D M , C L E A R  an d  CCS are  n o t sim ply
different form alism s fo r expressing  th in g s , th e y  ca rry  w ith  th em  d ifferen t analogies for
b u ild ing  th e  theory . E ven  in d iv id u a l form alism s can  be used  to  express d ifferen t w orld 
views: Z, for exam ple , can  b e  u sed  pu re ly  a lgebraically , fo r th e re  is no  need  to  use th e  
s ta te -b a se d  conventions [ML91].
I t  is also possib le, o f course, to  see th e  w orld  in  te rm s of p ro g ram m ab le  von  N eu m an n  
a rch itec tu re s . A  tru e  p ro g ram m in g  e x p e rt m ig h t well see a  p rob lem  d irec tly  in  te rm s  of 
a  p ro g ram m in g  fo rm alism , c o n s tru c tin g  a n  analogy  betw een  th e  p ro b lem  d om ain  an d  a 
P a sc a l p ro g ram , for exam ple. Such a  perso n  m ig h t well p ro d u ce  th e  p ro g ra m  as a  first 
phenom enolog ical th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n . T h is is only likely, how ever, if  th e  in d iv id u a l has 
experience o f th e  ty p e  of p rob lem  being  solved, an d  u n d e rs ta n d s  th e  th e o ry  o f P asca l 
well enough  to  sp o t th e  deep s tru c tu re . W e can n o t le t a  novice p ro g ra m m e r g e t aw ay 
w ith  such  a  th in g , for analogy , w ith  its  accom pany ing  th eo ry  b u ild ing , w ould  be  rep laced  
b y  m e ta p h o r , c rea tin g  a  m a tc h in g  only b e tw een  surface sim ilarities, an d  th e  p ro g ram m er 
w ould  be  unab le  to  reaso n  selfconsciously a b o u t th e  a rtifac ts : a  req u irem en t for engi­
neering . M oreover, leap ing  s tra ig h t to  th e  p ro g ram  renders th e  ta sk  o f re fu ta tio n  very
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difficult: we can n o t use th e  m athem atico -sc ien tific  ap p ro ach , b u t  we h av e  to  te s t ,  an d  
w e hav e  no  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d a ry  o th e r  th a n  th e  deliverable itse lf  u p o n  w hich to  agree. 
In  genera l, w e suggest t h a t  a  safer ap p ro ach  is to  co n stru c t sequences o f th eo ries , based  
011 analogies, an d  hence experience.
Som e w ays of seeing th e  w orld  w ould  a p p e a r  to  h av e  a  special s ta tu s ,  how ever, p rov id ing  
a  com m on fo u n d a tio n  for academ ic  discip lines. G o ethe , fo r exam ple , describes such 
w orld  views as follows:
“W e call th e se  p rim o rd ia l p h en o m en a , because  n o th in g  ap p rec iab le  by  th e  
senses lies beyond  th e m , on  th e  co n tra ry , th e y  a re  perfec tly  fit to  be con­
sidered  as a  fixed p o in t to  w hich we firs t ascend  [in th e  p rocess o f finding 
w h a t is fu n d am en ta l] , an d  from  w hich we m ay, in  like m an n e r, descend  to  
th e  com m onest case o f everyday  experience.” [Goe78, P ag e  72]
D iSessa discusses th e  role o f th ese  en titie s , w hich she refers to  as ‘phenom enolog ical p rim ­
itiv e s ’ (p -p rim s), in  th e  ed u ca tio n  o f physics s tu d e n ts . She observes t h a t  novices b rin g  
a  rich  en v iro n m en t o f p -p rim s to  b e a r on  p rob lem s, b u t th a t  th e se  a re  u n s tru c tu re d , 
a n d  th e  s tu d e n t h as  no  w ay o f selecting  su itab le  can d id a tes  for p a r tic u la r  p rob lem s. In  
p a r tic u la r , in a p p ro p ria te  p -p rim s m ay  d o m in a te , causing difficulties in  p rob lem  solving. 
T h ese  p -p rim s need  n o t b e  com plex  th e o re tic a l en titie s , b u t a re  q u ite  likely to  be ex­
p ressed  in  te rm s o f com m on-sense m odels [diS87]. T h e  sim plified m odels t re a te d  in  th e  
p h ysica l sciences a re  obvious can d id a tes  for useful p -p rim s. A s T ru s te d  has n o ted , “th e  
sacrifice of com prehensiveness to  com prehensib ility  is seen in  th e  a p p ea l to  ideal m odels 
w hich fe a tu re  in  m an y  scientific th eo rie s” [Tru87, P ag e  51].
W e can  also n o te  here  th a t  m an y  o f th e  analogies c o n s tru c ted  in  so ftw are  design a re  
p ic to ria l. D esp ite  th e ir  w idesp read  use, n o t only  in  S oftw are E ng ineering , very  little  has 
been  w ritte n  a b o u t how  th is  so rt o f analogy  w orks. As G ibson  n o tes
“N oth ing  even ap p ro x im a tin g  a  science o f dep ic tion  ex ists. W h a t a r tis ts ,  
c ritics an d  ph ilosophers of a r t  hav e  to  say  a b o u t p ic tu res  has l i t t le  in  com m on 
w ith  w h a t p h o to g rap h e rs , o p tic is ts  an d  geom eters have to  say  a b o u t th em .
T h ey  do n o t seem  to  b e  ta lk in g  a b o u t th e  sam e top ic . No one seem s to  know  
w h a t a  p ic tu re  is .” [G ib79, P ag e  5]
A  n u m b e r o f different no tio n s of w h a t a  p ic tu re  is hav e  been  p ro p o sed . A t one ex trem e  
is th e  id e a  th a t  p ic tu re s  a re  ju s t  sym bols, a n d  like any  lan g u ag e  we h av e  to  le a rn  th e ir  
m ean in g  for “no  degree o f resem blance  is sufficient to  estab lish  th e  req u is ite  re la tio n sh ip  
of reference. N or is resem blance  necessary fo r reference; a lm o st a n y th in g  m ay  s ta n d  for 
a n y th in g  else” [Goo76, P ag e  5]. T h is n o tio n  is clearly  in ad e q u a te , for if p ic tu res  w ere ju s t  
sym bols th e n  we w ould  have to  lea rn  th e ir  m ean ing , an d  if p re sen ted  w ith  a  p ic tu re  we 
h a d  n o t seen before, we w ould n o t be able to  in te rp re t it. T h e re  a re  a sp ec ts  o f p ic tu res  
th a t  do seem  to  conform  to  th is  id ea , how ever, such as th e  lines d raw n  a fte r  a  ca rto o n  
figure to  d en o te  m o tio n . T h is is a  conven tion  th a t  we lea rn  th ro u g h  co n tex t.
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A n o th e r com m on n o tio n  is th a t  p ic tu re s  hav e  m ean ing  by  v ir tu e  o f p h ysica l resem blance  
to  th e  o b jec ts  th e y  dep ic t. P ic tu re s  only rep re sen t o b jec ts  as seen fro m  p a r tic u la r  view ­
p o in ts , how ever, an d  th e y  will only be  recognised if  th e  v iew er can  re la te  to  th e  given 
p ersp ec tiv e . I t  is difficult to  reconcile th is  id e a  w ith  th e  use o f d iag ram s in  S oftw are 
E ng ineering , fo r we do n o t usually  th in k  o f “seeing” a  co m p u te r sy stem . W e m ig h t argue  
th a t  sy stem s have  a  fo rm , an d  hence th e  d iag ram  is being  u sed  to  p o r tr a y  s tru c tu ra l  
sim ilarity . T h is  raises a  p rob lem  w ith  th e  use o f d iag ram s, such  as d a ta flo w  d iag ram s, 
fo r c a p tu rin g  req u irem en ts , fo r if  w e believe th a t  th ese  should  express “w h a t” n o t “how ” , 
w h a t fo rm  is th e  d iag ram  dep ic ting?  O ne possib le  answ er is th a t  we a re  supposed  to  view 
th e  d iag ram  as g iving th e  fo rm  o f som e sy stem  th a t  is analogous to  th e  in te n d e d  sy stem , 
b u t  th a t  we a re  n o t m e a n t to  tra n s fe r  th e  s tru c tu ra l  in fo rm atio n  in h e re n t in  th e  d iag ram  
over to  th e  req u ired  system . T h is does n o t a p p e a r to  b e  th e  case, how ever, because  m o st 
uses o f da taflow  d iag ram s, a n d  sim ilar techn iques, in ten tio n a lly  ca rry  over th e  s tru c tu ra l  
in fo rm a tio n  in to  th e  design phases o f th e  developm ent process. T h is  leads us to  conclude 
th a t  th e  decision to  use a  d ia g ram m atic  tech n iq u e  carries w ith  i t  th e  co m m itm en t to  
accep t th e  s tru c tu ra l  in fo rm atio n  it  conveys.
A n a lte rn a tiv e  view w ould  b e  to  accep t th a t  such  d iagram s a re  pu re ly  sym bolic. In  th is  
case we need  to  lea rn  w h a t each  sym bo l m ean s, an d  w h a t th e  ju x ta p o s itio n  o f sym bols 
m eans. W e m ay  b e  able to  consider th e  d iag ram s as fo rm al lan g u ag es, a n d  to  give th em  
a  fo rm al sem an tics in  te rm s o f o u r c u ltu ra l b ed rock . T h is view  is com m only  a d o p te d  
of P e tr i  n e ts  an d  fin ite  s ta te  m ach ine  rep re sen ta tio n s . M any  o f th e  d iag ram s used  in 
S oftw are E ng ineering , how ever, a re  n o t described  in  th is  way. If  v iew ed as sym bolic 
languages, th e y  h av e  no  w ell-defined sem an tics. U sers of th ese  d ia g ra m m a tic  techn iques 
a re  free  to  in te rp re t p ic tu res  in  d ifferen t w ays. T h is  renders th e m  useless for th e  p u rposes 
of p rov id in g  theo ries th a t  a re  in te r-su b  jec tive ly  te s ta b le , how ever, fo r w e can n o t te ll w h a t 
in te rp re ta tio n s  any  given d iag ram  is being  given. M oreover, a  freq u en tly  c ited  ad v an tag e  
of such  d iag ram s is th a t  custom ers find  th e m  easy to  u n d e rs ta n d , so th e y  fo rm  a  good 
basis for c o n tra c tu a l ag reem en ts . If  cu sto m ers  find th e m  easier to  u n d e rs ta n d  it  is a lm ost 
ce rta in ly  because  th e y  a lread y  hav e  conven tio n a l m eanings fo r sh ap es such  as boxes ( to  
hold  th in g s to g e th e r) , an d  arrow s ( to  m ove th in g s a b o u t) . T h e  c o n tra c t will only be 
sensible if  th e  engineer tak es  th e  tro u b le  to  ensu re  th a t  all p a r tie s  to  th e  c o n tra c t a re  
using  th e  sam e in te rp re ta tio n s .
T h ese  d iscussions lead  ns to  conclude th a t  th e  possib ility  of specifying th e  “w h a t” w ith o u t 
th e  “how ” needs to  be  questioned . In  seeking to  p resen t a  th e o ry  of th e  “w h a t” , th e  
phenom enological th eo ry , w e will ta k e  p a r tic u la r  views of th e  w orld . Is it  possib le to  
a sse rt th a t  th e  views we ta k e  a t  th e  o u tse t will never p e rco la te  dow n th ro u g h  o u r design 
to  influence th e  “how ” ? T h is  seem s unlikely. I f  we p re sen t a  specification  in  te rm s 
o f d a ta flow , for exam ple , i t  w ould  ta k e  v as t leaps of th e  im ag in a tio n  to  th ro w  aw ay 
th e  underly ing  analogy  w ith  a  s ta te -b a se d  a rc h ite c tu re  an d  p ro d u ce  a  P ro lo g  p ro g ram ; 
sim ilarly  if  we p ro d u ce  a  process o rien ted  view using K ah n  n e ts  expressed  in  CCS we 
a re  unlikely  to  c o n s tru c t m ono lith ic  F o rtra n . T h e  choice o f view , if  we a re  ab le  m ak e  it  
selfconsciously, is one of th e  first design decisions. T h e  rea l issue is t h a t  th e  p u rp o se  of
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th e  th e o ry  a t th is  s tag e  is scientific, so w e need  to  ensu re  th a t  i t  is fit fo r th is  p u rp o se , 
an d  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f im p lem en ta tio n  specific d e ta il has to o  o ften  been  observed  to  
m itig a te  ag a in s t th is . T h e  deep s tru c tu re  o f a  ty p ica l p ro ced u ra l p ro g ra m , for exam ple , 
is no to rio u sly  convo lu ted , an d  does n o t u sua lly  lend  itse lf to  th e  ta sk  o f generalised  
ded u c tio n s su itab le  for re fu ta tio n .
W e shou ld  observe th a t  ideally  we w ould  like th e  choice of view s ta k e n  to  h e  a  selfcon- 
scious decision, for th e n  th e  engineer m a in ta in s  responsib ility  for th e  design. In  p rac tice , 
how ever, such  in sistence  leads to  an  in fin ite  regression , lo r  th is  choice will i tse ll involve 
view s. In s te a d  we will in sis t th a t  th e  engineer is aw are  o l  th e  prob lem s th a t  such  choices 
can  pose, an d  tak es  ac tio n  to  ensu re  th a t  th ese  p roblem s a re  d e a lt w ith  safely. O ur 
p ro o f  ob liga tions, fo r exam ple , a re  m an ifes ta tio n s  of th is  p rac tice . W e will re tu rn  to  th is  
question  in  C h a p te r  Seven.
5.6 Summary
In  th is  c h a p te r  w e have  briefly  review ed th e  n o tio n  of “th e o ry ” , an d  rap id ly  refined it 
to  th e  sem an tic  concep tion . W e hav e  discussed som e of th e  princip les u n d erly in g  th eo ry  
p re se n ta tio n s , an d  looked a t  th e  ro le o f analogies in  finding su itab le  p re se n ta tio n s . W ith  
th e  benefit o f th is  d iscussion, we can  now  refine o u r m odel o f sy stem  design.
O ur phenom enological th eo ry  bu ild ing  a c tiv ity  involves agreeing w ith  th e  cu sto m er b o th  
an  id ea lisa tio n  of th e  p rob lem , g iving rise to  a  s ta te  space, and  also a  se t o f p a r tia l  th eo ry  
p re se n ta tio n s  govern ing  th e  b eh av io u r of idealised  system s, n am ely  th o se  o f in te re s t to  
th e  cu sto m er. T h e  design ta sk  can  th e n  b e  view ed as th e  a c tiv ity  o f chang ing  th e  s ta te  
space re p re se n ta tio n , an d  also th e  th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n , so th a t  i t  c a p tu re s  th e  prob lem  
in  te rm s  o f s tru c tu re s  an d  tra n s itio n s  availab le in  som e ta rg e t  v ir tu a l m ach ine , such  as 
a  P asca l engine. T hese  changes m ay  be seen as refinem ents, o r as reco n stru c tio n s  w ith  
verifica tion  conditions. T h e  phenom enological th eo ry  p re sen ta tio n s  m u s t rem ain  p a r tia l  
p re se n ta tio n s  o f th e  re su ltin g  theo ry .
W e shou ld  stress th a t  a  n u m b er o f very  im p o r ta n t p rob lem  areas h av e  been  iden tified  in  
th is  c h a p te r , in  p a r tic u la r , th e  p rob lem  o f im posing  s tru c tu re  o n to  b o th  th e  s ta te  space 
an d  th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n . R esolving these  p rob lem s, how ever, is n o t considered  p a r t  
o f th is  re search , fo r we can n o t expec t th e  cu rricu lum  designer to  solve all th e  p rob lem s 
of S oftw are E ng ineering  en passant. W e can  expect th e  te a c h e r to  be  aw are o f these  
p rob lem s, how ever, fo r one o f th e  ta sk s  o f teach in g  is to  help th e  s tu d e n t n a v ig a te  a ro u n d  
th e  lea rn in g  experience, an d  iden tifica tio n  of p o te n tia l h a z a rd  a reas  is ce rta in ly  p a r t  of 
th is  ta sk , as is th e  in d ica tio n  of w here ideas can be carried  across from  one d om ain  to  
a n o th e r. Like th e  engineer, th e  te ach e r m u s t ta k e  responsib ility  fo r th is  n av ig a tio n  ta sk  
u n til th e  s tu d e n t is sufficiently well tra in ed .
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C hapter 6
Methods, Madness or Melee?
“Do all the good you can, by all the means you can, in  all the ways you can, 
in all the places you can, at all the tim e you can, to all the people you can, 
as long as ever you can”
John Wesley
O ne o f th e  m o st freq u en tly  d e b a te d  top ics in  Softw are E ng ineering  is th e  ro le  an d  m erits  
o f “m e th o d s” for so ftw are  deve lopm en t. Such deb a tes  a re  n o t on ly  com m on, b u t th ey  
a re  freq u en tly  acrim onious. O ne reaso n  for th is  is th a t  m uch  o f th e  d iscussion  re s ts  on 
dogm a, b u t  acknow ledging do g m atic  view s is unfash ionab le  in  w este rn  scientific cu ltu re , 
so th is  is o ften  h id d en  b eh in d  a  facade  of ra tio n a l a rg u m e n t, u sua lly  b ased  on  an ecd o ta l 
evidence. A n o th e r reason  for th e  acrim ony  is th a t  th e  concept o f “m e th o d ” is a  com plex 
one, an d  th e  te rm  h as a t  le a s t four com m on uses w ith in  S oftw are  E ng ineering . M any 
of th e  d eb a tes  a re  really  ju s t  confusions of th e  uses of th e  te rm . T o com pound  m a tte rs , 
how ever, m an y  of th e  p ro ta g o n is ts  in  th e  d eb a tes  seem  to  have  so u g h t refuge in  th e  te rm  
“m eth o d o lo g y ” , w hich, fa r  from  clarify ing m a tte rs , sim ply adds all th e  possib le  uses of 
“th e o ry ” to  th o se  o f “m e th o d ” . C larifica tion  o f th e  id ea  o f a  m e th o d  is e ssen tia l for ou r 
pedagog ical p u rp o ses, fo r every  schem e teach in g  Softw are E ng ineering  teach es m e th o d s  
in  som e fo rm  o r an o th e r.
In  one sense, w e have  a lread y  been  discussing m eth o d s , for o u r m odel o f so ftw are  devel­
o p m en t suggests a  n u m b er of p rocedures to  accom pany  it , an d  indeed  th e  m odel w ould  be 
m eaningless w ith o u t th e  p ro c e d u ra l in te rp re ta tio n  th e  read e r gives i t .  T h e  case has been  
m ad e  elsew here th a t  a  p ro p e r tre a tm e n t of m e th o d  should  be  carried  o u t in co n junc tion  
w ith  th e  tr e a tm e n t o f re p re se n ta tio n s , an d  th e  tw o  should  n o t b e  s e p a ra te d  [L0086]. W e 
will n o t a d o p t th is  ap p ro ach  here , how ever, because  ou r p rim a ry  concern  is to  explore 
ex isting  n o tio n s o f m e th o d s , an d  to  t r y  an d  re la te  th em  to  ou r p ro p o sed  m odel.
T h e  fou r uses of th e  te rm  “m e th o d ” th a t  we a re  going to  exp lo re  a re  clearly  n o t as 
sep a rab le  as we a re  going to  suggest in  th is  d iscussion, o therw ise  acrim onious d eb a te  
could b e  avoided. M ost m e th o d s  p ro p o sed  for S oftw are E ngineering  can  be  considered  
as fulfilling, o r have  been  claim ed to  fulfill, all four uses to  som e degree. W e w ould 
a rg u e , as we have  done th ro u g h o u t th is  thesis , th a t  sim plification  a n d  a b s tra c tio n  are  
th e  only w ays to  com e to  te rm s  w ith  com plex issues, how ever, a n d  th e  re -in tro d u c tio n  of 
m ore  com plex face ts  o f th e  p rob lem  can  w ait u n til  a  sim plified u n d e rs ta n d in g  h as  been
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achieved.
W e will s ta r t  by  considering m e th o d s  as p rov id in g  well-defined p lan s, in te n d e d  to  govern  
all th e  ac tio n s o f engineers an d  lead  to  th e  successful com pletion  o f a  p ro je c t. Such 
m e th o d s  will be  p rescrip tiv e . F in d in g  th e se  m e th o d s , if  th e y  ex is t, w ould  solve th e  so ft­
w are  crisis. T h ey  w ould  also ren d e r th e  engineer little  m ore  th a n  a  low -level tech n ic ian , 
an d  solve o u r cu rricu lum  design p rob lem  b y  reducing  it  to  th e  ta s k  o f devising an  a p p ro ­
p r ia te  tra in in g  course in  th e  m e th o d . W e will a rg u e  th a t  such a  m e th o d  can n o t ex ist. 
M oreover, p roceed ing  as if  i t  m ig h t leads to  u n d esirab le  consequences in  o u r cu rricu lum  
design th a t ,  fa r from  resolving th e  p rob lem s o f th e  discipline, e x a c e rb a te  th em .
G iven  th a t  m e th o d s  can n o t be  reliab le  p lan s fo r solving u n k n o w n  p rob lem s, we will 
discuss th e ir  ro le as ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f th e  process o f p rob lem  solving. T h is  is com m on 
p rac tice  b o th  in  th e  P h ilo so p h y  o f Science an d  also in  science an d  techno logy  itself, 
w here re su lts  a re  p resen ted  as if th e y  w ere th e  p ro d u c ts  o f ra tio n a l p rocesses, governed  
by  p lan s from  th e  o u tse t. I t  will b e  a rgued  th a t  ra tio n a lisa tio n , as well as p rov id ing  
a  vehicle for h is to rica l reco rd , can  assist in  th e  process of ach iev ing  q u a lity  in  so ftw are  
design. A  n u m b e r o f possib le  ra tio n a lisa tio n s  for p rocesses accom pany ing  o u r m odel of 
sy s tem  design will be d iscussed briefly.
O ur th ird  p e rsp ec tiv e  on m e th o d s  will view th e m  as c o n s tra in ts  011 th e  ac tiv ities o f 
engineers an d  sc ien tists . T hese  c o n s tra in ts  m ay  be ju stified  for a  n u m b e r o f reasons, 
inc lud ing  m an ag em en t o f th e  process, m ak in g  th e  engineer m o re  acco u n tab le  v ia  visible 
m ilestones, an d  fa c ilita tin g  th e  co o p era tio n  o f several engineers on  one p ro je c t.
F ina lly  w e will p resen t th e  id ea  th a t  m e th o d s  a re  collections o f usefu l too ls  available to  th e  
engineer for solving localised  p rob lem s, ra th e r  th a n  w ays of ad d ressing  th e  w hole q u estio n  
of design. T hese  too ls m ay  be a lg o rith m ic  in  n a tu re , ce rta in  to  w ork  if  app lied  correctly , 
or h eu ris tic , w here no  such  g u a ran tee s  a re  g iven. T hese  too ls inc lude  m a th e m a tic a l 
n o ta tio n s  w ith  th e ir  a sso c ia ted  an a ly tica l tech n iq u es, w ays of view ing an d  rep resen tin g  
th e  p ro b lem , heu ristics  for tack lin g  specific s itu a tio n s , an d  a  p le th o ra  o f o th e r  techn iques. 
T h e  engineer has resp o n sib ility  fo r selecting  th e  too ls an d  using  th e m  safely.
6.1 Methods as Plans
T h e  questio n  we w an t to  ad d ress  h ere  is w h e th e r or n o t i t  is possib le  to  have  a  m e th o d  
of sy s tem  design th a t  can  b e  used  for th e  so lu tion  of all possib le p rob lem s. W e m ig h t 
rep h ra se  th is  in  a  less p re jud ic ia l fo rm  as ask ing  w h e th e r, for an y  g iven  p ro b lem , we can  
alw ays identify , a t  th e  o u tse t, a  p a r tic u la r  m e th o d  for solving th a t  p rob lem . T h ese  tw o 
fo rm u la tio n s a re  equ iva len t, fo r th e  la t te r  involves finding a  p ro ced u re , o r m e th o d , for 
id en tify ing  th e  p a r tic u la r  m e th o d s , an d  th e  co n junc tion  o f th is  p ro ced u re  to g e th e r w ith  
all th e  in d iv id u a l m e th o d s  com prises a  u n iv ersa l m e th o d . W e will ta ck le  th e  question  
in  its  first form . W e shou ld  observe th a t  th e re  a re  classes o f p rob lem  w hich  a re  so well 
u n d e rs to o d  th a t  m e th o d s  for th e ir  so lu tion  do a p p e a r self-evident. C om piler w riting  for 
conven tional p ro ced u ra l languages an d  tra d itio n a l ta rg e t a rc h ite c tu re s , fo r exam ple , can
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be tack led  in  p rescribed  w ays, using too ls developed for th e  p u rp o se . I t  is im p o r ta n t  
to  realise , how ever, th a t  m o st p rob lem s o f S oftw are E ng ineering  do n o t fall in to  such 
classes. M any  p rob lem s m ay  b e  seen as sim ilar to  th e  exem plars from  th e  classes, such 
as so rtin g  an d  m erg ing  ty p e  p ro b lem s, a f te r  analysis h as  ta k e n  p lace , b u t  no general 
m e th o d  ex ists by  w hich th is  s im ila rity  can  b e  d e tec ted , an d  no  a lg o rith m ic  fo rm u la tio n  
for th e  requ isite  analysis h as  y e t been  given.
I t  m ay  seem  self-evident th a t  no  such  generalised  m e th o d  can  ex is t, b u t  th is  view  is n o t 
un iversa lly  held . M cC rory , for exam ple , a sse rts  th a t  n o t only  does such  a  m e th o d  ex is t, 
b u t th a t  it  is com m on to  th e  w hole o f design.
“T h e  design process follows a  m e thodo logy  sim ilar to  t h a t  o f th e  scientific 
m e th o d , a lth o u g h  th e  design m e th o d  h as n o t been so carefu lly  defined or 
h isto rica lly  well e s tab lish ed .” [M cC74, page  161].
I t  seem s likely th a t  sim ilar view s can be  a t t r ib u te d  to  m an y  so ftw are  engineers, w ho 
seem  to  have  fo rm ed  th e  view th a t  th e ir  p rob lem s will d isap p ea r w hen  th e  m e th o d  has 
been  found . U n fo rtu n a te ly  a  sim ilar view seem s to  b e  held  by  som e ed u c a to rs , w ho seem  
to  believe th a t  th e y  owe it to  th e ir  s tu d e n ts  to  te ach  th e  m o st com plica ted  version  of 
such  a  m e th o d  cu rren tly  used  in  in d u stry , on th e  g rounds th a t  th is  is th e  closest we have  
com e to  finding th e  H oly G rail, an d  it  will serve th e  s tu d e n ts  well w hen  th e  rea l th in g  is 
found .
Such a  view  is u n ten ab le . T h e  scientific m e th o d  th a t  M cC rory  ap p ea ls  to  sim ply does 
n o t ex ist. He seem s to  hav e  confused ph ilo so p h ers’ ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f th e  ac tiv ities of 
sc ien tis ts  w ith  p lan s th a t  sc ien tis ts  ho ld , an d  even th e n  he seem s to  h av e  overlooked th e  
v as t n u m b er of such  ra tio n a lisa tio n s  th a t  have  been  fo rm u la ted  fo r d ifferen t purposes. 
In  p a r tic u la r , he has confused science, as p re sen ted  in  scientific d iscourse, w ith  science 
as an  a c tiv ity  involving ex p lo ra tio n  an d  co o p era tio n  as well as th e  p re se n ta tio n  of final 
re su lts . W illiam s p u ts  th is  very  w ell, w hen  he w rites
“ . . .  no  p a p e r is ever w ritte n  w ith  its  rea l, genuine, h o n est h is to rica l in tro d u c ­
tio n ; because  som ew here in  in  th e  m iddle  o f it  w ould  have  to  be  th e  s ta te m e n t 
‘a t  th is  p o in t I h a d  an  id e a ’. E d ito rs— an d  I am  one m yself— can n o t accep t 
th is ; it  rem oves science from  its  au s te re  p ed es ta l an d  m akes i t  in to  a  c rea tiv e  
a r t— w hich of course i t  is, b u t we a re  n o t supposed  to  say  so in  p u b lic .” 
[W1164, page  54].
I t  is generally  accep ted  th a t  a lth o u g h  th e re  m ay  be w ays o f ra tio n a lis in g  th e  process 
of scientific ju s tific a tio n , scientific d iscovery  can  never be a  com pletely  ra tio n a l process. 
F ey erab en d , w ho tak es  an  a d m itte d ly  ex trem e  view , observes th a t
“ . .  . i t  is o f course possib le  to  sim plify th e  h is to rica l m ed ium  in  w hich  a  sci­
en tis t w orks by  sim plifying its  m a in  ac to rs . T h e  h is to ry  o f science, a f te r  all, 
consists n o t only  of fac ts  an d  conclusions d raw n  th erefro m . I t  consists also of
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ideas, in te rp re ta tio n s  of fac ts , p rob lem s c rea ted  by  a  c lash  of in te rp re ta tio n s , 
ac tio n s of sc ien tis ts , an d  so o n .” [Fey70a, page  20]
F u rth e rm o re , he  goes on to  say  t h a t  i t  is possib le  to  sim plify th is  s ta te  of a ffairs by  “b ra in ­
w ash in g ” ind iv id u a ls  to  accep t “professional conscience” an d  “professional in te g r ity ” , and  
th a t
“A n essen tia l p a r t  o f th e  tra in in g  is th e  in h ib itio n  of in tu itio n  th a t  m ig h t lead  
to  a  b lu rrin g  of b o u n d aries  [betw een science an d  o th e r ac tiv ities]. A  p e rso n ’s 
religion, for exam ple, o r his m etap h y sics , o r his sense o f h u m o u r m u s t n o t 
have th e  s ligh test connection  w ith  his scientific ac tiv ity . His im ag in a tio n  is 
re s tra in e d  an d  even his lan g u ag e  will cease to  be his o w n .” [Fey70a, pag e  20]
I t  is a  sobering  th o u g h t t h a t  H o a re ’s p lea  fo r p rofessionalism  an d  scientific a t t i tu d e s  m ay  
be  in te rp re te d  in  such  an  ex trem e  O rw ellian  fash ion . W h a t H oare  doub tlessly  in ten d ed  
as a  p lea  for h o n es ty  an d  in te g rity  could be  in te rp re te d  as a  call fo r th e  d eh u m an isa tio n  
o f science. T his is s ign ifican t, fo r it  causes us to  reflect th a t  a  possib le  reac tio n  to  
H o a re ’s persuasive  d iscourse is to  see i t  as an  a t te m p t to  s ta r t  th e  b ra in w ash in g  process: 
th is  m ig h t exp lain  th e  v io len t reac tio n  th a t  m an y  an ti-fo rm alis ts  show  w hen  faced  w ith  
suggestions th a t  m a th e m a tic s  h as  a  ro le  to  p lay  in  system  design.
T h is  is a  very  im p o r ta n t o b serva tion . I t  se ts  th e  scene for th e  d iscussion o f m e th o d s 
as in s tru m e n ts  o f co n tro l, b o th  in  th e  fo rm  o f lim ita tio n s  o f ac tio n  a n d  of language. 
M oreover, i t  h igh ligh ts  th e  ro le  o f in tu itio n  an d  ind iv id u a l b ack g ro u n d  in  sy stem  design. 
P a rn a s  an d  C lem ents hav e  n o ted  th a t  so ftw are  design is influenced by  ideas th a t  do n o t 
com e from  ra tio n a l consid era tio n  of th e  p ro b lem , b u t  “arise sp o n tan eo u sly  from  o th e r 
sou rces” [PC 85, page 83]. N au r goes fu r th e r , w hen he s ta te s  th a t  in tu it io n  “is th e  basis 
on w hich all ac tiv ities  involved  in softw are developm ent m u st b u ild ” [N au85, page  60]. 
B o th  P a rn a s  an d  N au r ad m it, how ever, th a t  in tu itio n  is fallible, a n d  dangerously  so 
because  th e  im m ediacy  o f response  m akes it  seem  a ttra c tiv e  an d  conven ien t. N au r goes 
on to  n o te  th a t  in tu itiv e  ac tions can  them selves be  view ed in tu itiv e ly  by  th e  ac to r , giving 
rise to  a  self-conscious m ode of proceed ing , echoing Q u ine’s co m m en t th a t  “science is 
self-conscious com m on sense” [Qui60].
N au r also develops th e  a rg u m e n t t h a t  th e  in ev itab ility  of in tu itio n  in  so ftw are  design 
m eans th a t  we should  co n c e n tra te  n o t on  rem oving  i t ,  b u t on  find ing  w ays o f d e tec tin g  
an d  co rrec ting  an y  e rro rs  in tro d u ced : th is  requ ires self-conscious design , a lb e it a  self- 
consciousness still based  on  in tu itio n . M oreover he endorses th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view 
p u t fo rw ard  here  w hen he w rites
“th e  p rob lem  of h igh  q u a lity  so ftw are  developm ent can n o t be solved b y  ru les 
an d  m e th o d s , w hich  essen tia lly  assum e th a t  th e  p ro g ram m er ac ts  like a  m a ­
chine for p ro d u c in g  p ro g ram s.
. . .  a  view o f so ftw are developm ent th a t  m akes th e  ap p lica tio n  o f ru le-based  
m e th o d s  an d  n o ta tio n s  th e  basic  issue is m isguided. T h e  deeper p rob lem  of
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so ftw are  developm ent is th e  p ro g ra m m e r’s bu ild ing  o f theories o f th e  com pu ter- 
b ased  so lu tio n s.” [N au85, pag e  78].
A ccep tan ce  of th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view , an d  re jec tion  of th e  ex istence  of a lg o rith m s for 
ca rry in g  o u t science, forces us to  re jec t th e  n o tio n  of an  a ll-em bracing  so ftw are  develop­
m en t m e th o d .
P a rn a s  also n o tes  th a t  design will in ev itab ly  b e  bese t by unforeseen  p rob lem s, such  as 
changes in  req u irem en ts  an d  technology , o r th e  im p osition  of m a n ag em en t decisions. W e 
could , o f course , s till seek a  m e th o d  capab le  o f ad m ittin g  change, such  as th e  m u ltip le  
feedback  loops o f th e  ty p ica l life-cycle. T h e  ac tions to  b e  ta k e n  in  th e  face o f such  
changes, how ever, will depend  on  so m an y  fac to rs , only tru ly  u n d e rs to o d  a t  th e  tim e  
of th e  change, th a t  it  is im possib le  to  find a  m e th o d  capab le  o f p rescrib ing  ac tions in  
a  d om ain  in d ep en d en t w ay[PC 85]. T h u s  even if  we do n o t accep t th e  th e o ry  build ing  
view , we are  forced to  re jec t th e  n o tio n  of a  p rescrip tiv e  m e th o d  o f design.
R ejec tion  o f th is  k ind  o f m e th o d , how ever, leaves us b ere ft o f an y  fram ew ork  w ith in  
w hich to  discuss ap p roaches to  a  design ta sk , unless we find an  a lte rn a tiv e  ex p lan a tio n . 
W e will a d o p t S u ch m an ’s n o tio n  th a t  b eh av io u r shou ld  be seen as s itu a te d  ac tions:
“T h e  te rm  [“s itu a te d  ac tio n ”] undersco res th e  view th a t  every  course  of ac­
tio n  depends in  e ssen tia l w ays u p o n  its  m a te r ia l an d  social c ircu m stan ces .” 
[Suc87, page 50].
U nder th is  view p lans a re  n o t p rescribed  se ts  o f ac tions, r a th e r  th e ir  p u rp o se  is
“to  o rien t you  in  such a  w ay th a t  you  can  o b ta in  th e  b es t possib le  p o sitio n  
from  w hich to  use th o se  em bodied  skills on  w hich, in  th e  final analysis , your 
success d ep en d s” [Suc87, pag e  52]
I t  is precisely because  th e  “em bod ied  skills” of th e  ty p ica l co m p u te r are  so lim ited , o f 
course , th a t  th e  so ftw are engineer needs to  tra n sfo rm  th e  th eo ry  u n d e rp in n in g  a  design 
in to  a  p re se n ta tio n  in  te rm s of a  sim ple p ro g ram m in g  language.
In te rp re te d  in  th e  th eo ry  of s i tu a te d  ac tio n s, th e  ro le of m e th o d s  is th a t  o f a  resource  to  
o rien t th e  engineer a t  th e  o u tse t o f th e  p rocess, an d  also to  p rov ide  a  fram e  of reference 
th a t  th e  engineer can  ap p ea l to  w hen p rob lem s arise. T h e  m e th o d  does n o t n a v ig a te  you 
th ro u g h  th e  p rob lem , b u t  gives a  canon ical fo rm  ag a in st w hich p rog ress can  be m easu red . 
T h e re  is no need , how ever, for such  m e th o d s  to  be all em bracing : th e  engineer can  seek 
d ifferen t fram ew orks as his o r h er p e rcep tio n  o f th e  p rob lem  changes,
6.2 Methods as Rationalisations
G iven th a t  th e re  can n o t b e  a  un iv ersa l d escrip tion  of how  th e  so ftw are  design process 
is ac tu a lly  to  b e  carried  o u t, we will now  tu rn  o u r a t te n tio n  to  th e  m a tte r  o f finding
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ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f th e  process. W h ereas  a  p resc rip tiv e  m e th o d  h as  to  foresee all possible 
ev en ts , ra tio n a lisa tio n s  a re  usually  allow ed th e  g re a t benefit o f im p erfec t m em ory  or 
know ledge. W e can  select th e  “sign ifican t” fea tu re s  of in d iv id u a l designs a n d  ignore all 
th e  o th e rs . T h is  selection  process is, o f course, p a r t  of th e  ra tio n a lisa tio n , b u t  i t  is seldom  
s ta te d  explicitly. In  seeking to  p lan , abso lu te ly , th e  ac tions o f an  eng ineer we need  to  
foresee th e  possib le consequences o f an  u n sa tis fa c to ry  lunch; in  ra tio n a lis in g  th e  process 
we can  decide th a t  th e  q u a lity  of can teen  food  h as  no  re levance to  th e  ac tions ta k e n . If  
we view  p lans as co n tro ls , o f course, we will es tab lish  w ays o f p roceed ing  th a t  a t te m p t 
to  deny cu linary  fac to rs  a  ro le  in  th e  process.
W h y  shou ld  we even a t te m p t  ra tio n a lisa tio n ?  O ne reason  for seeking ra tio n a l ju s tifica ­
tio n  o f engineering  ac tions is cu ltu ra l. T echnology, because  i t  involves so m an y  diverse 
fac to rs , c an n o t fo rm  a  logically closed sy stem . W estern  cu ltu res , how ever, “feel th e  need 
for o rd erin g  th e ir  fields o f know ledge so th a t  th ey  a re  su b jec t to  conscious analysis an d  
m a n a g e m e n t” [D eh86, pages 110-111], an d  hence seeks closed, logical, ra tio n a lisa tio n s  
of ac tions. W e will n o t pass ju d g em en t on  such  m o tiv a tio n , b u t  we should  n o te  th a t  
m an y  p ap e rs  p ropo sin g  ra tio n a l design processes seem  to  accep t th is  reason  as sufficient. 
R eaders o f th ese  p ap ers  w ho re jec t th e  c u ltu ra l values p laced  on  th e  closed logical s tru c ­
tu re s  o f science, o r a t  leas t questio n  th e ir  relevance to  engineering, a re  p erfec tly  e n title d  
to  re jec t th e  p ap e rs  as w orth less. M an y  read ers  o f D ijk s tra  a n d  H oare , u n fo rtu n a te ly , 
a t t r ib u te  only  th is  m o tiv a tio n  for ra tio n a lisa tio n  to  th e  a u th o rs , a n d  hence re jec t th e  
m essages co n ta in ed  in  th e  p u b lica tio n s o u t o f h an d . No d o u b t, som e o f th e  “so fte r” l i t ­
e ra tu re  is d isreg raded , for equally  d o g m atic  reasons, by th e  “fo rm a lis ts” , because  i t  does 
n o t acknow ledge th e  im p o rta n c e  of closed, logical, s tru c tu re s . T h u s  im p o r ta n t  m essages 
in b o th  cam ps m ay  be  lo st because  o f dogm a.
F ey erab en d  argues th a t  th is  a ssoc ia tion  of ra tio n a lisa tio n  w ith  closed sy stem s is u n fo r tu ­
n a te , a n d  th e  assu m p tio n  th a t  science, as th e  exem plar of valued  p ra c tic e  in  o u r academ ic 
cu ltu re , can  b e  ra tio n a lised  by  such system s is u n tru e .
“M a tu re  science unites  tw o very  different tra d itio n s  w hich a re  o ften  se p a ra te , 
th e  tra d itio n  of a  p lu ra lis t ph ilosophical c ritic ism  an d  a  m ore  p ra c tic a l (an d  
less h u m a n ita r ia n  . . . )  t ra d itio n  w hich explores th e  p o te n tia litie s  o f a  given 
m a te r ia l (o f a  th eo ry ; o f a  piece of m a tte r )  w ith o u t be ing  d e te rre d  by  th e  
difficulties th a t  m ay  arise an d  w ith o u t reg a rd  to  a lte rn a tiv e  w ays o f th in k in g  
(a n d  a c tin g ) .” [Fey70b, page 212]
W e shou ld  n o t confuse “being scientific” w ith  conform ing  to  ju s t  one asp ec t o f a  ra tio n a l­
isa tio n  of science. W e m u st bew are  o f ra tio n a lis in g  only one asp ec t o f th e  so ftw are  design 
p rocess, b u t  th e n  proceed ing  as if  we have  fin ished th e  ta sk , an d  also e levated  th e  s ta tu s  
o f th e  discipline to  th a t  o f a  “science” . T h is is n o t to  say, o f course , th a t  sep a ra tio n  of 
concerns can n o t be  used , p rov ided  th e  lim ita tio n s  of th e  tech n iq u e  a re  acknow ledged. 
T h u s  H oare  is perfec tly  e n titled  to  a sse rt th a t  we can  p rove th e  co rrec tness o f p ro g ram s, 
b u t  we m u st ta k e  care  to  recognise th a t  “p ro v e” , “co rrec tness” , an d  “p ro g ra m ” are  being  
g iven m ean ings w ith in  som e closed sy stem  o f ra tio n a lisa tio n .
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A second reason  for ra tio n a lisa tio n  is to  increase  u n d e rs tan d in g  o f th e  processes involved 
in  so ftw are  design. T h is  will allow  th e  d iscipline to  advance by  im p ro v in g  b o th  p rac tice  
an d  ed u ca tio n . T h is  increase  in  u n d e rs ta n d in g  does n o t com e p rim arily  from  ra tio n a lisa ­
tions th a t  everyone agrees w ith , how ever, b u t  w ith  th o se  th a t  cause d iscourse, to  clarify 
or d isp u te  th e  views p u t  fo rw ard . In  p a r tic u la r , it  is perfec tly  possib le  fo r one ind iv id u a l 
to  p ro p o se  several different ra tio n a lisa tio n s  of som e s itu a tio n  in  th e  fu ll know ledge th a t  
th ey  a re  in co n sis ten t. F ey erab en d , for exam ple , defends his r ig h t to  su p p o rt th e  r a t io ­
n a lisa tio n s o f b o th  K u h n  an d  L ak a to s , even th o u g h  th e re  are  fu n d a m e n ta l d isag reem en ts 
b e tw een  th e m  th a t  can n o t logically  be reconciled.
“ C o n tra ry  a rg u m en ts  b rin g  o u t th e  d ifferen t fea tu res  it  [science] co n ta in s , 
th e y  challenge ns to  m ak e  a  decision, th ey  challenge us to  e ith e r  accept th is  
m any-faced  m o n s te r  and  be devoured  by  i t ,  o r else to  challenge i t  in  accor­
dance  w ith  ou r w ishes.” [Fey70b, page  215]
W e shou ld  n o te  th a t  th is  is also an  excellent defence o f ex p lo ra to ry  d iscourse  in  science 
an d  design, w here th e  in d iv id u a l m ay  p ro p o se  conflicting theories to  p ro m o te  d iscussion 
an d  reso lu tio n  a n d , by  reflexivity , o f th is  thesis.
P e rh a p s  th e  m ost obvious c an d id a te  fo r a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  o f th e  so ftw are  design process 
is th e  life cycle m odel. W e shall a rg u e , in  th e  n ex t section , th a t  life cycles can  serve a  
usefu l fu n c tio n  as con tro lling  m echan ism s in  so ftw are  design, b u t  how  helpfu l a re  th ey  
as ra tio n a lisa tio n s?  T h e  answ er seem s to  be th a t  th ey  are  o f very  lim ited  use. M ost life 
cycles say  l i t t le  beyond  “before designing so m eth ing  you  need  to  th in k  a b o u t w h a t it  is 
you a re  going to  do, th e n  you  can  do it. If  th e  re su lt tu rn s  o u t to  b e  flaw ed, redesign  i t . ”
T h e  p rob lem s arise because  life-cycles a t te m p t  to  sa tisfy  peop le’s need  fo r closed ra tio n a l­
isa tio n s, b u t  th ey  p ropose  m odels th a t  no  one can  re fu te . T h u s  th e y  seek scientific ideals 
b u t  w ith  pseudo-scien tific  m e th o d s . Pfieeger, fo r exam ple, p roposes a  life cycle th a t  com ­
prises a  fully connected  g ra p h  w ith  n ine nodes. T hese  nodes a re  labe lled  w ith  te rm s  such 
as “req u irem en ts  analysis an d  defin ition” , “sy stem  design” , “p ro g ram  design” , “w riting  
th e  p ro g ra m ” , an d  so on. All we can  g lean  from  such  m odels is th a t  nebu lous ac tiv ities 
such  as “w ritin g  th e  p ro g ra m ” can  go on th ro u g h o u t th e  design process. H ow shou ld  such 
an  o b se rv a tio n  b e  in te rp re te d ?  D oes i t  m ean  th a t  “w riting  th e  p ro g ra m ” is p a r t  o f “p ro ­
g ra m  design” , in  w hich case shou ld  we conclude from  th e  full co n n ec tiv ity  of th e  g ra p h , 
th a t  a ll n ine  ac tiv itie s  a re  p o te n tia lly  p a r t  o f each  o ther?  P e rh a p s  i t  m eans th a t  th e re  
will b e  in te rleav ings o f “p ro g ram  design” w ith  “w ritin g  th e  p ro g ra m ” , b u t th is  only tells 
us som eth in g  if  we can  clearly  d istingu ish  b e tw een  th e  te rm s. A  fu n d a m e n ta l criticism  
of all life-cycle m odels is th a t  th e y  use ja rg o n  such  as “design” , “specifica tion” , an d  so 
on, b u t rely  on th e  m odel to  im ply  w h a t th e  te rm s  m ean . Such m odels will nev er lead  to  
m uch  im p ro v em en t in  u n d e rs ta n d in g , fo r we can  all place ou r ow n in te rp re ta tio n s  on  th e  
te rm s , an d  e ith er agree w ith  th e  m odel, o r qu ibble  over th e  te rm s an d  accuse each  o th e r  
of no m in a lis t gam es. M oreover, any  m a jo r  critic ism s of th e  m odel a re  u sually  g ree ted  by  
th e  a d d itio n  of e x tra  arrow s to  th e  d iag ram , o r ad jectives to  th e  te rm s , such  as ad d ing  
“fu n c tio n a l” , “fo rm al” , “req u irem en ts” o r “sy s tem ” to  th e  te rm  “specifica tion” , none  of
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w hich  really  help us to  u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t is m e a n t by  a  specification . H ence th e  claim  
tha.t life cycles are  u sually  accom pan ied  b y  pseudo-scientific  m e th o d s  o f defence.
Life cycles a re  n o t th e  only ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f th e  developm ent process. A n o th e r com m on 
ra tio n a lisa tio n  is th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n a l view , w hich sees th e  process as th e  tra n sfo rm a tio n  
o f specifications in to  im p lem en tab le  specifications, or un im p lem en t ab le  p ro g ram s in to  
ru n n ab le  p ro g ram s. T hese  ra tio n a lisa tio n s  can  b e  helpfu l, fo r th e y  usually  s ta r t  b y  
exp la in ing  w h a t is be ing  u n d e rs to o d  b y  a  specification  or p ro g ram . T h e  in te rp re ta tio n  
p laced  on th e  te rm s  is o ften  very  lim ited , such  as a  ca tegorical o r a lgeb ra ic  view , b u t  a t 
le a s t we know  w h a t we a re  d isagreeing  w ith  w hen  we ta k e  issue. A n o th e r  ra tio n a lisa tio n  
th a t  is w o rth y  of n o te  is th e  n o tio n  o f a  p ro g ra m  as an  ex istence p ro o f o f its  specification , 
ca rried  o u t in  a  co n stru c tiv e  logic. H ere th e  ra tio n a lisa tio n  can  be  c o n s tru ed  as im ply ing  
th a t  th e  m e th o d  of design is sim ilar to  th e  m e th o d  of p ro o f co n s tru c tio n  in  m a th e m a tic s . 
B ackhouse, for exam ple, discusses how  p ro o f  heu ristics in  M artin -L o f ty p e  th e o ry  can  be 
view ed as h eu ristics for th e  design o f p ro ced u ra l p ro g ram m in g  c o n s tru c ts  [Bac90].
T h e  rea l d anger in  ad o p tin g  th e  life cycle m odel as a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  is n o t th a t  it  is o f little  
value, th a t  m akes i t  a t  w orse a t  d is tra c tio n , b u t  its  u n iversa l ap p ea l, in  th e  sense th a t  
no  one can  re fu te  i t . T h is  has led to  its  (na ive) w idespread  a d o p tio n  in  s tru c tu r in g  th e  
cu rricu lum . W e will see in  th e  n ex t sec tion  th a t  life cycles have  a  sign ifican t ro le  to  p lay  
as con tro lling  m echan ism s in  th e  design p rocess, so if  we ad o p t th e m  as ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f 
th e  process as well we a re  likely to  endorse  th e  view  th a t  s tu d e n ts  shou ld  conform  to  th ese  
con tro lling  m echan ism s. Such a  m e th o d  o f teach in g  is im plicitly  accep tin g  D u rk h e im ’s 
thesis . E ven  if th e  courses w ith in  th e  designed cu rricu lum  a d o p t a  c ritica l s tan ce  to  th e  
life cycle, th ey  are  likely to  re su lt in  th e  s tu d e n ts  suggesting  p a tc h e s  to  th e  m odel r a th e r  
th a n  th e  o v erth ro w  of th e  m odel itself, fo r th ey  will w ork w ith in  th e  p a rad ig m  th a t  th e  
m odel estab lishes.
G iven  th is  d anger w ith  any  ra tio n a lisa tio n , p e rh ap s  we shou ld  seek m o re  ju stifica tio n  
fo r a tte m p tin g  ra tio n a lisa tio n  a t  all. P a rn a s  an d  C lem ents n o te  th a t  we do need  such 
ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f th e  design p rocess, n o t only fo r th e  ad v an cem en t o f know ledge, and  
because  th e y  su p p o rt th e  view th a t  we a re  being  scientific, b u t  m o st im p o r ta n tly  because  
th ey  help w ith  th e  ta sk  of im prov ing  so ftw are quality . T h e  reasons th ey  give include:
• R a tio n a lisa tio n  can  ac t as p lans for subsequen t p ro je c ts , p ro v id in g  valuab le  re ­
sources th a t  th e  engineer can  d raw  u p o n  fo r in itia l o r ie n ta tio n  a n d  also for h and ling  
p rob lem s w hen th e y  arise.
• R a tio n a lisa tio n s  help us to  discuss th e  reason ing  th a t  leads to  c e rta in  courses of 
ac tio n , th u s  p ro te c tin g  us to  som e e x te n t from  ad hoc sequences o f ac tio n s. T h is  
reaso n in g  will be  based  u p o n  id ea lisa tions, b u t i t  m ay  stiff p ro v id e  gu idance.
• R a tio n a lisa tio n s  help th e  social p rocess of design by  c o n tr ib u tin g  a  s ta n d a rd , if 
idealised , p ro ced u re  ag a in st w hich p rog ress can  be d iscussed. T h is  allow s th e  id en ­
tifica tio n  of m ilestones, for exam ple , an d  also th e  s ta n d a rd isa tio n  o f d iscourse ac­
tiv itie s  b o th  w ith in  th e  p ro je c t an d  fo r th e  purposes o f e x te rn a l m o n ito rin g .
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W e m ig h t ad d  to  th is  lis t th a t  ra tio n a lisa tio n s  also  serve to  su p p o rt a rg u m e n ts  fo r “b est 
p ra c tic e ” b e tw een  p ro je c ts . T h ey  m ig h t, fo r exam ple, be used to  defend ag a in s t charges 
o f negligence a fte r  th e  ev en t, o r in  ten d e rin g  for co n trac ts . If  we accep t th e  line of 
a rg u m e n t th a t  ra tio n a lisa tio n  is o f value, th e n  we shou ld  tu rn  o u r  a t te n tio n  to  possible 
ra tio n a lisa tio n s  o f design processes to  acco m p an y  o u r p roposed  m odel.
In  o u r p ro p o sed  m odel th e  engineer is faced  w ith  th e  ta s k  of p ro d u c in g  a  sequence o f th e ­
ories. A n obvious p lace to  s ta r t  looking  for ra tio n a lisa tio n s , th e re fo re , is th e  P h ilo sophy  
o f Science. As th e  d evelopm en t o f o u r m odel s ta r te d  w ith  P o p p e r ’s id ea  o f re fu ta tio n , 
we will also s ta r t  o u r ra tio n a lisa tio n s  from  here . T h e  sim plest ra tio n a lisa tio n  we can  
give is to  observe th a t  once a  th e o ry  has been  re fu ted  a n o th e r one m u s t be  found . T h is 
na ive  re fu ta tio n a lism  is n o t p a r tic u la r ly  help fu l, how ever, fo r i t  offers no  advice on  w h a t 
m ig h t c o n s titu te  scientific p rog ress, an d  no  guid ing  h eu ristics b ey o n d  a  process o f tr ia l 
an d  e rro r . A lso it  does n o t acco rd  w ith  th e  fac ts  for th e re  is no  d o u b t th a t  som e very  
successful science has been  carried  o u t w ith  theo ries th a t  h ad  a lread y  been  re fu ted . W e 
w ould  end up  w ith  little  m ore  th a n  a  tra c e  o f  science as a  sequence o f re fu te d , an d  u n ­
connec ted , th eo rie s , an d  th is  c learly  does n o t m odel th e  so ftw are design  process as we 
w ould  like it  to  be , even if i t  com es close to  th e  process as i t  is som etim es observed .
A m o re  so p h is tica ted  fo rm  of re fu ta tio n a lism  is b ased  011 P o p p e r ’s n o tio n s  th a t  we w an t 
to  m ak e  theo ries m ore  genera l a n d  m ore  precise  if  science is to  be p rogressive . W e can  
tra n s la te  th is  in to  th e  te rm s  o f o u r so ftw are  engineering  m odel q u ite  easily, a n d  we end  
up  w ith  a  lim ited  fo rm  o f refinem en t. If  w e d raw  a  la ttic e  sim ilar to  t h a t  o f figure 2.1, 
b u t using  th e  conven tio n a l n o ta tio n  of p ro g ra m  co rrec tness, an d  n o tin g  th a t  we w an t 
to  tr e a t  th e  specification S  an d  th e  p ro g ram  P  as theo ries, we g e t th e  la tt ic e  show n in  
F ig u re  6.1.
{x> 1} S {x > 2}
{x > 0} S’ {x > 2} {x> 1} S" {x = 2}
{x > 0} P {x = 2}
F ig u re  6.1: L a ttic e  o f R efinem ent
T h e  o rderings in  th is  la tt ic e  co rrespond  to  th e  refinem ent o rd erin g , an d  th e  d iag ram  
ab o v e  reflects th e  law s [M or90, p ag e  8].
(post1 = >  p o st) ==>■ w : [pre, post] C  w : [pre, post']
(pre pre') = >  w : [pre, post] C w : [pre', post]
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In  th is  case a d d itio n a l precision  w as in c luded  to  m ak e  th e  p ro g ram  d e te rm in is tic . P rec i­
sion m ay  also be increased  to  express th e  th e o ry  in  te rm s o f s ta te  local to  th e  p ro g ram , 
th a t  is, r a th e r  th a n  in  te rm s  only  o f  in p u t an d  o u tp u t  com ponen ts. T h is  w ould  give rise 
to  law s of refinem ent such  as [M or90, pag e  53]
if  pre  =>• 3 c : T .p re1 an d  c is a  fresh  n am e  n o t occuring  in  w ,p re  o r post th e n  
w : [pre, post] C  con c : T .w  : [pre', post]
I t  seem s likely th a t  all th e  o th e r  law s o f refinem en t can  be exp la ined  in  te rm s  of P o p p e r ’s 
n o tio n  o f genera lisa tio n  o r m ak ing  m ore  precise.
T h is ra tio n a lisa tio n  gives a  fa ir  id ea  o f w h a t p rogress in  o u r m odel m ig h t m ean , b u t  
w h a t o f re fu ta tio n  itse lf?  S uppose , w hilst a tte m p tin g  a  refinem ent s tep , w e d e tec t an  in ­
consistency , how  shou ld  w e reac t?  R e fu ta tio n a lism , b o th  naive an d  so p h is tica ted , leaves 
us floundering  here , fo r it  says n o th in g  m ore  th a n  th a t  th e  th eo ry  shou ld  be  re jec ted . 
S oftw are  designers certa in ly  do n o t beh av e  in  th is  fash ion , ra th e r  th ey  b a c k tra c k  in  qu ite  
su b tle  w ays. G iven a  p ro g ram  th a t  is in co n sis ten t w ith  th e  req u irem en ts , fo r exam ple, 
th e  p rofessional designer is n o t allow ed th e  o p tio n  of changing  th e  req u irem en ts  (a lth o u g h  
th is  is a  com m on reac tio n  am o n g st th o se  lack ing  p rofessionalism , a n d  also am o n g st m an y  
s tu d e n ts ) . S im ilarly  th e  designer does n o t usually  re jec t th e  th eo ry  o f th e  p ro g ram m in g  
lan g u ag e , an d  rep lace  i t  by one th a t  rem oves th e  inconsistency , fo r th is  w ould  requ ire  th e  
re -im p lem en ta tio n  of com pilers, an d  ad d  a  n u m b er of p ro o f ob liga tions. B o th  of these  
o p tio n s m u s t rem ain  a  possib ility , o f course, for th e  com piler and  req u irem en ts  h av e  only 
been  te s te d , an d  so m ay  c o n ta in  th e  inconsistency , b u t  usually  th e  designer will assum e 
th a t  a  m is tak e  has been  m ad e  in p ro d u c in g  an  aspec t o f th e  th e o ry  u n d e r his o r h er 
co n tro l, an d  o f im m ed ia te  concern , a n d  look for co rrections in  th is  region.
T h is id e a  fits  in  very  n ea tly  w ith  K u h n ’s n o tio n  o f p a rad ig m s [K uh70b], T h e  engineer 
will accep t c e rta in  theories an d  w ays o f p roceed ing , includ ing  th e  use o f to o ls , as fo rm ing  
a n  irre fu ta b le  p a r t  o f th e  p a rad ig m , an d  w ork  w ith in  th e  c o n s tra in t th ey  im pose:
“ . .  .w h en  engaged  in a  n o rm a l re sea rch  p ro g ram , th e  sc ien tis t m u s t prem ise  
c u rre n t th eo ry  as th e  rules o f th e  gam e. His o b jec t is to  solve a  puzzle, 
p re fe rab ly  one a t  w hich o th e rs  h av e  failed , an d  cu rren t th eo ry  is req u ired  to  
define th a t  puzzle an d  to  g u a ra n te e  th a t ,  given sufficient b rilliance , i t  can  be 
solved. O f course th e  p ra c titio n e r  of such  an  en te rp rise  m u st o ften  te s t  th e  
co n jec tu red  puzzle so lu tion  th a t  his in te g rity  suggests. B u t on ly  his p e rso n a l 
co n jec tu re  is te s te d . If  i t  fails th e  te s t ,  only his ab ility  n o t th e  co rpus of 
c u rre n t science is im p u g n ed .” [K uh70a, page  70]
T h e  ru les assum ed  c o n s titu te  a  p a rad ig m , an d  K uh n  d istinguishes b e tw een  n o rm al sci­
ence, th a t  occurs w ith in  a  p a r tic u la r  p a rad ig m , from  periods of scientific rev o lu tio n , 
w hen  p a rad ig m s them selves a re  ov erth ro w n  an d  rep laced . T h e  o v erth ro w  o f a  p a rad ig m  
is n o t th e  d irec t re su lt o f a  re fu ta tio n , th e re fo re , b u t  a  reflection o f a  n u m b er o f re fu ta ­
tio n s t h a t  h av e  o ccu rred  in  n o rm a l science w hich have n o t been  reso lved  sa tisfac to rily .
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I t m ay  also be  a  reflection  o f th e  in ad eq u acy  o f a  p a rad ig m  to  p e rm it c e rta in  puzzles to  
be a t te m p te d  a t  all.
C learly  a  s itu a tio n  can  occur in  so ftw are  developm ent w here, for exam ple , confidence 
in  a  com piler is sh ak en , o r w hen  fa ilu re  to  m eet a  specification causes d o u b t as to  th e  
consistency  o f th e  specification  itself. In  genera l, how ever, th e  n o tio n  o f a  p a ra d ig m  shift 
does n o t seem  p a rtic u la rly  a p p ro p ria te  to  th e  p rogress of in d iv id u a l p ro je c ts . T h e re  is 
m ore  to  p a rad ig m s th a n  ju s t th e  th eo ries  we a d o p t, how ever, fo r th e y  also include w ays 
of looking a t  th e  w orld , an d  w hen  p a rad ig m  sh ifts occur
I t  is r a th e r  as if  th e  p rofessional co m m u n ity  h a d  been sudden ly  t ra n s p o r te d  to  
a n o th e r  p lan e t w here fam ilia r o b jec ts  a re  seen in  different lig h t an d  a re  jo ined  
by  u n fam ilia r ones as well. . . .  w e m ay  w a n t to  say  th a t  a f te r  a  revo lu tio n  
sc ien tis ts  a re  re spond ing  to  a  d ifferen t w o rld .” [K uh79, page  110]
T h e re  is lit tle  d o u b t th a t  such  p a rad ig m  sh ifts do occur in  S oftw are E ng ineering , b u t  th e  
im p o sitio n  of co n tro l m echan ism s usually  ensu re  th a t  th ese  occu r only  b e tw een  p ro je c ts  
an d  n o t d u rin g  th em . L uker, fo r exam ple, says th a t
“I feel s tro n g ly  th a t  C o m p u te r  Science is ap p ro ach in g  a  p a ra d ig m  sh ift. T h is 
w ould  have stag g erin g  financial im p lica tions, an d  m an y  h u m a n  ones— som e 
m ay  be u n ab le  o r unw illing to  a d a p t to  a  new  p arad ig m . T h e  cham pions of 
new  p rac tices a re  n early  a lw ays tre a te d  w ith  g re a t suspicion as th e y  shake th e  
very  fo u n d a tio n s  of a  d iscip line. H ow ever, once th e  sh ift h as  been  effected, 
i t  is reg a rd ed  as a  n a tu ra l  s tep , an d  one w hich should  have been  ta k e n  m uch  
ea rlie r .” [Lul<89, page  255]
T h e  in tro d u c tio n  o f O b jec t O rien ted  D esign, fo r exam ple, w ith  i ts  a sso c ia ted  to o ls , causes 
th e  designer to  ta k e  a  rad ica lly  d ifferen t view  of th e  w orld [DIL90], M eyer no tes  th a t  
th e  m ove to  O O D  rep resen ts  a  p a rad ig m  shift:
“F or som e p ro g ram m ers th is  change in  v iew poin t is as m u ch  o f a  shock  as 
m ay  have been  for som e people , in  a n o th e r  tim e , th e  id ea  o f th e  e a r th  o rb itin g  
a ro u n d  th e  sun  r a th e r  th a n  th e  rev erse .” [M ey88, page 50]
P uzzles th a t  could n o t be  exp la ined  in  p ro ced u ra l pseudocode, can  now  b e  add ressed , 
such  as th e  w idesp read  re-use of code. A  n u m b e r of o th e r  w ays o f tack lin g  system  
design can  be  seen to  fo rm  p arad ig m s, inc lud ing  von  N eum ann  b ased  designs, fu n c tio n a l 
p ro g ram m in g , logic p ro g ram m in g  an d  e x p e rt sy stem s. I t  m ig h t be a rg u ed  th a t  fo rm al 
an d  in fo rm al app roaches to  design, o r even  selfconscious and  unselfconscious design, form  
exam ples of p a rad ig m s. A  discussion o f th is , an d  its  im plica tions for cu rricu lu m  design 
has been  given elsew here [Loo90c].
T h is  ra ises a  question  th a t  is o f significance for o u r ta sk  o f cu rricu lum  design, nam ely  to  
w h a t e x te n t shou ld  an  engineer be responsib le  for th e  selection of p a rad ig m s?  C learly
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n o t every  asp ec t o f an  a d o p te d  p a rad ig m  can  b e  su b jec ted  to  reflec tion  by  its  p ro p o n en ts ; 
som e o f th e  w orld  view s, fo r exam ple , will be  ta c i t ,  an d  n o t availab le  to  in tro sp ec tio n , 
b u t  shou ld  engineers b e  ex p ec ted  to  a t te m p t  selfconscious selection  o f w orld  view s w here 
possib le? Shields, for exam ple, d e m o n s tra te d  n early  a  decade ago  th a t  th e  p a rad ig m  
u n d e rp in n in g  SDL like system s o f specification  w as unso u n d . T h is d e m o n s tra tio n  has 
n o t led  to  a  re jec tio n  of th e  p a rad ig m . W e can  only assum e th a t  th is  is because  th o se  
w ork ing  w ith in  th e  p a rad ig m  a re  n o t p re p a re d  to  question  its  fo u n d a tio n s . T h is is very  
im p o r ta n t , fo r i t  ra ises th e  questio n  as to  w h e th e r we should  te a c h  w ith in  a  p a ra d ig m , o r 
a t te m p t  to  in tro d u c e  an d  co m p are  m an y  p a rad ig m s. N a tu ra l science teach in g  ce rta in ly  
does te a c h  w ith in  p a ra d ig m , fo r i t  uses exem plars d raw n  from  w ith in  one  p a rad ig m  m ost 
o f th e  tim e . G oldberg , fo r exam ple , h as  n o te d  th a t  th e  response  o f B ritish  physic ists 
to  E in s te in ’s th eo ry  w as cond itioned  b y  th e  fa c t th a t  a  “B ritish  th e o re tic a l physic ist 
. . .  w as tra in e d  to  do e th e r  m echanics; i t  is w h a t he h a d  to  lea rn , a n d  it  is w h a t he 
knew  b e s t” [GolTO, P ag e  91]. M oreover, th is  ed u ca tio n  is assessed by  know ledge o f these  
ex em p lars , so a  successful sc ien tis t a t  th e  o u tse t o f a  career is one w ho w orks well w ith in  
th e  g iven p a rad ig m . W e shall questio n  th is  a t t i tu d e  fu r th e r  in  th e  n e x t c h a p te r , w here 
w e will suggest th a t  i t  is to o  early  for w ith in -p a rad ig m  teach in g  to  be u sed  in  Softw are 
E ng ineering , an d  a lte rn a tiv e s  h av e  to  b e  found .
W e shou ld  n o te  in  passing  th a t  K u h n  h as  o ften  been  d u b b ed  a  sociologist by  o th e r  
ph ilosophers because  o f his in tro d u c tio n  o f p a rad ig m  sh ifts th a t  d ep en d  on  th e  social 
p rocesses of accep tan ce , an d  the re fo re  his ra tio n a lisa tio n s  a re  n o t “m ethodo log ies in 
te rm s of w hich th e  h is to rian  re c o n s tru c ts  ‘in te rn a l h is to ry ’ ” [Lak71, page  91]. T h ey  
in tro d u c e  ex tran eo u s  fac to rs  over w hich th e  sc ien tis t has no  con tro l. Jo n es, how ever, 
re jec ts  th is  011 th e  g rounds th a t  th e  m a jo r  influence on  th is  social b eh av io u r is in itia l 
ed u ca tio n , an d  th is  ed u ca tio n  shou ld  be  considered p a r t  o f science.
“B ecom ing e d u ca ted  is in te rn a l to  th e  professional a c tiv ity , even  if i t  is, in
itse lf, n o n -ra tio n a !” [Jon86, page  450].
K u h n ’s no tio n  of p arad ig m s seem s to  offer a  good  basis for ra tio n a lisa tio n  of th e  sh ifts 
th a t  occu r b e tw een  p ro je c ts , b u t i t  does n o t offer a  g rea t deal o f en lig h ten m en t on  th e  
p rog ress of in d iv id u a l p ro je c ts , o th e r  th a n  th e  neg a tiv e  observ a tio n  th a t  such  sh ifts w ould 
be  p o te n tia lly  d isastro u s for p ro je c ts  w ith in  w hich th ey  o ccu rred , so w e shou ld  consider 
con tro lling  scientific ac tiv ities  to  d iscourage  th a t  from  h ap p en in g . A  m ore  p rom ising  
a p p ro ach  to  th e  ra tio n a lisa tio n  o f a  single p ro je c t seem s to  be L a k a to s ’s re search  p ro ­
g ram m es [Lak70]. L aka tos suggests th a t  we can  co n stru e  th e o ry  co n s tru c tio n  as being  
governed  by tw o  ty p es  o f m ethodo log ica l ru les: negative heuristics  t h a t  te ll us w h a t 
ro u te s  to  avoid, an d  positive heuristics  t h a t  te ll us w h a t p a th s  to  p u rsu e .
Science, accord ing  to  L ak a to s , com prises research programmes governed  by  th ese  tw o 
ty p es  o f h eu ris tic . In  p a r tic u la r , each  research  p ro g ram m e has a sso c ia ted  w ith  it  a  hard 
core o f th eo ry , an d  th e  n eg a tiv e  h eu ris tic  forb ids us from  try in g  to  a t te m p t  to  re fu te  
i t .  W e m u s t p ro te c t th is  core by  bu ild ing  a  p ro tec tiv e  b e lt o f au x ilia ry  h y p o th eses  if 
necessary . T hese  aux ilia ry  h y p o th eses  will fo rm  th e  progressive  p a r t  of th e  th eo ry , an d  a
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“research  p ro g ram m e is successful i f  i t  leads to  a  p rogressive p rob lem  shift; unsuccessful 
if  it  leads to  a  d eg en era tin g  p rob lem  sh if t” [Lak70, page 133]. T h a t  is, if  th e  aux ilia ry  
s ta te m e n ts  in h ib it th e  so lu tion  o f th e  p rob lem s th e  research  p ro g ram m e  se ts  o u t to  
solve, th e  p ro g ram m e  will fail. W h en  a  p ro g ram m e ceases to  be  successful, we need  to  
a b an d o n  it  an d  find  a n o th e r . T h u s  th e  h a rd  core is n o t sim ply an  ad o p tio n  of P o in c a re ’s 
conven tionalism , for th e  theo ries i t  co n ta in s  a re  still vu lnerab le  to  re jec tion .
T h e  positive  h eu ris tic  o f a  re search  p ro g ram m e  is w h a t d rives us to  c o n s tru c t th e  p ro ­
tec tiv e  b e lt, for i t  en cap su la tes  th e  p u rp o se  b eh in d  th e  p ro g ram m e, a n d  th e  m e th o d s  
we m ig h t a d o p t to  achieve th is  pu rp o se . T h e  sc ien tist is se ttin g  o u t to  solve p a r tic u la r  
p rob lem s, a n d  hence will need  to  c o n s tru c t a d d itio n a l th eo re tica l s ta te m e n ts , b u t th ese  
will b e  d irec ted  m ore  closely th a n  sim ply  by  genera lisa tio n  an d  precision . M oreover, 
re fu ta tio n  w ill be  a im ed  a t  th e se  a d d itio n a l s ta te m e n ts , ra th e r  th a n  th e  p ro g ram m e  as a  
w hole. Sim ilarly, th e  engineer is seeking to  solve p a r tic u la r  p rob lem s, n o t sim ply  to  con­
s tru c t  an y  a r tifa c t. T h e  p rob lem  to  b e  solved, to g e th e r  w ith  re s tr ic tio n s  im posed  by  th e  
h a rd  core, lead  to  th e  selection  o f th e  p o sitive  h eu ristic , w hich th u s  com prises “a  p a rtia lly  
a r tic u la te d  se t of suggestions or h in ts  on  how  to  change, develop th e  ‘re fu tab le  v a r ia n ts ’ 
o f th e  re sea rch -p ro g ram m e, how  to  m odify, so p h is tica te , th e  ‘re fu ta b le ’ p ro te c tiv e  b e l t” 
[Lak70, page  135]. I t  is th ese  “suggestions o r h in ts ” th a t  will fo rm  th e  basis o f o u r final 
use o f “m e th o d ” discussed la te r  in  th is  c h a p te r . T h is  analysis suggests t h a t  s ta n d a rd s , 
w hich if  a d o p te d  will fo rm  p a r t  o f th e  h a rd  core of a  ran g e  o f re sea rch  program .es, m ay  
h av e  a  pern icious ro le  to  p lay , for th e y  re s tr ic t th e  op tions open  to  th e  designer. T h e ir 
use can  b e  ju stified , how ever, if  seen as p a r t  o f a  la rg e r research  p ro g ram m e , w hose aim  
is th e  un ifica tion  o f system s. T h e  designer m u s t m ake th e  value ju d g em en ts  necessary  
to  decide b e tw een  th e  heu ristics o f th ese  tw o p ro g ram m es, w eighing up  fac to rs  such  as 
re-use o f co m p o n en ts  ag a in s t possib le d is to rtio n s  th a t  m ay  ensue.
W e can  now  discuss o u r th e o ry  bu ild ing  view  o f sy stem  design in  th e  lig h t o f L a k a to s’s 
re search  p ro g ram m es. T h is  can  be done in  a t  least tw o  w ays. W e can  n o te , fo r exam ple , 
t h a t  so ftw are engineers u sua lly  ca rry  a  h a rd  core from  p ro je c t to  p ro je c t. T h is  will 
com prise  th eo ries o f ta rg e t  en v iro n m en ts  a n d  also theories in h e ren t in  too ls and  m e th o d s  
a d o p te d  for rep resen tin g  w orld  views. In  th is  se ttin g  th e  h a rd  core will only  be  re jec ted  
w hen i t  fails to  solve p rob lem s, th a t  is, w hen i t  fails to  su p p o rt c u rre n t p ro je c ts . T h e  
m ove fro m  m ach ine  code to  h igh  level lan g u ag es, for exam ple, can  b e  seen as a  re jec tion  
of th e  h a rd  core based  on low level a rc h ite c tu re , to  be  rep laced  by  theo ries o f m ore  
a b s tra c t  m ach ines. S im ilarly  th e  use  o f flow c h a rts  as w orld view s declined as th e y  failed 
to  su p p o rt m ore  com plex design ta sk s . O nce we have a d o p te d  a  h a rd  core, how ever, 
we will th e n  su p p o rt i t  fo r th e  re s t o f th e  p ro je c t. H ere th e  so ftw are  engineer faces 
sim ilar p rob lem s in  decid ing  w hen to  overth row  a  h a rd  core th a t  th e  sc ien tis t faces. I t  
is a  m a t te r  o f ju d g em en t as to  w hen such  a  core has ceased to  be p rogressive. U nder 
th is  in te rp re ta tio n , K u h n ’s p a rad ig m s can  be  seen as research  p ro g ram m es th a t  have 
o b ta in e d  som e k in d  of m onopoly  w ith in  a  co m m u n ity 1.
1 Lakatos disputes this, claiming that the decision to reject a hard core is rational, being based on the 
notion of progress, whereas the overthrow of a paradigm is fundamentally irrational. This claim seems
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W e can  also consider an  in d iv idua l p ro je c t as g iving rise to  re sea rch  p ro g ram m es. In  
th is  case we m ig h t consider th e  p h ase  o f design up  to  th e  estab lish in g  o f a  c o n tra c tu a l 
b o u n d a ry  w ith  th e  cu sto m er as a  research  p ro g ram m e in  its  ow n r ig h t. O nce th e  c o n tra c t 
has been  estab lish ed , a  new  research  p ro g ram m e is e stab lished  co n ta in in g  th e  c o n tra c tu a l 
in fo rm a tio n  in  its  h a rd  core. T h is core, w hich  will also co n ta in  w orld  view s an d  so on, 
m u s t b e  p ro te c te d . T h e  n eg a tiv e  h eu ris tic , the re fo re , de term ines th a t ,  w h a te v e r else m ay  
h a p p e n , we m u st m eet th e  c u s to m e r’s req u irem en ts . T h e  positiv e  h eu ris tic  drives ns to  
seek so lu tions to  th e  puzzle o f how  to  do  th is  w ith  a  th e o ry  th a t  can  be  a u to m a te d , th a t  
is, to  e x te n d  th e  phenom enological th e o ry  to  include th e  s ta te  o f som e re a l m achine. N ote  
t h a t  th e  specification  of a  ta rg e t  en v iro n m en t as p a r t  of th e  c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d a ry  now  
co n trib u te s  to  b o th  th e  n eg a tiv e  an d  p o sitiv e  h eu ristics. T h e  th eo ries su rro u n d in g  th is  
m ach in e  c o n s titu te  p a r t  o f th e  h a rd  core , b u t  th e  “suggestions o r h in ts ” th a t  com prise  th e  
en g in eers’ experience o f th e  m ach in e  will c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  positiv e  h eu ris tic . W ith  th is  
in te rp re ta tio n , th e  decision to  o v erth ro w  a  re search  p ro g ram m e d u rin g  a  p ro je c t reflects 
e ith e r th e  eng ineer’s re jec tio n  of th e  m e th o d s  an d  too ls a lread y  chosen for th e  p ro je c t, 
o r b o th  th e  cu s to m er an d  engineer agreeing  to  a  change o f c o n tra c t. W e shou ld  n o te , 
how ever, th a t  an  experienced  engineer will n o t base  a  research  p ro je c t on  a  h a rd  core 
th a t  is to o  volatile . In  p a r tic u la r , n o t every  d e ta il o f th e  c u s to m e r’s req u irem en ts  will 
necessarily  be  inc luded  in  th e  core as specific s ta te m e n ts : w here th e  eng ineer an tic ip a te s  
changes occu rring  in  th e  fu tu re , a  g enera l s ta te m e n t will b e  in c lu d ed , an d  a  specific 
in s ta n tia tio n  ad d ed  to  th e  p ro te c tiv e  b e lt. No self-respecting  so ftw are  engineer w ould  
base  a  design on  a  h a rd  core th a t  co n ta in ed  th e  specific r a te  o f V .A .T ., for exam ple , o r 
on  th e  c u s to m e r’s in sistence  th a t  no  invoices are  issued w ith  m ore  th a n  six d ig its in  th e  
n u m b er.
O ne im p o r ta n t  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  re fu ta tio n ism  an d  L a k a to s’s re sea rch  p ro g ram m es is 
th a t  th e  d ialectic  o f th e  la t te r  is no  longer sim ply  one of co n jec tu re  follow ed by  refu ­
ta tio n , W e do n o t te s t  all o f o u r th eo ries , fo r exam ple, ra th e r  w e allow  th e  p o sitive  
h eu ris tic  to  d rive  o u r p ro g ram m e fo rw ard , re ly ing  on th e  ju d g em en t o f th e  engineer to  
n o te  p rogressive s itu a tio n s . In  an  ex trem e  case, w here we em b race  a  fo rm al system  of 
refinem en t in  o u r h a rd  core, we m ig h t allow  th e  positive  h eu ris tic  com prising  refinem ent 
m e th o d s  to  d rive th e  design along , an d  n o t te s t  th e  re su ltin g  th e o ry  a t  all. In  genera l, 
how ever, te s tin g  o f theo ries will be  carried  o u t a t jud icious p o in ts , b u t  m ore  to  solve 
local puzzles th a t  to  re fu te  th e  w hole theo ry . T h u s a lth o u g h  P o p p e r ’s ideal o f science is 
m a in ta in e d , th e  m e th o d s  a d o p te d  a re  sign ifican tly  d ifferen t. W e know , for exam ple , th a t  
th e  th e o ry  o f in fin ite  s tack s will b e  in co m p a tib le  w ith  t h a t  o f an y  rea l, fin ite , m ach ine  
u sed  fo r im p lem en ta tio n . R efu tin g  a  th e o ry  th a t  con ta in ed  in te ra c tio n s  o f th e  tw o  w ould  
b e  po in tle ss , fo r i t  is to o  sim ple. R a th e r  we shelve th e  inconsistency , allow ing th e  p o s­
itiv e  h eu ris tic  o f th e  p ro g ram m e to  cause it  to  progress u n til a  sensible p o in t has been  
reached  for th e  in tro d u c tio n  of fin ite  s tack s. R efu ta tio n a lism , b o th  na ive  an d  so p h isti­
c a te d , w ould requ ire  us to  re fu te  a n d  re jec t th e  th eo ry  as soon as th e  inconsistency  was 
no ticed , an d  o u r scientific a t t i tu d e  w ould  requ ire  us to  n o tice  it  as soon  as possible.
difficult to support without a much firmer notion of “progress55 than Lakatos ever provided.
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6.3 Methods of Control and Coordination
S oftw are E ngineering  is u sua lly  considered  to  be  p rim arily  a  social p rocess, involving 
team s o f ind iv iduals  in  g roup  prob lem -so lv ing  ac tiv ities. A  th ird  view  o f “m e th o d ” th a t  
we can  ta k e  is as a  con tro lling , o r co o rd in a tin g , influence on  th e se  ac tiv itie s . M cC rory , 
fo r exam ple , w rites
“In  ad d itio n  to  being  a  con tro lling  influence u p o n  th e  design  p rocess, th e  
design m e th o d 2 also serves as a  co m m unications m ed ium . M an ag em en t of­
te n  does n o t u n d e rs ta n d  th e  s tep s  th ro u g h  w hich a  design p ro g ram m e  m u st 
pass b e tw een  its  incep tio n  an d  its  com pletion . . . . T h e  design m e th o d  can 
p rov ide  a  ‘un iversa l la n g u ag e ’ u n d e rs ta n d a b le  to  b o th  th e  designer a n d  his 
m a n a g e m e n t.” [M cC74, P ag e  172]
T h is  is a  very  com plex issue, a n d  a  d e ta iled  s tu d y  o f th e  su b jec t w ould  ta k e  us in to  th e  
rea lm s of a t  least m an ag em en t s tu d ies , social psychology an d  sociology, in  ad d itio n  to  a 
co n sid era tio n  o f th e  e th ica l issues involved. W e can n o t avoid  som e co n sid e ra tio n  o f th e  
m a,tte r, how ever, for th e  s ta n c e  we ta k e  h ere  will m a.terially effect o n r  cu rricu lum  design.
W h a t does i t  m ean  w hen m an ag em en t claim s to  b e  using  a  so ftw are  design m ethod(o logy)?  
T h e re  a re  a t  least th ree  possib le in te rp re ta tio n s  th a t  we m ig h t p lace on  such  a  claim . 
F ir s t ,  i t  m ig h t m ean  th a t  m an ag em en t has im posed  a  n u m b er of hoops for engineers to  
ju m p  th ro u g h  in  th e  course o f every  p ro je c t. Such im p o sition  is som etim es, erroneously , 
iden tified  w ith  q u a lity  con tro l: as Voss has observed , q u a lity  co n tro l com es only w ith  a 
q u a lity  cu ltu re , an d  th e  im position  o f hoops does n o t fit well w ith in  such  a  cu ltu re  [Vos90, 
P ag e llG ]. T hese  hoops m ay  o r m ay  n o t be  seen as su p p o rtiv e  of th e  design process b y  th e  
engineers involved , b u t  th is  is irre lev an t, fo r th e y  m u st be ju m p e d  none th e  less. M ore­
over, th ese  hoops m u s t be  ju m p e d  in  a  pre-defined  o rder, an d  p ro je c t costing  m akes th e  
na ive  a ssu m p tio n  (o r defin ition) th a t  w hen all th e  hoops hav e  been  successfully ju m p ed , 
th e  p ro je c t has been  successfully  com pleted . R ejec tion  of th e  m e th o d  is n o t an  op tio n  
for th e  engineers concerned , fo r th is  decision will be  ta k e n  by  a  h igher a u th o rity , w ith  
due re g a rd  n o t so m uch  fo r th e  ideals o f engineering , b u t for th o se  o f c o rp o ra te  finance. 
In  th is  scenario  th e  engineer can n o t assum e responsib ility  for th e  fitness for p u rp o se  of 
th e  designed a rtifa c t: only  m an ag em en t can  claim  th is , and  th e y  m ay  n o t feel inclined to  
do so. T h e  engineer need  only  b e  concerned  w ith  th e  localised ta sk  of ju m p in g  th ro u g h  
th e  hoops. M oreover, such  a  scenario  has a  ce rta in  ap p ea l to  th e  eng ineer as em ployee. 
F ey erab en d  has n o te d  th a t  sim ilar p h en o m en a  hav e  arisen  in  m o d ern  science, w hen  he 
w rites
. . la te  2 0 th -cen tu ry  science h as  given up  all ph ilosoph ical p re ten sio n s and  
has becom e a  pow erfu l business t h a t  shapes th e  m e n ta lity  o f its  p ra c titio n e rs .
G ood  p a y m e n t, good  s tan d in g  w ith  th e  boss an d  th e  colleagues in  th e ir  ‘u n i t5
2 M cCrory believes th at a single design m ethod exists.
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a re  th e  chief aim s o f th e se  h u m a n  a n ts  w ho excel in  th e  so lu tio n  o f tin y  
p rob lem s b u t w ho c a n n o t m ake  sense o f a n y th in g  tran scen d in g  th e ir  dom ain  
o f com p eten ce .” [Fey75, P ag e  188]
W h y  has such  a  s itu a tio n  arisen , w here people  are  p rep a red  to  be  tr e a te d  as “h u m an  
a n ts ” ? M ost engineers a re  well ed u c a te d  a n d  w ould  like to  th in k  of them selves as free 
th in k e rs . W h y  w ould  anyone w an t to  becom e ju s t  a  cog in  a  “softw are fa c to ry ” [Tul87] 
o r a  science m achine? F ey erab en d  h as  a  reason  fo r th is:
“ . . .  it  needs only  a  few w ell-placed p h rases  to  p u t th e  fear o f C haos in to  
th e  m o st en ligh tened  aud ience , a n d  to  m ak e  th e m  y ea rn  fo r sim ple ru les an d  
sim ple dogm as w hich th e y  can  follow w ith o u t h av in g  to  reconsider m a tte rs  
a t  every  tu r n .” [Fey75, P a g e  181],
T h e re  a re  u n d o u b ted ly  tim es w hen th e  com plexity  o f th e  so ftw are d eve lopm en t ta sk  is 
such  th a t  th e  ind iv id u a l flounders, an d  feels th e  need  for he lp , b u t  th e  im p o sitio n  of 
sets o f hoops is n o t th e  answ er. W lia t we m u st do is to  s tru c tu re  o u r ap p ro ach  to  each  
p ro je c t, w ith  due re g a rd  to  th e  p rob lem s an d  resources availab le, a n d  b e  p rep a red  to  ta k e  
resp o n sib ility  for th ese  ac tio n s. T h is  is o f crucial im p o rtan ce  fo r o u r cu rricu lu m  design 
ta sk , fo r a  re jec tion  o f im posed  m e th o d s  per se  rad ica lly  a lte rs  o u r  th e  p rob lem . W e no 
longer h av e  th e  refuge o f teach in g  a  subse t o f com m on m e th o d s  from  w ith in  p a rad ig m , 
b u t  we m u s t te a c h  th e  s tu d e n ts  to  select m e th o d s. T h is is n o t th e  easy  o p tio n  fo r it  
requ ires a  m ore  reflective ap p ro ach  an d , as F ey erab en d  no tes
“I do find  it  a  l i ttle  as to n ish in g  to  see w ith  w h a t fe rvour s tu d e n ts  an d  o th e r  
n o n -in itia te s  cling to  s ta le  p h rases  an d  decrep it princip les as if  a  s itu a tio n  in
w hich th ey  b e a r th e  full respo n sib ility  for every ac tio n  an d  a re  th e  orig inal
cause for every  reg u la rity  o f th e  m in d  w ere q u ite  u n b ea rab le  to  th e m .” [Fey75,
P ag e  182]
R ejec tion  of th is  ap p ro ach  to  m e th o d s , the re fo re , an tagon ises som e in d u s tr ia lis ts , w ho 
cite  th e  a rg u m en t o f chaos, som e ed u c a to rs , w ho cite  th e  p ro d u cer-co n su m er m odel of 
ed u ca tio n  as an  excuse for ad o p tin g  th e  easy o p tio n , an d  m an y  s tu d e n ts , w ho a re  terrified  
of th e  rea lisa tio n  th a t  in  designing fa u lty  so ftw are th ey  m ig h t kill som eone, an d  m uch 
p refer th e  resp o n sib ility  to  be sh ifted  to  som eone else. To com plica te  m a tte r s ,  we can n o t 
a rg u e  th e  case on  pure ly  ra tio n a l g ro u n d s, for we can n o t claim  such  an  a p p ro p ria te  set 
o f hoops does n o t ex is t, th e  co u n te r will b e  m ad e  th a t  we ju s t  h av e  n o t found  it  y e t.
I t  is a  m a tte r  o f ju d g em en t, an d , like th e  s tu d e n ts , we a re  n a tu ra lly  unw illing  to  ta k e
resp o n sib ility  for th e  re su ltin g  ac tions. I t  is m u ch  easier to  follow  th e  tre n d  in  a  fear o f 
C haos, seek su p p o rt in  th e  jo b  ad v e rtisem en ts  fo r softw are engineers, c ite  th e  la te s t  D T I 
in itia tiv e s , an d  avoid ta k in g  u n p a la ta b le  decisions. E d u c a tio n a lis t, be ing  designers, m ay  
also try  to  avoid  th e  loss o f innocence by  seeking refuge in  sty les. T h e  discussions on 
cu rricu lum  design in  th e  re s t o f th is  th esis , how ever, a re  p red ica ted  on  re jec tio n  of th is  
a p p ro ach .
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T h e  p h ra se  “ad o p tio n  o f a  m e th o d ” m ig h t also m ean , how ever, th a t  a  p a r tic u la r  ra tio n a l­
isa tio n  o f th e  process is being  em b raced . T h is  is a  very  d ifferen t m a t te r ,  fo r it  now  m eans 
th e  hoops do n o t ac tu a lly  need to  b e  ju m p e d  th ro u g h , b u t re su lts  m u s t b e  p re sen ted  as 
if th e y  h a d  been . In  a  sense, th is  is d ish o n est, b u t only in  th e  w ay th a t  a  sc ien tist is dis­
h o n est w hen he w rites u p  his ex p erim en ts , o r a  m a th e m a tic ia n  in  p re sen tin g  a  po lished  
proof.
T h e re  a re  m an y  ad v an tag es  o f a d o p tin g  such  ra tio n a lisa tio n s , inc lud ing  u n ifo rm ity  of 
d o c u m e n ta tio n , th e  iden tifica tio n  o f m ilestones, an d  th e  “scientific” facad e  it can  offer 
th e  discipline. T h is ra tio n a lisa tio n , like th e  hoop  ju m p in g , is u sually  m an ifest as a  series 
o f d iscursive ac ts  u n d e rta k e n  by  th e  engineers. R a th e r  th a n  a  single, final, ra tio n a lisa tio n , 
th e  engineer will usually  show  ra tio n a lisa tio n  by  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f d o cu m en ts  a t  various 
stag es  o f th e  design. T h is  is th e  t ru e  ro le  o f th e  life cycle. I t  identifies d o cu m en ts  th a t  
engineers shou ld  p ro d u ce  to  ra tio n a lise  th e  process. A  ty p ica l life cycle does n o t co n stra in  
th e  engineer to  th in k  only  a b o u t req u irem en ts  analysis u n til th e  req u irem en ts  do cu m en t 
h as  been  p ro d u ced , sim ply to  p ro d u ce  such  a  d ocum en t p red a tin g  th e  design  do cu m en ts . 
O ne of th e  lim ita tio n s  o f th e  ty p ica l life cycle, how ever, is th a t  it  te n d s  to  em phasise  
in fo rm ativ e  discourse a t  th e  expense o f e x p lo ra to ry  or scientific d iscourse . T h e  engineer 
is en couraged  to  d o cu m en t th e  “w h a t” of th e  p ro je c t, th e  “how ” being  sim ply “w h a t 
could be done to  b ring  th is  a b o u t” , b u t  n o t to  answ er th e  “w hy” q u estions, such  as 
“w hy th is  p re se n ta tio n  of req u irem en ts  w as a d o p te d ” o r “w hy th is  w ay  o f proceed ing  
will b rin g  a b o u t th e  desired  consequences” . M oreover, th e  p rog ress o f a  p ro je c t ten d s  
to  be ju d g ed  solely by  th e  s tre a m  o f d o c u m e n ta tio n  th a t  is p ro d u ced . B row n  h as n o te d  
th a t  th is  need  to  p ro d u ce  d o c u m e n ta tio n  m ay  adversely  effect th e  p ro je c t:
“ . .  .w e suffered from  an  excess o f design d o cu m en ta tio n  lite ra lly  driv ing  o u t 
design p ro p er. W e never h a d  tim e  to  n o tice  th a t  th e re  w as a  sim ple, e leg an t, 
answ er to  th e  p ro b lem .” [Bro84, P ag es 59-60]
N orcio an d  C h m u ra  have suggested  th a t  discourse betw een  engineers m ay  be a  b e t­
te r  in d ic a to r  o f design p rogress th a n  d o c u m e n ta tio n  p ro d u ced  for e x te rn a l consu m p tio n  
[NC86].
I t  is precisely  to  red ress th is  b a lance  th a t  th e  th eo ry  view has been  p ro p o sed , fo r a  th eo ry  
is in fo rm ativ e , b u t it  can  also b e  u sed  for ex p lo ra tio n  o r as th e  basis fo r p roofs. T h is  
ra tio n a lisa tio n  show s very  clearly  th a t  we will need to  teach  s tu d e n ts  to  ca rry  o u t all 
th re e  ty p es  o f reference discourse. U n fo rtu n a te ly , it  is un c lear how  such  a  ra tio n a lisa tio n  
w ould  b e  a d o p te d  by  m an ag em en t for th e  p u rposes o f co n tro l an d  co o rd in a tio n . P e rh a p s  
a  “neg a tiv e  h eu ris tic” do cu m en t is req u ired , iden tify ing  th e  a ssu m p tio n s  being  m ad e  a t 
th e  o u tse t of th e  p ro je c t, w hich will develop as th e  user req u irem en ts  a re  ad d ed , an d  also 
a  “p o sitive  h eu ris tic” d o cu m en t w hich d e ta ils  th e  w ays in  w hich p rog ress to w ard s  th e  goal 
h as  been  m ade. W e m ig h t in sis t th a t  th e  engineer uses p a r tic u la r  p re se n ta tio n  techn iques 
fo r in fo rm ativ e  an d  scientific d iscourse, th u s  m ak ing  V D M  an d  data flo w  d iag ram s, say, 
a  p ro je c t s ta n d a rd , o r even  in sist th a t  a  to o l fo r keeping tra c k  o f th is  p rog ress is used , 
b u t th e n  assu m p tio n s accom pany ing  th ese  n o ta tio n s , tools a n d  techn iques w ould  becom e
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p a r t  o f th e  h a rd  core. T h is  w ould  hav e  th e  ad v an tag e  of forcing m an a g e m e n t to  accep t 
th e  consequences of im posing  p a rad ig m s on  th e  designers.
A  th ird  possib ility  is th a t  m an ag ers  claim  to  have  ad o p ted  m e th o d s  w hen  th e y  believe 
th e  engineers are  using  th e  m e th o d s  as th e  basis for p lans. In  th is  case th e  m e th o d  
is u sed  to  o rien t th e  p ro je c t a t  th e  o u tse t, a n d  to  fall back  on  d u rin g  its  course. T h e  
engineers will n o t feel b o u n d  to  th e  p lan , how ever, an d  m ig h t re jec t i t  ve ry  early  on  if 
th e y  a re  finding it  o f l i t t le  use. In  th is  case, m a n a g e m e n t’s co m m itm en t to  th e  m e th o d  is 
largely  one of ed u ca tio n : th e y  hav e  p laced  th e ir  engineers in  a  p o sitio n  to  be ab le  to  use 
th e  m e th o d  (o therw ise  claim ing to  use th e  m e th o d  w ould  b e  d ish o n es t) , b u t  th ey  a re  n o t 
c laim ing  th a t  th e  m e th o d  is be ing  used  in  an y  co n tinu ing  sense. T h is  sense o f “m e th o d ” 
allow s th e  engineers to  re ta in  co n tro l o f th e  p ro je c t, b u t  identifies a  com m on p o in t o f 
d e p a r tu re . T h e  m e th o d  will s ta n d  o r fa ll on  its  m erits  for each  in d iv id u a l p ro je c t.
T h e re  is a  com plica tion , how ever, an d  th a t  is th e  prov ision  o f too ls su p p o rt. M ost too ls 
are  p rov ided  to  accom pany  c e rta in  m e th o d s , th a t  is, th ey  assum e th e  engineer is follow ing 
a  p re-defined  p lan , an d  th e  too ls will becom e useful only if  a  p a r tic u la r  p o in t in  th e  p lan  
is reached . M oreover, th ese  too ls u sua lly  c a p tu re  m uch  of th e  “w h a t” in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t 
a  p ro je c t, th e reb y  d ic ta tin g  to  som e e x te n t th e  in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse th a t  will ta k e  p lace 
in  an y  ra tio n a lisa tio n  of th e  p ro je c t. O nce th e  in fo rm ativ e  d iscourse is d e te rm in ed , 
how ever, th e  scientific an d  e x p lo ra to ry  discourse processes will be  co n stra in ed  to  fit in . 
R a th e r  th a n  th e  ex p lo ra tio n  driv ing  th e  p rocess, th e  too ls s ta r t  to  do so. T h is fu r th e r  
confuses th e  slogan  “specify th e  w h a t before  th e  how ” , for now  we can  see th a t  “how ” 
w e specify th e  “w h a t” m ay  b e  in h e ren t from  th e  o u tse t as a  d riv ing  force b eh in d  th e  
design. A d o p tin g  d a ta  flow as p a r t  o f a  m e th o d , for exam ple, leads inex o rab ly  to w ard s a  
p ro c e d u ra l im p lem en ta tio n . O nce a  p ro je c t ad o p ts  a  m e th o d  as a  m ean s of o rie n ta tio n , 
an d  su rro u n d s th is  m e th o d  by  an  in te g ra te d  to o lse t, th e  m e th o d , v ia  i ts  to o ls , s ta r ts  to  
co n tro l th e  p rocess, b ring ing  w ith  i t  all th e  dangers of a  m an ag em en t im posed  m e th o d , 
b u t  w ith  th e  ad d ed  confusion th a t  i t  is un c lear w ho re ta in s  re sp o n sib ility  for th e  design.
F ig u re  6.2: M eth o d s, L anguages an d  Tools
M itchell p re sen ts  th e  d iag ram  show n in  F ig u re  6.2, an d  asse rts  th a t  it
“c ap tu re s  th e  fac t t l ia t  u n d erly in g  chosen too ls, m e th o d s a n d  languages are  
a  n u m b e r o f concep ts w hich will v a ry  from  p a rad ig m  to  p a ra d ig m . . . .  [it also 
suggests th a t]  we m u s t be clear w h a t concep ts we a re  w ork ing  w ith  w hen  we
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design to o ls , m e th o d s an d  lan g u ag es.” [M it88, P ages 8-9].
W e should  also n o te  th e  converse, how ever, n am ely  th a t  selection o f th ese  th in g s  effec­
tively  locks ns in to  a  re sea rch  p ro g ram , o r p a rad ig m , by  fixing th e  w ays in  w hich we 
view th e  w orld . If  m e th o d s , languages an d  too ls a re  forced u p o n  us th e n  we hav e  li ttle  
co n tro l over th e  w orld  views we ta k e . A s R ap p  has observed ,
“B ecause of th is ch a ra c te ris tic  an d  fa r reach ing  in te rd ep en d en ce , all in d iv id ­
u a l p h en o m en a  a re  com bined  to  fo rm  a  com prehensive techno log ica l com ­
plex  in to  w hich, it  seem s, th e  in d iv id u a l h u m a n  being  is help lessly  d ra w n .” 
[Rap81, P ag e  48]
G rego ry  goes even fu r th e r , suggesting  th a t
“I t  is surely  tru e  of all too ls , th a t  by  m ak ing  som e th in g s easier th e y  d irec t 
a c tiv ity  an d  th in k in g  from  th in g s th a t  a re  m ore  difficult; b u t  w h a t is easy  
an d  w h a t is difficult a re  p a r tly  set by  th e  available to o ls , a n d  so we are  
carried  along by a  sequence of largely  a rb itra ry  an d  som etim es u n fo r tu n a te  
fea tu re s  o f o u r technology , inc lud ing  o u r language. H u m an  in telligence is very  
largely  A rtific ia l In telligence, an d  even  ou r hopes an d  fears (a n d  o u r m o ra l 
co m m itm en ts , fo r th e y  a re  se t by  possib ilities o f ach ievem en t) a re  la rgely  se t 
by  ex isting  techno logy .” [G re84, P ag e  51]
6.4 Methods as Tools
T h e  final sense o f th e  te rm  “m e th o d ” we w an t to  consider is one com m only  en co u n tered  
in  b o th  eng ineering  an d  m a th e m a tic s . A sim ow  observes th a t
“T h e  designer en co u n te rs  a  h o s t o f p rob lem s w hich a re  p ecu lia r to  th e  p rocess 
of design. . . .  W e w ill speak  of th e  an a ly tica l techn iques w hich cope w ith  th ese  
p rob lem s as th e  g enera l m e th o d s an d  too ls o f design .” [Asi62, p ag e  3]
In  a d d itio n  to  th ese  m e th o d s  of design, th e re  a re  also m e th o d s asso c ia ted  w ith  p a r tic u la r  
dom ains of know ledge, such as m a th e m a tic a l m e th o d s , an d  also m e th o d s  from  th e  p ro b ­
lem  d om ain  such  as dou b le-en try  boo k  keeping. M eth o d s, in  th is  sense, a re  localised  to  
solving w ell-identified p rob lem s w ith in  p a r tic u la r  disciplines. T h ey  a re  useful tricks: as 
P o ly a  a n d  Szego hav e  said,
“A n id ea  w hich can  b e  used  only  once is a  tr ick . If  you use  it  m o re  th a n  once 
i t  becom es a  m e th o d ” C ited  in  [A rb90, pag e  499]
I t could  be  a rg u ed  th a t  design m e th o d s  in  th e  large , such  as SSA D M , a re  a tte m p ts  to  
find such  localised  m e th o d s  for th e  d iscip line o f design, b u t th ey  a re  c learly  different in
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scale from  th e  m e th o d s  a  m a th e m a tic ia n  uses w hen solving an  e q u a tio n . M oreover, th e  
m e th o d s  w e are  going to  consider h ere  a re  u sua lly  used  by  one in d iv id u a l, r a th e r  th a n  
a tte m p tin g  to  p rescribe  ac tions fo r te a m s, an d  a re  all u n d erp in n ed  by  bodies o f th eo ry  
w here possib le. C om piler w rite rs , fo r exam ple , use  m e th o d s o f p a rse r  g en e ra tio n  b ased  
on  th e  th eo ry  of L A L R  p arsin g . M a th e m a tic ia n s  solving eq u a tio n s use th e  a p p ro p ria te  
th e o ry  for th e  eq u a tio n  en co u n te red . T h e re  is no th eo ry  o f design , how ever, so th e re  
can  be no  general m e th o d  o f design in  th e  sense of m e th o d  used  here , ju s t  as th e re  
can  be  no m e th o d  o f m a th e m a tic s  u n til  a  unified  th eo ry  o f m a th e m a tic s  is found . I t  is 
th is  use o f “m e th o d ” th a t  gives rise  to  tra d itio n a l “m eth o d s courses” in  engineering  an d  
m a th e m a tic s , th a t  a re  differ from  th e  m e th o d s  courses in  so ftw are engineering .
C onsider th e  p rob lem  o f solving th e  q u a d ra tic  eq u a tio n
(as +  12)(14 -  x ) =  25
A  co m p e ten t m a th e m a tic ia n  m ig h t solve th is  as follows:
x - j-12 — 25 and x — 13 or
14 — x =  25 and x =  —11
T his  m e th o d  (w hich  m ay  su rp rise  less m a th em a tica lly  experienced  read ers) is b ased  on  
know ledge of q u a d ra tic  eq u a tio n s. I t  h inges on  th e  fac t th a t  an y  e q u a tio n  o f th e  form  
(x + u )(v  — x) ~  c, w here  u -f v — c +  1, can  be  solved in  th e  above  fash ion . T h is  show s 
very  clearly  th a t  methods are intrinsically linked to knowledge. Since th eo ries a re  w ays 
of expressing  know ledge, we can  see am ple  su p p o rt for R a p p ’s s ta te m e n t th a t  “n o th in g  
. .  .is  m ore  p ra c tic a l th a n  a  good  th e o ry ” [R ap81, page 37]. T h e  claim  th a t  engineers are  
p ra c titio n e rs  w ho do n o t need  theo ries is u n ten ab le , for even if  we release th e m  from  p ro o f 
o b liga tions, th e ir  very  m e th o d s  a re  based  u p o n  theories. Suggestions th a t  co m p u tin g  is 
a  “p ra c tic a l” su b je c t, an d  so “h an d s on experience” is m ore  im p o r ta n t  th a n  th e o ry  are  
equally  lud icrous. T h e  cause o f th e  p rob lem  seem s to  b e  a  m isu n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  
s ta te m e n t th a t  we can  lea rn  from  o u r m istakes. P o p p e r claim s th is  as th e  th em e  for his 
boo k  C on jec tu res an d  R e fu ta tio n s  [Pop63], b u t  w h a t does i t  m ean? K u h n  m akes th e  
im p o r ta n t  observ a tio n  th a t
“T h e  in d iv id u a l can  lea rn  from  his m istak es only because  th e  g ro u p  w hose 
p rac tice  em bodies th ese  ru les can  iso la te  th e  in d iv id u a l’s fa ilu re  in  app ly ing  
th e m ” [K uh70a, pag e  11].
T h is  is w hy we can  te a c h  som e skills w ith o u t im p a rtin g  th eo ry  explic itly : th e  teach er 
uses th e o ry  in  co rrec ting  ac tio n s T h e  so ftw are  engineer, how ever, needs to  b e  ab le  to  
co n tin u e  to  le a rn  a fte r  fo rm al ed u ca tio n  has been  com pleted . I t  is th e  selfconscious 
asp ec t o f design th a t  allow s th is  to  h ap p en : by  con tinuously  m o n ito rin g  p rog ress ag a in s t 
a  th e o re tic a l fram ew ork , th e  engineer can  con tinue  learn ing  from  m istak es. Ind iv iduals 
can  c o n s tru c t th e ir  ow n theo ries to  su p p o rt m e th o d s , using  te s ts  fo r re fu ta tio n s . I t  is 
equally  lud icrous to  su g gest, how ever, th a t  m o d ern  society  can be su p p o rte d  by  a  learn in g
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process wlxere every  th e o ry  is re -lea rn t from  re fu ta tio n s . E ngineers m u s t be able to  learn  
p re sen ted  theories as well as co n s tru c tin g  th e ir  ow n, for th ese  will be th e  basis for m an y  
of th e  positive  h eu ristics  th e y  a re  to  use  d u rin g  th e  design process.
O ne com plica tion  here  is th a t  m an y  engineers do n o t need to  ap p ea l d irec tly  to  fu n d am en ­
ta l  th e o ry  every  tim e th e y  w an t to  use a  m e th o d . M ethods a re  o ften  n e a tly  en cap su la ted  
in ru le  fo rm , w here all th e  engineer h as  to  do  is m a tc h  th e  p rob lem  to  an  a p p ro p ria te  
ru le , an d  use i t . M a th em a tic ian s  use th is  s tra te g y , w hen th e y  look up  s ta n d a rd  resu lts  
in  tab le s  of in teg ra ls , fo r exam ple. T o  use such  a  s tra te g y  safely, how ever, requ ires a  
g ro u n d in g  in  theo ry . A lth o u g h  engineers m ay  b e  excused th e  ta s k  o f solving a  p a r tia l  
d ifferen tia l eq u a tio n  from  firs t p rinc ip les by  th is  ap p ro ach , th e y  m u s t u n d e rs ta n d  enough  
th eo ry  to  iden tify  th e  eq u a tio n  fo r w h a t i t  is , an d  to  check th a t  all th e  cond itions for 
using  th e  ru le  a re  m e t. M oreover, th e y  m u s t possess a  good  sy s tem  for classifying th e ir  
m e th o d s  if  th ey  a re  to  be  able to  s to re  an d  find th e  a p p ro p ria te  ru les. T h e  softw are 
engineer, on th e  o th e r  h an d , has very  few  such  rules available, so th e re  is c u rren tly  no  
o p tio n  b u t to  ge t to  grips w ith  th e  th e o ry  directly .
T hese  m e th o d s  will p rov ide  positiv e  heu ristics for o n r research  p ro g ram . T h e  eng ineer, 
be ing  faced w ith  a  th e o ry  in  a  p a r tic u la r  fo rm , an d  know ing th e  aim s o f th e  p ro g ram m e, 
will use th e  m e th o d s  of th e  discipline to  m ake  progress. In  th e  early  stag es  of th e  
ta sk , th ese  h eu ristics  will b e  techn iques for in terv iew ing  cu sto m ers  a n d  users, m e th o d s  
of d ischarg ing  consistency  a n d  com pleteness p ro o f ob liga tions fo r specifications, a n d  so 
on. In  la te r  s tages th e  heu ris tics  will include th o se  of refinem en t to w ard s  p a r tic u la r  
lan g u ag es, know n a lg o rith m s for so rtin g , an d  so on. W e will n o t a t te m p t  to  item ise  th e  
so rts  o f m e th o d s th a t  so ftw are  engineers shou ld  have  a t  th e ir  d isposal, fo r such  a  lis t will 
be  su b jec tiv e , an d  b o u n d  up  in  ap p lica tio n  dom ains and  o th e r  such  specifics. R a th e r  we 
will consider w h a t i t  m eans for th e  engineer to  have  a  m e th o d  available.
O ne o f th e  d istin c tio n s th a t  is usually  m ad e  be tw een  ex p erts  an d  novices in  som e dom ain  
is th e ir  ab ility  to  solve exem plar p rob lem s from  th a t  dom ain . I t  is no  longer considered  
th a t  th is  ab ility  is sim ply  a  reflection  o f s tag es  o f developm en t, as P ia g e t p roposed . 
R ecen t re search  in  psychology suggests th a t  p rob lem  solving a b ility  is linked  to  th e  
a m o u n t of know ledge th e  in d iv id u a l is ab le  to  b rin g  to  b e a r on th e  p rob lem . T h is , in 
tu rn , is n o t sim ply  a  m a tte r  o f “h av in g ” th e  know ledge, b u t how  o f how  th is  know ledge 
is encoded . T h is  is o f crucial im p o rta n c e  for cu rricu lum  d ev e lo p m en t, for it  suggests 
th a t  th e  in itia l encoding  o f p resen ted  in fo rm atio n  can  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r o r n o t th a t  
in fo rm a tio n  is useful to  an  engineer in  solving p rob lem s. I t  is su rp ris in g , th ere fo re , th a t  
v ery  l i ttle  seem s to  have been  said  a b o u t th is  in  th e  l i te ra tu re  of so ftw are  engineering  
e d u ca tio n . W e shou ld  n o te  th a t  “experience” an d  “ex p ertise” a re  n o t necessarily  linked. 
W h e th e r  o r n o t experience leads to  th e  developm ent o f ex p ertise , an d  w h a t governs th e  
p rocess, is l i ttle  u n d e rs to o d . L ittm a n  et al. have  show n, how ever, th a t  th e re  is “v irtu a lly  
no  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  years of p rofessional p ro g ram m in g  experience a n d  successfully 
p erfo rm in g  a  [program ] en h an cem en t ta s k ” [LPLS86, page 95]. W e shou ld  n o t assum e, 
th erefo re , th a t  “h an d s  on” experience will necessarily  develop ex p e rtise  in  o u r s tu d e n ts . 
T h ey  d id  show  a  re la tio n sh ip , how ever, b e tw een  successful p ro g ram  en h an cem en t an d
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th e  w ays in  w hich th e  o rig inal p ro g ram  w as stu d ied . P ro g ram m ers  w ho perfo rm ed  a  
sy s te m a tic  s tu d y  o f th e  p ro g ram  h a d  m ore  success th a n  th o se  w ho so u g h t in fo rm atio n  
as th e y  needed  it . W e can  in te rp re t th is  as a n o th e r  en d o rsem en t o f th e  th eo ry  build ing  
a p p ro ach  to  so ftw are design.
C hase  a n d  S im on forged  th e  link  b e tw een  recall a n d  encoding  o f in fo rm a tio n  w ith  th e ir  
s tu d ies  o f chess m a s te rs  an d  novices [CS73]. T h ey  concluded th a t  m a s te rs  encode m e a n ­
ingful chess b o a rd s  in  m ore  so p h is tica ted  w ays th a n  novices. W h ereas  th e  novice uses 
p ro x im ity  re la tio n s to  encode a  b o a rd , th e  e x p e rt uses a  n u m b er o f tech n iq u es, inc lud ing  
re la tio n sh ip s b e tw een  pieces th a t  a re  re lev an t to  th e  goals o f th e  gam e, such as offen­
sive an d  defensive scenarios. C hi an d  G laser show ed th a t  p h y sic ists  sim ilarly  classify 
p rob lem s in  te rm s  o f sign ifican t s tru c tu re , in  th is  case using  th e  u n d erly in g  princip les 
of th e  su b je c t (such  as th e  conservation  o f energy) r a th e r  th a n  th e  ru les o f th e  gam e, 
w hereas s tu d e n ts  co n c e n tra ted  on  su rface  sim ilarities (such  as th e  m en tio n  o f blocks on 
an  inclined  p lane) [CG85]. T h ey  also show ed th a t  ex p e rts  ta k e  longer to  classify th e  
p rob lem s th a n  th e  s tu d e n ts  do , p resu m ab ly  as a  resu lt o f doing m ore  w ork  in  uncovering  
th e  deeper s tru c tu re  th e y  a re  seeking. T h is  m ig h t exp lain  w hy w eaker s tu d e n ts , w hen 
given a  p ro g ram m in g  p rob lem , o ften  s ta r t  w ork a t  a  te rm in a l before  th e  b e t te r  s tu d e n ts , 
fo r th ey  can  p erfo rm  th e ir  superficial analysis o f th e  p rob lem  m ore  quickly. G u g e rty  an d  
O lson, on  th e  o th e r h a n d , hav e  observed  th a t  novice p ro g ram m ers s tu d y  p ro g ram s for 
longer before  a tte m p tin g  to  find  e rro rs  in  th e m  th a n  ex p erts  [G 086]. O ne possib le ex­
p la n a tio n  for th is  a p p a re n t co n trad ic tio n  is th a t  in fo rm atio n  can  b e  p re sen ted  to  people 
im p lic itly  o r explicitly . Im plic it in fo rm atio n  requ ires th e  read e r to  ex p en d  m ore  effort 
in  find ing  its  s tru c tu re . B o th  novices an d  ex p e rts  m ig h t t r e a t  p ro g ram s as explicit in ­
fo rm a tio n  for th e  p u rposes of debugging , consequen tly  th e  e x p e r ts ’ fa m ilia rity  w ith  th e  
lan g u ag e  allow s th e m  to  com plete  th e  ta sk  m ore  quickly. T h is in te rp re ta tio n  accords 
w ith  B ra n sfo rd ’s ex p erim en t th a t  show ed p o o r readers read  d o cu m en ts  co n ta in in g  im ­
plic it know ledge m ore  quickly  th a t  good  read e rs , failing to  g rasp  th e  significance o f w h a t 
th e y  a re  read in g , b u t th e y  read  d o cu m en ts  w ith  explicit know ledge m o re  slowly [BS82]. 
He concluded  sim ilarly  th a t  b e t te r  read ers  encode w ith  a  deeper s tru c tu re  th a n  p o o r 
read ers , so sp en d  longer seeking o u t im plic it m eaning .
C hi, F eltov ich  an d  G laser fo u n d  th a t  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  o f a  p ro b lem  h as  a  significant 
im p ac t on  th e  so lu tions th a t  will be  found  [CFG 81]. T h is  is n o t su rp ris in g , b u t it  adds 
su p p o rt to  th e  earlie r s ta te m e n t th a t  i t  is po in tless in sisting  th a t  specifications should  
be  p re sen ted  in d ep en d en tly  o f im p lem en ta tio n  deta ils . T h e  choice o f th e o ry  fo rm u la tio n  
lan g u ag e  for o u r specification  is p a r t  o f th e  prob lem  rep re se n ta tio n  p rocess, an d  hence is 
likely to  influence th e  designs found . R a th e r  th a n  try  to  live up  to  such  a  slogan , p e rh ap s  
we shou ld  recognise th a t  th e  choice o f specification  sty le  an d  n o ta tio n  will influence o u r 
design an d  m ake  conscious choices o f th ese  in  recogn ition  o f th e  fa c t th a t  selfconscious 
design s ta r ts  w ith  ad o p tio n  o f a  p a rad ig m . As H irschheim  an d  K lein h av e  n o ted ,
“ th e  iden tifica tio n  o f p a rad ig m  along w ith  th e  set o f ph ilo soph ical a ssu m p ­
tions w hich  each  em braces p rovides a  new  vehicle fo r in v es tig a tin g  new  th e ­
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ories a b o u t th e  n a tu re  an d  p u rp o se  o f in fo rm atio n  system s d ev e lo p m en t.” 
[HK89, page 1214]
A n o th e r im p lica tio n  o f th is  re sea rch  on  encod ing  is th a t  s tu d e n ts  m ay  well “know ” som e­
th in g , b u t  be u n ab le  to  app ly  i t  to  p rob lem s because  of u n su itab le  encod ing . M ay e r’s re ­
search  on learn in g  co m p u te r p ro g ram m in g , fo r exam ple , suggests t h a t  s tu d e n ts  lea rn  how  
to  w rite  an d  u n d e rs ta n d  p ro g ram s b e t te r  if th e y  a re  p resen ted  w ith  a  m odel w ith in  w hich 
to  encode th e ir  new  know ledge [M ay75]. F u rth e rm o re , M ayer n o te d  th a t  using  flow charts 
as a  m odel w as less effective t h a t  a  m ore  a b s tra c t  (b u t s till o p e ra tio n a l)  m odel to  w hich 
th e  s tu d e n ts  could re la te . T h is , he concluded , w as because  “th e  [flow chart] sym bols 
them selves p rov ided  only a  second lay e r o f code (ie. tra n s la tin g  s ta te m e n ts  to  a rb itra ry  
sym bo ls) r a th e r  th a n  an  o rgan ising  su p e rs tru c tu re ” [page 732]. T h is  causes us to  ques­
tio n  th e  w isdom  of teach in g  in fo rm atio n  system s design using m odelling  techn iques such 
as da ta flow  d iag ram s. T h e  o ften  cited  benefit th a t  th ey  a re  a  close re p re se n ta tio n  of 
th e  p rob lem , easily u n d e rs to o d  b y  th e  u ser, m ay  be m ore of a  h in d ran ce  to  th e  learn ing  
process th a n  an  aid.
T h e  im p o rta n c e  o f finding m odels fo r teach in g  th a t  a re  m ore th a n  sim ply  surface encod­
ings seem s p a ra m o u n t. F or com plica ted  encodings i t  m ay  be w o rth  seeking to  es tab lish  
in te rm e d ia te  m odels. Siegler h as  n o ted
“I t m ay  som etim es be m ore  desirab le  to  te a c h  to w ard s an  in te rm e d ia te  in ­
s tru c tio n a l goal th a n  to  te ach  d irec tly  to w ards th e  final goal. . .  . I t  m ay  be 
m ore  effective to  add ress . . .  difficulties one a t  a  tim e  as th e y  arise  th a n  to  try  
to  a t ta in  th e  u ltim a te  in s tru c tio n a l o b jec tiv e  in  one s te p .” [Sie86, page  180].
T h is is o f crucia l im p o rta n c e , for it  im pinges d irec tly  on  th e  d e b a te  as to  w h e th e r we 
shou ld  b e  teach in g  “w h a t in d u s try  w a n ts” . T h e  answ er m ay  n o t h e  a  s tra ig h t “yes” or 
“n o ” , b u t  a  “yes th ro u g h  th e  use o f sim plified m odels” . T h is u n d o u b te d ly  seem s obvious 
to  teach e rs  o f su b jec ts  o th e r  th a n  so ftw are engineering , b u t th e  m u ch  o f th e  l i te ra tu re  on  
w h e th e r we shou ld  teach  A d a  as a  first p ro g ram m in g  language show s th a t  m an y  teach ers  
in  ou r d iscip line have n o t le a rn t to  se p a ra te  th e  end from  th e  m eans.
P e rk in s  an d  M a rtin  have  carried  o u t a  s tu d y  of novice p ro g ram m ers , a n d  w hy th e y  fail 
to  solve p rob lem s th a t  ex p e rts  m an ag e  to  solve. T h ey  have  concluded  th a t  i t  is n o t ju s t  
a  m a t te r  o f ex p erts  “h av in g  know ledge” th a t  novices do n o t have . R a th e r , th e y  suggest 
th a t  novices m ay  well hav e  th e  req u ired  know ledge, b u t in  to o  fragile  a  fo rm  fo r i t  to  
be used  effectively [PM 86]. T h ey  suggest th a t  fragile  know ledge can  b e  ca tego rised  in to  
four ty p es.
P a r t i a l l y  M is s in g  K n o w le d g e :  here  som e asp ec ts  o f th e  know ledge a re  m issing, leav ­
ing th e  novice w ith  insufficient to  solve th e  problem .
I n e r t  K n o w le d g e :  th is  is possessed , b u t  can n o t be  re triev ed  on  th e  cue of th e  p rob lem . 
I t is suggested  th a t  know ledge is in e rt as a  resu lt o f th e  encoding  process: th e  w ay
156
we lea rn  so m eth ing  d e te rm ines th e  c ircum stances u n d e r w hich  w e will be ab le  to  
use i t .
M is p la c e d  K n o w le d g e :  th is  occurs w hen  know ledge is invoked  th a t  does n o t assist 
in  solving th e  p rob lem  posed . T h is  m a y  b e  because  m issing  o r in e r t know ledge 
leaves th e  novice in  d esp a ir, so m isp laced  know ledge is all th e re  is le ft. F u n c tio n a l 
fixedness an d  th e  E in ste llu n g  effect ( th e  carry in g  over o f so lu tions from  prob lem  
to  p rob lem ) a re  classic exam ples o f m isp lacem en t. T h is can  also occu r as a  re su lt 
o f over-generalisa tion  o f a  re su lt o r u n d er-d iffe ren tia tio n  o f a  p ro b lem  s itu a tio n .
Conglom erated Knowledge: th is  is w hen tw o  o r m ore  p a r t ia l  b its  o f know ledge a re  
m istak en ly  jo ined . In  a  sense it is a  special fo rm  o f m isp lacem en t. P e rk in s  and  
M a rtin  observed  th a t  th is  is com m onplace in  novice p ro g ram m ers , an d  th ey  spec­
u la te  th a t  i t  could be  becau se  novices a re  used to  conversing w ith  h u m an s , and  
people a re  qu ite  a d e p t a t  overcom ing  erro rs  in  discourse, an d  un rav e llin g  d isp a ra te  
tra in s  o f th o u g h t. T h e  novice h as  n o t y e t discovered th a t  co m p u te rs  are  n o t c a p a ­
ble o f in ferring  th e  requ ired  p ro g ram  from  frag m en ts  o f code, b u t  requ ire  th e  w hole 
th in g  in  a  sy n tac tica lly  co rrec t fo rm . E x p e rts , how ever, h av e  le a rn t th e  lesson th a t  
p ro g ram s can n o t be  n early  rig h t: th e y  a re  e ith er r ig h t o r w rong.
In ad d itio n , P e rk in s  an d  M a rtin  also n o te d  th a t  th e  p rob lem  o f frag ile  know ledge in  
novices is e x ace rb a ted  by  a  lack  of g enera l p rob lem  solving s tra teg ie s  th a t  w ould  help 
th e m  to  overcom e th ese  lim ita tio n s . T h e  s tra teg ie s  th ey  lacked  w ere o ften  very  basic , 
inc lud ing  techn iques such  as re-expressing  th e  p rob lem  in  a lte rn a tiv e  form s.
6.5 Summary
In  th is  c h a p te r  w e have  explored  four uses o f th e  te rm  “m e th o d ” . W e hav e  also devel­
op ed  th e  m ethodo log ica l a sp ec ts  o f o u r m odel th ro u g h  th e  use of p o s itiv e  an d  n eg a tiv e  
heu ris tics , an d  th e  id ea  o f re search  p ro g ram m es. In  p a r tic u la r , we have  d raw n  a t te n tio n  
to  th e  lim ita tio n s  of life cycle app roaches to  m e th o d s , an d  also qu estio n ed  th e  ro le  of 
design “m ethodo log ies” such  as SSA D M . W e have explored  w h a t i t  m eans fo r som eone 
to  hav e  a  m e th o d  for solving a  p rob lem , an d  briefly d iscussed som e o f th e  d is tinc tions 
be tw een  e x p e rts  an d  novices in  th e ir  use o f m e th o d s.
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C h a p ter  7
P erso n a l C on stru ct T h eo ry
“The educational dogma seem s to be that everything is fine  as long as the 
student does not notice that he is learning som ething really new: more often  
than not, the s tu d en t’s im pression is indeed correct”
Edsgar D ijkstra
W e h av e  now  com pleted  o u r analysis o f S oftw are E ngineering  design , a n d  a rriv ed  a t  a  
m odel a ro u n d  w hich th e  tech n ica l a sp ec ts  o f o u r curricu lum  could b e  co n stru c ted . P ro ­
d u c tio n  o f th is  m odel is only one asp ec t o f th e  ta sk , how ever, for a  cu rricu lu m  com prises 
m ore  th a n  ju s t  tech n ica l c o n te n t. W e have h in te d  a t  th is  id ea  a lready , by  s tre ss in g  th e  
self conscious a t t i tu d e  necessary  fo r m o d e rn  engineering design. N ow  it is time* to  m ake  
th is  explic it by tak in g  a  s tan ce  on how  people will fit in to  o n r cu rricu lu m . T h is  m eans we 
need  to  ad d  to  o u r discussion som e consid era tio n  of teach in g  an d  lea rn in g  th e o ry  a t  th e  
very  lea s t. In  fa c t, we h av e  also ra th e r  neg lected  th e  question  o f how  people  c o n s tru c t, 
r a th e r  th a n  p re sen t, th e ir  theo ries. As th e o ry  build ing  an d  lea rn in g  a re  sim ilar, if  n o t 
id en tica l, concerns, we will allow  o n r discussion to  serve a  d u a l p u rp o se .
U sing th e  discussion for th is  d u a l p u rp o se , how ever, p resen ts  us w ith  a  d ifficulty  of 
d iscourse s tru c tu re , for th e  discussion of how  people co n stru c t theo ries w hen designing 
system s w ould  proceed  r a th e r  d ifferen tly  from  th e  discussion of how  th ey  do so in  an  
e d u ca tio n a l se ttin g . T h e  ap p ro ach  w e will a d o p t, therefo re , is to  p rov ide  a  largely  n e u tra l 
p re se n ta tio n  o f a  th e o ry  w hich is p e r tin e n t to  b o th  ta sk s , b u t  w e will leave th e  ta sk  o f 
app ly ing  th is  th e o ry  to  o n r m odel up  to  th e  read er. T h is is n o t becau se  i t  is p a rtic u la rly  
h a rd  to  do, o r because  th e  a u th o r  is to o  lazy  to  u n d e rta k e  th e  ta sk , b u t  sim ply  because  
we h av e  reached  a  p lace in  th e  te x t  w here th e  read er has to  ta k e  a  m o re  ac tive  p a r t  in  
th e  process. M oreover, th is  is a  reflexive ap p lica tio n  o f th e  th e o ry  we will p re sen t, so it 
is also a  n a tu ra l  th in g  to  do. S trin g er expresses th is  as follows:
“T h e  goals o f lite ra ry  w ork is to  m ak e  th e  read e r no longer a  consum er, b u t 
a  p ro d u cer of th e  te x t .  . . .  C o n stru c tiv e  A lte rn a tiv ism  is a  cunn ing  bu ilt-in  
device of p e rso n a l c o n s tru c t psychology to  p rev en t its  ow n te x ts  be ing  closed 
in  a  final defin ition . Seen reflexively, i t  tu rn s  read in g  in to  w ritin g . M an -th e  
sc ien tis t can n o t help b u t (re )-w rite  The Psychology o f Personal C onstructs  as 
she seeks to  m ake  sense of M a n ’s a t te m p t  to  m ake sense o f th e  w o rd .” [Str85,
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pages 212-213]
W e hope  th a t  th is  will m ak e  m ore  sense as P e rso n a l C o n s tru c t T h eo ry  is in tro d u c e d  in 
th e  follow ing section .
In  a d d itio n  to  discussing th e  peo p le -re la ted  asp ec ts  o f cu rricu lum  design , we should  also 
discuss ed u ca tio n  in  th e  w ider co n te x t, b y  ou tlin in g  th e  ph ilosoph ical s tan ce  w e a re  tak in g  
on  ed u ca tio n  itself. In  p rac tice , how ever, m o st philosophies o f ed u ca tio n  are  in trin sica lly  
linked  to  th e  w ays in  w hich we view  th e  su b je c t an d  th e  people  being  ta u g h t ,  so ra th e r  
th a n  se p a ra te  th is  o u t as an  a d d itio n a l concern  we will t r e a t  it  im plicitly , as indeed  we 
h av e  a lread y  been  doing.
A lth o u g h  we a re  n o t going to  consider o u r ph ilosophy  sep ara te ly , a  b rie f overview  will 
help  to  set th e  scene fo r w h a t follows. T h e  ph ilosophy  of ed u ca tio n  we h av e  a d o p te d  as 
o u r s ta r t in g  p o in t is one o f tran sfo rm a tio n a lism . S tu d en ts  a re  no  longer to  be  considered 
as e m p ty  vessels to  be filled w ith  lea rn in g , h u t  as selfconscious peop le  w ho a re  to  be 
helped  to  grow  in  w ays th ey  d e te rm in e , an d  in  p a r tic u la r , w ho are  to  b e  he lped  to  lea rn  
to  lea rn . T h e  jo b  o f th e  te ach e r is to  a id  in  th is  process o f lea rn in g , n o t to  fill a  vessel like 
a  p e tro l p u m p  a t te n d a n t.  S lau g h te r [Sla89] suggests th a t  th e  eq u a tin g  o f ed u ca tio n  w ith  
th e  im p a rtin g  o f second-hand  “know ledge” , w hich is ac tu a lly  l i ttle  m o re  th a n  d a ta  w hen 
it  is received, is p o te n tia lly  d isas tro u s  for th e  m o d ern  w orld. F or society , th e  ap p lica tio n  
o f th is  received d a ta , in  th e  absence o f tru e  know ledge an d  w isdom , “can  lead  to  w orld  
d es tro y in g  techno log ies” . F or th e  in d iv id u a l, th e re  is “a  sy s tem a tic  f ru s tra tio n  o f th e  will 
to  m ean in g ” ; people no longer h av e  a  p erso n a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  w orld  a b o u t th em . 
H e also n o tes  th a t  th e  s ta te  o f affairs w here ed u ca tio n  is view ed in  th is  w ay h as been  
p e rp e tu a te d  by “sh o rt- te rm ism ” :
“T h e  N e w to n ia n /C a rte s ia n  syn thesis  c o n s tru c ted  a  w ay o f look ing  a t  th e  
w orld  w hich p e rm itte d  la te r  g en era tio n s to  m istaken ly  believe th a t  th e y  w ere 
‘m aste rs  of n a tu r e ’, se p a ra te  from , o r above, n a tu ra l p rocesses. W e are  le a rn ­
ing  th e  h a rd  w ay th a t  th is  is sim ply n o t tru e . B u t in s te a d  o f looking  a t 
w h a t th is  im plies for th e  fu tu re , o u r econom ic, p o litica l, a n d  ed u ca tio n a l 
system s rem ain  cau g h t u p  in  th e  business of rep roduc ing  an  obso le te  p a s t . 
S h o rt-te rm ism  is n o t ju s t  ja rg o n  fo r a  concept applicab le  to  business an d  
in v es tm en t; i t  p e n e tra te s  o u r pub lic  an d  p riv a te  lives to o .” [Sla89, page  256]
T h is  ph ilosophy  sits  u p o n  S ch u m ach er’s Levels of B eing: m inera l— ex istence , p la n t— life, 
an im al— consciousness, h u m a n — self-aw areness: he  no tes  th a t
T h e  m o st im p o r ta n t  in sigh t th a t  follows from  th e  four g re a t Levels of B eing [is 
th a t]  a t  th e  level o f m a n  th e re  is no  d iscernible lim it o r ceiling; [self-aw areness 
is] a  pow er o f u n lim ited  p o te n tia l” [Sch77, page  48]
S lau g h te r adds to  th is  by  say ing
159
“I t  is th is  [higher consciousness] ( r a th e r  th a n  new  techno logy  per se) w hich 
leads on to  th e  new  h u m a n  an d  c u ltu ra l possib ilities.” [Sla89, p ag e  267]
If  we accep t th is  philosophy, a  sh ift is necessary  from  th e  co n ten t-d riv en  p e rcep tio n  of 
cu rricu lu m  cu rre n tly  p rev a len t in  m o st h igher ed u ca tio n  estab lish m en ts , to w ard s experi­
e n tia l lea rn in g , reflexive m odes, an d  m eta-leve l fram ew orks of m ean ing . W e will consider 
th is  fu r th e r  in  sec tion  7 .2 , w here  i t  can  b e  d iscussed in  th e  lig h t o f o u r th e o ry  o f learn ing . 
F ir s t ,  how ever, we m u st develop such  a  th eo ry . W e have selected  K elly ’s P e rso n a l C on­
s tru c t  T heo ry , as th is  is w idely accep ted  as an  excellent basis fo r th e  em erg ing  s tu d y  of 
s tu d e n t-c e n tre d  learn in g , w hich fits very  well w ith  ou r ideas o f selfconscious design an d  
in d iv id u a l responsib ility . H arri-A u g ste in  expresses th is  perfec tly :
“I t  w as th ro u g h  K elly ’s c ra ft th a t  a  b re a k th ro u g h  w as ach ieved  in to  a  h u ­
m an istic  techno logy  th a t  allows m ean ing  to  em erge in  in d iv id u a l te rm s  an d  
y e t re ta in  som e sy s tem a tic  fo rm .” [HA85, page 61]
7.1 Outline of the Theory
K elly ’s P e rso n a l C o n s tru c t T h eo ry  (P C T ) , a lth o u g h  nearly  40 years  o ld , is s till considered 
rad ica l [Fra88]. I t  is a  com plete  psychology, w ith  explicit s tru c tu re  w hich  we will re ta in  in  
o u r p re se n ta tio n . T h e  sim ilarities be tw een  ou r m odel of sy stem  design a n d  P C T  should  
becom e a p p a re n t as we p roceed , b u t to  to  a id  o rie n ta tio n , we will s ta r t  by  giv ing an  
ou tlin e  of th e  fu n d a m e n ta l sim ilarities, leav ing  th e  read er to  co n stru e  o th e r  sim ilarities 
an d  p o in ts  o f c o n ta c t fo r his o r h e r self. T h is , as will becom e a p p a re n t, is a  reflexive use of 
P C T  itself. W e w ould  also a rg u e , t h a t  such  a  p re se n ta tio n  is o f m o re  use to  th e  cu rricu lum  
designer th a n  a  ca ta lo g u e  o f p o in ts  on  w hich th e  a u th o r  has n o te d  sim ilarities . M oreover, 
we will n o t go in to  deta ils o f how  th e  ideas p re sen ted  w ould b e  app lied  to  p rac tica lities , 
such  as deciding u p o n  c o n ten t o r te ach in g  m e th o d , for th ese  d e ta ils  w ould  involve us in 
fa r  to o  m an y  aux ilia ry  d iscussions to  e s tab lish  co n tex t, an d  are  p ro p erly  th e  concern  of 
each  ind iv id u a l te ach e r an d  cu rricu lum  designer. T h e  n ex t c h a p te r , how ever, p rovides 
an  overview  o f som e designs th a t  have been  p ro d u ced  in  th e  lig h t o f th is  analysis.
P C T  is an  an tic ip a to ry , r a th e r  th a n  reac tiv e , psychology. C onseq u en tly  i t  fits  in  very  
well w ith  P o p p e r’s ph ilosophy  o f science, based  u p o n  con jec tu res an d  re fu ta tio n s . B o th  
th e  p e rso n  an d  th e  sc ien tis t a re  seen as p ro ac tiv e , ra th e r  th a n  ac tiv e  on ly  if p rovoked  by 
stim uli. T h is  sim ila rity  has ben  n o ted  an d  ex ten d ed  by  M ancin i, w ho w rites:
“ [Kelly] rep resen ts  for psychology w h a t P o p p e r  rep resen ts  fo r ep istem ology; 
th a t  is, th e  a t te m p t  to  reconcile co n stru c tio n s to  th e  possib ility  o f know ing 
th e  ‘re a l’ w orld , an d  im prov ing  such  know ledge, on  a  firm  b as is .” [MS88, 
p ag e  69]
As we shall see, th e  c e n tra l th em es o f P C T  are  very  sim ilar to  th o se  o f o u r m odel of 
sy stem  deve lopm en t, an d  also to  th o se  o f o u r (briefly ske tched ) ph ilosophy o f edu ca tio n .
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selfconsciousness p lays a  key  ro le  in  all th re e , as does th e  in d iv id u a l’s co n stru c tio n  of 
theo ries (o r co n stru c t sy stem s) an d  th e ir  va lid a tio n  ag a in st experience.
P C T  is b ased  on co n stru c tiv e  a lte rn a tiv ism , a  philosophy w here o u r co n stru c tio n s o f 
th e  w orld  a re  su b je c t to  revision  a n d  rep lacem en t, an d  th e re  a re  alw ays a lte rn a tiv e  
c o n s tru c ts  open  to  ns. T hese  c o n s tru c ts , how ever, m ay  differ in  th e ir  effectiveness in 
allow ing ns to  p red ic t an d  co n tro l ev en ts  in  o u r w orld . T h ey  also allow  us to  do aw ay 
w ith  in d u c tiv e  reason ing  as a  s e p a ra te  device, fo r ou r p red ic tions a b o u t th e  w orld  can 
be seen as ded u c tiv e , b ased  on c u rren tly  held  c o n stru c ts . Like K elly, we will leave aside 
th e  b o o ts tra p p in g  ta sk  o f o b ta in in g  th e  firs t c o n s tru c t.
P C T  is a  fully  a r tic u la te d  th eo ry , com prising  a  fu n d a m e n ta l p o s tu la te  a n d  eleven corol­
laries. T hese  corollaries a re  n o t s im ply  deduc tio n s from  th e  p o s tu la te , b u t  am plifications 
of it  th a t  serve to  exp la in  th e  c e n tra l ideas b eh in d  th e  theory . In  a d d itio n  to  th e  th e o ry  
itse lf, P C T  is also closely asso c ia ted  w ith  a  m ethodo logy  o f research  b ased  on re p e rto ry  
g rid  analysis. Indeed , th e  a ssoc ia tion  is so close th a t  F ran se lla  refers to  g rid  analysis 
as th e  “secu rity  b la n k e t” o f p e rso n a l c o n s tru c t th eo ris ts , allow ing th e m  to  re ta in  th e  
q u a n tita tiv e  a sp ec ts  necessary  to  be  “re sp ec tab le” psycho log ists, w h ilst accep ting  a  r a d ­
ica l th e o ry ” [Fra88, page  30]. W e will b reak  w ith  tra d itio n  here  a n d  u tilise  th e  th eo ry  
w ith o u t reference to  g rid  analysis.
F u n d am en ta l P o stu la te
A  person’s processes are psychologically channellised by the ways in  which
they anticipate events.
In  P C T  a  person  is a  fu n d a m e n ta l u n it , r a th e r  th a n  various collections o f p rocesses such  
as cogn ition , p e rcep tio n  an d  m em ory , w hich  a re  th e  ob jec ts  o f concern  in  m o re  tra d itio n a l 
psychology. K elly tak es  th e  view o f “p e rso n -as-sc ien tis t” , an d  stresses th e  in d iv id u a lity  
of th e  w hole person . T h is  allows us to  consider th eo ry  bu ild ing  a n d  selfconsciousness as 
p rim ary , w hich  is very  difficult to  achieve if  we rem ain  in  th e  rea lm  o f tra d itio n a l p sy ­
chology. A lth o u g h  we m ig h t c o n s tru c t a  n o tio n  o f selfconsciousness in  social psychology, 
for exam ple , th is  w ould  n o t be  im m ed ia te ly  reconcilable w ith  a  sim ilar n o tio n  we m ig h t 
bu ild  in  cognitive  psychology. T h e  ho listic  view  o f th e  perso n  is th e  m a jo r  d istingu ish ing  
fe a tu re  of P C T , an d  should  n o t be fo rg o tte n . I t  does, how ever, cause som e m a jo r  p ro b ­
lem s of p re se n ta tio n , fo r th e  th e o ry  is h igh ly  reflexive and  is, th e re fo re , w h a tev e r you 
co n stru e  it  to  be. In  p a r tic u la r , th e  only defin ition  we can give fo r “e v e n ts” is th a t  th ey  
arise  as th e  re su lt o f th e  in d iv id u a l choosing to  “chop up  tim e  in to  m an ag eab le  le n g th s” 
[Kel55, page  52]. T h u s  an  ev en t for T om  m ay  com prise several fo r D ick, o r be  considered 
only p a r t  o f one by  H arry .
T h e  perso n -as-sc ien tis t view  also suggests  th a t  we could try  to  ap p ly  som e o f o u r d iscus­
sions of science to  th e  theo ry . H orley, for exam ple , suggests th a t  w e could  see a  p e rso n ’s 
end eav o u rs  n o t only  in  te rm s o f even ts , b u t  as p rog ram m es o f ev en ts  [Hor88]: th ese  show  
a  clear s im ila rity  w ith  L a k a to s ’s research  p rog ram m es. M cW illiam s goes fu r th e r  th a n  th e
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perso n -as-sc ien tis t view , w hen  he a rgues th a t  we should  rea lly  c o n s tru e  P C T  as advo­
ca tin g  th e  p e rso n -a s-an arch is t. T h is  is a  n a tu ra l  developm ent o f follow ing F e y e rab en d ’s 
view  th a t  science is b ro ad e r th a n  ju s t  th e  ra tio n a lis t w este rn  tra d itio n s  u sually  assum ed . 
I t  m ay  seem  th a t  such  a  m ove w ould  b e  n ih ilistic; M cW illiam s argues th is  is n o t th e  
case, for
“as p e rso n a l consciousness evolves, a  n a tu ra l  ten d en cy  o f th e  p e rso n  is to  
a t te m p t  to  discover th e  p a tte rn s  o f n a tu re  an d  live in  h a rm o n y  w ith  th em . 
A n arch is t ph ilosophy  suggests  th a t  w hen  th is  p rinc ip le  is follow ed, an d  con­
s tru c ts  a re  rev ised  to  co rrespond  m o re  closely to  ev en ts , h u m a n , social con­
d u c t will n a tu ra lly  be ‘m o ra l’ a n d  co opera tive . In  c o n tra s t , w hen  co n stru in g  
fails to  a d a p t to  th e  n a tu re  o f even ts, conflict an d  ‘im m o ra l’ b eh av io u r to ­
w ard s o th e rs , seen as hostility , o ccu rs .” [M cW 88, pages 17-18]
H in ts  a t  th is  id ea  o f an a rch y  can  be  found  in  th e  heu ristics  acco m p an y in g  such  te c h ­
niques as b ra in s to rm in g  [Osb63] an d  synectics [Gor61]. W e shou ld  bew are  o f a t tr ib u tin g  
to o  m uch  to  such tech n iq u es, how ever, p a rtic u la rly  th e  increased  flow o f ideas th a t  is 
som etim es claim ed. E vidence suggests th a t  a lth o u g h  n people  in  a  g ro u p  p ro d u ce  m ore 
ideas in  m  m in u tes  th a n  a  person  w orking  alone, th ey  p ro d u ce  sign ifican tly  few er ideas 
th a n  n  people  w ork ing  ind iv idually . T h e  benefits of g roup  c rea tio n  seem s to  com e in  th e  
ev a lu a tio n  a n d  developm ent of ideas, r a th e r  th a n  th e  in itia l in sig h ts  [LT73].
T h is  n o tio n  of “h o s tility ” ra ised  above will b e  considered  fu r th e r  as th e  th e o ry  is devel­
oped  in  m ore  d e ta il, b u t  w e will n o t p u rsu e  th e  idea  of p e rso n -a s-an arch is t. A lth o u g h , 
in  re tro sp e c t, i t  m ig h t be  in te re s tin g  to  rep lace  softw are engineering  as th e o ry  bu ild ing  
w ith  so ftw are  engineering  as anarchy , we will heed  B u rk h a rd t’s w arn ing :
“If  in n o v a tio n  is n o t close to  th e  fam ilia r, few people will b u y  it ;  if  i t  is to o  
close, w hy b o th e r  to  develop i t . ” [B ur89, page 8]
a n d  accep t th a t  o u r th e o ry  b u ild ing  view  is p ro b ab ly  as rad ica l as w e can  go w ith o u t 
risk ing  re jec tion . Suffice i t  to  say  th a t  as o u r view o f science changes, so to o  o u r co n stru a l 
o f P C T  will change.
C o n stru ction  C orollary
A person anticipates events by construing their replications.
C o n stru c ts  fo r Kelly com prise  b o th  sim ilarities an d  c o n tra s ts , th u s  we can n o t h av e  th e  
c o n s tru c t “looping  p ro g ra m ” , b u t  we m ay  hav e  th e  co n stru c t “loop ing  p ro g ra m /n o n -  
loop ing  p ro g ra m ” , a lth o u g h  we will o ften  p re sen t a  co n stru c t in  te rm s  o f one em ergen t 
pole, an d  allow  th e  o th e r  to  rem ain  im plic it. M oreover, c o n s tru c ts  need  n o t be re p re ­
sen tab le  verbally , so i t  is p erfec tly  possib le  for an  in d iv idua l to  have  w ays o f co n stru in g  
th e  w orld  th a t  can n o t be m ad e  pub lic  verbally . S ubsequen t coro llaries ex p an d  on th e  
id ea  of a  c o n s tru c t an d  re la te  th e  p riv a te  n a tu re  o f co n stru c ts  to  social b eh av io u r.
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T h e  c o n s tru c ts  we p lace on  even ts a re  p e rso n a l, an d  n o t sim ply a  p ro d u c t o f th e  even ts 
them selves. B an n is te r  a n d  F ran se lla  p rov ide  an  excellent exam ple  o f th is  w hen  th ey  
discuss th e  p rob lem  o f cond ition ing  a n  in d iv id u a l to  b link  every  tim e  a  p rim e  n u m b e r is 
show n on  a  screen [BF86, page  9]. N um b ers  a re  flashed u p , an d , if  a  p rim e is show n, a  
je t  o f a ir is d irec ted  in to  th e  eye. A fte r a  tim e , we m ig h t expec t th e  su b je c t to  a n tic ip a te  
ev en ts  by  b link ing  w hen  a  p rim e  is show n, even if  th e  je t  o f a ir  is a b se n t. T h is  will 
only occur, how ever, if  th e  su b je c t co n stru es  th e  n u m b er as p rim e. I f  we a t te m p t  to  
cond ition  som eone w ho is ig n o ra n t o f th e  n o tio n  of prim eness, we can n o t succeed. W e 
m ay  succeed in  in a d v e rte n tly  cond ition ing  a  reflex to  all od d  n u m b ers  an d  tw o , if th a t  
is how  th e  even ts a re  co n stru ed . P eop le  do n o t re sp o n d  to  stim u li, b u t  to  w h a t th ey  
perceive th em  to  be. T h is  is clearly  a  very  im p o r ta n t  m essage fo r th o se  ch arg ed  w ith  
th e  ta sk  of carry in g  o u t req u irem en ts  analysis: is is n o t th e  req u irem en ts  th a t  we a re  
analysing  b u t  th e  people  m ak in g  th e  responses.
T h is  is crucia l to  te ach e rs , fo r if  we see one asp ec t o f ed u ca tio n  as cond ition ing  s tu d e n ts  
to  re sp o n d  to  even ts  in  p a r tic u la r  w ays, such  as solving sim ple eq u a tio n s  a lm o st by  re ­
flex, o r invoking  th e  id ea  o f an  in v a r ia n t w henever a  loop is p re se n te d , we need  to  be 
aw are  th a t  i t  is n o t enough  sim ply  to  p resen t exam ples an d  leave th e  s tu d e n t to  in fer 
th e  connections. M uch “b o tto m -u p ” teach in g  seem s to  p roceed  in  th is  w ay: num erous 
exam ples a re  p re sen ted , an d  th e  s tu d e n t is left to  infer th e  g re a te r  p ic tu re . T h is can  only 
h a p p e n , how ever, if  th e  s tu d e n t’s c o n s tru c t sy stem  is a lready  sufficiently  developed for 
th e  p e rcep tio n  rep lica tio n  to  ta k e  place. P re se n tin g  tw en ty  exam ples o f p roofs by  con­
tra d ic tio n  will only help th e  s tu d e n ts  to  a n tic ip a te  so lu tions to  th e  tw e n ty  first p rob lem , 
if  th e ir  c o n s tru c t system s allow  th em  to  co n stru e  th e  “p ro o f by  co n trad ic tio n -n ess” of 
th e  p a s t ev en ts , so th a t  th ey  can  see th e  new  p rob lem  as a  rep lica tion .
T h e  rep lica tions re fe rred  to  a re  p red ic ted  ev en ts , h u t n o t in th e ir  ‘re a l’, concre te , fo rm . 
R a th e r  th e y  a re  a b s tra c tio n s  of se ts  o f p ro p e rtie s , th a t  is, o f o th e r  c o n stru c ts . T h u s  if  I  
co n s tru e  a  p ro g ram  as “b ad ly  w r itte n ” as opposed  to  “well w r it te n ” , I  m ay  p red ic t from  
th is  th e  even t th a t  i t  will be  difficult to  m odify. T h is  difficulty need  n o t h av e  a  concre te  
ex istence  as a  “th in g ” , how ever, b u t will m an ifest itse lf as a  n u m b e r of p ro p e rtie s  th a t  
th e  ev en t will have , such  as a  n u m b e r o f e rro rs  m ade  w hen m o d ifica tion  is a tte m p te d , 
th e  need  to  rew rite  several reg ions o f code w hen m ak ing  a  sim ple change, an d  so on.
In d iv id u a lity  C orollary
Persons differ from  each other in their constructions o f  events.
T h is  is K elly’s n o tio n  of in d iv id u a l differences. W h a t m akes peop le  d ifferen t is th a t  th ey  
will live th e ir  lives d ifferently , as a  re su lt o f seeing th e  w orld  differently . S oftw are engi­
neers will p ro d u ce  different sy stem s to  solve th e  sam e p rob lem  because  th ey  will see th e  
w orld  differently , th a t  is, th ey  will use different co n stru c t sy stem s. If  we w an t conform ity , 
we m u st enab le  all engineers to  see th e  w orld  th ro u g h  th e  sam e se t o f c o n stru c ts . I t  is 
n o t enough  to  im pose m e th o d s , o f course, fo r these  m e th o d s m ay  them selves b e  view ed
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differently . If  we can  p e rsu ad e  each  engineer to  see th e  w orld  th ro u g h  a  c o n s tru c t from  
w hich th e y  a n tic ip a te  be ing  sacked  if  th e y  do n o t use th e  m e th o d  in  som e a lgo rithm ic  
way, an d  if we can  also p e rsu ad e  each  engineer th a t  th ey  do n o t w a n t to  b e  sacked , th e n  
con fo rm ity  m ay  occur. I t  m ay  also occur, o f course, if  th e y  see o th e r  benefits from  com ­
m o n a lity  o f b eh av io u r. T h is  is s ign ifican t, for i t  show s th a t  c o n s tru c ts  do  n o t need  to  be 
believed  to  be used: we can  use a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  because  som e h igher level co n stru c ts  
te ll us it  is exped ien t to  do so. O f course, if  we do th is  by encourag ing  s tu d e n ts  to  develop 
c o n stru c ts  such as “will lead  to  being  sacked” th e re  m ay  be im p lica tio n s. F o r exam ple, 
i t  is likely th a t  such  a  sy stem  will n o t b e  com patib le  w ith  c o n s tru c ts  such  as “ta k in g  
p rid e  in  w o rk ” . If  we w an t th e m  to  consider using  m e th o d s , th e n  we m u s t help  th e m  
develop th ese  h igher o rd e r c o n s tru c ts  so th a t  th e y  can m ake th e  choices. In  m an y  w ays 
th is  h igh ligh ts one o f th e  m o st sign ifican t a sp ec ts  o f th is  research  p ro g ram m e , for we a re  
now  faced  w ith  th e  question  “can th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  ap p ro ach  ever w ork , o r will i t  ju s t  
lead  to  B ab e l” ? C learly  one o f  th e  reasons th a t  m e th o d s  a re  seen as useful in  softw are 
engineering  is because  th e y  a re  co n stru ed  as a  w ay of avoiding th e  chaos th a t  w ould 
ensue if engineers w ere allow ed to  view th e  w orld  as th ey  w ish. W e will n o t a t te m p t  
to  answ er th is  q u estion , b u t  we will suggest th a t  in  a  selfconscious cu ltu re , w here  th e  
ind iv id u a l is sufficiently  well e d u ca ted , B ab el will only follow if  th e  in d iv idua ls desire it: 
a f te r  all, th e y  a re  free to  co n tro l th e ir  w orld . I f  we do n o t t r u s t  engineers sufficiently  to  
o rd e r th e ir  w orld , i t  is o n r c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  is to  b lam e. I f  w e do  n o t ed u ca te  th em  
sufficiently  for th e m  to  be ab le  to  do so, i t  is o u r ed u ca tio n  sy stem  th a t  is a t  fau lt.
O rganisation  C orollary
Each person characteristically evolves, fo r  their convenience in  anticipating  
events, a construction system  embracing ordinal relationships between con­
structs.
C o n s tru c ts  a re  bu ilt in to  h ie ra rch ies , such th a t  each  c o n s tru c t m ay  h av e  one or m ore  
su b o rd in a te s  an d  su p e ro rd in a te s . T h is  s tru c tu r in g  can  ta k e  tw o  d is tin c t form s. F irs t , 
th e  su b o rd in a te  s tru c tu re  m ay  ru n  in  th e  sam e d im ension as its  su p e ro rd in a te , th u s  if 
w e h av e  th e  c o n s tru c t “e v a lu a tiv e /d e sc rip tiv e ” , th e n  th e  c o n s tru c t “p ro ced u ra l p ro g ra m ­
m ing  la n g u a g e /fu n c tio n a l p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e” m ay  be m ad e  su b o rd in a te , in  such  a  
w ay th a t  p ro ced u ra l languages are  seen as ev aluative , w hereas fu n c tio n a l ones a re  seen as 
descrip tive , as show n in  F ig u re  7.1. A lte rn a tiv e ly , we m ay  see th e  su b o rd in a te  c o n s tru c t
evaluative — — -------—  descriptive
procedural functional
programming —  programming
language language
Figure 7.1: Longitudinal Subordinate construct
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itse lf as eva lua tive  or descrip tive . In  th is  case, th e  su b o rd in a te  c o n s tru c t ru n s  across its  
su p e ro rd in a te . F ig u re  7.2 show s tw o  frag m en ts  of a  co n stru c t sy s tem  w here th e  d is tin c­
tio n  be tw een  p ro ced u ra l a n d  fu n c tio n a l languages is seen as firs t as ev a lu a tiv e , an d  th e n  
as descrip tive.
descriptive
procedural
programming
language
procedural
programming
language
F ig u re  7.2: T ran sv erse  S u b o rd in a te  C o n s tru c ts
I t is im p o r ta n t  to  realise th a t  c o n s tru c t system s change, an d  su b sy stem s can  be deliber­
a te ly  selected  for p a r tic u la r  pu rp o ses . T h u s , for som e pu rp o se  we m ay  classify “F o r tra n ” 
as a  p ro ced u ra l lan g u ag e  an d  b e  using  a  pu re ly  descrip tive  c o n s tru c t, on  a n o th e r  occa­
sion, how ever, we m ay  be using  th e  c o n s tru c t as a  m eans o f ev a lu a tio n . T h is  can  cause 
considerab le  confusion to  s tu d e n ts , p a rtic u la rly  if th ey  do n o t y e t have  sufficiently  well 
developed  c o n s tru c t sy stem s to  allow  such  flexibility.
C onsider, fo r exam ple, a  s tu d e n t w ho co n stru es  “b a d /g o o d ” as h av in g  a  lo n g itu d in a l 
su b o rd in a te  “w o rth  le a rn in g /n o t w o rth  lea rn in g ” . Such a  s tu d e n t will hav e  considerab le  
prob lem s if  to ld , by  som eone he o r she tru s ts ,  th a t  F o r tra n  is a  b a d  lan g u ag e  b u t  one th a t  
is w o rth  learn ing . T h e  sim ple o p tio n  is to  re -co n strn e  F o rtra n  as good , o r to  refuse to  tru s t  
th e  teach e r any  m ore . In  th e  longer te rm , how ever, and  in  th e  face o f p e rs is te n t even ts 
of th is  n a tu re , th e  s tu d e n t’s c o n s tru c t sy stem  m ay  be unab le  to  cope w ith o u t s tru c tu ra l 
reo rg an isa tio n . T h e  g re a te s t challenge facing teach ers  is to  a id  th is  reco n stru c tio n . In  
th is  sense, th e  teach er is a  p sych o -an a ly st: th e  an a ly st is help ing  “a b n o rm a l” people  
to  develop m ore  “n o rm a l” co n s tru c ts , an d  in  p a r tic u la r  to  reach  a  se t o f co n stru c ts  
w here th e ra p y  is no  longer requ ired ; th e  te ach e r is help ing  th e  “n o rm a l” s tu d e n t to  
develop m ore  helpfu l c o n stru c ts  for coping w ith  genera l an d  specific ta sk s , in c lud ing  th e  
ta sk  o f ca rry in g  on th e  developm ent process itself. C o n stru in g  th e  te a c h e r’s ro le in  th is  
w ay is p o te n tia lly  qu ite  th re a te n in g : it  som ehow  seem s m uch  easier to  view  ourselves as 
deliverers o f in fo rm atio n  th a n  as an a ly s ts  responsib le  for th e  developm en t o f o u r s tu d e n ts . 
A s we shall see w hen we m ove on  to  consider social b eh av io u r, how ever, th e  w ays in  w hich 
we co n stru e  o u r ow n role has im p lica tions for how  th e  s tu d e n ts  will co n s tru e  th e irs .
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D ich o to m y  C orollary
A  person’s construction system  is composed o f a fin ite  num ber o f  dichotomous 
constructs.
In  P C T , Kelly has a d o p te d  th e  view  th a t  it  is useful to  see c o n s tru c ts  as d em o n strab ly  
b ip o la r, w ith  som e o b jec ts  an d  ev en ts  be ing  o u ts id e  th e  ran g e  o f p a r tic u la r  co n stru c ts . 
T h u s  o u r c o n s tru c t “p ro ced u ra l p ro g ram m in g  la n g u a g e /fu n c tio n a l p ro g ram m in g  la n ­
guage” , for exam ple , m u s t h av e  e lem en ts we can  use to  i l lu s tra te  each  pole. In  fac t, 
K elly  in sists  on  a t  le a s t tw o  a t  one pole, to  show  th a t  th e re  is a t  le a s t som e degree 
of sam eness in h e ren t in  th e  c o n s tru c t, a n d  one a t  th e  o p p o site  po le, to  d e m o n s tra te  
c o n tra s t . M oreover, we a re  free to  decide th a t  th e  e lem ent “cab b ag es” o r th e  e lem ent 
“P ro lo g ” is ou ts id e  th e  ran g e  o f th e  c o n s tru c t if  we w ish. T h e  ran g e , like th e  co n stru c t 
itself, is personal.
C learly  th e re  is a  sim ila rity  b e tw een  c o n s tru c ts  an d  p red ica tes  (in  a  ty p e d  sy s tem ), and  
be tw een  c o n s tru c t system s a n d  fo rm al sy stem s, b u t co n stru c ts  m ay  b e  m ore  com plex 
th a n  ju s t  p red ica tes . K elly suggests th re e  ty p e s  of co n stru c t:
P r e - e m p t i v e  c o n s t r u c t s :  an y  even t co n stru ed  u n d e r such  a  c o n s tru c t m ay  be  p re ­
em p ted  from  being  co n stru ed  in  an y  o th e r  way. T hese are  “n o th in g  b u t” co n stru c ts  
—  “com m unism  is n o th in g  b u t  d ic ta to rsh ip ” , “SSA D M  is n o th in g  b u t  p ic to ria l 
ru b b ish ” , “fo rm al m e th o d s  are  n o th in g  b u t  th e  sav iour o f S oftw are E ng ineering” . 
T eaching  s tu d e n ts  in  such  a  w ay th a t  th e y  see th e  w orld  in  te rm s  of such  p re-em p tiv e  
c o n stru c ts  lim its  th e ir  g ro w th , fo r su b seq u en t inva lid a tio n  leaves th e  s tu d e n t w ith  
no o p tio n  b u t re jec tio n  an d  m a jo r  reo rg an isa tio n . T h u s  a  s tu d e n t w ho com es 
to  see a  w orking p ro g ram  as n o th in g  b u t  a  good  p ro g ram  will h av e  considerab le  
p rob lem s w hen faced  w ith  feedback  say ing  th a t  a  w ork ing  p ro g ra m  has failed to  
m eet c e rta in  c rite r ia  o f assessm en t. T h is  s tu d e n t will be u n ab le  to  lea rn  m uch 
a b o u t p ro g ram m in g  u n til  a  d ra m a tic  re a d ju s tm e n t of th e  c o n s tru c t sy stem  has 
rem oved  th e  p re -em p tiv e  co n stru c t.
C o n s t e l l a t i o n  c o n s t r u c t s :  th ese  bu ild  links be tw een  co n stru c ts  o f th e  fo rm  “if i t  is an  
A  th e n  it  is a  B ” . F ig u re  7.3 show s a  co n ste lla tion  w here th e  co n s tru e r sees all p ro ­
g ram s as d e te rm in is tic  an d  execu tab le . C o nste lla tions are  v ita l, b u t  in a p p ro p ria te  
ones lead  to  s te reo ty p es  an d  b linkered  vision.
P r o p o s i t i o n a l  c o n s t r u c t s :  th ese  a re  q u ite  free. No su b o rd in a te  or su p e ro rd in a te  s tru c ­
tu re  is im posed  u p o n  th e m , th e y  a re  free agen ts. T h ey  m odel p red ica tes , r a th e r  
th a n  law s, in  o u r fo rm al system . As we shall see, how ever, th e y  need  n o t fo rm  a  
consis ten t se t,
As well as th is  c lassification , i t  is also useful to  consider co n stru c ts  as pe rm eab le  or im ­
p erm eab le , depend ing  on  how  co n stric ted  th e  ran g e  of ap p lica tio n  is seen to  be. T h u s  if 
we a re  only p rep a red  to  consider tra d itio n a l p ro g ram m iu n g  lang u ag es u n d e r o u r “p ro ce­
d u ra l/fu n c tio n a l” c o n s tru c t i t  is im perm eab le : if  we are  p rep a red  to  see M artin -L o f ty p e
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program j     ----------------  non-program
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executable \ —-------- non-executable
i
i
deterministic 1 nondeteim inistic
F ig u re  7.3: C o n ste lla tio n  C o n stru c ts
th e o ry  as w ith in  th e  ran g e  o f th is  c o n s tru c t, i t  is m ore perm eab le . If  we also see com m on 
v egetab les as o b jec ts  in  th e  d o m ain , th e  c o n s tru c t is very  perm eab le! P e rm eab ility  is 
im p o r ta n t  w hen  we m ove on  to  consider ed u ca tio n a l p rocesses, fo r i t  will allow  new  ideas 
to  b e  assim ila ted  in to  ex isting  s tru c tu re s .
C hoice C orollary
Persons choose fo r  themselves that alternative in a dichotom ised construct 
through which they anticipate the greater possibility fo r  the elaboration o f 
their system .
T his  co ro llary  m irro rs  P o p p e r ’s search ligh t th eo ry  of know ledge: we do n o t co n stru c t 
theo ries  b y  filling a  b u ck e t w ith  m iscellaneous fac ts , h u t by  ac tive ly  search ing  o u t th e  
b e s t fac ts  for o u r p u rp o se . K elly is suggesting  th a t  “b e t te r ” choices a re  th o se  th a t  lead  
to  an  e lab o ra tio n  o f o u r c o n s tru c t sy stem . E la b o ra tio n  com prises tw o  a sp ec ts , ex tension  
a n d  defin ition , w hich are  analogous to  P o p p e r ’s genera lity  a n d  precision  respectively . 
E x ten sio n  is th e  developm ent o f co n stru c ts  th a t  hav e  w ider ranges of app licab ility ; def­
in itio n  is th e  developm ent o f m ore  precise c o n stru c ts . T h e  choices th a t  people  m ake, 
b ased  on  th e ir  c o n s tru c ts , can  be  deeply  sign ifican t (such  as choosing to  see them selves 
as successful o r unsuccessful peop le), o r useful sim ply  for solving a  sim ple p rob lem  (such  
as choosing to  see a  q u a rtic  eq u a tio n  as a  q u a d ra tic  in  x 2 to  m ake  it  am en ab le  to  sim pler 
m e th o d s  of so lu tion ).
T h e  choice coro llary  is very  im p o r ta n t , for i t  leads on to  som e fu n d a m e n ta l aspec ts  o f 
th e  th eo ry . F o r exam ple , we can  choose to  ta k e  safe, co n s tric ted  view s, a n tic ip a tin g  
th re a ts  to ,  a.nd th e  possib le d e s tru c tio n  of, o u r co n stru c t sy stem  if  we ta k e  risks, o r we 
can  ta k e  ex ten d ed  view s, an tic ip a tin g  m ax im al g ro w th  of o u r sy s tem  th ro u g h  th e  use of 
bo ld  con jec tu res. P o p p e r ad v o ca tes  th e  la t te r  course of ac tio n  a t  all tim es, b u t  th e n  he 
is only  concerned  w ith  d e tach ed  theo ries, firm ly p laced  in to  th e  th ird  w orld . C o n s tru c t 
sy stem s, how ever, involve n o t only th ese  scientific theo ries, b u t  also self-im age. P C T , 
like K u h n ’s social view o f science, p roposes th a t  scientific decisions c a n n o t so easily  be 
d ivorced  from  p erso n a l decisions. If  sc ien tists  con stru e  re fu ta tio n  o f th e ir  theo ries  as 
d e s tru c tiv e  o f th e ir  re p u ta tio n s , th e n  bo ld  con jec tu res are  th re a te n in g , an d  th ey  m u st 
w eigh up  p e rso n a l p rogress ag a in s t scientific p rogress.
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S oftw are engineers need  to  ta k e  ex ten d ed  views in  o rd er to  see possib le  so lu tions to  
p roblem s: th is  is th re a te n in g , as th e y  m ay  lay  them selves open  to  rid icu le . T h ey  also 
need  to  be  ab le  to  co n stric t th e ir  view s, how ever, w hen th e y  a re  m oving  to w ard s an  
im p lem en ta tio n . C o n stric tio n  to o  ea rly  will lead  to  sim ple cloning o f ex is tin g  system s, 
an d  th e  in ab ility  to  co n stru e  rep lica tions fo r novel s itu a tio n s . E x ten sio n  to o  la te  m ay  
lead  to  divergence from  th e  so lu tion  w hen  effort needs to  be ex p en d ed  refin ing  th e  con­
s tru c t  sy stem  in  o rd e r to  solve m ore  localised  p rob lem s. T h e  engineer w ho w alks in to  a  
crisis m eeting , called to  discuss w hy th e  final s tag es  of coding a re  b eh in d  schedule , an d  
announces th a t  he has ju s t  realised  th a t  th e  sy stem  is a  cu cu m b er can  ex p ec t som e hos­
tility . T h e  engineer w ho, d u rin g  a  concept m eetin g , provides a  s im ilar in s ig h t, t h a t  leads 
to  th e  rea lisa tio n  th a t  th e  sy s tem  shou ld  b e  considered  using  cy lindrica l, n o t ca rte s ian , 
p a ra m e te rs , m ay  be hailed  as a  genius. T h e  choices of c o n s tru c t developm en ts we m ake 
a re  th e re fo re  governed  by  c o n s tru c ts  ju s t  like any  o th e r decisions. W e m u s t help  o u r s tu ­
d en ts  to  develop th e  c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  governs th ese  choices. T h is  is selfconscious 
design an d  learn ing  to  lea rn .
T h a t  th e  choice coro llary  m a in ta in s  choice as p a r t  o f th e  c o n s tru c t sy s tem  is crucial. As 
K elly n o tes ,
“F req u en tly  th e  th e ra p is t  finds i t  difficult to  u n d e rs ta n d  w hy  his clien t, in  
sp ite  of in sigh ts w hich w ould  a p p e a r  to  m ak e  it  clear how  he shou ld  behave , 
con tinues to  m ak e  th e  ‘w ro n g ’ choices. T h e  th e ra p is t , seeing only  th e  single 
issue w hich he has helped  th e  client to  define, o ften  fails to  realise t h a t ,  w ith in  
th e  sy stem  of p e rso n a l c o n s tru c ts  w hich th e  client has e rec ted , th e  decision 
for ac tio n  is n o t necessarily  b ased  on th a t  issue alone b u t  on  a  com plex of 
issu es .” [Kel63, pages 67-68]
W e have all experienced  th is  as teach ers  o r p a re n ts . S tu d e n ts  an d  ch ild ren  o ften  seem  
to  hav e  all th e  “in fo rm a tio n ” th e y  need  to  solve a  p rob lem , b u t  p e rs is t is in  g e ttin g  it  
“w ro n g ” . A  ty p ica l scenario  m ig h t ru n  as follows:
P a r e n t :  If  you sh a re  o u t a  b a n a n a  equally  b etw een  tw o ch ild ren , how  m an y  will th ey  
g e t each?
Child: O ne.
P a r e n t :  N ow th in k , if  you  sh a re  o u t an  app le , how  m uch  do th e y  get?
C h i ld :  Half.
P a r e n t :  G ood , an d  an  o ran g e  . . .
Child: Half!
P a r e n t :  V ery good , now  a  b a n a n a  . . .
Child: One!
168
T h e  su b tle ty  of co n stru in g  app les, o ranges an d  b a n a n a s  as th in g s t h a t  sh a re  o u t in  sim ilar 
w ays p ro b ab ly  escapes us, for we a re  v ery  fam ilia r w ith  i t ,  b u t  ch ild ren  a re  so o ften  ta u g h t 
to  do “sh a rin g  p ro b lem s” w ith  ro u n d  o b jec ts  th a t  sharing  a  b a n a n a  m ay  well be  seen 
as a  com pletely  new  p rob lem  an d  n o t as a  rep lica tio n  o f p a s t  ev en ts . S im ilar scenarios 
d raw n  from  teach in g  s tu d e n ts  p ro g ram m in g  ( “You know  how  to  do th is  in  P asca l, an d  
you  know  th e  sy n ta x  o f A d a , w hy c a n ’t  you  solve th e  p rob lem ?” ) o r m a th e m a tic s  ( “B u t 
you  know  how  to  do th is  fo r re la tio n s , an d  you  have  ju s t  agreed  th a t  fu n c tio n s a re  special 
so rts  o f re la tio n s, so w hy c a n ’t  you  do it  fo r functions!” ) will b e  fam ilia r to  all teach ers  
of C om p u tin g . If  we d o n ’t  encou rage  s tu d e n ts  to  develop flexible c o n s tru c t sy stem s, we 
m u s t expec t th ese  prob lem s o f tran sfe ren ce .
R an ge C orollary
A  construct is convenient fo r  the anticipation o f a fin ite  range o f  events only.
As well as developing su itab le  c o n s tru c ts  for seeing th e  w orld , s tu d e n ts  need  to  develop 
th e  ranges su itab le  for th e  ap p lica tio n  o f th ese  co n stru c ts . I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  realise th a t  
th e  ran g e  of a  c o n s tru c t can  inc lude  o th e r  co n s tru c ts , th u s  th e  ra n g e  o f th e  c o n s tru c t 
“p ro p e r ty  of a  p ro g ra m /n o t p ro p e r ty  o f a  p ro g ra m ” m ay  h av e  poles ep itom ised  by  th e  
c o n s tru c ts  “com piles” , “te rm in a te s” , ‘’re d ” , o r “good p ro g ra m /b a d  p ro g ra m ” .
E x p erien ce  C orollary
A  person’s construction system  varies as they successively construe the repli­
cation o f events.
T h is  is one th e  m o st sign ifican t corollaries for o u r pu rposes, fo r it  m akes lea rn in g  an  
in te g ra l p a r t  o f a  person . K elly m akes th is  p o in t explicitly , w hen  he w rites
“L earn ing  is n o t a  special class o f psychological processes; i t  is synonym ous 
w ith  any  and  all psychological p rocesses. I t  is n o t som eth in g  th a t  h ap p en s 
to  a  person  011 occasions; i t  is w h a t m akes h im  a  p e rso n  in  th e  firs t p lace .” 
[Kel63, page 75]
M oreover, th is  clearly  in d ica tes  th a t  “dev e lo p m en t” is n o t so m eth in g  th a t  h ap p en s only 
to  ch ild ren , as develo p m en ta l psychology o ften  seem s to  im ply, b u t  a  co n tin u in g  process 
of life.
I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  realise th a t  lea rn in g  is n o t b ro u g h t a b o u t by  even ts  a lone, b u t  by  th e  
co n stru in g  of even ts. K elly reserves th e  te rm  “experience” for such  c o n stru in g  o f even ts .
“I t is n o t w h a t is h ap p en in g  a ro u n d  h im  th a t  m akes a  m an  experienced ; it  is 
th e  successive co n stru in g  an d  reco n stru in g  o f w h a t h ap p en s , as i t  h ap p en s , 
th a t  enriches th e  experiences o f his life. . . .  i t  is w hen m a n  begins to  see
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orderliness in  a  sequence o f ev en ts  th a t  he begins to  experience th e m .” [Kel63, 
page  73-74]
P o p p e r  m akes precisely th e  sam e p o in t:
“W e do n o t s tu m b le  u p o n  o u r experiences, n o r do we le t th e m  how  over us like 
a  s tre a m . R a th e r , we h av e  to  b e  active ; we have  to  ‘make7 o n r experiences.
I t  is we w ho alw ays fo rm u la te  th e  questions to  be  p u t to  n a tu re ; i t  is we w ho 
try  again  a n d  again  to  p u t  th ese  questions so as to  elicit a  c lear-cu t ‘y es’ 
o r ‘n o ’ (for n a tu re  does n o t give a n  answ er unless p ressed  fo r i t ) . ” [Pop59, 
page 59]
T h is is c rucial, fo r i t  tu rn s  on  its  h ead  th e  com m only held  n o tio n  o f lea rn in g  by  expe­
rience. As K elly says, “i t  is th e  lea rn in g  th a t  c o n s titu te s  experience” [Kel63, page  172] 
n o t sim ply  th e  experience th a t  b rings a b o u t learn ing . T h u s  experience is n o t p rim arily  
a  fu n c tio n  of tim e  sp en t on th e  jo b , b u t o f o u r revision of c o n s tru c t sy stem s. W e can  
be in  th e  v ic in ity  of ev en ts  fo r y ears , b u t  experience very little , conversely , we can  gain  
p len ty  of experience in  a  sh o rt tim e  if  th e  s itu a tio n  is rig h t.
T h is  coro llary  also show s th e  flaw  in  th e  id ea  th a t  we should  expose s tu d e n ts  to  a  w ide 
ran g e  of experiences. T h is  can n o t h e  done, for only th e  s tu d e n ts  them selves can  co n stru e , 
th u s  tu rn in g  even ts in to  experiences. W h a t we can  do, o f course , is to  p re sen t even ts  
w hich w e believe th ey  a re  capab le  o f tu rn in g  in to  experiences, a n d  also a t te m p t  to  p rov ide  
th e  r ig h t so rt o f en v iro n m en t for th is  to  occur. In  p a r tic u la r , we need  to  encou rage  
s tu d e n ts  to  develop p erm eab le  c o n s tru c ts , for
“ a  perso n  w ho ap p roaches his w orld  w ith  a  re p e r to ry  o f im p erm eab le  con­
s tru c ts  is likely to  find his sy stem  unw orkab le  th ro u g h  a  w ider experience 
o f even ts. He will, the re fo re , te n d  to  co n stric t his experiences to  th e  n a r ­
row er ranges w hich he is p rep a red  to  u n d e rs ta n d . O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , if  he 
is p rep a red  to  perceive ev en ts  in  new  w ays, he  m ay  accu m u la te  experience 
ra p id ly ” [Kel63, page  172]
B an n is te r , in  a  s tu d y  [Ban65] w hich has also been  confirm ed by  F iirs t [F78], has show n 
th a t  th e re  is a  re la tio n  b etw een  th e  so rt o f feedback  received a n d  th e  re su ltin g  changes 
w e m ake  to  o u r c o n s tru c t sy stem s. V alida ting  even ts are  likely to  lead  to  a  tig h ten in g  
o f th e  sy stem , so th a t  it  is su b sequen tly  in te rp re te d  as m ore de te rm in is tic ; in v a lid a tin g  
ev en ts  lead  to  a  loosening o f c o n s tru c ts . If  we estab lish  an  en v iro n m en t in  w hich s tu d e n ts  
ca rry  o u t drill exercises, w hich will v a lid a te  co n stru c ts  b u t ra re ly  challenge th e m , we will 
ce rta in ly  reinforce th e  sy stem , b u t we will also change its  n a tu re , causing  th e  s tu d e n ts  
to  see i t  as m ore  de te rm in is tic . T h is m ay  serve th em  well if  th e y  a re  faced  w ith  ro te  
p rob lem s, b u t w hen  c rea tiv ity  is req u ired  th e y  need  to  explore  ev en ts  in  w ays in  w hich 
th e ir  sy stem  does n o t fall a p a r t  every  tim e  th ey  m ake  an  in co rrec t p red ica tio n . I f  th ey  
see th e  w orld  in  te rm s o f r ig h t answ ers, how ever, an d  th e ir  ro le as q u estin g  for these
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answ ers, th e y  m ay  well flounder. K elly suggests th a t  good  d eve lopm en t is encouraged  
by  cycles o f tig h ten in g  a n d  loosening , r a th e r  th a n  ex ten d ed  perio d s of one o r th e  o th e r. 
T h is  id ea  seem  analogous to  th e  s im u la ted  annea ling  used  in  th e  le a rn in g  s tag e  for n eu ra l 
ne tw orks.
E x ac tly  w h a t changes do  we m ak e  w hen in v a lid a tio n  occurs? K elly suggests th a t  ou r 
c o n s tru c ts  are  lay e red , so th a t  we a t te m p t  to  change th e  m o st exposed  co n s tru c ts , w hich 
a re  likely to  b e  tho se  w hich  o u r ex p erim en t se t o u t to  te s t  [Kel55, pag e  160]. In  th is  
re sp ec t o u r p e rso n a l c o n s tru c t sy s tem  has a  (layered) core, p ro te c te d  by  a n  o u te r  level, 
sim ilar to  th e  h a rd  core p ro p o sed  b y  L ak ato s  for research  p ro g ram m es. O ne o f th e  
critic ism s o f P C T  is th a t  th is  layering  is n o t exp lic it. D uck h as  su ggested  th a t  it  is 
possib le to  express th is  w ith in  th e  th e o ry  itse lf  [[Duc83] c ited  in  [Ja h 88 , pages 9-10]]. 
T h is  is sign ifican t, for i t  suggests th a t  th e  th e o ry  is pow erful enough  to  express b o th  
“c o n te n t” c o n s tru c ts  an d  “p rocess” c o n stru c ts .
W e shou ld  also n o te  th a t  changes to  a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  are  n o t a u to m a tic  sim ply because  
we experience in v a lid a tin g  ev en ts . W e can  choose to  ignore inconsistencies (as sc ien tis ts  
do in  K u h n ian  p a rad ig m s) for inconsistency  is itse lf a  co n stru c t th a t  is open  to  change, 
an d  we m ay  perceive inconsistency  m ore  in  te rm s  of m a in ta in in g  a  co n sis ten t w ide view 
th a n  as conflicts b e tw een  local de ta ils . T h u s  we do n o t re jec t a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  is 
serv ing  ns well in coping w ith  life sim ply because  of one sm all inconsistency . P o p p e r ’s 
view  on re fu ta tio n  can  be  a t tr ib u te d  to  his sep a ra tio n  of science fro m  th e  sc ien tis t, an d  
th e  fo rm a tio n  o f closed scientific theo ries.
M o d u la tio n  C orollary
The variation in a person’s construction system  is lim ited by the perm eability  
o f  the constructs within whose range the variants lie.
I t  is n o t only o u r ex te rn a lly  visible ac tions th a t  a re  governed  b y  o n r c o n s tru c t sy stem s, 
b u t  also th e  changes we m ak e  to  th e  sy stem  itself.
“E ven  th e  changes w hich a  p e rso n  a t te m p ts  w ith in  h im self m u s t be  co n stru ed  
by  h im . T h e  new  o u tlo o k  w hich a  perso n  gains from  experience is itse lf  an  
ev en t; an d  being  an  ev en t in  his life, i t  needs to  be co n stru ed  b y  h im  if  he is 
to  m ake  any  sense o u t o f i t . ” [Kel63, p ag e  79]
If a  s tu d e n t has a  c o n s tru c t “p a r t  o f S oftw are E n g in ee rin g /n o t p a r t  o f S o ftw are  E ng ineer­
in g ” such  th a t  th e  d iscipline is seen as n o th in g  m ore  th a n  w ritin g  w ork ing  p ro g ram s, th is  
im p erm eab le  c o n s tru c t will in h ib it changes as a  re su lt o f experience. I f  we, as teach ers , 
endorse  such  im p erm eab le  co n s tru c ts , teach in g  th a t  design is defined by th e  life cycle, 
fo r exam ple , r a th e r  th a n  p resen tin g  th is  as one view o f th e  process, th e n  s tu d e n ts  will 
h a v e  g re a t difficulty  learn in g  beyond  th ese  c o n stru c ts . N o te  th a t  i t  is n o t w h e th e r we 
view life cycles in  th is  w ay th a t  is im p o r ta n t , b u t  how  on r s tu d e n ts  c o n s tru e  th em . If  
s tu d e n ts  co n stru e  “w o rth  lea rn in g ” as a  lo n g itu d in a l su b o rd in a te  o f “p a r t  o f Softw are
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E n g ineering” , an d  th e ir  view  of th e  d iscipline is lim ited  to  a  few sim ple c o n s tru c ts , th e n  
th ey  will never develop as so ftw are  engineers, choosing to  lea rn  only  th o se  top ics th a t  
fall w ith in  th e ir  lim ited  c o n s tru c t sy stem s.
I t is n o t only  a t  th e  tech n ica l levels th a t  th is  p resen ts  a  p rob lem , o f course , for a  s tu d e n t 
w ho has an  im p erm eab le  c o n s tru c t for “tru e /fa ls e ” such th a t  “said  by  le c tu re r /n o t  said  
by  le c tu re r” is seen as a  su b c o n s tru c t, m ay  hav e  g rea t difficulty in  h ig h er ed u ca tio n , 
w here t ru th s  a re  n o t th e  o rd e r o f th e  day. Such s tu d e n ts  a re  un likely  to  re c o n s tru c t 
th e ir  system s sim ply  in  response  to  tech n ica l ev en ts , th e y  a re  m ore  likely to  revise th e  
c o n s tru c t p e r ta in in g  to  in d iv id u a l le c tu re rs . T o change th is  a sp ec t o f th e  sy stem  requ ires 
ev en ts  ta rg e te d  a t  th e  ta sk .
F ragm entation  C orollary
A  person may successively employ a variety o f construction system s which
are inferentially incompatible with each other.
As w e develop o u r c o n s tru c t sy stem , i t  is generally  th e  low er level c o n s tru c ts  th a t  change 
as a  re su lt o f experience: we do  n o t, in  genera l, change h igher-level c o n s tru c ts  every  tim e 
a  d e ta il is o u t o f place. T h e  new  su b sy stem s we devise need  n o t be co n sis ten t w ith  th e  
old ones, b u t  in  a  “n o rm a l p e rso n ” th e y  will be consisten t w ith  th e  e stab lish ed  higher- 
level c o n s tru c ts . T h e  fu n d a m e n ta l p o s tu la te  carries co n n o ta tio n s  o f p rogression , and  
consistency  needs to  be seen w ith  re sp ec t to  th is  p rogression . F or exam ple , an  ev en t m ay  
cause us to  sh ift from  co n stru in g  F o r tra n  as a  b a d  p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  to  co n stru in g  it 
as a  good  one. T h is m ay  seem  in co n sis ten t, b u t  if  i t  is accom pan ied  b y  th e  developm ent 
of a  new  c o n s tru c t, such  th a t  F o r tra n  is seen as good  w hen app lied  to  n u m erica l analysis 
ty p e  p rob lem s, th e  w ider consistency  of th e  sy stem  is m a in ta in ed .
C om m o n a lity  C orollary
To the extent that one person employs a construction o f  experience which
is sim ilar to that employed by another, their processes are psychologically
sim ilar to those o f  the other person.
T h is  coro llary  am o u n ts  to  a  re jec tion  o f stim u lus-response  psychology, for K elly is as­
se rtin g  th a t  i t  is n o t ev en ts  th a t  lead  to  b eh av io u r, b u t  th e  co n stru in g  o f even ts. T h u s 
if tw o  people b eh av e  in  sim ilar fash ion  it  is because  th ey  co n stru e  ev en ts  sim ilarly , n o t 
because  th e  ev en ts  w ere sim ilar. T h is  is o f fu n d a m e n ta l im p o rta n c e  fo r ed u ca tio n , for 
it  suggests th a t  if  we w an t to  p ro d u ce  so ftw are  engineers w ith  c e r ta in  b eh av io u ra l ch a r­
ac te ris tic s  th e n  a  com m on cu rricu lum  will only  w ork if th e  s tu d e n ts  all possess sim ilar 
c o n s tru c t sy stem s on en try . I t  is n o ticeab le , for exam ple, how  m a tu re  s tu d e n ts  b ehave 
very  d ifferen tly  from  th e  m ore  tra d itio n a l s tu d e n ts  w ho com e s tra ig h t fro m  school. W ith  
w idening  access policies, such  issues becom e crucial. If  we accep t P C T , an d  y e t we still
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estab lish  o u r cu rricu lum  in  te rm s  o f com m on aim s an d  b eh av io u ra l o b jec tiv es , w e have  
to  accep t as a  consequence th a t  th e  experience for each s tu d e n t shou ld  be ta ilo red , to  
develop th e ir  c o n s tru c t sy stem s in  such  a  w ay th a t  th e  req u ired  b e h av io u r is expec ted . 
P C T  is closely a sso c ia ted  w ith  th e  id ea  o f s tu d e n t-c e n tre d  lea rn in g , b u t  u n fo rtu n a te ly  
th is  id ea  has com e to  be  c o n stru ed  b y  m a n y  academ ic  a d m in is tra to rs  as “ch eap er” . In  
fa c t, of course, ju s t  as in d iv id u a l th e ra p y  is likely to  cost m ore  th a n  g ro u p  th e ra p y , so 
we shou ld  expec t s tu d e n t-c e n tre d  lea rn in g  to  cost m ore th a n  g ro u p -cen tred  learn ing .
W ith  “fo rm al e d u ca tio n ” in  su b jec ts  like m a th e m a tic s  an d  physics, w here m o st o f th e  
c o n s tru c ts  developed h av e  been  fo rm ed  w ith  th e  help of a  te a c h e r, w e can  expec t som e 
conform ity . T h e  te ach e r carefully  con tro ls  even ts , an d  p rovides th e  v a lid a tio n . A fte r 
several years  of experience, th e  s tu d e n t com es to  develop a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  su itab le  for 
a lgebra ic  m a n ip u la tio n . T h is  c o n s tru c t sy stem , how ever, m ay  well d ep en d  on  a  te ach e r 
for v a lida tion : th e  pu p il m ay  n o t co n stru e  th a t  x  +  x — 2x fo r any  rea so n  o th e r  th a n  th e  
rep lica tio n  of te a c h e r’s v a lida tions. If  we subseq u en tly  rem ove th e  te a c h e r ’s va lida tion  
from  th e  sy stem , th e  s tu d e n t is lo st. W h en  we ask s tu d e n ts  to  m ak e  explic it asp ec ts  
o f th e ir  c o n s tru c t sy stem , by  exp la in ing  w hy  th e y  p red ic t t h a t  x  +  x — 2x, we do n o t 
accep t as an  ex p lan a tio n  “because  I  go t ticks for say ing  so for m an y  y e a rs” , a lth o u g h  in  
p ra c tic e  th is  m ay  well be th e ir  reaso n . I t  is im p o r ta n t, th erefo re , t h a t  if  we w an t s tu d e n ts  
to  be ab le  to  co n tin u e  learn in g  a fte r  we rem ove th e  teach e r th e n  we shou ld  help th e m  
to  develop n o t only a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  conform s because  of e x te rn a l va lid a tio n  b u t 
also a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  will co n tin u e  to  fu n c tio n  w hen te a c h e r presence  is rem oved . 
T h is  am o u n ts  to  a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  th a t  ad m its  to  th e  loss of innocence.
W e shou ld  also rem em b er th a t  s im ila rity  in  b eh av io u r can  a rise  becau se  peop le  have  
decided th e y  w an t to  beh av e  in  th e  sam e way. W h en  tw en ty  s tu d e n ts  give very  sim ilar 
answ ers to  a n  ex am in a tio n  question , we can n o t in fer sim ply th a t  th ey  all see th e  p rob lem , 
in  th e  sam e w ay because  th e y  ha.ve com m on c o n stru c ts . I t  m ay  well be th e  case th a t  
th ey  have  all seen th e  p rob lem  o f passing  th e  ex am in a tio n  in  th e  sam e way, decided 
u p o n  th e  so rt o f answ er th a t  is exp ec ted , an d  co n stru ed  th e  p rob lem  accordingly . T h u s  
com m o n ality  leads us n a tu ra lly  to  consider p rob lem s of sociality  W h a t we, as te ach e rs , 
expec t o f o n r s tu d e n ts  will be co n stru ed  by  th em , and  can  effect th e ir  ac tio n s. W e are  
p a r t  o f th e  p rob lem s we se t.
S o c ia lity  C orollary
To the extent that one person construes the construction processes o f  another,
they m ay play a role in  a social process involving the other person.
C o m m o n a lity  is n e ith e r  necessary  n o r sufficient for social p rog ress. T h e re  a re  m an y  
s itu a tio n s  w here i t  is b e t te r  for people  to  b ehave  differently  in  g ro u p s. T h e  socia lity  
coro llary , the re fo re , is c rucial if  we expec t so ftw are  engineers to  fu n c tio n  w ith in  team s, 
in te ra c t w ith  custom ers an d  u sers, an d  so on. N ote  th a t ,  unlike fra g m e n ta ry  no tio n s of 
psychology, we do n o t h av e  to  shift from  cognitive  to  social psychology  to  discuss th is
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asp ec t o f b eh av io u r. P C T  is a  psychology o f th e  p erson , an d  th e  p e rso n  can  fu n c tio n  as 
p a r t  o f a  g roup .
K elly’s te rm  “ro le” needs som e ex p lan a tio n , for it  is n o t so m eth in g  th a t  is im posed  upo n  
a  p e rso n , b u t  som eth ing  th a t  com es from  w ith in . T h u s  we can n o t say  th a t  a  so ftw are 
engineer has a  ro le  to  p lay  in  a  te a m , on ly  th a t  th e  engineer has chosen to  p lay  th e  ro le. 
T h e  ro le  chosen co rresponds to  th e  se t o f c o n stru c ts  a d o p te d  to  fit in  w ith  o th e rs . O nly 
one p e rso n  need  a d o p t a  ro le  in  social in te ra c tio n , a lth o u g h  it  is n o t u n com m on  fo r m ore  
p a r tic ip a n ts  to  do so. T h u s  i t  is sufficient fo r th e  engineer to  a d o p t a  ro le  in  d iscussing 
req u irem en ts  w ith  a  custom er: th e  cu s to m er does n o t need  to  a d o p t a  ro le  too .
In  p lay ing  a  ro le , th e  p e rso n  does n o t sim ply  ad o p t th e  c o n s tru c t sy stem s o f o th e r 
p a r tic ip a n ts , b u t  seeks to  co n stru e  th e ir  co n s tru c tio n  system s sufficiently  to  a d o p t a  
su itab le  ro le. T h e  engineer does n o t necessarily  look a t  th e  w orld  as a  co m p u te r u ser 
w hen  discussing req u irem en ts , b u t  m u s t b e  ab le  to  con stru e  th e  w orld  as a  u ser w ould  in 
o rd e r to  p a r tic ip a te  in  social discourse. T h is  is a  high-level skill, th a t  requ ires a  flexible 
an d  y e t ro b u s t c o n s tru c t sy stem . F lexible because  th e  co n stru c t sy s tem  m u s t in c o rp o ra te  
th e  u se r’s c o n s tru c ts  readily . R o b u st because  we do n o t w an t ro le  p lay ing  to  influence 
und u ly  o u r ow n co n stru c t sy stem . B eing ab le  to  see th e  w orld  as a  child shou ld  n o t m ake  
us becom e child-like in  o u r c o n stru c ts . I t  is com m only  n o ted  th a t  te a c h e rs , w ho sp en d  a  
la rg e  a m o u n t of tim e  ro le  p lay ing , o ften  in h e rit asp ec ts  o f th e ir  pupils b eh av io u r.
T h is  leads us to  a  very  im p o r ta n t p o in t: in  co n stru in g  th e  c o n s tru c t sy stem s o f o th e rs  we 
a c t as a  p e rso n a l sc ien tis t, b u t  fo r com plex p rob lem s, we need  to  m ak e  pub lic  th e  th eo ry  
we a re  devising. T h e  b ip o la r c o n s tru c ts  o f P C T  are  in ad eq u a te  for th is , fo r th ey  a m o u n t 
to  a  b in a ry  sy stem , a.nd we req u ire  m uch  rich er s tru c tu re s  for expressing  ty p ica l so ftw are 
engineering  prob lem s. T hese  a re  p rov ided  b y  on r th eo ry  p re se n ta tio n  lan g u ag e , an d  i t  is 
th e  fo rm al ed u ca tio n  o f so ftw are  engineers th a t  will p e rm it us to  co n stru e  th ese  in  com ­
m o n  w ays, th u s  allow ing th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  to  a c t as specifications. T re a tin g  th e  
w ritin g  of th e  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  as a  sequence o f even ts leads to  e x p lo ra to ry  discourse, 
w here we d e b a te  (possib ly  w ith  ourselves) w h a t we m ean  by  w h a t we hav e  w ritte n  or 
said . U sing th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  to  ca rry  o u t proofs will lead  us to  co n stru e  p ro p e rtie s  
such  as consistency  an d  co rrec tness, w hich m ay  in  tu rn  lead  to  fu r th e r  c o n stru c ts  such 
as fitness fo r pu rp o se . T h is is c rucial, fo r i t  fo rm s th e  m issing link  b e tw een  H oare  and  
G ries, w ith  th e ir  scientific theo ries, an d  N au r, w ith  his psychological theo ries  (o r p e r­
sonal c o n s tru c t sy stem s). N o te  th a t  i t  is n o t sufficient for s tu d e n ts  to  le a rn  how to  w rite  
specifications, th ey  also need to  ap p rec ia te  how  they , an d  o th e rs , m ig h t co n stru e  th em .
Since th e  cu sto m er will n o t, in  genera l, have  undergone th e  sam e so rt o f fo rm al edu ca tio n , 
these  ex te rn a l th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  will need  to  b e  m ad e  availab le  in  o th e r  form s if  th ey  
are  to  be used  as th e  basis fo r c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d aries . T h e  form s will typ ica lly  involve 
tra n s la tio n  in to  n a tu ra l  language , im p lem en ta tio n  of p ro to ty p e s , o r in te rp re ta t io n  by  th e  
engineer. In  all o f th ese  fo rm s, th e  custom er-as-sc ien tis t can  use th is  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  
as th e  basis for ex p erim en ts , decid ing w h e th e r invalid a tio n  shou ld  lead  to  revision o f 
co n s tru c ts , o r th e  c o n s tru a l o f th e  th e o ry  as “w rong” .
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T each ing  an d  s tu d y in g  a re  b o th  social p rocesses. T eachers co n stru e  th e ir  s tu d e n ts ’ con­
s tru c ts , an d  vice v ersa . T h u s  teach ers  m ay  a d a p t to  in te ra c t w ith  each  s tu d e n t, an d  
s tu d e n ts  a d a p t to  in te ra c t w ith  each  teach e r. If  we w ish to  co m m u n ica te  a  useful se t o f 
c o n s tru c ts  for so ftw are  engineering , the re fo re , w e need  to  p a r tic ip a te  in  a  social process. 
W e m ig h t th ro w  all th e  onus on  th e  s tu d e n t to  ad o p t a  ro le , o f course, b u t  typ ica lly  
th e  te a c h e r , supposed ly  h av ing  th e  b e t te r  developed  c o n s tru c t sy s tem , will ad o p t a  ro le 
to o . T h is  m eans th a t  th e  te ach e r n o t on ly  h as  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  su b je c t, an d  be able 
to  m ake  c o n s tru c ts  exp lic it, b u t  also h as  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  c o n s tru c ts  th a t  th e  s tu d e n t 
will b e  b ring ing  to  b e a r in  th e  social p rocess, a n d  engineer ev en ts  t h a t  will help  th e  
co n s tru c ts  to  develop in  th e  desired  way. T h is  is w idely acknow ledged am o n g st p rim a ry  
school te ach e rs , w ho realise th e  im p o rta n c e  o f u n d e rs ta n d in g  how  th e ir  young  pupils 
see th e  w orld , b u t seem s to  be largely  ignored  in  h igher ed u ca tio n . T h is m ig h t b e  as a  
re su lt o f develo p m en ta l psychologists g iv ing th e  im pression  th a t  developm ent s to p s  a t 
adolescence, so th a t  s tu d e n ts  a re  a lread y  developed  by  th e  tim e  th e y  reach  us a n d  so, 
since th e y  are  ad u lts  like u s, o u r c o n s tru c ts  will be sim ilar. In  p ra c tic e , o f course, even 
if som e asp ec ts  o f th e ir  c o n s tru c t system s will lead  to  com m onality , a ll s tu d e n ts , and  
indeed  all teach ers , a re  different.
7.2 Discussion of PCT
In  th e  n ex t c h a p te r  w e will discuss in d e ta il how  we m ig h t te a c h  a  few  a sp ec ts  o f Softw are 
E ng ineering  th a t  a rise  from  consid era tio n  o f o u r m odel. B efore do ing  th is , how ever, it  
is conven ien t to  consider som e g enera l ed u ca tio n a l p o in ts  th a t  a rise  fro m  P C T , a n d  how  
th ey  m ig h t influence o u r cu rricu lum  design ta sk .
T h e  firs t th in g  we can  n o te  is t h a t  th e  n a tu re  o f “cu rricu lum ” itse lf  h a s  to  be u n d e rs to o d  
before  we can a t te m p t  design. If  we view  th e  cu rricu lum  as a  rig id  p la n  fo r ac tio n , w hilst 
em b rac in g  P C T , th e n  we m u s t believe th a t  we can  p red ic t all o f o u r s tu d e n ts ’ c o n s tru c t 
sy stem s on  en try , an d  also how  th e y  will develop. As th is  seem s u n te n a b le , we need  a  
m o re  flexible view o f cu rricu lum . Doll sum s u p  th e  s tan ce  we will ta k e , w hen  he w rites
“In  a  m o d e rn is t p e rsp ec tiv e , cu rricu lum  p lans a re  to  be well a r tic u la te d , w ith  
ends clear an d  m eans precise. T h is  is th e  key to  th e  T y le r-H u n te r  m odel.
In  a  p o s t-m o d e rn  cu rricu lum  th e re  m u s t be, as D ew ey rea lised , a  sense of 
indecision an d  in d e te rm in acy  to  cu rricu lu m  p lann ing . T h e  ends perceived  
are  n o t so m uch  ends as beginnings; th ey  rep resen t ends-in-v iew , o r beacons, 
w hich a c t as guides before th e  cu rricu lu m  im p lem en ta tio n  p rocess begins.
B u t once th e  course develops its  ow n e th o s th o se  ends a re  them selves p a r t  
o f th e  tra n sfo rm a tio n ; th ey , to o , a long  w ith  th e  s tu d e n ts , th e  te ach e rs , th e  
course m a te r ia l, und erg o  tra n s fo rm a tio n . T h e  locus o f pow er a n d  d irec tion  
sh ifts from  th e  ex te rn a l to  th e  in te rn a lity  o f th e  course experience.” [Dol89, 
p age  250]
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In  essence, D oll is n o tin g  th a t  cu rricu lum  design is an  E -P ro b lem , b o u n d  in to  a  con­
tin u a lly  chang ing  en v iro n m en t, w here th e  quest for so lu tions changes p e rcep tio n s o f th e  
prob lem  significantly , th u s  th e  cu rricu lum  is n o t a  final p ro d u c t, b u t  an  on-going process.
O ne w ay o f help ing cu rricu lum  designers to  solve th is  E -P ro b lem  is to  p ro v id e  a  n u m b e r o f 
resources u p o n  w hich  th e y  can  d raw  w hen m ak ing  s itu a te d  ac tions. M ost o f th e  S oftw are 
E ng ineering  ed u ca tio n  li te ra tu re , how ever, co n tr ib u te s  to  th is  p rocess in  th e  fo rm  of sets 
of a im s, o b jec tiv es , an d  course co n te n t. T h a t  is, it  offers in fo rm a tiv e  discourse. O ur 
co n trib u tio n  here  is r a th e r  m ore  fu n d am en ta l; i t  seeks to  in itia te  som e o f th e  ex p lo ra tio n  
necessary  fo r th e  process th a t  c u rren tly  seem s sad ly  lacking. W e w ould  a rg u e  th a t  th e  
p rov ision  o f aim s an d  co n ten t is n o t enough , an d  is o f lim ited  use a t  th e  cu rre n t s tag e  o f 
developm en t o f th e  discipline. A d o p tin g  th e  A C M  curricu lum  [Do89] does n o t help  w ith  
th e  process o f cu rricu lum  design, i t  sim ply  defers th e  rea l issues u n til  th e  im p lem en ta tio n . 
Inc lusion  o f “re la tio n s” in  a  p u b lished  d iscre te  m a th e m a tic s  sy llabus is only  o f rea l value 
if it  is accom pan ied  by  a  positio n  on  w hy th e y  a re  inc luded , how  th ey  shou ld  be ta u g h t, 
how  th e  s tu d e n t should  be  encouraged  to  perceive th em , an d  so on . Sim ilarly , d iscussion 
o f A d a  as a  firs t teach in g  lan g u ag e  is only o f value if ca rried  o u t w ith in  a  com m u n ity  
th a t  h as  a  sufficiently refined n o tio n  o f w h a t it m an s to  te ach  “p ro g ram m in g ” , w h a t a  
p ro g ram m in g  lan g u ag e  is, an d  w h a t value system s a re  being used  to  m ak e  th e  ju d g em en t.
O ne o f th e  g rave  dangers in  w ritin g  a b o u t cu rricu lum  design a t  th e  level o f course  aim s, 
o b jec tives an d  co n ten t is th a t  som e teach ers  m ay  feel ju stified  in , o r coerced in to , a d o p t­
ing ideas p u t fo rw ard  w ith o u t ga in ing  a  deep u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  issues involved. T h ey  
a d o p t top ics a n d  teach in g  m e th o d s , for exam ple , on authority, th u s  avoid ing  th e  loss of 
innocence. T h ey  use g roup  w ork , p ra c tic a l sessions, and  C A SE  to o ls  n o t because  th ey  
h av e  a  good  reaso n , w hich th ey  are  p re p a re d  to  defend, b u t  because  som eone else has 
suggested  th ey  should . M oreover, th e y  freq u en tly  m is in te rp re t th ese  suggestions in  q u ite  
fu n d a m e n ta l w ays. S chupp , fo r exam ple , h as  n o te d  th a t  th e  p ro p o sa ls  fo r “New M a th e ­
m a tic s” arose  in  reac tio n  to  th e  Soviet lau n ch  o f S p u tn ik  in  1957. T h e  end  w as to  be an  
im p ro v em en t in  th e  uses o f m a th e m a tic s  fo r science an d  technology. He goes on  to  no te , 
how ever, th a t
“th e  m eans ( s tru c tu ra l cleaning u p , logical fo u n d a tio n s, lin g u a l exa.ctification) 
becam e th e  ends. . .  .o n e  can s ta te  th a t  New M ath  ce rta in ly  did not p ro m o te  
app lied  m a th e m a tic s  te ach in g .” [Sch89b, page  41]
T h e  sam e p rob lem  o f m is in te rp re ta tio n  h as  been  n o ted  by  M arion  w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  
ty p ica l d iscre te  m a th e m a tic s  sy llabus in  S oftw are Engineering:
“how  does one p rev en t such  a  course from  degen era tin g  in to  a  collection o f 
d iscre te  top ics o r from  being  used  as a  w ay to  ru sh  th ro u g h  as m uch  m a te ria l 
as possib le so as to  get to  th e  good  app lica tions?  . . .  how  does one keep 
u p p e rm o st in  m ind  th e  need fo r m a th e m a tic a l rig o u r?” [M ar89, p ag e  276]
T h e  p rob lem  of coherence is fu n d a m e n ta l to  th is  research  p ro g ram m e, fo r o u r m odel has 
so u g h t to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th e re  is a t  leas t one w ay in w hich m an y  o f th e  top ics usually
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asso c ia ted  w ith  S oftw are E ng ineering  m ay  b e  reconciled. T h is  m odel m ay  be used as 
th e  basis for teach in g , p rov id in g  c o n s tru c ts  fo r th e  s tu d e n ts  to  use w hen  assim ila ting  
m a te ria l. I t  m ay  also b e  used  as th e  basis for cu rricu lum  design, th u s  p rov id in g  a  
fram ew o rk  for ra tio n a l d iscussion.
I t is th e  accep tan ce  th a t  th e  cu rricu lum  is n o t ju s t  a  te x t describ ing  w h a t m u s t be 
done, b u t a  set o f c o n stru c ts  th a t  will guide teach e rs  and  s tu d e n ts  th ro u g h  th e  lea rn ing  
p rocess, th a t  justifies o u r choice o f ti t le  for th is  thesis. T h e re  is no  in te n tio n  o f p roduc ing  
“th e  cu rricu lu m ” fo r S oftw are E ng ineering , b u t  hopefully  b y  help ing  teach e rs  to  develop 
a p p ro p ria te  co n stru c ts  for S oftw are E ng ineering  ed u ca tio n , a n d  b y  ra is in g  ev en ts  for 
th e m  to  v a lid a te  o r in v a lid a te , a  co n tr ib u tio n  to  cu rricu lum  design is be ing  m ade.
P C T  suggests th a t  one o f th e  m o st sign ifican t roles th e  te ach e r will p lay  will b e  to  use 
his o r h er co n stru a l o f th e  cu rricu lum  to  engineer a  su itab le  en v iro n m en t fo r s tu d e n ts  
to  develop new  c o n s tru c ts . K elly h as  suggested  a  n u m b er o f heu ris tics  for doing th is  
an d , a lth o u g h  th ese  w ere orig inally  in te n d e d  fo r th e ra p is ts  r a th e r  th a n  teach e rs , we will 
briefly  see how  th e y  m ay  be  app lied  to  edu ca tio n .
U se  o f Fresh E lem en ts
I t  is useful i f  a fresh set o f  elem ents is provided as the context in which new  
constructs are to emerge.
T h is  is in te re s tin g , because  is seem s to  ru n  c o n tra ry  to  conven tional ed u ca tio n a l p rac tice , 
w hich is based  on teach in g  by  analogy. In  fa c t, how ever, we m u s t ta k e  care  to  d istingu ish  
b etw een  developing new  c o n s tru c ts  a n d  ex ten d in g  th e  ran g e  of ex is tin g  ones. A nalogy  
o ften  helps us to  b ring  ex isting  c o n s tru c ts  to  b e a r on p red ic tin g  ev en ts , b u t  n o t to  develop 
en tire ly  new  c o n stru c ts . If  we are  try in g  to  ad d  a  new  c o n s tru c t such  as “fo rm a l/in fo rm a l 
lan g u ag es” , w hich s tu d e n ts  c u rren tly  do n o t h av e , th e re  does seem  to  b e  som e su p p o rt 
for th is  h eu ris tic , fo r in tro d u c in g  such  a  c o n s tru c t w ith  w ell-understood  exam ples such as 
a r ith m e tic  expressions is f ra u g h t w ith  p rob lem s. S tu d en ts  w an t to  co n stru e  “2 + 3 ” an d  
“3 + 2 ” as th e  sam e s tr in g , because  th e y  a re  b ring ing  a  rich  c o n s tru c t sy stem  to  b e a r on 
th e  p ro b lem , an d  th ey  co n stru e  to o  m uch  from  it . U sing a b s tra c t  exam ples, in  th e  sense 
th a t  th ey  are  n o t co n stru ed  as rep lica tions by  th e  s tu d e n ts , overcom es th is  p ro b lem , an d  
once th e  c o n s tru c t has been  estab lish ed , th e  ran g e  can be ex ten d ed  b y  giving several 
exam ples of ex isting  e lem ents a lread y  b o u n d  in to  th e  co n stru c t sy stem .
E x p er im en ta tio n
The next condition which is hospitable to the form ation o f new constructs is 
an atmosphere o f experiment.
A n en v iro n m en t shou ld  be p rov ided  in  w hich th e  s tu d e n ts  can  t ry  o u t new  co n stru c ts  
in  re la tiv e  iso la tio n , th u s  w e t ry  to  avoid  estab lish ing  s itu a tio n s  in  w hich  com plex con­
s te lla tio n s occur. T o  achieve such  an  en v iro n m en t th e  effects o f th e  ex p erim en t m u st be
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lim ited . T h is  is analogous to  th e  use o f sim plified m odels fo r te a c h in g  science, w here 
s tu d e n ts  a re  encou raged  to  develop c o n stru c ts  such as energy  con serv a tio n  by  experi­
m en tin g  in  w orlds consisting  of fric tion less p lanes an d  inex tensib le  s trin g s . O nly la te r  
do we p rov ide  en v iro n m en ts  w here  h e a t is d issip a ted  th ro u g h  fric tion .
W e can  use th ese  tw o  heu ristics  to  discuss th e  d eb a te  betw een  teach in g  b o tto m -u p , 
w here deta ils a re  in tro d u c e d  before  g enera l p rincip les, an d  to p -d o w n , w here princip les 
a re  ta u g h t  firs t. I t  is o ften  sa id , fo r exam ple , th a t  one can n o t te a c h  w h a t p ro g ram m in g  
is before  yon  have  ta u g h t a  lan g u ag e  like P asca l. T h is , we w ould  a rg u e , involves w ork ing  
ag a in st th e  firs t h eu ris tic , for once you  h av e  ta u g h t P asca l you  m ay  h av e  g re a t difficulty 
in  te a s in g  o u t th e  c o n s tru c t “p ro g ram m in g ” as d is tin c t from  “P a sc a l p ro g ram m in g ” . 
R a th e r , we w ould  suggest a  to p -d o w n  s tra te g y , w here th e  c o n s tru c t is developed d irec tly  
using  sim plified m odels w ith  w hich th e  s tu d e n ts  a re  n o t fam iliar, b u t  keep ing  th e  con­
s tru c t  as p erm eab le  as possible. T h is  is n o t alw ays possible, b u t  experience suggests 
th a t  i t  can  w ork very  efficiently. W e shall discuss exam ples o f th is  ap p ro ach  in  th e  n ex t 
c h a p te r . A  cu rricu lum  designed on th ese  lines is “in v e rted ” , in th e  sense th a t  it  allows 
th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f g enera l p rincip les before  de ta ils , ra th e r  th a n  th e  m o re  tra d itio n a l 
ap p ro ach  [C0I186].
A v a ila b ility  o f V a lid atin g  D a ta
I f  returns on the prediction are unavailable or unduly delayed, one is likely to
postpone changing the construct under which the prediction was made.
I t is im p o r ta n t  to  realise th a t  only th e  ex p erim en te r really  know s w h a t th e  aim  o f th e  
ex p erim en t w as, an d  can  co n stru e  th e  ex p erim en t as va lid a tin g  o r in v a lid a tin g  c o n tru c ts . 
If  we se t exercises fo r o u r s tu d e n ts , th e ir  s ta tu s  should  b e  clearly  u n d e rs to o d . T hey  
m ig h t be ex p erim en ts  we a re  carry in g  o u t on th e  s tu d e n ts , to  p ro v id e  feedback  on  th e  
effectiveness o f teach in g  for exam ple , o r th e y  m ig h t be suggestions fo r ex p erim en ts  th e  
s tu d e n ts  shou ld  ca rry  o u t. T h e  la t te r  use can  be p ro b lem atic , how ever, as o u r suggestions 
for ac tions will n o t necessarily  lead  to  th e  experim en ts we a n tic ip a te , indeed  th e y  m ay  
n o t even lead  to  any  rea l experience fo r th e  s tu d e n ts . P ro g ram m in g  ta sk s , fo r exam ple , 
m ay  well be v a lid a ted  by s tu d e n ts  u sing  a  sim ple “ru n n in g /n o n -ru n n in g ” c o n s tru c t. In  
th is  case we m ay  be  re inforcing  som e b a d  p ro g ram m in g  h a b its  (as  we see th e m ). If  we 
expec t s tu d e n ts  to  b rin g  m ore  com plex c o n s tru c ts  to  b e a r on  ta sk s  such  as p ro g ram m in g  
o r w ritin g  specifications, th e n  we m u st ensu re  th a t  these  c o n s tru c ts  a re  developed firs t, 
an d  th a t  th e  s tu d e n t sees th em  as sufficiently perm eab le  to  a d m it th e  ev en ts  to  th e ir  
ran g e . If  we teach  s tu d e n ts  to  “com m en t code” , for exam ple, we a re  developing a  fa irly  
im p erm eab le  c o n s tru c t, an d  it  is q u ite  likely th a t  th ey  will n o t see th e  lessons learned  
as app licab le  to  do cu m en tin g  p roofs, specifications, o r designs. W e m ay  end  up  teach in g  
th ese  as se p a ra te  concep ts, th e n  a tte m p tin g  to  develop su p e r-co n stru c ts  to  em b race  th em  
all. T h is , we w ould  argue , is th e  d anger o f a  frag m en ted  cu rricu lum , an d  is one of th e  
fac to rs  ac tin g  ag a in s t p rog ress in  S oftw are E ng ineering  ed u ca tio n : as i t  becom es seen 
as necessary  for th e  engineer to  u n d e rs ta n d  m ore  an d  m ore  “to p ic s” th e  fra g m e n ta tio n
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increases, b u t th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  decreases, fo r th e  top ics a re  only u n d e rs to o d  in  te rm s 
o f im p erm eab le  co n stru c ts .
A void in g  T h reat
I f  the elem ents out o f which it is proposed to form  a new construct com m only 
involve threat, that is, i f  they tend to elicit a contruct or an issue which is 
basically incompatible with the system  upon which the person has come to rely 
fo r  his living— he m ay not readily utilize the elem ents fo r  form ing  any new  
contruct.
K elly, be ing  p rim arily  in te re s te d  in th e ra p y  as th e  app lica tio n  fo r his th eo ry , has a  g rea t 
deal to  say  a b o u t “th r e a t” an d  also one o f th e  sy m ptom s it  evokes, hostility . H ostility  is 
th e  reac tio n  to  th r e a t  th a t  is a sso c ia ted  w ith  th e  desire to  p ro te c t a  c o n s tru c t sy stem  by  
in te rp re tin g  even ts so th a t  in v a lid a tio n  can n o t be  observed . T h is  m u s t n o t be confused 
w ith  K elly ’s use o f th e  te rm  “aggression” , how ever, w hich is th e  sy m p to m  of a  p e rso n ’s 
ac tive  e x p e rim en ta tio n  w ith  th e  en v iro n m en t. T h u s h o s tility  is th e  re su lt o f avoiding 
experience, w hereas aggression is th e  p u rsu it o f i t .  I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  realise  th a t  th re a t  
n o t only h inders th e  developm ent o f c o n s tru c t sy stem s, b u t m ay  also re ta rd  it . I f  a  p erso n  
is be ing  forced to  re jec t th e  c u rre n t sy stem  in  th e  face of th r e a t  a  com m on reac tio n  is to  
fall back  u p o n  earlier system s w hich can  be  held  even m ore  dogm atica lly .
W e can  th in k  o f th e  loss of innocence as posing  a  th re a t  for m an y  people , because  th e ir  
c o n s tru c t sy stem s te ll th e m  th a t  com plex  design p roblem s will req u ire  decisions th ey  
a re  u n ab le  to  m ake  confidently . T h e  tw o  reac tio n s we n o ted , p re ten sio n s to  genius and  
refuge in  sty le , a re  b o th  exam ples o f a d o p tin g  ex isting  c o n s tru c t sy stem s ra th e r  th a n  
risk ing  th e  developm ent of new  ones. T h e  acrim onious d eb a tes  th a t  a re  sy m p to m a tic  
o f m an y  discussions in  S oftw are E ng ineering  d e m o n s tra te  th e  h o s tility  th a t  arises as a  
re su lt o f con fron ting  th ese  reac tio n s , an d  hence posing  th re a t .  O f course, one p e rso n ’s 
aggression  can  lead  to  a n o th e r  p e rso n ’s th re a t:  it is qu ite  possib le  th a t  one p a r ty  in  a  
d e b a te  is genuinely  try in g  to  ask  p ro v o ca tiv e  questions to  gain  experience, b u t if a n o th e r  
p e rso n  in te rp re ts  th ese  questions as th re a te n in g  even ts, ho stility  will occur. T h is  is w here 
th e  sociallity  co ro llary  becom es so im p o r ta n t , fo r in  ga in ing  experience, w h e th e r i t  be  
lea rn in g  in  an  ed u ca tio n a l e s tab lish m en t o r perfo rm ing  req u irem en ts  analysis, we m u st 
realise  th e  possib ility  o f th re a tin g  o th e rs  and  a c t accordingly. O u r lea rn in g  is n o t a  
p riv a te  affair if we m ake visible o n r ex p erim en ts  so th a t  th ey  can  b e  co n stru ed  b y  o th e rs . 
T h e  so ftw are  engineer w ho poses th e  q u estio n  “w hy does th is  job  need  to  be  done” or 
“w hy h av e  we been  to ld  to  use th is  m e th o d ” m ay  well be aggressively seeking experience, 
b u t  could  b e  th re a te n in g  th e  jo b  secu rity  o r re p u ta tio n  o f o th e rs .
O n-the-job  tra in in g , th e re fo re , requ ires a  degree of persona l skill if  genu ine  experience 
is to  be gained . O ne o f th e  ta sk s  o f th e  te ach e r is to  p rov ide  a  secure  en v iro n m en t 
w here ex p erim en ts  can  be  carried  o u t w ith o u t u n d u e  th re a t .  T h u s  s tu d e n ts  can  engage 
in  design ta sk s  w ith o u t th e ir  careers depend ing  on  th em , o r t r y  o u t new  p ro g ram m in g
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sty les w ith o u t th e  fear o f rid icule. A ssessm ent an d  g roup  w ork , how ever, increase  th e  
risk  o f th r e a t ,  an d  m u s t b e  tre a te d  w ith  ex trem e  cau tio n . T h e  a rg u m e n t th a t  g roup  
w ork ing  is e ssen tia l in  in d u s try , so s tu d e n ts  should  lea rn  to  w ork in  g ro u p s, should  lead  
us to  conclude th a t  th e y  need  to  develop co n stru c ts  th a t  will enab le  th is  to  h a p p e n , n o t 
th a t  th ey  shou ld  a t te m p t  to  develop th e ir  ow n c o n s tru c t system s largely  w ith in  g roup  
ex p erim en ts .
A void  P re -o ccu p a tio n  w ith  O ld M ater ia l
Old and fam iliar m aterial tends to be fixed in place by old and childlike con­
structs; it is only as we let the client interweave it with new and adult material 
that he starts bringing his constructs up to date.
T his is a  p a r tic u la r  p rob lem  for s tu d e n ts  w ho have “done co m p u tin g  b efo re” , for th ey  
b rin g  w ith  th e m  a  set o f c o n s tru c ts , possib ly  developed and  v a lid a ted  over a  n u m b e r of 
y ea rs , t h a t  a re  usually  q u ite  im perm eab le . T h ey  are  also likely to  h av e  b een  su b jec ted  to  
ev en ts  th a t  v a lid a te , r a th e r  th a n  in v a lid a te , th ese  c o n stru c ts , so th e y  a re  likely in te rp re t 
th e ir  system s as de te rm in is tic . If  we seek to  bu ild  on  these  c o n s tru c ts  to o  d irectly , by  
suggesting  in v a lid a tin g  ex p erim en ts , we pose th re a ts :  if we suggest fu r th e r  v a lid a tin g  
ex p erim en ts  w e reinforce th e  co n stru c ts  s till fu r th e r . T h is  suggests t h a t  it  m ay  be a p ­
p ro p ria te  to  avoid  d irec t c o n fro n ta tio n  u n til  som e new  co n stru c ts  h av e  been  developed 
to  rep lace  th e  old. T each ing  “p ro g ram m in g ” th ro u g h  a  lan g u ag e  th a t  is un fam iliar to  all 
s tu d e n ts , fo r exam ple , m ig h t be m ore  p ro d u c tiv e  th a n  a tte m p tin g  to  bu ild  on  experiences 
w ith  P asca l, F o r tra n  or B asic. Indeed , avoiding th e  te rm  “p ro g ram m in g ” itse lf  m ig h t be 
helpfu l, excep t th a t  m o st s tu d e n ts  w ould  find such  avoidance itse lf  th re a te n in g , as th e ir  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f w h a t th e y  h av e  com e to  s tu d y  should  p ro b ab ly  include p ro g ram m ing .
7.3 Summary
In  th is  c h a p te r  we hav e  in tro d u c e d  P C T  an d  d iscussed som e o f its  ram ifica tio n s for 
so ftw are  engineering  ed u ca tio n . W e hav e  n o t in ten d ed  to  explic itly  link  th is  d iscussion 
to  o n r m odel of sy stem  design, b u t we w ould  expect th e  read e r to  h av e  form ed som e 
co n s tru c ts  concern ing  how  th is  m ig h t be  done. O ne p a r tic u la r  ro le  th is  c h a p te r  has 
perfo rm ed  is to  forge th e  link  b e tw een  th e  in d iv id u a l an d  social ac tio n s , involv ing  b o th  
th eo ry  bu ild ing  for engineering  an d  c o n s tru c t fo rm a tio n  in  ed u ca tio n . In d eed , we can  see 
th a t  o n r m odel of sy stem  design, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  accep tance  of P C T , m ig h t fo rm  an  
excellent basis to  explore th e  sim ilarities b e tw een  E d u ca tio n  and  S oftw are  E ngineering .
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C hapter 8
C urricu lu m  D esig n  E x p er im en ts
“In  Dip. Ed., as in any fa iry  tale, ju s t when you th ink yo u ’re out o f the 
woods, there is suddenly more to them  than you ever imagined. Ju st when 
you think you have escaped to an open quiet place it turns out yo u ’re still in  
them . Even later, the woods yo u ’re wandering in  turn out to be yourse lf”
A  S tuden t Teacher
W e h av e  now  reach ed  th e  s tag e  w here we can  reap  th e  rew ard s , an d  suffer th e  con­
sequences, o f our research  p ro g ram m e. O u r aim  w as to  increase  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f 
ed u ca tio n a l p ra c titio n e rs , so th a t  th e y  can im prove th e  q u a lity  o f so ftw are  eng ineer­
ing . In  th is  c h a p te r  we will discuss som e of th e  consequences o f th is  re sea rch  fo r h igher 
ed u ca tio n . B oxer develops th e  analogy  o f a  business as
“a  tan g le  of conversa tions w hich have  fo rm ed  in to  a  k n o t [which can  be 
th o u g h t o f as th e  p a r tic u la r  w ay in  w hich  th ese  conversa tions com e toge th er]: 
th e y  are  th e  h is to ry  w hich th e  business is to  tho se  w ho a re  in  its  em ploy. T h e  
k n o t in  tliis  sense is th e  ex p lan a tio n  w hich governs w ho can  m ak e  choices 
w hen , w here an d  how  a b o u t w h a t k inds o f th in g s .” [Box88, p ag e  421]
T h is  also seem s a  very  a p t  analogy  fo r th e  in s ti tu tio n  of h igher e d u ca tio n , an d  it  h igh­
ligh ts  a  decision we need  to  m ake  before  p roceeding  w ith  th is  c h ap te r: w h a t view  a re  we 
going to  ta k e  o f th e  kno t?
O u r research  has been  highly  reflexive, for by  discussing th e  n a tu re  o f design we have 
a rriv ed  a t  som e te n ta t iv e  re su lts  w hich w e surely  should  seek to  app ly  to  th e  design  o f 
th e  cu rricu lu m , as well as to  th e  design o f th e  cu rricu lum  to  teach  design', th u s  process 
an d  c o n te n t once m ore  m erge. T h e  fo rm er, how ever, tak es  us well an d  tru ly  in to  th e  ta sk  
o f u n tan g lin g  th e  k n o t. I t  p re sen ts  us w ith  a ll th e  problem s o f self re fe ren tia l sy stem s, 
p a rtic u la rly  th o se  of consistency  [Smu87]. I t  also raises issues o f th e  ro les o f m an ag em en t, 
g o v ern m en t, s tu d e n ts  an d  teach e rs , issues o f co n tro l, academ ic freedom , e th ics , an d  m an y  
m ore  face ts  of ed u ca tio n . O u r discussion m ay  well lead  us in  d irec tions th a t  will be  
in te rp re te d  as rad ica l, subversive a n d  th re a te n in g . T his alone shou ld  n o t w orry  us, of 
course, for th e re  w as never an y  g u a ra n te e  th a t  th is  en te rp rise  w ould  b e  com forting  for 
th e  read e r, o r th e  a u th o r . T h e re  is one reac tio n  we should  g u a rd  a g a in s t, how ever,and  
th a t  is th e  “all r ig h t in  th e o ry ” response . If  o u r research  leads us to  conclusions th a t
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can  only be u tilised  in  som e u to p ia n  w orld , it  is likely to  b e  ign o red —  a  fa te  fa r  w orse 
th a n  re fu ta tio n . W e m ig h t a rg u e , o f course, th a t  b ring ing  a b o u t such  an  idealised  w orld 
is p a r t  o f th e  te a c h e r’s jo b , b u t  th is  leads us to  an  in fin ite  reg ression , fo r th e  “all r ig h t 
in  th e o ry ” response  will doub tless  re so u n d  again . F o rtu n a te ly , how ever, we can  escape 
th ro u g h  th e  ho rns of th is  d ilem m a by  show ing th a t  onr re sea rch  has ap p lica tio n s even 
if  we a re  co n te n t to  leave th e  k n o t u nexp lo red , for we can  tin k e r w ith  th e  loose ends 
o f s tr in g  th a t  p ro tru d e . T h is  m ay  n o t im prove  so ftw are eng ineering  ed u ca tio n  as an  
in s ti tu tio n , b u t  i t  m ig h t im prove  th e  ed u ca tio n a l experience fo r som e s tu d e n ts .
In  th e  tw o  sections th a t  follow  w e will s ta r t  b y  briefly exp lo ring  th e  im p lica tions o f ou r 
re search  for th e  p rob lem  o f u n tan g lin g  th e  k n o t. W e will th e n  sk e tch  o u t som e ac tiv ities  
th a t  have  been  carried  o u t in  tid y in g  u p  loose ends.
8.1 Untangling (or Tightening?) the Knot
O ne o f th e  m a jo r  re su lts  o f o u r research  has been  th e  conclusion th a t  so ftw are  engineering  
design is, a n d  m u s t be, a  self conscious ac tiv ity . If  we accep t th is , th e n  it  is v ita l th a t  
s tu d e n ts  a re  ed u ca ted  in  such  a  w ay th a t  self consciousness develops. M oreover, o n r m odel 
suggests  th a t  s tu d e n ts  need  to  b e  ab le  to  c o n s tru c t theories to  solve novel p rob lem s, th u s  
th e y  need  to  be  ab le  to  le a rn  w ith o u t th e  su p p o rt o f a  teach e r. W e need , the re fo re , to  
encourage  o u r s tu d e n ts  to  becom e selfconscious lea rners. T h is poses a  m a jo r  p rob lem  for 
th e  ed u ca tio n a l e s ta b lish m e n t, how ever, w hich desp ite  its  p ro te s ta tio n s , is s till largely  
an  in s ti tu tio n  w here co n tro l is v ested  cen tra lly , d issip a ted  th ro u g h  resou rce  a llo ca tio n , 
com m on cu rricu la , a n d  teach e rs , w ith  s tu d e n ts  com ing fa r  dow n th e  lis t. “A cadem ic 
freed o m ” m eans freedom  to  w ork  w ith in  ce rta in  no rm s an d  c o n s tra in ts . T h e  te a c h e r’s 
ro le  in  th is  is largely  to  su b v e rt th e  b eh av io u r o f th e  e r ra n t s tu d e n t in  an  a t te m p t 
to  achieve conform ity , m easu red  th ro u g h  exam in a tio n s o f one so r t o r a n o th e r. E ven  
“research  s tu d e n ts ” a re  exp ec ted  to  conform  to  fairly  re s tr ic te d  n o rm s, in  sp ite  o f th e  
fac t th a t  th ey  a re  supposed  to  be  d e m o n s tra tin g  an  ab ility  to  m ove th e  fro n tie rs  o f 
know ledge1.
O ne m a jo r  consequence o f th e  sh ift o f em phasis from  “teach in g ” to  “lea rn in g ” is to  
deprive  th e  re sea rch er o f an  estab lished  m ethodo logy  for in v es tig a tin g  ed u ca tio n a l p ro b ­
lem s. H arri-A u g ste in  sum s th is  up  perfectly :
“If  ed u ca tio n a l re search  concerns itse lf  w ith  lea rn ing  and  th e  re se a rc h e r /te a c h e r  
defines lea rn in g  in  th is  way, th e n  th e  p rio rity  of scientific o b je c tiv ity  becom es 
su sp ec t. T h e  p u rsu it o f o b je c tiv ity  no rm ally  involves th e  ed u ca tio n a l re ­
searcher in  a  de ta iled  co n tro l o f ex p e rim en ta l s itu a tio n s . B u t stu d ies  a im ed 
a t  increasing  se lf-o rgan isa tion  requ ire  th a t  th e  research er recognise  th a t  th e  
le a rn e r lias his or h er ow n p o in t o f view , an d  needs th e  freedom  to  explore
’ T he author decided, through w isdom  or cowardice, not to  pursue th is line o f argum ent! R eflexivity  
is all very well, as long as it  applies to  som eone else.
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If  th is  is th e  case, w e a re  p re sen ted  im m ed ia te ly  w ith  an  inconsistency  w ith in  c u rre n t 
ed u ca tio n a l developm ents. In d u s try  is c u rre n tly  calling upo n  us to  p ro d u ce  s tu d e n ts  who 
can  co m m u n ica te  effectively, solve novel p rob lem s, m an ag e  change, design, an d  ca rry  o u t 
all th e  ac tiv ities  th a t  o u r re sea rch  suggests requ ire  selfconscionsness in  lea rn in g  to  learn . 
G o v ern m en t, how ever, th ro u g h  its  various agencies, is calling fo r m ore  o b jec tiv e  m e tric s , 
such  as s ta n d a rd ise d  te s tin g  of s tu d e n t a n d  te ach e r com petence, b o th  o f w hich becom e 
increasing ly  difficult as we m ove to w ard s p roduc ing  s tu d e n ts  w ho a re  lea rn in g  to  lea rn .
W e shou ld  also observe th a t  th e  m o ra lity  o f ed u ca tio n a l ex p erim en ts , in  th e  tra d itio n a l 
scientific sense, is questionab le . S u b jec tin g  s tu d e n ts  to  experiences w ith  th e  a im  of 
re fu tin g  o u r theo ries  is, in  th e  a u th o r ’s op in ion , uneth ica l. W e shou ld , o f course, t r e a t  o u r 
te ach in g  as ex p e rim en ta l in  th e  sense th a t  will recognise re fu ta tio n s  an d  ta k e  a p p ro p ria te  
ac tio n , b u t  we shou ld  n o t u n d e rta k e  d e lib era te ly  risky  ex p erim en ts  or e s tab lish  con tro ls.
A  lea rn in g  to  le a rn  cu rricu lum  can  b e  considered  as a  “double-helix” [HA85, pag e  62]. 
O ne co m p o n en t, th e  learn in g  o f th e  lea rn in g  p rocess, develops a longside th e  o th e r, th e  
lea rn in g  o f discipline co n ten t. T h is  is com plica ted  for softw are eng ineering  design, how ­
ever, by  th e  o b serv a tio n  th a t  th e  c o n te n t, as suggested  by  o u r m odel, is also a  double  
helix  of p rocess an d  theo ries. T h is leads us to  ask  how  th e  tw o  process co m ponen ts 
a re  re la te d . If  we help s tu d e n ts  to  becom e effective lea rn e rs , will th e ir  th e o ry  build ing  
skills in  so ftw are  design com e fo r free? C onversely , if we te a c h  th e m  how  to  co n stru c t 
theo ries  in  so ftw are  engineering , will th is  m ake  th em  m ore  effective lea rn ers?  A  te n ta tiv e  
answ er we w ould  offer to  b o th  questions is “yes, if we can  develop sufficiently  perm eab le  
c o n s tru c ts” . Indeed , b o th  ap p ro ach es can  be used  sim ultaneously , as we shall see in  th e  
n ex t section .
W ith in  th e  double-helix  m odel, th e  te ach e r h as  a t  least tw o  roles to  play. F ir s t ,  th a t  o f 
an  experienced  resea rch er help ing  th e  less experienced  s tu d e n ts  to  develop th e ir  m e th o d ­
ology. In  th is  ro le th e  te a c h e r is a  co -s tu d en t, help ing  th e  s tu d e n ts  to  m an ag e  th e ir  
lea rn in g , suggesting  techn iques fo r im prov ing  lea rn ing , an d  also using  p rev ious research  
re su lts  to  offer w ays o f ap p ro ach in g  th e  su b je c t. T h e  second ro le is th a t  o f an  o racle , 
o r p ro v id er of in fo rm atio n . H arri-A u g ste in  develops th e  n o tio n  o f a  “m in d p o o l” as th e  
collected  know ledge of th e  w orld , sim ilar to  asp ec ts  o f P o p p e r’s th ird  w orld  [HA78]. T h e  
teach e r can  ac t as a  w indow  o n to  th e  m in dpoo l, o r a  lib ra ria n  h e lp ing  th e  s tu d e n t to  
find  re levan t in fo rm atio n , inc lud ing  h igher level s tru c tu re s . In  th is  ro le , th e  te ach e r m ay  
w ork in  several d ifferen t m odes: le c tu re  m ode , offering s tu d e n ts  p re-defined  se ts  o f in ­
fo rm atio n ; tu to r ia l  m ode , offering a  m ore  flexible set o f in te rro g a tio n  p rocedures; and  
so on. O bviously  th ese  roles in te ra c t,  for th e  co-researcher m ay  decide to  help by  ask ­
ing  th e  oracle to  deliver in fo rm atio n . I t  is c rucial th a t  an  a p p ro p ria te  ba lan ce  is s tru c k  
b e tw een  th ese  ro les, how ever, for s tu d e n ts  will n o t le a rn  to  le a rn  if  th e y  spen d  all th e ir  
tim e  lis ten ing  to  an  o racle , b u t  sim ilarly  th ey  will no t le a rn  to  le a rn  if left to  flounder 
by  them selves in  a  v as t m indpoo l w ith  no  lifeguard .
I t  is th ro u g h  th ese  ro les, an d  th e ir  in te ra c tio n , th a t  th e  te ach e r exercises con tro l. “Con-
each learning situation” [HA85, page 61]
183
t ro l” , how ever, is sim ply  one pole  o f a  c o n s tru c t, w hich can  hav e  m an y  o th e r  ends, in ­
clud ing  “chaos” , “d iso rg an isa tio n ” , “freedom ” o r “an a rch y ” . C learly  th e  w ay a  te ach e r 
exercises co n tro l will b e  largely  d e te rm in ed  b y  th e  co n stru c t sy s tem  in  use. A  teach e r 
th a t  fears chaos as th e  a lte rn a tiv e  m ay  exercise t ig h t  con tro l, a  te a c h e r th a t  fears loss of 
freedom  m ay  exercise very  li ttle  co n tro l. W e w ould  argue  th a t  exercising  tig h t  co n tro l 
o f th e  double-helix  is also likely to  lead  to  t ig h t co n stru a l o f th e  p rocess co m p o n en t in  
th e  helix  of c o n te n t, so th a t :  m e th o d s  a re  s tre ssed  n o t as too ls to  be  u sed  b u t as con­
tro ls  to  b e  obeyed; theo ries  a re  n o t p e rso n a l in  op rig in  an d  in te rp re ta tio n , b u t  o b jec tive ; 
an d  selfconsciousness, w ith  its  consequences o f possib le s tu d e n t rebellion , will b e  p layed  
dow n in  favour o f received w isdom . Indeed , m u ch  o f o u r d iscussion on  m e th o d  can  be 
re in te rp re te d  to  app ly  to  te ach in g  m e th o d : is i t  a  p lan , a  co n tro l, a  ra tio n a lisa tio n , o r a  
se t o f useful techn iques? W e shou ld  also realise th a t  th e  con tro ls w e exercise as teach ers  
will la rgely  be  governed  b y  o u r p e rso n a l m y th s  o f ed u ca tio n , such  as “s tu d e n ts  lea rn  
by  do ing” , “s tu d e n ts  le a rn  w hen th e y  ta k e  n o te s” ,“ s tu d e n ts  need  to  le a rn  b o tto m  u p ” , 
a n d  so o n , m o st o f w hich a re  b ased  on o u r  recollection o f how  we feel we lea rn  m o st 
effectively.
C learly , th e  w ay in  w hich con tro ls  a re  exercised form s p a r t  o f th e  p ro fessional ju d g m e n t 
o f te ach e rs , an d  w e w ould  n o t p resu m e  to  say  how  th is  should  be  done. I t  is precisely  th is  
exercise o f co n tro l, an d  its  im p lica tio n s, th a t  c o n s titu te  th e  te a c h e r’s view  o f cu rricu lum  
design. H ence th e  conclusion th a t  we can n o t te ll a n o th e r  te ach e r how  to  design a  softw are 
engineering  cu rricu lu m , only  offer to  engage in  discussion an d  re la te  experiences. In  
any  p a r tic u la r  c ircu m stan ce , th e se  co n tro ls  will be affected b y  th o se  in h e re n t in th e  
k n o t. Im p o sitio n  of tim e ta b le , schem e s tru c tu re , assessm ent m e th o d s , c u ltu ra l n o rm s, 
“c u s to m e r” ex p ec ta tio n s , s tu d e n t b ack g ro u n d s, la b o ra to ry  facilities, p ro fessional bod ies, 
sh o r t- te rm  an d  lo n g -te rm  in d u s tr ia l req u irem en ts  will all hav e  a  p a r t  to  p lay , fo r th e  
te a c h e r is n o t free to  te a c h , b u t free to  exercise ju d g m en ts  only  w ith in  th e  en v iro n m en t 
p ro v id ed  by  th e  k n o t.
8.2 Playing with Loose Ends
In  th is  sec tion  we will briefly describe som e app lica tio n s of o u r d iscussion to  th e  ta sk  o f 
tid y in g  up  som e loose ends em erg ing  from  th e  e s tab lish m en t k n o t. T h ese  ap p lica tio n s 
h av e  n o t been carried  o u t in  a  la b o ra to ry , u n d e r con tro lled  co n d itions, so th e y  a re  n o t 
“e x p e rim en ts” in  th e  scientific sense of th e  te rm , b u t th ey  a re  e x p e rim en ta l in  th e  sense 
th a t  th e y  th ey  hav e  allow ed th e  a u th o r  to  va lid a te , o r in v a lid a te , his p e rso n a l c o n stru c ts  
an d  hence gain  experience. I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  realise th a t  th ese  ex p erim en ts  h av e  been  
carried  o u t in  th e  ebb  an d  flow of th e  en v iro n m en t p rov ided  by  a  ty p ica l h igher ed u ca ­
tio n a l e s tab lish m en t. T h ey  a re  ex p erim en ts  in  “rea listic  te ach in g  [w hich is] focussed  on 
w h a t can  b e  achieved in  p rac tice  by  ty p ica l teach ers  in  rea listic  c ircu m stan ces o f w ork 
a n d  s u p p o r t” [B ur89, page  9]. T h e  s tan ce  we a re  ad o p tin g  here  h as  been  sum m ed  u p  by  
G ough , w ho w rites,
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“I can n o t reconcile m u ch  o f th e  rh e to ric  of new -parad igm  th in k in g  w ith  th e  
k ind  o f cu rricu lum  w ork  th a t  I  w an t to  do now  an d  in  fu tu re  (for exam ple,
I am  suspicious of th e  q u a lity  of life a fte r  quest: w h a t does one ac tu a lly  do 
a fte r  one lias found  th e  H oly G ra il? ). C e rta in ly  th is  so r t o f rh e to ric  is to o  
p re te n tio u s  for th e  k ind  o f w ork  I  am  doing here , now . I  am  n o t a tte m p tin g  
to  w rite  a  c h a p te r  in  one o f th e  G re a t B ooks, I am  w riting  a  w ork-in -p rogress 
re p o r t— a  sh o rt s to ry — w ith  th e  in te n tio n  of engaging  you , th e  re a d e r, in  a  
fu r th e r  ex p lo ra tio n  of th e  w orld  i t  signifies: ‘W h a t we need  is n o t g re a t w orks 
b u t  p lay fu l ones— A  s to ry  is a  gam e som eone lias p layed  so you  can  p lay  it 
to o ’ (Sukenic  1969, q u o ted  in  W au g h  84 [W au84]) ” [G ou89, pages 226-227]
T h e  ex p erim en ts  described  com prise  tw o  ty p es . F irs t , th e re  is th e  design o f a  w hole 
schem e for th e  con tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  of so ftw are  engineers, lead ing  to  th e  aw ard  of an  M Sc. 
Second, th e re  is th e  design o f in itia l ed u ca tio n  in  softw are engineering  fo r u n d e rg ra d u a te s .
C on tin u in g  E d u cation  in Softw are E n gin eerin g
I t  is im p o r ta n t to  n o te  th e  u n u su a l ro le  o f co n tinu ing  ed u ca tio n  in  S oftw are E ng ineering  
fo r, as M ills observes,
“In  a  field m ore  s tab le  th a n  S oftw are E ngineering , u n iv e rs ity  ed u ca tio n  p lays 
a  d o m in an t ro le  in  sh ap in g  th e  princip les and  values o f th e  field, w hile in d u s­
t r ia l  ed u ca tio n  consists o f refresher an d  u p d a tin g  courses in  fringe an d  fro n ­
t ie r  a reas. B u t u n iv e rs ity  ed u ca tio n  in  S oftw are E ng ineering  w as n o t avail­
ab le  to  th e  m a jo rity  o f people  w ho p rac tice  an d  m an ag e  it  to d a y .” [M il80a, 
p ag e  1158]
M ills, th ere fo re , p roposes th a t  i t  is necessary  fo r con tinu ing  ed u ca tio n  in  th is  field to  
consider n o t only fringe an d  fro n tie r  a reas , b u t  also th e  fu n d a m e n ta l p rinc ip les o f th e  
su b je c t as th e y  a re  now  perceived . A lth o u g h  th e  necessity  o f co n tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  is 
genera lly  accep ted , th e  fu n d a m e n ta l n a tu re  i t  m ay  need to  assum e is n o t. M oore, for 
exam ple , holds up  a  very  differen t exem plar o f con tinu ing  ed u ca tio n  w hen he w rites
“A fte r being  on  th e  jo b  for a  m o n th , a  fellow p rac tic in g  so ftw are  engineer in ­
v ited  K im  to  a  C D R  to  review  th e  S D D D , S T D s, an d  u p d a te s  to  th e  S T L D D ,
SRS an d  SD P. K im  w as to ld  th a t  an  SQ A  engineer w ould  b e  th e re  an d  to  
ge t th e  m o st recen t version  o f th e  SD D D  from  SC M . D id  K im  go in to  m as­
sive p an ic  m ode? No! H av ing  a tte n d e d  th e  S oftw are E ng ineering  W orkshop  
(S E W ) tw o  weeks earlie r, K im  w as ab le  to  rem em b er som e o f th e  acronym s.
K im  referenced  th e  S E W  n o teb o o k  for an  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  o th e r  acronym s.
K im  now  knew  th e  m ean ing  of th e  acro n y m s, u n d e rs to o d  how  ev ery th in g  
in te rre la te d , an d  w h a t to  expec t a t  th e  C D R .” [M P88, page  42]
M ills is to ta lly  d isp arag in g  of such  courses, s ta tin g  th a t
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“T h e re  a re  any  n u m b e r o f courses w hich will com fo rt, r a th e r  th a n  ed u ca te .
T h ey  a re  ‘p ra c tic a l’, ‘easy  to  u n d e rs ta n d ’, ‘th e  la te s t  te ch n iq u es’. O n a t te n ­
dance , p ro g ram m ers  discover various new  nam es fo r com m on sense, su p e r­
ficial id eas, an d  th e reb y  conclude, w ith  m u ch  com fort an d  relief, th a t  th ey  
have  been  u p  to  d a te  all th e  tim e . B u t u n fo rtu n a te ly  fo r th e  co u n try , th ese  
p ro g ram m ers  h av e  n o t on ly  lea rn ed  very  little , b u t  hav e  been  re inforced  in  
th e  very  a t t i tu d e  th a t  th ey  h av e  li t t le  to  le a rn .” [M il80a, pag e  1158]
O ne o f th e  m o st sign ifican t con tro ls  exercised  b y  th e  k n o t on  co n tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  is 
im posed  b y  in d u s try , w ho ty p ica lly  fu n d  such  ac tiv ities directly . In  1982, H atfie ld  P o ly ­
tech n ic  w as fo r tu n a te  to  be  ap p ro ach ed  by  a  local com pany, S T C -ID E C , w ho h a d  seen 
th e  lo n g er-te rm  benefits w hich  m ig h t accrue  from  a  fu n d a m e n ta l con tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  
p ro g ram m e  for its  sen ior tech n ica l s ta ff, a n d  w an ted  to  com m ission th e  design, develop­
m en t an d  im p lem en ta tio n  o f such  a  p ro g ram m e. T h e  p ro g ram m e w as to  b e  c o n cen tra ted  
011 th e  tech n ica l fo u n d a tio n s  o f th e  su b je c t, an d  how  th ese  could  b e  b ro u g h t to  b e a r 
in  solving rea l p rob lem s. T h is  p ro g ram m e, w hich even tu a lly  becam e a  P o s tg ra d u a te  
D ip lom a in  Softw are P rincip les an d  P ra c tic e , an d  w as su b sequen tly  o p en ed  to  non -S T C - 
ID E C  sta ff, h as  been  described  an d  discussed in  m ore d e ta il elsew here [JLS86]. T h is  
p ro g ram m e  w as in s tru m e n ta l in  b ring ing  to  lig h t m an y  o f th e  p rob lem s discussed an d  
developed in  th is  re search , an d  has recen tly  been  rep laced  by  an  M Sc in  S oftw are E ng i­
neering , w hich has been  designed in  th e  ligh t o f m an y  o f th e  discussions carried  o u t in  
th is  d o cu m en t. Full d e ta ils  o f th e  M Sc schem e a re  available elsew here [H at89], b u t  we 
will briefly  discuss how  th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view  developed in  th is  th esis  h as  been  used 
to  o r ie n ta te  th e  design o f th is  m a jo r  schem e o f s tu d y .
T h e  a u th o r  w as fo r tu n a te  to  be  allow ed to  p lay  a  significant p a r t2 in  th e  design of 
th is  schem e, an d  very  few  c o n s tra in ts  w ere im posed . C o nsequen tly  th e  w hole schem e 
could  b e  o rien ted  b y  th e  p rop o sed  m odel. In  p a r tic u la r , th e  co n tro l ex e rted  by  th e  
cu rricu lum  could be reduced  significantly  to  encourage s tu d e n ts  to  ta k e  resp o nsib ility  
fo r th e ir  learn ing . I f  co n tro l is to  be  re laxed , how ever, i t  is crucia l th a t  s tu d e n ts  a re  in  
a  p o sitio n  to  le a rn  from  th e ir  experiences, r a th e r  th a n  flounder in  th e  m indpoo l. P e rry  
suggests th a t  we can  consider five stag es  o f in te llec tu a l developm ent as p e r tin e n t to  
s tu d e n ts  in  h igher ed u ca tio n  [CH82]:
1. “S tu d e n ts  see th e  w orld  in  p o la r te rm s  o f te rm s of r ig h t vs w rong. A bso lu te  r ig h t 
answ ers ex ist for ev ery th in g . P ro b lem s a re  solved sim ply by  follow ing th e  w ord  of 
an  a u th o r ity .”
2. “S tu d e n ts  begin  to  perceive a lte rn a tiv e  view s, as well as u n c e rta in ty  am o n g st A u­
th o ritie s , b u t acco u n t for th e m  as u n w a rra n te d  confusion am ong  poorly  qualified 
A u th o ritie s .”
3. “S tu d e n ts  acknow ledge th a t  d iversity  a n d  u n c e r ta in ty  a re  leg itim a te , b u t  still te m ­
p o ra ry , in  a reas  w here  A u th o rity  “h a sn ’t  found  th e  answ ers y e t” . T h ey  seek relief
2T h e  author chaired the developm ent com m ittee.
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in  h a rd  sciences a n d  m a th e m a tic s  w hich  seem  b e tte r  u n d e rs to o d  by  A u th o rity .”
4. “S tu d e n ts  perceive leg itim a te  u n c e rta in ty , an d  therefo re  d iv e rsity  of op in ion , to  be 
pervasive. T h ey  are  suspicions o f an y  evidence or au th o ritie s  op in io n .”
5. “S tu d e n ts  perceive all know ledge an d  value, inc lud ing  a u th o r i ty ’s, as c o n te x tu a l 
an d  re la tiv e .”
T h e  adm issions policy for th e  designed schem e w as in ten d ed  to  en su re  th a t  s tu d e n ts  
h a d  reach ed  level th re e  or above, consequen tly  th e  decision w as m ad e  to  allow  th e m  to  
h av e  com plete  co n tro l over b o th  th e  process an d  co n ten t sp ira ls o f th e ir  edu ca tio n . T h e  
c o n s tra in t im posed  b y  th e  aw ard  o f an  M Sc. w as overcom e b y  th e  “teacher-as-sen io r- 
re sea rch er” agreeing  a  p ro g ram m e o f s tu d y  w ith  th e  s tu d e n t. T h is p ro g ram m e , p roposed  
by  th e  s tu d e n t, identifies a im s, o b jec tiv es , an d  assessm ent ta sk s  to  show  th a t  th e  ob jec ­
tives have  been  m et. I t  also identifies resources th a t  th e  s tu d e n t requ ires to  com plete  th e  
p ro g ram m e , inc lud ing  access to  p re-defined  courses, lib ra ry  facilities, e q u ip m en t, an d  so 
on. In  essence, th e  sp irit o f th e  schem e is th a t  o f an  M P h il., w here th e  em phasis  is on 
p e rso n a l research  an d  developm ent ra th e r  th a n  c o n tr ib u tin g  to  th e  m indpoo l.
I t  w as ag reed , how ever, th a t  such  a  rad ica l ap p ro ach  m ig h t well leave  th e  s tu d e n ts  
floundering , an d  so a  s ta n d a rd  p ro g ram m e w as designed to  ac t as a  s ta r t in g  p o in t from  
w hich th e  s tu d e n ts  could d ev ia te . T h is  p ro g ram m e also served  to  id en tify  a  set o f e igh t 
courses th a t  w ere felt to  be  sufficiently fu n d a m e n ta l to  be useful to  s tu d e n ts  in  designing 
th e ir  ow n p ro g ram m es. T hese  courses w ere based  en tire ly  on th e  th e o ry  b u ild ing  view  
o f so ftw are design, an d  com prised:
Theories and Formalisms: T his  course serves to  in tro d u ce  th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  p ro ­
cess to g e th e r w ith  a  d iscussion o f th e  ro le of fo rm alisa tion . I t  also in tro d u ces  a  
collection of m a th e m a tic a l top ics , useful in m odel-based  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s , in  a  
w ay th a t  is described  la te r .
T y p e s  and State in Computation: T his  course develops th e  id ea  o f using  law s of 
consequence a n d  coexistence in  p resen tin g  theo ries, an d  discusses sty les o f specifi­
ca tio n  w ith  th e  p ro o f ob liga tions th a t  th ey  en tail.
Com m unicating System s: T h e  id ea  of law s o f in te ra c tio n  is in tro d u c e d , an d  th e  in te r ­
p re ta tio n  of such  law s in  sy stem  design, to g e th e r  w ith  exam ples o f com m unica tion  
p rim itives in  im p lem en ta tio n  en v iro n m en ts  th a t  p rov ide  m odels o f th ese  law s, is 
explored.
Perform ance and Reliability: H ere we deal d irec tly  w ith  a sp ec ts  o f th e  ta rg e t  envi­
ro n m en ts  th a t  give rise  to  p o sitiv e  design h eu ristics, an d  also discuss th e  possib ility  
o f in co rp o ra tin g  th ese  fea tu re s  in to  th e  th eo ry  itself.
F i t n e s s  f o r  P u r p o s e :  T h is course deals m ore  fully w ith  th e  concep t o f re fu ta tio n  of 
a  phenom enological th eo ry , an d  w h a t w ould  m ake  o u r theo ries  fit for p u rp o se . I t  
also discusses th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  fitness for p u rp o se  a n d  co rrec tness.
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Software D evelopm ent Strategies: H ere we explore th e  s tra teg ie s  open  to  th e  engi­
neer in  co n s tru c tin g  a n d  tran sfo rm in g  theo ries. In  p a r tic u la r , th e  ro le , uses and  
dangers of p ro p rie ta ry  m e th o d s  a re  d iscussed.
H um an Factors in Software Design: A t th is  s tag e  we acknow ledge m o re  fully  th a t  
th e  design of so ftw are  system s is usually  carried  ou r fo r h u m an s  a n d  by  h u m an s. 
T h is course discusses top ics such  as p ro je c t m an ag em en t, c o n tra c tu a l b o u n d aries  in  
law , e th ica l considera tions an d  human co m p u te r in te ra c tio n , in  w ays co m m en su ra te  
w ith  th e  m a tu r i ty  a n d  experience o f th e  s tu d e n ts .
K nowledge and D ata R epresentation in Com putation: M an y  a p p lica tio n  dom ains 
now  ex ist in  w hich p rob lem s give rise  to  la rg e  a m o u n ts  o f p e rs is te n t d a ta . T h is  
d a ta  is o ften  s tru c tu re d  in  quite com plex  w ays to  c a p tu re  ex is tin g  theo ries, such  as 
th o se  in h e ren t in  e x p e rt system s o r te m p o ra l d a tab ase s . T h is course seeks to  unify 
th e  app roaches in  use in  th e se  ap p lica tio n  dom ains a ro u n d  th e  th e m e  o f th eo ry  
build ing .
T h is  design illu s tra te s  how  o u r m odel an d  discussion has served  to  influence cu rricu lum  
design in  b o th  process an d  co n ten t p a r ts  o f th e  double  helix , a n d  how  i t  can  ac t as a  
s tru c tu r in g  m echan ism  fo r a  w hole schem e o f study . T h e  re a d e r is in v ited  to  d is tin ­
guish  th e  coverage o f th is  m a te ria l, w hich is reaso n ab ly  fam iliar, fro m  its  s tru c tu re  and  
m o tiv a tio n , w hich a re  un ique .
In itia l U n d ergrad u ate  E d u cation
A n a ssu m p tio n  d is tingu ish ing  in itia l ed u ca tio n  from  con tinu ing  ed u ca tio n  is th a t  s tu ­
d en ts  em b ark in g  u p o n  th e  la t te r  a re  likely to  be a t  earlier s tag es  of in te lle c tu a l devel­
o p m en t. T h is is a  gross g en era lisa tio n , o f course, p a rtic u la rly  w ith  policies of w idening 
access to  h igher ed u ca tio n , b u t  th is  a ssu m p tio n  is im plicit in  m o st schem e designs, an d  
u n d erp in s  th e  discussions th a t  follow. G iven th is  a ssu m p tio n , i t  is n o t  reasonab le  to  
ex p ec t u n d e rg ra d u a te  s tu d e n ts  to  ta k e  th e  sam e degree o f respo n sib ility  for th e ir  s tu d ies  
as con tin u in g  ed u ca tio n  s tu d e n ts , fo r th e y  rely  to o  m uch  on a u th o rity . C onsequen tly  
teach ers  a n d  cu rricu lum  designers need  to  lay  dow n a  fairly  specific p ro g ram m e  o f s tu d y  
for th e  earlier s tag es  o f th e  schem e, w hilst a t  th e  sam e tim e  n o t in h ib itin g  th e  s tu d e n t 
from  achieving h igher levels o f in te lle c tu a l developm ent. I t  m ig h t be  a rg u ed , o f course, 
th a t  we shou ld  n o t a t te m p t to  te a c h  S oftw are E ng ineering  to  s tu d e n ts  w ho a re  still a t  
such  early  s tages o f in te lle c tu a l dev e lo p m en t, b u t should  w a it u n til  p o s tg ra d u a te  courses. 
R ich ard so n  prov ides an  answ er as to  w hy  th is  is n o t really  an  op tion :
“T h e  m o re  im m a tu re  th e  d iscipline, th e  m ore  m a tu re  th e  p ra c titio n e rs  or 
lea rn e rs  of th a t  d iscip line m u s t be. U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  re a lity  is th a t  we can ­
n o t w ait fo r softw are engineering . W e can  n e ith e r only have m a s te r ’s level 
people ab le  to  speak  confidently  a b o u t softw are engineering to p ics n o r can
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we w ait fo r th e  d iscipline to  m a tu re  enough  to  be easily  ta u g h t  to  u n d e rg ra d ­
u a te s . T h e  fu tu re  h as  been  forced u p o n  us by  advances in  o th e r  a reas  an d  
we can n o t look th e  o th e r  w ay.” [Ric88, pages 127-128]
In  1990, th e  BSc in  C o m p u te r Science a t  H atfie ld  P o ly techn ic  w as rev iew ed to  its  seven th  
set o f reg u la tio n s3 [BSC90], In  th is  section  we will discuss th e  firs t y ea r courses from  
th a t  rev ised  schem e, an d  how  th e y  conform  to  o u r th eo ry  build ing  view . E xpressed  in  
th e o ry  b u ild ing  te rm s , th e  firs t y ea r o f th e  schem e seeks to  develop th e  s tu d e n ts ’ skills 
in  th e  follow ing asp ec ts  o f S oftw are E ngineering :
•  selfconsciously designing so lu tions to  prob lem s.
•  developing theo ries.
•  fo rm alising  theo ries, iden tify ing  an d  d ischarg ing  p ro o f ob liga tions.
• expressing  theo ries  in  p ro g ram m in g  languages in  a  fo rm  su itab le  for execu tion .
•  u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  im p lica tions o f th e  underly ing  techno log ica l p la tfo rm  fo r th e  
positiv e  h eu ris tic  o f th e  research  p ro g ram m e.
To achieve th ese  a im s, th e re  a re  fo u r courses th a t  ru n  th ro u g h o u t tlie  year: P ro b lem  
Solving, F o rm al N o ta tio n s  an d  M odels, P ro g ram m in g , an d  th e  O rg an isa tio n  o f C o m p u te r 
S ystem s.
P ro b lem  S o lv in g
T rad itio n a lly , p rob lem  solving is ta u g h t v ia  th e  m ed ium  o f th e  d iscip line being s tu d ied . 
T h is  m eans th a t  s tu d e n ts  can  only  tack le  p rob lem s up  to  th e  c u rre n t lim its  o f th e ir  
ex p ertise  in  th e  discipline. M oreover, th is  can  lead  to  a  very  false im pression  o f th e  
processes involved, as B en tley  h as  n o ted ,
“A fte r 16 years o f school, th e  average  college senior has th e  m is ta k e n  n o tio n  
th a t  all p rob lem s com e n ea tly  packaged . O f th e  m an y  w ounds in flic ted  by 
m o d ern  ed u ca tio n , th is  is one o f th e  m o st trag ic : p re-school ch ild ren  com e 
u p  w ith  w onderfully  c rea tiv e  so lu tions to  prob lem s, w hile g ra d u a te s  seem  to  
have  acqu ired  tu n n e l v ision .” [Ben88, page  4]
S tu d e n ts  do n o t need  to  a d o p t a  selfconscious a t t i tu d e  to  p rob lem  solving w hen it  is 
p re sen ted  in  th is  way, for th e  m e th o d  of so lu tion  is in h e ren t in  th e  p ro b lem  co n tex t. Such 
ta sk s  are  useful, of course, in  p rov id ing  va lid a tin g  even ts to  conso lida te  th e  co n stru c ts  
o f m a te r ia l in tro d u ced , b u t th e y  do li ttle  to  help th e  h igher-o rder p ro b lem  solving skills, 
such  as th e  selection  an d  ev a lu a tio n  o f m e th o d s , languages a n d  too ls .
3T he author was A ssistant Head of D ivision, w ith  special responsibility for subject developm ent, while  
th is review  was taking place.
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T lie  H atfie ld  P o ly tech n ic  p rob lem  solving course  w as designed to  ta ck le  precisely  th is  
a re a 4. I t  does n o t se t o u t to  develop m e th o d s  or n o ta tio n s  su itab le  fo r an y  p a r tic u la r  
a sp ec t o f S oftw are E ng ineering , a lth o u g h  som e m ay  be  en co u n te red  in  passing . T h e  
course involves s tu d e n ts  p a r tic ip a tin g  in  a  n u m b er of ex p erim en ts , w hich th e y  ca rry  o u t 
largely  using ex isting  skills a n d  know ledge, b u t  w hich  th ey  w rite  u p  in  a  reflexive m an n e r 
in  a  la b o ra to ry  book . T h u s  th e y  a re , in  a  very  rea l sense, ex p erim en tin g  on  them selves. 
T h e  p rob lem s tack led  d u rin g  th e  firs t h a lf  o f th e  course have  no  obvious ( to  th e  s tu d e n t)  
link  to  top ics en co u n te red  in  o th e r  courses. T y p ica l p roblem s inc lude  egg-races, sy stem  
im p ro v em en t ta sk s  (such  as increasing  traffic  flow a ro u n d  th e  P o ly tech n ic  cam p u s), an d  
pencil an d  p a p e r  puzzles. M ost ta sk s  a re  u n d e rta k e n  in  g ro u p s, th u s  developing ro le 
p lay ing  skills an d  also th o se  necessary  fo r m ak in g  theories explic it a n d  defending th em  
to  peers. T h u s  ex p lo ra to ry , in fo rm ativ e , a n d  scientific d iscourse a re  a ll in h e ren t from  
th e  o u tse t o f th e  schem e, an d  one ty p e  o f d iscourse is n o t g iven a n  artific ia lly  e levated  
s ta tu s .
W e w ould  argue  th a t  one of th e  ad v an tag es o f th is  ap p ro ach  is th a t  s tu d e n ts  develop m an y  
of th e  v ita l c o n s tru c ts  for sy stem  design w ith o u t th e m  becom ing  im p e rm eab ly  linked  to  
ep h em era l technological de ta ils . S tu d e n ts  le a rn  w h a t i t  m eans to  analy se  an d  specify 
sy stem s, design so lu tions, defend th e ir  designs, an d  so on , b u t  w ith o u t th e  lim ited  vision 
o ften  p ro m o ted  by  system s analysis a n d  design courses, p ro g ram m in g  courses, o r even 
fo rm al m e th o d s  courses. T h ey  also lea rn  th a t  designs com e from  people , n o t p rob lem s, 
an d  com e to  recognise th e ir  ro le  in  th e  process. As S lau g h te r h as  n o ted ,
“such  [self-reflexive] m ethodologies an d  app roaches su p p o rt view s o f th e  w orld  
in  w hich we recognize o u r em beddedness in  a  series of co n tex ts . W e begin  to  
see only to o  clearly  th a t  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  of ‘re a lity ’ is d ep en d en t u p o n  th e  
q u a lity  o f th e  m odels used. P rob lem -so lv ing  is no longer a b o u t a b o u t m ak ing  
sm all, iso la ted  changes. I t  is a b o u t p a r tic ip a tio n  an d  in te rv e n tio n  in  m u tu a lly  
in te ra c tin g  w ebs an d  processes. In  th is  sense, so lu tions te n d  n o t to  b e  ‘r ig h t’, 
b u t  e legan t. A n d , as F ish er n o te s , ‘th e  co n tex ts  o f elegance a re  d ep en d ed en t 
u p o n  th e  illu m in a tio n  th a t  enables ns to  see th e m ’ [Fis87, pag e  11]. As ever, 
th e  th re a d s  w hich c rea te  th e  w orld  lead  back  to  u s .” [Sla89, pag e  265]
B y design ing , an d  discussing, a  v a rie ty  o f so lu tions to  prob lem s, a n d  th e  ra tio n a le  b eh ind  
th e m , s tu d e n ts  com e to  realise th a t  so ftw are  engineering design is n o t a  d e te rm in is tic  
ac tiv ity , b u t one w here perso n a l co n stru c ts  m ake  people see p rob lem s in  d ifferen t w ays, 
lead ing  to  different so lu tions. T h is  also m o tiv a te s  th e  need for p re sen tin g  designs in  w ays 
t h a t  can  be d iscussed a t a  level above th ese  p e rso n a l c o n s tru c ts , using  accep ted  th ird  
w orld  o b jec ts  ta u g h t  th ro u g h  fo rm al ed u ca tio n , so th a t  th ey  will b e  sim ilarly  co n stru ed  
by  all p a r tic ip a n ts .
4T his course was originally designed by John Sapsford-Francis and the author, bu t the author has 
played no part in subsequent developm ents o f the course.
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I t  is in te re s tin g  to  n o te  th a t  th is  course is view ed as very  “difficult” by  th e  s tu d e n ts , 
in  sp ite  of th e  lack  o f tech n ica l c o n te n t, fo r th e y  find th e  ta sk  o f p ro d u c in g  reflexive 
la b o ra to ry  re p o rts  very  h a rd , being  u n u sed  to  h av in g  to  exp la in , ana lyse  a n d  ju s tify  th e ir  
m e th o d s , ra th e r  th a n  accep tin g  th e m  on  a u th o r ity  an d  app ly ing  th e m  to  ro te  prob lem s. 
O nce th e y  m an ag e  to  overcom e th is  difficulty, how ever, we h o p e  th a t  th e  s tu d e n ts  a re  
developing th e  c o n s tru c ts  necessary  fo r th e  confidence an d  w illingness to  accep t th e  loss 
of innocence.
F orm alisation
I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  m ak e  th e  p o in t th a t  w hen  we teach  fo rm alisa tio n  we a re  n o t teach in g  
m a th e m a tic s , even app lied  m a th e m a tic s , in  th e  tra d itio n a l sense. T h is  p o in t is also m ad e  
q u ite  freq u en tly  am o n g st te ach ers  o f m a th e m a tic a l m odelling , w hich is surely  fo rm alisa ­
tio n  by  a n o th e r  n am e. B kouche sum s th is  u p , w hen  he w rites,
“M ath em a tic s  is p ro p o sed  to  physic ists  exclusively as a  to o l a n d  physics is 
p rop o sed  to  s tu d e n ts  o f m a th e m a tic s  as a  series of ap p lica tio n s o f m a th e m a t­
ica l theories. In  th is  n a rro w  p ersp ec tiv e , th e  p rob lem  o f th e  u se  of m a th ­
em atics  (m a th e m a tic s  as a  service subject) becom es artific ia l; m a th e m a tic s  
is deprived  o f its  a c tu a l an d  h is to rica l connection  w ith  scientific p ra c tic e .” 
[Bko89, pages 49-50]
I f  w e are  to  avoid  s tu d e n ts  seeing th e  use o f m a th e m a tic s  as an  a rtific ia l device, we m u st 
encou rage  th e m  to  see fo rm alisa tio n  n o t sim ply  as th e  ap p lica tio n  of an  ex isting  b o d y  
o f m a th e m a tic a l know ledge to  w e ll-understood  prob lem s, b u t  as p a r t  o f th e  process of 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  p rob lem s them selves. T h is  w ay of v iew ing m a th e m a tic s  ru n s  c o n tra ry  
to  th a t  o f m an y  m a th e m a tic ia n s , how ever, w ho subscribe  to  th e  “p u re ” an d  “ap p lied” 
p a r titio n in g  o f th e  su b je c t, an d  also th a t  o f m an y  “u sers” of m a th e m a tic s . F ish e r sum s 
th is  u p  very  n e a tly  w hen he w rites
“T h o se  [m athem atic ians] w ho c o n s tru c t th e  m odel em otionally  a re  d is tu rb ed  
by  th e  ap p ea ran ce  o f new  asp ec ts  o r even co n trad ic tio n s. T h ey  w a n t to  be 
to ld  once an d  for all w h a t people  w an t so th ey  can c o n c e n tra te  on  solving 
th e  p rob lem . In  c o n tra s t to  th is  t ra d itio n a l o rie n ta tio n  th e  m a th e m a tic ia n  
[who is o rien ted  to w ard s bu ild ing  a  d escrip tion  of th e  problem ] u n d e rs ta n d s  
h im self as an  explainer o f  the problem , w ho helps people to  a r tic u la te  th e ir  
im ag in a tio n s, w ho p o in ts  to  a lte rn a tiv e s ; som etim e even as som ebody  w ho 
slows dow n th e  process o f solving th e  p ro b lem .” [Fis89, pag e  19]
W e w ould  a rg u e  th a t  it  is th is  view  o f m a th e m a tic s  an d  fo rm alisa tio n  th a t  needs to  be  
ta u g h t to  s tu d e n ts  if  we are  to  p ro m o te  th e  th eo ry  bu ild ing  view . S tu d e n ts  m u s t be  
encou raged  to  b reak  aw ay from  th e  n o tio n  of m a th em a tic s  as a  m ed iu m  for scientific 
d iscourse  alone. Sim ply ex ten d in g  th e ir  co n s tru c ts  so th a t  th e y  also see i t  as a  m ed ium
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for in fo rm a tiv e  d iscourse is n o t sufficient, for th e y  m u st also com e to  see th e  ro le  of 
m a th e m a tic s  in  e x p lo ra to ry  discourse. T h is is certa in ly  n o t th e  w ay th a t  m a th e m a tic s  
is u sua lly  p re sen ted  to  s tu d e n ts  by  m o st teach ers  o f th e  su b jec t. M ason  observes th a t
“M a th e m a tic a l th in k in g  is like going on  a  voyage. D oing  m a th e m a tic s  w ith  
o th e rs  involves voyaging to g e th e r , w ith  all th e  ag reem en ts an d  d isag reem en ts 
o f fellow trav e lle rs . W ritin g  u p  m a th e m a tic s  is like re p o rtin g  b ack , o r w ritin g  
a  travelogue. T each ing  m a th e m a tic s  involves being b o th  a  to u r  gu ide, an d  
an  old h a n d  lis ten ing  c ritica lly  to  fresh  re p o r ts .” [M as87b, p ag e  77]
He goes on  to  say  elsew here, how ever, th a t  th is  is n o t an  a c c u ra te  reflection  o f c u rre n t 
p rac tice :
“M ost teach ers  an d  s tu d e n ts  . . .  th in k  th a t  th e  fo rm al lan g u ag e  is th e  m a th ­
em atics . . .  .W h e n  th is  lan g u ag e  is ta u g h t to  s tu d e n ts , a t te n tio n  is d raw n  to  
th e  p ro ced u ra l, sy n ta c tic  a sp ec ts , because  o u te r  b eh av io u r is desired  (solving 
ty p ic a l p ro b lem s), visible an d  accessible. T h u s  th e re  is an  a ssessm en t-induced  
th ru s t  aw ay from  m ean ing  to w ard s m echan ical m a n ip u la tio n .” [M as87a, 
p ag e  209]
T h e  a p p ro ach  a d o p te d  to  teach in g  fo rm alisa tio n  a t  H atfield  is th a t  m a th e m a tic s  m u st 
be p resen ted  n o t as a  s ta tic  b o d y  o f know ledge b u t  as a  h u m an  process. S tu d e n ts  do n o t 
sim ply  need  to  lea rn  m a th e m a tic a l know ledge an d  m e th o d s , b u t  need  to  le a rn  to  p a r ­
tic ip a te  in  th e  m a th e m a tic a l process itself. T h is  is n o t only a.n ed u ca tio n a l persp ec tiv e , 
how ever, b u t i t  is also in d ica tiv e  o f a  sh ift in  th e  s ta tu s  o f m a th e m a tic s  itself, an a lo ­
gous to  th e  recen t tre n d s  to  re -in tro d u ce  th e  sc ien tis t in to  science. T h is  id ea  has been  
developed  elsew here [Loo90a]. L ak a to s , in s tru m e n ta l in  b ring ing  a b o u t th e  re -ap p ra isa l 
o f science, also proposes th is  view o f m a th e m a tic s  [Lak76] [Lak78]. E rn e s t suggests th a t  
ad o p tio n  o f th is  new  s ta tu s  o f m a th e m a tic s  serves to  m ake it  m ore  accessible to  s tu d e n ts , 
ra th e r  th a n  m ak ing  it m ore  difficult.
“H aving  carried  o u t th e ir  p ro g ram m es, b u t  hav ing  failed to  p ro v id e  ce rta in  
fo u n d a tio n s , th e  tra d itio n a l philosophies o f m a th e m a tic s  [logicism, fo rm alism , 
in tu itio n ism  a n d  p la ton ism ] a re  now  sp en t forces, w hich do  n o t offer ten ab le  
acco u n ts  o f th e  n a tu re  o f m a th e m a tic s .
T h e  new  w ave in  th e  ph ilosophy  o f m a th e m a tic s  has se t a  new  ag en d a  for 
d iscussion. No longer is i t  sufficient to  consider only th e  im m u ta b le  o b jec ts  
an d  tru th s  of m a th e m a tic s , th a t  is, i ts  p ro d u c ts . T h e  h u m a n  co n tex t m u s t be 
seen as a  leg itim a te  an d  essen tia l co n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  P h ilo sophy  o f M a th e ­
m atic s . . . .  B u t th is  persp ec tiv e , w hich includes th e  n a tu re  o f m a th e m a tic a l 
ac tiv ity , th e  p lu ra lity  o f m e th o d s , th e  ro le  o f e rro r an d  th e  n eg a tio n  o f t r u th  
com prises all th e  fac to rs  w hich m o st p o te n tly  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  p u p il’s view 
o f m a th e m a tic s .” [E rn89, page  559].
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C learly  th is  ap p ro ach  fits  very  n e a tly  w ith  o u r m odel o f sy stem  design, fo r we w a n t to  
develop s tu d e n ts ’ skills in  co n stru c tin g  theo ries using  fo rm al m odes, r a th e r  th a n  sim ply 
skills in  using  ex isting  fo rm alism s. W e also  w a n t th e m  to  becom e selfconscious p a r tic ­
ip a n ts  in  th e  m a th e m a tic a l p rocess, n o t sim ply  ad ep t in  th e  m ech an ica l ap p lica tio n  of 
s ta n d a rd  resu lts  [Loo90b] [LM88]. T h is  does n o t im ply  th a t  we shou ld  ignore  s ta n d a rd  
resu lts  a n d  ex isting  know ledge, o f course, fo r o u r s tu d e n ts  will need  to  bu ild  on  th ese  if 
th ey  a re  to  o p e ra te  efficiently, an d  th e y  also  p rov ide  a  com m on fo u n d a tio n  for discourse 
b e tw een  engineers. T h e  challenge is to  in c o rp o ra te  th e  tra d itio n a l m a te r ia l w ith  th e  
process driven  view o f m a th e m a tic s .
O ne w ay to  achieve th is  is to  te ach  fo rm alisa tio n  by  developing theo ries o f m a th e m a tic a l 
o b je c ts , th a t  is, to  use m e ta -m a th e m a tic s . T h e  F orm al N o ta tio n s  an d  M odels cou rse5 
begins w ith  a  discussion o f w h a t it  m ean s to  b e  “fo rm al” , a n d  a n  in tro d u c tio n  to  fo rm al 
languages an d  system s. T h is gives rise  to  a n o th e r ad v an tag e  of th e  a p p ro a c h , nam ely  
th a t  th e  close connection  b e tw een  languages a n d  m achines can  be in tro d u c e d  very  early  
on  in  th e  schem e, so th a t  th e  s tu d e n ts  view p ro g ram m in g  as ju s t  a n o th e r  exam ple  of 
fo rm alisa tio n . Tools are  u sed  w herever possib le to  in c o rp o ra te  fo rm alisa tio n  in to  th e  
co m p u tin g  cu ltu re , so th a t  s tu d e n ts  do n o t see an  artific ia l d iv ide b e tw een  “p ra c tic a l” 
ac tiv ities  on  a  m ach ine  an d  “th e o re tic a l” ac tiv ities  using  pencil an d  p a p e r . Y acc an d  
lex, fo r exam ple, a re  used  in  w eek one, allow ing th e  s tu d e n ts  to  ex p erim en t w ith  fo rm al 
g ra m m a rs . T h is also serves to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t  fo rm alisa tion  can  lead  to  sim pler solu­
tio n s , as well as causing  e x tra  w ork. F o rm al languages an d  sy stem s a re  b o th  in tro d u ced  
using  a b s tra c t  exam ples to  avoid u n d u e  in te rfe rence  from  ex isting  c o n s tru c ts , a lth o u g h  
we rap id ly  m ove on to  p rov id ing  sem an tics  for th e  exam ples an d  also expressing  fam iliar 
exam ples form ally , th u s  developing th e  ran g e  o f th e  co n stru c ts .
O nce s tu d e n ts  h av e  ach ieved  som e u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f fo rm al sy stem s, w e in tro d u c e  propo- 
sitio n a l a n d  p red ica te  calculus, an d  th e  n o tio n  of a  fo rm al th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n  is dis­
cussed. A t th is  s tag e , fo rm alisa tio n  o f m a th e m a tic s  itse lf  begins. A ll s tu d e n ts  will have 
m e t se ts  befo re  (a  se lf-study  package is used  to  ensure  a  ce rta in  level o f b ack g ro u n d  
k n o w ledge), so we now  app ly  th e  p erm eab le  co n stru c ts  o f fo rm al system s to  th e  ta sk  of 
co n s tru c tin g  a  se t theo ry . T h e  ta sk  is exp lo red , b u t even tually  Z F  se t th e o ry  is p resen ted  
as th e  th e o ry  we will b u ild  up o n . T h is  involves discussing w h a t p ro p e rtie s  we expect 
sets to  h av e  an d  how  th ese  m ig h t b e  expressed , th u s  set th e o ry  is seen n o t as a  s ta te  of 
know ledge rep resen tin g  th e  em erg en t p ro p e rtie s  o f se ts, b u t  as a  designed  theo ry . T h is 
d iscussion in ev itab ly  leads in to  consid era tio n  o f re la ted  o b jec ts  such  as bags an d  lis ts , 
w hich th e  s tu d e n t will also be m eeting  in  th e  p ro g ram m in g  course.
W h en  se ts  h av e  been  fo rm alised , m odel-based  theories of fu n c tio n s , re la tio n s  a n d  se­
quences a re  p re sen ted . T h is process is rem ark ab ly  sim ple, for th e  s tu d e n ts  can  see th a t  
th ese  a re  ju s t  m ore  exam ples of theo ries. T h ey  m ay  be overw helm ed by  n o ta tio n , b u t 
th e y  seem  to  accep t th e  im p o r ta n t  issues very  readily . M oreover, b ecau se  th ey  h av e  b een  
encouraged  to  see theo ries  as a r tifa c ts  th a t  have  been  designed, r a th e r  th a n  G od-given
5T his course was designed and taught by the author.
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p ro p e rtie s  th a t  em erge, th e y  also seem  to  accep t th a t  a lte rn a tiv e  th eo ries  a re  to  be ex­
p ec ted . T h e  fa c t t h a t  m a th e m a tic ia n s  te n d  to  consider only to ta l  fu n c tio n s  as fu nc tions, 
an d  use fun c tio n s o f severa l variab les r a th e r  th a n  cu rried  fo rm s, does n o t seem  to  confuse 
th e m  as one m ig h t ex p ec t. T h is  is crucia l, fo r i t  suggests th a t  th e  s tu d e n ts  hav e  reach ed  
s tag e  5 in  P e r ry ’s stag es  o f in te lle c tu a l developm ent in  very  quick  tim e  (w ith in  a  te rm  
o f s tu d y ) . T h is is evidence only  w ith in  a  very  re s tr ic te d  d o m ain , o f course, b u t  i t  is a  
do m ain  in  w hich a u th o r ita tiv e  answ ers u su a lly  p red o m in a te , an d  hence we m ig h t expec t 
th e  low er stag es  to  p e rs is t longer.
T h e  n e x t p a r t  o f th e  course is devo ted  to  developing th e  s tu d e n ts ’ ab ilities in  co n stru c tin g , 
an d  using , theories to  a c t as specifications. T h ere  are  tw o  possib le  w ays fo rw ard  here: 
we can  e ith e r encourage  th e  p e rcep tio n  o f p rob lem s in  te rm s o f c o n s tru c ts  th e  s tu d e n ts  
a lread y  know  how  to  fo rm alise , o r w e can  a t te m p t  to  form alise  th e  c o n s tru c ts  t h a t  seem  
to  be  suggested  n a tu ra lly  by  th e  p rob lem . T h e  fo rm er leads us to w ard s  m odel-based  
specifications in  Z, for exam ple , w hilst th e  la t te r  leads us to w ard s  a  m ore  p rim itiv e  
specification , typ ica lly  using  an  eq u a tio n a l p red ica te  logic. Since w e w an t o u r s tu d e n ts  
to  be selfconscious, w e d iscuss b o th  m e th o d s , b u t  em phasis is p laced  on  m odel-based  
techn iques as these  also develop fluency in  c o n s tru c ts  w hich th e  s tu d e n t will find useful 
in  social processes. A  sm all a m o u n t o f tim e  is also sp en t developing  a  fo rm alism  for 
com m u n ica tio n  an d  concurrency , C C S. T h is typ ica lly  causes p rob lem s because  s tu d e n ts  
h av e  usually  developed th e  n o tio n  th a t  co m p u te rs  “do w h a t th e y  a re  to ld ” , b u t  th is  
c o n s tru c t is n o t sufficiently  p erm eab le  to  a d m it n o n -d e te rm in is tic  b eh av io u r. T h ey  find 
i t  very  h a rd  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th a t  we can  hav e  a  th eo ry  of b eh av io u r w hich is precise, 
b u t fro m  w hich we can n o t p red ic t b eh av io u r. I t  is im p o r ta n t to  realise th a t  th is  is n o t 
a  p ro b lem  of fo rm alisa tio n , o f course, b u t th e  em ergence, th ro u g h  th e  fo rm alism , of a  
p ro p e r ty  o f th e  sy stem  u n d e r co n sidera tion . I t  is o ften  said th a t  “fo rm al m e th o d s” a re  to o  
h a rd  to  te a c h  to  first y ea r s tu d e n ts : we w ould  a rg u e , how ever, th a t  th e  d ifficulty  is sim ply 
a  reflection  of th e  fa c t th a t  we can n o t so easily  w ave on r h an d s  an d  avoid  discussing th e  
difficult face ts  o f o n r prob lem s. W e can , o f course, es tab lish  sim ple p rob lem s in  w hich 
th ese  difficulties do n o t arise. To arg u e  from  th is  th a t  fo rm al m e th o d s  a re  on ly  useful 
for tr iv ia l p rob lem s, w hereas in fo rm al ap p ro ach es allow  us to  ta ck le  re a l p rob lem s, is 
fu n d am en ta lly  d ishonest: in fo rm al ap p roaches sim ply allow  us to  avoid  tack lin g  rea l 
p rob lem s m ore  convincingly.
T h is  th e o ry  bu ild ing  ap p ro ach  to  te ach in g  m a th e m a tic s  itse lf  has been  d iscussed a t  
g re a te r  len g th  elsew here [Loo90a]. Indeed , w hen th e  a u th o r  first p re se n te d  th ese  ideas 
[Loo84], a lb e it w ith o u t th e  ra tio n a lisa tio n  p rov id ed  by  th e  m odel, th e  reac tio n  w as th a t  
only th e  b e t te r  s tu d e n ts  w ould  b e  ab le  to  cope [Juk85]. I t  is im p o r ta n t  to  n o te  th a t  
th is  is n o t th e  case, for i t  h as  also been  used  to  g re a t effect w ith  a  g ro u p  o f 180 H ND 
s tu d e n ts  [LB91]. In  ad d itio n , a  te x tb o o k  h as  been  w ritte n  to  su p p o r t th is  p rocess, as 
ex is tin g  books w ere found  to  ru n  co u n te r to  th e  ap p ro ach  [W L88].
T h e  fina l co m p o n en t of th is  course is to  develop th e  s tu d e n ts ’ a p p rec ia tio n  o f th e  ro le  of 
p ro o f  in  sy stem  design. B ecause th e  m a te r ia l has all been  p re sen ted  v ia  fo rm al system s 
an d  th eo ries , p ro o f is seen as a  n a tu ra l  ex tension  to  ex p lo ra tio n  an d  specification , b u t
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som e ex tension  of c o n s tru c ts  is needed  to  allow  discussion o f proofs o f co rrec tness. A 
m ore  de ta iled  acco u n t of th e  view  ta k e n  o f co rrec tness, an d  how  it re la te s  to  th e  co n stru c t 
o f fitness for p u rp o se , h as  been  p resen ted  elsew here [Loo91].
P rogram m in g
T each ing  p ro g ram m in g  using  th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view is a  de lica te  o p e ra tio n , for we 
w ould  a rg u e  th a t  i t  develops p o o r c o n s tru c ts  if  s tu d e n ts  a re  en co u rag ed  to  p resen t th e ­
ories d irec tly  in  te rm s o f p ro g ram m in g  languages. T his is th e  ap p ro a c h  ta k e n  in  m an y  
te x tb o o k s , som e o f w hich a re  even e n title d  “p rob lem  solving w ith  x x x ” . O ne so lu tion  is 
to  delay  th e  teach in g  o f p ro g ram m in g  u n til  a f te r  th e  s tu d e n ts  hav e  developed  th e  requ i­
site  co n stru c ts  for th e o ry  bu ild ing . T h e re  are  tw o d raw backs w ith  th is  ap p ro ach . F ir s t ,  
s tu d e n ts , em ployers, p rofessional bod ies, and  m an y  o th e r  in te re s te d  p a r tie s , h av e  expec­
ta tio n s  th a t  p ro g ram m in g  w ith  “re a l” languages will fo rm  p a r t  o f th e  in itia l teach in g  
of S oftw are  E ngineering . T h e  a rg u m en t th a t  teach in g  fo rm alisa tio n  ac tu a lly  develops 
th e  req u ired  co n stru c ts  m ore  effectively th a n  using  a  language such  as P a sc a l o r A d a  is 
difficult to  m ak e  persuasively  in  an  a tm o sp h e re  w here “fo rm al m e th o d s” a re  freq u en tly  
seen as p a r t  o f a n  opposing  p a rad ig m , an d  w here s tu d e n ts  expec t to  ca rry  on  an  ex isting  
p a rad ig m  from  school o r college. T h e  second p rob lem  is th a t  th e  p o sitiv e  heu ristics  for 
th e  research  p ro g ram m e in  o u r design p rocess com e largely  from  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  
facilities available in  a  ty p ica l ta rg e t en v iro n m en t.
T h e  so lu tion  th a t  has been  a d o p te d  a t  H atfie ld  in  ou r p ro g ram m in g  courses for m an y  
y ears  is to  te a c h  th ro u g h  a  “rea l” fu n c tio n a l lan g u ag e6. T h is m eans th a t  s tu d e n ts  are  
lea rn in g  to  form alise  theo ries  in  a  w ay th a t  co rresponds d irec tly  to  th e  so rt o f c o n stru c ts  
th e y  are  enco u n terin g  in  th e  F o rm al N o ta tio n s  an d  M odels course. I t  is in c id en ta l th a t  
th e  n o ta tio n  used  p e rm its  execu tion  o f p a r tic u la r  schem as on  a  rea l m ach ine . T h is  
ap p ro ach  su p p o rts  th e  id ea  th a t  th e  s tu d e n ts  re ta in  re sp o nsib ility  fo r th e ir  p ro g ram s: it  
is th e ir  theories th a t  a re  be ing  p re sen ted , r a th e r  th a n  th e  th e o ry  being  som e em ergen t 
p ro p e r ty  of th e  code p ro d u ced . W e w ould  arg u e  th a t  teach in g  p ro g ram m in g  in itia lly  
th ro u g h  a  rea l p ro ced u ra l language , w ith  its  loss o f re fe ren tia l tra n sp a re n c y , m akes th is  
v ery  h a rd  to  achieve, fo r th e  p ro g ram s a re  h a rd  to  reason  a b o u t, an d  consequen tly  th e ir  
s ta tu s  as theories is difficult to  ap p rec ia te . L apaim e an d  C an tray , for exam ple , p resen t 
a  very  d ifferen t view o f p ro g ram m in g  from  th e  one ou tlin ed  here , th a t  suggests th e y  are  
a im ing  a t  developing very  d ifferent so rts  o f co n stru c ts  in  th e ir  s tu d e n ts . T h ey  p resen t 
p ro g ram m in g  as if  it  com prises ex p erim en ts  w ith  a  m ach ine to  d iscover w h a t a  p ro g ram  
does:
“As A d a 7 is one o f th e  first w idesp read  languages to  p rov ide  a  s ta n d a rd  w ay
6T his approach has been developed over a num ber of years by various m em bers of staff, but has 
prim arily been prom oted by Bob Dickerson. T he author claim s no credit for this approach.
7 T he author cannot resist including the delightfully am biguous quotation from  Chandok: “Introducing  
A da at a late point in the curriculum can lessen its  im pact on shaping the behaviour o f the student, as 
m any bad habits are already well established by this point” ! [CG88, page 200]
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of describ ing  pa ra lle l ac tiv ity , w e tr ie d  to  use it  in  a  course , b u t  we soon 
realised  th a t  i t  w as im possib le  to  debng  th o se  system s sh o rt o f doing b y  h a n d  
m an y  o u tp u t  s ta te m e n ts  g iving an  id ea  o f w here th e  a c tiv ity  o f th e  p ro g ram  
is tak in g  place. T h e  o u tp u t  s ta te m e n ts  h av e  th e  u n fo r tu n a te  d raw b ack  o f 
obscuring  th e  in itia l code. . . .  E xperienced  p ro g ram m ers do n o t need  all th a t  
in fo rm atio n , b u t novice ones d o .” [LC87, page  185].
W e w ould  arg u e  th a t  s tu d e n ts  shou ld  never never be encouraged  to  w rite  p ro g ram s 
w here th e y  do n o t “hav e  an  id ea  o f w here  th e  a c tiv ity  o f th e  p ro g ra m  is tak in g  p lace” ; 
th e  p ro g ram  rep resen ts  their theo ry , n o t a n  o b je c t th a t  h as  m y ste rio u sly  a p p ea red  from  
n a tu re . T o recom m end  teach in g  in  an  en v iro n m en t w here p ro g ram s can  b e  exp lo red  
to  see w h a t th ey  m ean  w ould  suggest th a t  s tu d e n ts  a re  n o t be ing  encouraged  to  ta k e  
resp o n sib ility  for th e ir  p ro g ram s, b u t  to  t r e a t  th e  re su lts  o f th e ir  “designs” as o b jec ts  
of em pirica l study . T h is  is n o t to  say  th a t  th e  env iro n m en t shou ld  b e  devoid  o f useful 
feedback , o f course, fo r s tu d e n ts  need  to  be  able to  check th e  valid ity  o f th e ir  theories 
an d  also th a t  th e ir  choice o f p re se n ta tio n  causes th e  p red ic ted  m ach in e  b eh av io u r. T h e  
em phasis shou ld  be on  p red ic tio n  an d  a tte m p te d  re fu ta tio n , how ever, ra th e r  th a n  on 
o b serv a tio n  an d  ind u c tio n .
O ne o f th e  ob jec tio n s som etim es ra ised  ag a in s t th is  ap p ro ach  to  te ach in g  p ro g ram m in g  is 
th a t  s tu d e n ts  need  to  develop com petence  in  “rea l p ro g ram m in g ” . E xperience  suggests 
t h a t  th is  is n o t a  p ro b lem , for th e  c o n s tru c t o f p ro g ram m in g  developed  is sufficiently 
pe rm eab le  to  ad m it o th e r  s ty les o f p ro g ram m in g  to  its  range. In d eed , w e w ould  suggest 
th a t  i t  m ay  be a  m ore  efficient w ay o f te ach in g  a  p ro ced u ra l s ty le  th a n  ap p ro ach in g  it 
directly .
O ne of th e  ad v an tag es  o f teach in g  p ro g ram m in g  in  th is  w ay is th a t  i t  allow s ns to  de­
velop th e  c o n s tru c ts  w ith o u t b ind ing  th e m  inexorab ly  to  th e  o p e ra tio n a l sem an tics of 
som e m ach ine . T h u s  th e  concep t o f p ro g ram m in g  can  be b ro ad en ed  to  include th e o ry  
bu ild ing , r a th e r  th a n  being  co n stra in ed  to  fo rm ing  p a r t  o f th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  process. 
T h is  ap p ea rs  to  be th e  suggestion  being  m ad e  b y  D ijk s tra  in  th e  1989 d eb a te  on  C om ­
p u te r  Science E d u ca tio n  [Dij89], b u t s tran g e ly  D ijk s tra  goes on  to  a d v o c a te  th e  use o f a  
sim plified p ro ced u ra l language. W e w ould  a rg u e  th a t  th is  is unnecessary , an d , given th e  
ex isting  co n stru c ts  o f m an y  s tu d e n ts  e n te rin g  h igher ed u ca tio n , unhelpfu l: a  p o in t also 
m ad e  b y  Scherlis [Sch89a], w ho no tes  th is  seem ing inconsistency  of D ijk s tra ’s a rg u m en ts .
C om p u ter  S y stem s
T each ing  a  co m p u te r system s course alongside th e  th ree  courses o u tlin ed  above poses an  
in te re s tin g  challenge. A  tra d itio n a l a p p ro ach  is to  te ach  th e  m a te r ia l th ro u g h  a  sim ple, 
b u t rea lis tic , p rocesso r an d  its  m ach ine  code. T h is does n o t fit well w ith  th e  teach in g  
o f fu n c tio n a l p ro g ram m in g  as a  first lan g u ag e , how ever, fo r it  m eans th a t  s tu d e n ts  are  
developing m an y  of th e  c o n s tru c ts  o f p ro ced u ra l p ro g ram m in g  fo r th e  firs t tim e  in  a  
m ach ine  code, w hich is n o t su p p o rtiv e  o f th e  th eo ry  bu ild ing  view.
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T h e  a p p ro ach  a d o p te d  a t  H atfie ld8 is to  in tro d u c e  co m p u te r system s v ia  fin ite  s ta te  
m ach ines an d  pushd o w n  a u to m a ta . T h is  is a  n a tu ra l  ex tension  o f th e  fo rm al lan g u ag e  
m a te r ia l in  th e  F o rm al N o ta tio n s  an d  M odels course, an d  th e  s tu d e n ts  a re  n o t en co u r­
aged  to  se p a ra te  th e  tw o  courses a t  th is  s tag e . O nce th e  id ea  o f a  m ach in e  an d  s to red  
p ro g ra m  hav e  been  e stab lish ed , L an d in ’s SE C D  m ach ine  is th e n  in tro d u c e d  to  i l lu s tra te  
a  co m p u te r sy stem  o f sufficient pow er to  su p p o rt th e  fu n c tio n a l p ro g ram m in g  th e y  are  
c u rre n tly  learn ing . T h is  allows th e  d iscussion o f a  n u m b er o f im p o r ta n t  top ics , b u t  w ith in  
a  very  sim ple m odel. S to red  p ro g ram m es, m em ory , p a ra m e te r  p assing  m echan ism s, sav­
ing  an d  re s to rin g  en v iro n m en ts , com piling , an d  m an y  o th e r  issues can  all be  discussed 
w ith o u t th e  c lu tte r  o ften  a sso c ia ted  w ith  a  “rea l” m achine. T h is m ach in e  is also used  to  
h igh ligh t th e  fu n c tio n a l u n its  th a t  m ay  be  helpful in  im p lem en ting  a  h a rd w are  system , 
an d  th e se  u n its  a re  d iscussed a n d  fo rm ally  described , w ith  th e ir  th eo ries  be ing  t r a n s ­
la te d  in to  h a rd w a re  configura tions. T h u s  th e  th eo ry  bu ild ing  view  is su p p o rte d , and  
used , in  h a rd w a re  design as well as so ftw are, w hich serves to  reduce  th e  p rob lem  o f an  
artific ia l divide. T h e  course con tinues in  a  m ore  tra d itio n a l vein , as th e  fu n c tio n a l u n its  
a re  configured to  su p p o rt m ore  conven tional languages.
8.3 Summary
In  th is  c h a p te r  we h av e  d iscussed th e  ap p lica tio n  of ou r m odel to  cu rricu lu m  design, in  
th e  w idest sense, an d  also p rov ided  an  overview  o f som e ex p erim en ts  th a t  have  been  
ca rried  o u t in  a  rea lis tic  teach in g  en v iro n m en t.
8T he author designed and teaches this course.
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C h a p ter  9
C on clu sion s
“No one believes an hypothesis except its originator, but everyone believes 
an experim ent except the experim enter”
W. I. B. Beveridge
K eane suggests th a t
“T h e re  is no  rea l beginning  to  a  piece o f research  (especially  d o c to ra l research ) 
b u t ra th e r  a  set o f false s ta r ts  a n d  dim  gropings; w h a t w e m ay  choose to  call 
th e  middle  is a  com plex ta n g le  o f issues a n d  cross connections, ite ra tio n s , 
b lind  alleys an d  m istakes; an d  th e  end  is n o t an  end  b u t a  frozen  fram e  o f a  
cu rre n t se t o f ideas, w hich co n tinue  to  develop .” [Kea88, P ag e  9]
V iew ed in  th is  lig h t, th e  p rev ious ch ap te rs  o f th is  docum en t h av e  p re se n te d  th e  frozen 
fram e. T h e  p u rp o se  of th is  c h a p te r  is to  s ta n d  back  from  th e  fram e  an d  ev a lu a te  th e  
to ta l  p ic tu re . Ideally  w e w ould  s ta r t  th is  discussion by  considering th e  e x te n t to  w hich 
ou r p rim a ry  aim  h as been  m e t. Since th is  a im  involves increasing  th e  re a d e r ’s u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  o f th e  so ftw are design p rocess, th e  e x te n t to  w hich i t  h as  been  m et is difficult to  
gauge w ith o u t de ta iled  psychological te s tin g  of each  ind iv idual: an d  th is  w as n o t deem ed 
possib le. W e can , how ever, discuss th e  e x te n t to  w hich we have m et o n r subsid ia ry  aim s, 
w hich we will do in  th e  firs t sec tion  of th is  ch ap te r .
W e can  also reflect on  th e  re search  m e th o d , d iscussing th e  p rob lem s th a t  w ere encoun­
te red  a n d  how , w ith  th e  benefit o f h in d sig h t th e y  m ig h t have  been  avoided. Such a  
d iscussion m ay  be  o f value to  anyone seeking to  bu ild  on th is  research  p ro g ram m e, or 
ca rry  o u t a  sim ilar one. T h is  com prises th e  second section . Sim ilarly , in  section  th re e , 
we will discuss th e  p re se n ta tio n  o f th e  thesis  itself, analysing  th e  d o cu m en t as a  piece of 
d iscourse an d  suggesting  im p ro v em en ts  t h a t  could be m ade  if  m ore  tim e  w ere available. 
F ina lly  we will discuss a  n u m b e r o f fu tu re  research  p ro g ram m es th a t  could  usefully be  
b u ilt u p o n  th is  one, inc lud ing  a  few for w hich th e  a u th o r  h as  a lready  d raw n  up  p ro posa ls . 
T h is  can n o t be a  defin itive lis t, fo r v ir tu a lly  all cu rren t research  in  c o m p u te r  science and  
so ftw are  eng ineering  can  be  seen as m o tiv a ted  by  o u r analysis, so we will re s tr ic t a t te n ­
tio n  to  areas th a t  c u rren tly  seem  to  be neg lec ted , possib ly  due  to  th e ir  in te rd isc ip lin a ry  
n a tu re .
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B efore doing so, how ever, le t ns develop a  sim ple m odel, o r r a th e r  an  analogy , o f th is  
p ic tu re . C onsider th e  p rob lem s arising  w hen  a  m assive, com plex o b je c t ap p ea rs  one day  
in  a  valley su rro u n d ed  by  hills. T h e  local in h a b ita n ts  a re  curious, a n d  u n d e rs ta n d a b ly  
w an t to  d iscover m ore  a b o u t th is  s tra n g e  o b je c t. T h ey  can  go u p  to  i t ,  b u t  th e y  have  
110 w ay  o f in te rp re tin g  w h a t th e ir  senses d e tec t in any  holistic  w ay, so th e y  clim b one of 
th e  hills for a  b e t te r  overall view . T h is  hill offers a  re s tr ic te d  s igh t o f th e  o b je c t, and  
from  only  one v an tag e  p o in t, so th e y  m ove o n to  a n o th e r  hill offering d ifferen t re s tric tio n s  
a n d  a  new  v an tag e  p o in t. T h ere  com es a  s tag e  w hen one o f th e  in h a b ita n ts  believes he 
u n d e rs ta n d s  th e  o b jec t well enough to  sketch  o u t a  m odel. A rm ed  w ith  th is  sk e tch , th e  
locals can  clim b new  h ills, seeking verifica tion  an d  re finem ent. T h ey  can  also rev isit th e  
o rig inal hills, w here th e y  will doub tlessly  re -in te rp re t m an y  of th e  g lim pses th e y  have  
o f th e  o b jec t in th e  lig h t o f th e  m odel. T h ey  can  also use th is  m o d el as th e  basis for 
th e ir  discussion o f th e  o b je c t, fo r it  provides com m on g ro u n d , a n d  th e y  m ay  use these  
d iscussions as th e  ra tio n a le  b eh ind  ce rta in  ac tions.
In  th is  re sea rch  p ro g ram m e we h av e  clim bed th e  hills p rov ided  by  a  n u m b e r o f academ ic 
d isciplines an d  th e ir  a sso c ia ted  bodies o f l i te ra tu re  in  th e  h o p e  o f ca tch in g  revealing  
glim pses of so ftw are  engineering  design. W e h av e  co n stru c ted  o u r m odel, an d  re p o rte d  
b ack  on  a  few o f th e  ensu ing  discussions an d  ac tions. C h a p te rs  T w o a n d  T h re e  o f th is  
d o cu m en t reco rd  o u r g lim pses, C h a p te r  F o u r p resen ts  a  m odel, C h a p te rs  F ive , Six and  
Seven seek o u t new  v an tag e  p o in ts , an d  rev isit som e old ones, in  o rd e r to  fill in  som e 
d eta ils  th a t  a re  obviously  m issing. C h a p te r  E ig h t reco u n ts  som e of th e  d iscussions, and  
ensu ing  ac tio n s, th a t  hav e  re su lted  from  o u r developing m odel. C h a p te r  O ne rep resen ts  
th e  briefing session th a t  set o u t th e  challenge facing us, an d  th is  c h a p te r  is to  be  a  reflec­
tiv e  discussion as to  how  well th ese  challenges have been  m e t, to g e th e r  w ith  id en tifica tion  
o f areas th a t  s till need  exp lo ring , an d  also gu idance  for su b seq u en t exp lo rers  to  enable  
th e m  to  avoid  som e o f th e  p itfa lls  an d  w asted  tr ip s  th a t  befell us on  o u r journey .
9.1 Meeting the objectives
T h ere  w ere th re e  su b sid ia ry  o b jec tives iden tified  for th is  research  p ro g ram m e; th e  es­
tab lish in g  of a  fram ew ork  fo r th e  d iscussion o f th e  softw are eng ineering  design process 
(find ing  th e  hill to  clim b a n d  reco rd ing  th e  view s), c o n s tru c tin g  an d  refin ing a  m odel of 
th e  process (b ring ing  to g e th e r  th e  view s an d  seeking ou t m issing d e ta il) , an d  illu s tra tin g  
how  th e  ensu ing  discussion can  b e  u tilised  in  cu rricu lum  design. W e will consider each 
of th ese  in  tu rn .
E sta b lish in g  a fram ew ork
T his  o b jec tiv e  p roved  p a r tic u la r ly  difficult to  m ee t, due largely  to  th e  lack  o f a  ph ilosophy  
o f engineering , w hich i t  h a d  been  a n tic ip a te d  w ould  serve to  o r ie n ta te  th e  search . No 
claim  is m ad e  th a t  th e  fram ew ork  estab lish ed  is p a rticu la rly  good , a lth o u g h  it  d id  serve 
its  p u rp o se  in  su p p o rtin g  th e  in itia l co n stru c tio n  of our m odel. T h e  decision to  cen tre
199
discussion on P o p p e r  s ph ilosophy  o f science p ro v ed  crucial, for i t  en ab led  th e  subsequen t 
expansion  of th e  fram ew ork , as o u r m odel developed , to  inc lude , fo r exam ple , th e  w orks 
of K u h n , L ak a to s , S uppe an d  Kelly. T h e  (em bryonic) ph ilosophy  of techno logy  and  
design also c o n tr ib u te d  significantly , p a rtic u la rly  in  estab lish ing  th e  id ea  th a t  th e  softw are 
developm en t process m u s t be  one o f selfconscious design. T h e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  ru les, 
th eo ries an d  law s is also crucia l, fo r it  leads to  th e  ideas o f th e o ry  co n stru c tio n  an d  
schem a im p lem en ta tio n  found  in  o u r m odel. K in n eav y ’s n o tio n  o f th e  th re e  k inds of 
reference d iscourse w as also v ita l, for i t  p ro v id ed  th e  fram ew ork  to  reconcile ex p lo ra tio n , 
specification , an d  exp lica tion , all o f w hich a re  crucial in  th e  design process.
T hese  exam ples show  th e  value of th e  eclectic ap p ro ach , for no  reference to  th e se  ideas 
h a s  been  found  in  th e  S oftw are E ng ineering  li te ra tu re . T h e  m o st d isap p o in tin g  asp ec t 
of th e  w ork  on estab lish in g  a  fram ew ork  w as th e  fa ilu re  to  in te g ra te  th e  psychology of 
p rob lem  solving to  any  g re a t e x te n t. W ith  th e  benefit o f h in d sig h t, a n d  an  increased  
u n d e rs tan d in g  o f th e  d iscip line, th e  reason  fo r th is  is easy  to  see; th e  re sea rch  w as 
ex p ec tin g  m ore  from  th e  d iscip line th a n  it  w as able to  offer. In  p a r tic u la r , th e  desire 
to  be  scientific has led  to  psychologists a d o p tin g  a  very f ra g m e n ta ry  a p p ro ach , w hereas 
th e  a ssis tan ce  we req u ired  w as a im ed a t  un ifica tion . In  re tro sp e c t, i t  m ig h t h av e  been  
m ore  sensible to  use K elly ’s P e rso n a l C o n s tru c t T h eo ry  earlie r, w hen  estab lish in g  th e  
fram ew o rk , ra th e r  th a n  using  it  in  i t ’s d u a l ro le  la te r . T h is  w ould  h av e  been  fra u g h t w ith  
d ifferen t p rob lem s, how ever, fo r P C T  poses an  in te re s tin g  d icho tom y  fo r th e  researcher: 
e ith e r we accep t K elly ’s th eo ry  as re g n a n t in  som e ab so lu te  sense, in  w hich case we a re  
deny ing  th a t  all c o n s tru c ts  a re  o n r ow n, or we re jec t his co n stru a l, rep lac ing  it  by  ou r 
ow n in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  theo ry , in  w hich case o u r d iscourse m u s t b e  su b jec tiv e . T h e  
a u th o r  w as u n p rep a red  to  do th e  fo rm er, for th is  w ould have m e a n t estab lish in g  K ellian 
c o n s tru c ts  as pervasive  th ro u g h o u t o u r fram ew ork ; an d  n o t confident enough  to  do th e  
la t te r ,  fo r a  d o c to ra l thesis  th a t  is u n ash am ed ly  su b jec tiv e  seem ed to  fly to o  m uch  in  th e  
face o f conven tion .
C on stru ction  o f th e  M od el
T h e  o b jec tives o f co n stru c tin g  a  m odel o f th e  so ftw are design process ap p ea rs  to  have 
been  fully m e t. T h e  m odel is n o t in  an y  sense com plete , o f course , b u t  it  has p roved  
a d e q u a te  for o u r in te n d e d  p u rp o se , an d  seem s to  be  sufficiently ro b u s t to  su p p o rt fu r th e r  
deve lopm en ts. T h e  p ro p o sed  m odel has th e  v irtu es  of sim plicity  an d , in  th e  a u th o r ’s 
op in ion , a  ce rta in  elegance. T h e  use of theo ries as th e  unify ing fe a tu re  p e rm its  d iscussion 
o f m an y  face ts  o f th e  design process in  w ays th a t  cu t across ex isting  divisions. Soft an d  
h a rd  top ics, such as req u irem en t analysis an d  proofs o f co rrec tness, can  be reconciled 
w ith in  th is  m odel w ith o u t th e  need  to  a d o p t p a r tic u la r  p a rad ig m s such  as jo in ing  th e  
fo rm al m e th o d s  cam p o r th e  C A S E  cam p. T h u s  th e  m odel m ay  serve to  reduce  h o stility , 
b u t w ith o u t rem oving  aggression.
T h e  m odel is also very  useful in  estab lish in g  links betw een  fitness for p u rp o se  an d  cor­
rec tn ess , a n d  b etw een  te s tin g  a n d  proofs. N otice  th a t  we have  n o t so u g h t to  abo lish
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te s tin g , b u t to  e levate  it  to  its  p ro p e r s ta tu s . W e have, how ever, so u g h t to  show  w ays in  
w hich  te s tin g  m ay  b e  re lo ca ted  a n d  reused .
O ne possib le d isad v an tag e  o f ad o p tin g  th e  te rm  “th eo ry ” is th a t  i t  m ay  be  seen as 
neg lec tion  o f “p ra c tic e ” , a  reac tio n  th a t  arises as a  resu lt o f a n  in d iv id u a l developing a  
“th e o ry /p ra c tic e ” c o n s tru c t. Such a  reac tio n  has a lready  been  n o te d  on  occasions w hen 
th e  m odel has been  used  in  conference p re se n ta tio n s . H opefully a  carefu l consid era tio n  
o f th e  m odel will show , in  a  n o n -th re a te n in g  w ay, th a t  such  a  c o n s tru c t is u n te n a b le  o r, 
a t  le a s t, unhelpfu l.
A sign ifican t re su lt has been  th e  iden tifica tio n  o f th e  sem an tic  co n cep tion  o f theo ries as 
a  useful b o d y  of know ledge in  w hich  to  in te rp re t m an y  asp ec ts  o f sy stem  design. C learly  
m ore  w ork needs to  b e  done in  m ak ing  th e  links explic it, b u t  if  th is  can  b e  achieved th e re  
is th e  possib ility  o f a  m a jo r  a re a  o f ph ilosoph ical lite ra tu re  becom ing  d irec tly  re lev an t to  
S o ftw are  E ngineering . In  p a r tic u la r , th e  sim ilarities b e tw een  S u p p e ’s th re e  k inds o f law s 
an d  th e  th re e  ty p es  of specification  p a rad ig m  identified  b y  C ohen  a n d  P i t t  s ta n d  o u t as 
req u irin g  deeper analysis.
T h e  use o f L a k a to s’s id ea  o f research  p ro g ram m es is also sign ifican t, fo r i t  offers a  w ay 
o f ta lk in g  a b o u t th e  p rog ress o f a  single p ro je c t an d  th e  tra n s itio n  b e tw een  p ro je c ts . 
I t  also p e rm its  se p a ra tio n  o f d ifferent k inds o f req u irem en ts  in to  th e  h a rd  core a n d  th e  
p ro te c tiv e  be lt.
O ne possib le deficiency in th e  m odel is its  fa ilu re  to  p rov ide  a  m ore  concre te  view of 
s tru c tu r in g  p re se n ta tio n s , an d  th e  p ro o f o b liga tion  th is  en ta ils . T h is  is n o t su rp rising , 
fo r th e  su b je c t is very  m u ch  a  concern  of c u rre n t research  in  S oftw are E ng ineering , b u t 
only  w ith in  p a r tic u la r  p a rad ig m s, so ex p ec tin g  any  deep gen era lisa tio n  is over op tim istic . 
T h e  a u th o r  c o n tem p la ted  in tro d u c in g  ca teg o ry  th eo ry  to  discuss th e se  p rob lem s, b u t  
decided th a t  th is  w ould  serve to  reinforce th e  (false) im pression  th a t  th e o ry  co n stru c ts  
an d  fo rm alisa tio n s w ere one an d  th e  sam e th in g , w ith o u t co n trib u tin g  m u ch  to  th e  d eb a te : 
we can  only in te rp re t th e  ca teg o rica l p re se n ta tio n  if we a lread y  have  an  in te rp re ta tio n  
of th e  prob lem .
U tilisa tio n  o f th e  m o d el
T h e  a u th o r  considers th a t  th is  o b jec tiv e  has been  fully m e t, a lth o u g h  th is  is difficult to  
d e m o n s tra te  th ro u g h  th is  d o cu m en t alone. P e rh a p s  th e  b es t ev idence h as  been  p rov ided  
th ro u g h  th e  use of th e  m odel to  design an d  te a c h  a  fo rm al n o ta tio n s  a n d  system s course 
to  one h u n d re d  an d  e igh ty  H .N .D . s tu d e n ts . T his has re su lted  in  a  course  w hich is well 
reg a rd ed  in  a  n u m b er o f senses: th e  s tu d e n ts  like it (in  sp ite  of be ing  a  m a th e m a tic s  
cou rse), s ta ff  a re  keen to  te a c h  on  it  (a lth o u g h  it  is a  low ly firs t y ear H .N .D . cou rse), th e  
B T E C  m o d e ra to r  considered  it  an  excellent course, and  v isiting  H .M .I. w ere also very  
im pressed  by  th e  level an d  s ta n d a rd  of w ork th a t  th e  s tu d e n ts  w ere achieving. W e can n o t 
claim  th a t  th e  m odel deserves all th e  c red it for th is , of course, fo r m an y  fac to rs  have  
p lay ed  a  p a r t ,  b u t  th e  a u th o r  believes th a t  th e  research  u n d e rta k e n  in  th is  p ro g ram m e
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p lay ed  a  sign ifican t p a r t  in  b ring ing  th is  a b o u t.
A  sign ifican t re su lt a rising  from  th is  o b jec tiv e  is th e  rea lisa tio n  th a t  th e  p rob lem  w as 
ac tu a lly  p h ra sed  in  th e  w rong  te rm s  a t  th e  o u tse t. W e shou ld  h av e  been  ask ing  w h a t we 
could do to  help s tu d e n ts  to  becom e b e t te r  lea rn e rs , r a th e r  th a n  ourselves b e t te r  teach e rs . 
I t  is in te re s tin g  th a t  th is  o b se rv a tio n  h as  arisen  from  co nsidera tion  o f th e  co n te n t, ra th e r  
th a n  process, o f th e  cu rricu lum .
9.2 Research Method
T his  re sea rch  p ro g ram m e h as p roved  ex trem ely  difficult to  c o o rd in a te  an d  con tro l. T h e  
eclectic n a tu re  of th e  research  h as  led  th e  re sea rch er to  clim b m an y  u n fam ilia r h ills, an d  
w hen  he has reach ed  a  v an tag e  p o in t, to  in te rp re t th e  o b jec t o f in te re s t in  th e  lig h t o f 
th e  disciplines su rro u n d in g  h im . G oguen  observes th a t
“To add ress such  issues i t  is n o t necessary  to  be an  ‘e x p e r t’, th a t  is, have  
ev e ry th in g  a lread y  w orked  o u t. Indeed , it  is n o t even d esirab le , because  
genuine m ean ing  arises th ro u g h  u n c e r ta in ty  an d  question ing , even  th ro u g h  
confusion an d  e rro r. I t  is necessary  to  e n te r  in to  a  d ialogue in  o rd e r fo r t r u th  
to  em erge from  co n cea lm en t.” [Gog90, P ag e  25]
W h ils t ex p ertise  m ay  n o t h e  necessary  in  te rm s  o f d ep th  o f know ledge, th e  a u th o r  w ould  
suggest th a t  w h a t is req u ired  is possib ly  a  deeper fo rm  o f u n d e rs tan d in g : an  u n d e rs ta n d ­
ing  of th e  d isciplines them selves a n d  th e  o rg an isa tio n  of th e ir  lite ra tu re s . T w o exam ples 
illu s tra te  th is  p o in t adm irab ly . F ir s t ,  th e  ph ilosoph ical l i te ra tu re  has to  be  read  in  a  
very  special w ay; i t  is s teep ed  in  b ack g ro u n d  a n d  th e  novice re a d e r m a y  well fo rm  th e  
im pression  th a t  th e  only w ay to  u n d e rs ta n d  a  te x t is to  follow every  reference back  to  
its  source. T h is  rap id ly  explodes in to  an  im possib le  ta sk . T h e  tr ick  is to  re a d  th e  l ite r­
a tu re  a t  a  n u m b er o f levels, firs t fo rm ing  som e id ea  of th e  co n tex t in  w hich th e  a u th o r  
is w ritin g , th e n  e x tra c tin g  th e  m a in  p o in ts , an d  only seeking o u t a  d e ta iled  discussion 
w hen th is  h as  been  done. T h e  s ty le  o f w riting , how ever, o ften  suggests th a t  every  w ord 
shou ld  b e  s tu d ied  in  its  ow n r ig h t s tra ig h t away.
Sim ilarly , th e  p rob lem s en co u n te red  in  un ravelling  th e  psychology o f p ro b lem  solving can 
be a t tr ib u te d  to  a  lack  o f overview  o f th e  discipline. I ts  f ra g m e n ta ry  n a tu re  w as n o t a p ­
p rec ia ted  u n til a  su b s ta n tia l  p a r t  o f th e  research  h a d  been  u n d e rta k e n : as a  consequence 
considerab le  tim e  h a d  been  sp e n t search ing  th e  l i te ra tu re  for th e  reconcilia tion  o f ideas. 
T h is  reconcilia tion , it  is now  being  acknow ledged, has been  neg lec ted  by  psychologists 
in  favour of tig h tly  con tro lled  po ck e ts  of study .
A  consequence o f th is  need  to  develop an  overview  of th e  disciplines v isited  before  th e ir  
l i te ra tu re  b ecam e usefully availab le  w as th a t  th e  open ing  s tages o f th e  re sea rch  seem ed 
very  u n p ro d u c tiv e . M an y  item s w ere s tu d ied  th a t  w ere o f relevance to  su b seq u en t stu d y , 
b u t o f no  d irec t re levance to  th e  p rob lem  in  h an d , th u s  th e  early  s tag es w ere a  devel­
o p m en t o f m e th o d . In  re tro sp e c t, som e of th ese  ac tiv ities could have  been  sim plified by
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seeking help fro m  e x p e rts , b u t  a t  th e  tim e  b u t  a t  th e  tim e  th e  re sea rch er w as un ab le  
to  p h ra se  th e  rig h t questions: ask ing  fo r som eone to  “te ll m e a b o u t th e  ph ilosophy  of 
science” is ac tu a lly  th e  r ig h t so rt of req u es t, b u t  such  req u ests  w ere a lw ays in te rp re te d  
as “te ll m e a b o u t som e o f th e  d e ta ils  w ith in  th e  ph ilosophy of science” .
A n o th e r p rob lem  w ith  eclecticism  is th e  feeling th a t  you  a re  v isiting  a  hill on  th e  off- 
chance  th a t  th e  view m ay  b e  helpful. S om etim es, o f course, som eone p o in ts  o u t th e  hill to  
you , b u t  o ften  w hen you  a rriv e  you  a re  un ab le  to  in te rp re t w h a t y o n  see. C onsequen tly  a 
n u m b e r o f d isciplines an d  bodies o f know ledge w ere explored  th a t  h av e  n o t been  included  
in  th is  thesis  e ith e r  because  th e  view s th e y  gave w ere to o  re s tr ic te d  to  be  of m u ch  use, 
o r because  th e  re sea rch er w as u n ab le  to  in te rp re t th e m  sufficiently  to  in c o rp o ra te  th em  
in  th e  design of th e  m odel. Topics such  as th e  ph ilosophy o f m a th e m a tic s  an d  ca tego ry  
th e o ry  w ere d isco u n ted  for th e  firs t reaso n , th e  use o f an th ro p o lo g y  fo r th e  second. H ere 
we m u st acknow ledge th e  ro le  o f acc id en t, fo r h a d  S u ch m an ’s book  011 s itu a te d  ac tions 
been  d iscovered  a  y ea r ea rlie r th is  w ould p ro b ab ly  hav e  p rov ided  th e  in sig h ts  th e  a u th o r  
needed  to  m ake  use o f an th ropo logy . T h is  leads to  a n o th e r  p ro b lem , n am ely  th a t  i t  
is n o t possib le  to  ca rry  o u t sy s tem a tic  searches for l i te ra tu re  th a t  “m ig h t cast a  ligh t 
on  th e  so ftw are  engineering  design p rocess” . I t  w as only w ith  th e  d evelopm en t o f th e  
m odel th a t  a  sy s tem a tic  a p p ro ach  becam e ten ab le . E xpressed  in  P o p p e r  s te rm s , d u ring  
th e  early  stages we w ere forced  to  seek know ledge w ith  a  b u ck e t, co llecting  item s as we 
chanced  across th e m , b u t th e  design of o u r m odel allow ed us to  sw itch  to  a  search ligh t 
s tra te g y . T h is  suggests th a t  th e  g lobal s tra te g y  o f e stab lish ing  a  fram ew o rk , to  co n stra in  
th e  b u ck e t filling, th e n  designing a  m odel to  focns th e  search  w as a  good  choice.
A n o th e r p rob lem  has been  th a t  th e  w orld  does n o t s ta n d  still to  allow  d o c to ra l research  
to  be com pleted . T h is  is t ru e  in  all d iscip lines, o f course, b u t  w hen  w ork ing  on th e  cusp 
fo rm ed  by  th e  in te rsec tio n  o f m an y  chang ing  disciplines th e  p rob lem s a re  com pounded , 
p a rtic u la rly  w hen  th e  re sea rch  has to  be carried  o u t p a r t- t im e  over a  n u m b e r o f years. 
In  ad d itio n , th e  use o f a n  a u th e n tic  p rob lem  causes difficulty he re , fo r th e  p rob lem  sh ifts 
as th e  re sea rch er develops, a lth o u g h  i t  w as, to  a  ce rta in  e x te n t, frozen  by ad o p tin g  th e  
th re e  subsid ia ry  ob jec tives. I t  shou ld  b e  n o ted  th a t  th is  is n o t such  a  p rob lem  for th e  
re sea rch  p ro g ram m e per se , b u t  o f try in g  to  s tru c tu re  it in  a  w ay su itab le  for a  d o c to ra l 
d isse rta tio n .
A u th e n tic ity  h as  also caused  a  m ethodo log ica l difficulty w ith  re sp ec t to  o u r th ird  ob jec ­
tiv e , fo r every  o p p o rtu n ity  w as exp lo ited  to  solve problem s using  th e  m odel. T h is  has 
led  to  th e  m odel be ing  u sed  to  s tru c tu re  m eetings, w rite  p ap e rs  an d  books, give lec­
tu re s , design schem es an d  courses, explore  teach in g  m eth o d s , an d  p ro b ab ly  m an y  o th e r  
pu rp o ses . R ep o rtin g  back  on  th e  th ird  o b jec tiv e , how ever, w ould  h av e  been  fac ilita ted  
if  som e ex p e rim en ta l co n tro l h a d  been  exercised. No apology  is m ad e  for th is  lack  of 
re s tra in t ,  how ever, fo r th e  a u th o r  considers th e  educa tio n  o f s tu d e n ts  m ore  im p o r ta n t  
th a n  th e  sim plification  o f th e  d o cu m en ta tio n  ta sk .
P e rh a p s  th e  b iggest p rob lem , b u t one of th e  m o st exciting  o bserva tions for th e  re search er, 
is th e  e x te n t to  w hich th e  developm en t of th e  fram ew ork  an d  m odel hav e  fed in to  th e
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quest for a  su itab le  research  m e th o d . I t  posed  a  prob lem , because  th e  resea rch er s ta r te d  
o u t w ith  th e  tra d itio n a l, b u t  im p o verished , view  of science, in  w hich  “m e th o d ” gives 
rise  to  “re su lts” , ra th e r  th a n  being  p a r t  o f th e  resu lts: th u s  th e  early  stag es  o f th e  
re sea rch  p ro g ram m e  w ere decidedly th re a te n in g . I t  w as exciting , how ever, because  it  
blew  a p a r t  th e  re search  p ro g ram m e in  th e  m o st sp ec tacu la r w ays. R ead ing  a  research  
p a p e r  ostensib ly  on  an  asp ec t o f te ach in g  m e th o d , fo r exam ple , could  lead  to  th e  m o st 
pow erfu l in sig h ts  in to  req u irem en ts  analysis , p ro o f techn iques, o r th e  re search  m e th o d  
itself. T h o m as an d  H arri-A u g ste in  sum  th is  up  w hen th ey  w rite
“F or us as research ers , th e  in te ra c tio n  b etw een  th eo ry  an d  m e th o d  is cen tra l 
to  w h a t we do. Som etim es th e  id ea  system  is ah ead  of th e  m e th o d s , an d  
one looks a ro u n d  for (o r is fo rced  to  in v en t) m e th o d s  th a t  allow  one to  op ­
era tio n a lise  o n e ’s ideas. T h en  sudden ly  one finds oneself w ith  m e th o d s  th a t  
p ro d u ce  all k inds o f su rp rising  re su lts  th a t  do n o t seem  re la te d  to  th e  ideas 
th a t  gave rise  to  th em . O ften  th is  is because  one develops all k inds o f in sigh ts 
an d  skills in  using  th e  tech n iq u es .” [TH A 88, page  98]
E ven  m ore  exciting  w as th e  rea lisa tio n  th a t  ou r research  m e th o d  itse lf  feeds back  in to  
th e  m odel: exciting , b u t  very  h a rd  to  c a p tu re  in  a  sequen tia l d o cu m en t o f th is  n a tu re .
9.3 Presentation of Results
T h e  m a jo r  difficulty in  p re sen tin g  th e  re su lts  o f th is  research  is th a t  th ese  “re su lts” 
rep re sen t a  frozen fram e of ex p lo ra to ry  ra th e r  th a n  scientific o r in fo rm a tiv e  d iscourse. 
T h is  leads to  a  m a jo r  p rob lem  o f honesty , fo r th e  a u th o r  is co n fro n ted  by  th e  d ilem m a 
as to  w h e th e r a  tru e  acco u n t should  be given, o r w h e th e r a  facad e  shou ld  be c rea ted  
to  p re sen t th e  re sea rch er as m o re  clever th a n  he really  w as. T h is  is accep ted  p rac tice  
in  scientific d iscourse, b u t  th e  a u th o r  to o k  th e  view th a t  th e  o b jec tiv e  o f th e  research  
w ould  be b e t te r  m et by  an  h o n est p re se n ta tio n , as th is  w ould involve th e  re a d e r in  th e  
ex p lo ra tio n  p rocess r a th e r  th a n  re leg a tin g  h im  o r her to  an  observer. In  p a r tic u la r , 
C h a p te rs  T w o an d  T h re e  w ere developed as a  resource u p o n  w hich to  d raw  in  bu ild ing  
ou r m odel: th e y  hav e  n o t been  re w ritte n  in  th e  ligh t of th e  m odel to  ad d  resources th a t  
w ere m issing o r to  rem ove th o se  th a t  w ere n o t used.
A  sim ilar p rob lem  arose in  selecting th e  sty le  o f p re se n ta tio n . T h e  n o rm s o f scientific 
d iscourse te n d  to  d iscourage use o f th e  firs t person . Philosoph ical l i te ra tu re , how ever, 
uses th e  first perso n  q u ite  liberally , as ph ilosophers freq u en tly  p re se n t th e ir  opinions as 
such , a n d  n o t as theories d e tach ed  from  them selves. T h e  a u th o r  decided to  a d o p t th e  firs t 
p e rso n  p lu ra l to  encourage  th e  view o f ex p lo ra tio n : “we will . . . ” h av in g  co n n o ta tio n s 
of “le t us agree to  . . . ” , leav ing  th e  read e r free to  rebel an d  w rite  th e ir  ow n a lte rn a tiv e  
versions. T h is  seem ed p referab le  to  “I th in k  . . . ” w hich sim ply re p o r ts  a  fac t. T h is  p o in t 
w as n o t m ad e  in  th e  in tro d u c tio n  as th e  a u th o r  believes th a t  such  explic it references to  
th e  s ty le  of w riting  can  d e tra c t from  th e  p leasu re  of read ing .
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In  one sense, i t  is e ssen tia l th a t  th e  a u th o r  should  rem ain  d issatisfied  w ith  a  te x t  o f 
th is  n a tu re . If  it  is to  serve its  p u rp o se , i t  m u s t provoke an  aggressive reac tio n  from  its  
read ers  (its  a u th o r  in c lu d ed ), o therw ise  i t  is in e r t, a  piece o f h is to ry : a n d  since, un like a  
ra ilw ay  tim e ta b le , i t  co n ta in s  no  “fa c ts” o r “t r u th s ” , i t  is useless. In  a n o th e r  sense, th e  
a u th o r  is very  satisfied  th a t  he  is u n ab le  to  re -read  th is  do cu m en t w ith o u t th in k in g  of 
b e t te r  w ays to  express th in g s , o r o f p o in ts  th a t  need  c larification , o r o f fu r th e r  avenues 
to  explore . I t  is ce rta in ly  th e  in te n tio n  th a t  th e  m a te ria l shou ld  co n tin u e  to  develop, 
su b se ts  be ing  e x tra c te d  an d  p resen ted  fo r p u b lica tio n  in  d ifferen t fo rm s.
O ne in te re s tin g  p ossib ility  w ould  be  th e  developm ent of a  h y p e r te x t version  o f th is  thesis, 
allow ing th e  read ers  to  clim b th e  hills as th e y  w ish , c o n tr ib u tin g  th e ir  ow n n o te s  to  th e  
te x t  n o t as m arg in a l item s b u t as valid  co n tr ib u tio n s  to  th e  m ain  co rpus. Possib ly  h igher 
e d u ca tio n a l in s ti tu tio n s  shou ld  consider a d m ittin g  such w orks as d o c to ra l th eses , even if 
it  w ould  m ean  re lax ing  th e ir  reg u la tio n s on binding!
A  source o f d isap p o in tm en t is th a t  th e  a u th o r  w as unab le  to  c a p tu re  th e  h igh  degree of 
reflex iv ity  in h e ren t in  th is  research . No w ay could be found  o f ach iev ing  th is  w ith o u t 
e ith e r  allow ing th e  re search  m e th o d  to  in tru d e  c o n stan tly  in to  th e  te x t ,  th u s  c rea tin g  an  
h is to rica l acco u n t of th e  p ro g ram m e, o r developing several s tra n d s  o f discussion sim ul­
taneously . A lth o u g h  som e key p o in ts  o f reflex iv ity  have  been  h ig h lig h ted , i t  m u s t b e  left 
to  th e  re a d e r to  im ag ine w here o th e rs  m ig h t hav e  occurred .
9.4 Future Research directions
T h ere  a re  m an y  possib le research  p ro g ram m es th a t  can  be seen as em erg ing  from  th is  
ex p lo ra to ry  w ork. W e will re s tr ic t a t te n tio n  to  avenues th a t  cu rre n tly  seem  p o o rly  rep ­
re sen ted  in  cu rren t re search , an d  suggest possib le developm ents th a t  could ta k e  p lace.
T h e re  is re search  th a t  needs to  be ca rried  o u t to  increase u n d e rs ta n d in g  of aspec ts  o f th e  
so ftw are  design process. In  p a r tic u la r , o n r m odel suggests th a t  a  key q uestion  involves th e  
re la tio n sh ip s  b e tw een  th e  s tru c tu re s  o u r th e o ry  p re sen ta tio n s  assu m e a t  various s tages in 
th e  process. If, as we hav e  claim ed, th e  s tru c tu re  o f a  specification  h as  im p lica tions for 
th e  su b seq u en t im p lem en ta tio n  s tru c tu re , th e n  clearly  som e resea rch  needs to  be  done 
to  es tab lish  th ese  re la tio n sh ip s . M itchell an d  Loom es, for exam ple , h av e  suggested  th a t  
th e  s tru c tu re  o f a  specification h as  im p lica tions for th e  m a in ta in a b ility  of th e  resu ltin g  
sy stem  [ML91]. R efinem ent an d  co rrec tness p ro o f techn iques exp lo it such  re la tio n sh ip s , 
b u t  d iscussion is alw ays carried  o u t w ith in  a  p a rad ig m  con ta in ing  p a r tic u la r  specification  
an d  im p le m e n ta tio n  languages. T h e  challenge is to  generalise th e se  ideas, possib ly  using  
S u p p e ’s n o tio n  of law s o f coexistence, consequence and  in te ra c tio n . T h is  w ork  could 
also cover th e  p ro o f ob liga tions th a t  a rise  o u t o f d ifferent s ty les o f specification , seeking 
to  in te g ra te  th e  w ork o f C ohen an d  P i t t  in to  a  philosophical fram ew o rk . T h is  research  
p ro g ram m e  w ould  allow  us to  s u b s ta n tia te , o r deny, th e  claim  we h av e  m ad e  th a t  i t  is 
im possib le  to  p resen t specifications in  such a  w ay th a t  th ey  do n o t co n ta in  im p lem en ta ­
tio n  deta ils . S u b s ta n tia tio n , m oreover, w ould  focus a t te n tio n  on  th e  need  to  teach  th e
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design of specifications, r a th e r  th a n  suggesting  th a t  design s ta r ts  a fte r  specification , as 
m o st life-cycles can  be in te rp re te d .
A n o th e r avenue to  explore  is th e  use o f K ellian  techn iques fo r req u irem en ts  analysis. 
C learly  b ip o la r c o n s tru c ts  will n o t be sufficient for p resen tin g  o u r th eo ry , b u t possib ly  
re p e r to ry  g rid  analysis could be  u tilised  d u rin g  th e  early  stag es  o f analysis to  focus 
a tte n tio n  on th o se  c o n s tru c ts  th e  u sers consider im p o r ta n t.  T h is  w ould  be p a rtic u la rly  
usefu l in  dom ains w here a rtic u la tio n  o f  th e  p rob lem  is difficult. Such an  ap p ro ach  m ig h t 
lead  to  th e  developm ent o f som e o f th e  co m p u ter-b ased  too ls  c u rre n tly  used  fo r grid  
analysis in to  too ls  for th e  in itia l s tag es of req u irem en ts  cap tu re .
A  sim ilar p ro g ram m e o f re sea rch  h as  been  suggested  by M ichie1 fo r developing system s 
to  em u la te  h u m a n  e x p e rts , such  as he licop ter p ilo ts . H e suggests t h a t  a u to m a tic  ru le  
in d u c tio n  could be  used  to  in fer theo ries th a t  w ould exp lain  ac tions o f h u m a n  ex p e rts  
b y  observ ing  th e m  in  con tro lled , ex p e rim en ta l, s itu a tio n s . T h is  id ea  h as  been  te s te d  
in  sim ple la b o ra to ry  stu d ies  an d  h as  y ielded encourag ing  re su lts , b u t th e  issue as to  
w h e th e r th e  tech n iq u e  will scale up  is an  open  question . A n o th e r questio n  is can  such  
an  ap p ro ach  be m ad e  accep tab le  for ap p lica tio n  to  th e  d eve lopm en t o f sa fe ty  critica l 
system s? A n affirm ative  answ er to  th e  second question  is m ore  likely if  a  w ay can  b e  found  
to  form alise  th e  assu m p tio n s underly in g  th e  ru le  in d u c tio n  sy stem , an d  th e  re su ltin g  
th e o ry  it  p roduces, in  a  m an n e r th a t  conform s to  req u irem en ts  fo r th e  developm ent of 
such  system s.
O ur m odel has also h ig h lig h ted  th e  various views th a t  can  b e  ta k e n  o f m e th o d s  in  th e  
so ftw are  design process. A n  in te re s tin g  questio n  is: how  do engineers claim  to  be  us­
ing  m e th o d s , an d  a re  th e se  claim s co n sis ten t w ith  th e ir  ac tions?  T h is  is an  im p o r ta n t  
question  because  com panies a re  increasing ly  spend ing  large  sum s o f m oney  on “m e th ­
o d s” , typ ica lly  th ro u g h  in v es tm en t in  tra in in g  an d  too ls su p p o rt. In  o rd e r to  ju d g e  th e  
w isdom  o f co n tin u ed  in v es tm en t, how ever, th ey  need  to  ev a lu a te  th e  im p ro v em en ts  th a t  
th ese  m e th o d s  h a v e  b ro u g h t a b o u t. I f  th e  engineer is n o t really  u sing  th e  m e th o d , o r is 
using  it  in  w ays n o t env isaged  by  m an ag em en t, th is  ju d g m en t m ay  b e  ill-founded. A n 
in te rd isc ip lin a ry  research  p ro je c t com prising  o f co m p u te r sc ien tis ts , psycho log ists an d  
ph ilosophers of science has been  p ro p o sed  to  explore  th is  q u estion , a n d  w as sh o rt lis ted  
fo r fu nd ing  by  th e  T ri-council. U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  p ro p o sa l w as finally  re jec ted  on  th e  
g ro u n d s of an  insufficiently  developed m ethodology . T h is h igh lig h ts  a  m eta-leve l o f re ­
search  th a t  needs to  be  done before  ex p lo ra tio n  of som e im p lica tions of o u r m odel can  
be  explored . In  p a r tic u la r , accep tab le  m ethodologies for in te rd isc ip lin a ry  research  need 
to  be devised.
In  ad d itio n  to  th e  n um erous research  ac tiv ities  th a t  could refine a n d  develop o u r m odel, 
we could also seek to  u tilise  o u r m odel in  new  w ays for cu rricu lum  design. O f p a r tic u la r  
in te re s t w ould  be to  exp lo re  th e  ram ifica tions of b ring ing  to g e th e r  th e  theo ry -b u ild in g  
view  o f design , P C T , an d  a  tra n s fo rm a tio n a l view o f edu ca tio n . W e h av e  a lread y  n o ted  
how  close th ese  th ree  co m p o n en ts  a re  in  a  n u m b e r o f w ays, and  an  in  d e p th  in v es tig a tio n
’ In a personal correspondance.
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of th e  im p lica tions of a d o p tin g  th e ir  co n ju n c tio n  m ig h t lead  to  sign ifican t advances in  
tech n ica l ed u ca tio n . Such an  in v es tig a tio n  w ould  hav e  to  be  lib e ra te d  from  sh o rt- te rm  
goals, such  as designing a  p a r tic u la r  course o r schem e, for th e se  w ould  im pose  to o  m an y  
c o n s tra in ts  on  th e  process. A  suggested  s ta r t in g  p o in t w ould  be a  d e ta iled  discussion of 
th e  ro le  o f th e  designer, ca rried  o u t in  te rm s  o f P C T .
W e could also a t te m p t to  find  w ays o f o rien tin g  an d  ev a lu a tin g  design ed u ca tio n  in 
te rm s  o f th e  c o n s tru c ts  be ing  developed. Such p sychom etric  ap p ro ach es  to  jo b  analysis 
a re  becom ing  m ore  com m on, an d  re p e rto ry  g rid  techn iques a p p e a r  to  b e  usefu l too ls  
in  th is  reg a rd . T h is opens u p  an  in te re s tin g  possib ility , fo r such  a  re sea rch  p ro g ram m e 
could  be linked  to  th e  use o f g rid  analysis for req u irem en ts  c a p tu re  d iscussed  earlie r. T h is  
w ould  tru ly  reconcile so ftw are  design w ith  ed u ca tio n , for th e  c o n s tru c ts  to  b e  developed , 
w h e th e r th ese  a re  to  b e  ed u ca ted  in to  m an  or designed in to  m ach ine  , becom e th e  basis for 
b o th  processes. T his w ould  force us to  ask  som e very  h a rd  (in  all senses) q uestions, such 
as w ho p rovides th e  req u irem en ts  for ed u ca tio n : th a t  is, w hose c o n s tru c ts  a re  sign ifican t, 
a n d  w hose co n stru c ts  p rove  d o m in an t in th e  social p rocesses o f e d u ca tio n  an d  design.
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A p p en d ix  A
R ela ted  P u b lica tio n s
T his  ap p en d ix  lists p u b lica tio n s by  th e  re sea rch er th a t  a re  re la ted  to  th is  re sea rch  p ro ­
g ram m e, to g e th e r  w ith  a  b rie f co m m en t on  th e  ro le th ey  hav e  p layed .
1. M athem atics and com puter science: com ing together again?'. In v ited  p re se n ta tio n  
a t  th e  S tan d in g  C onference fo r H eads o f M a th em a tic s , S ta tis tic s  a n d  C o m p u tin g , 
S carb o ro u g h , 1984.
T h is  p re se n ta tio n  discussed th e  ap p ro ach  to  teach in g  m a th e m a tic s  th a t  th e  a u th o r  
w as developing a t  H atfie ld . I t  w as largely  because  o f th e  difficulties in  defending 
th is  ap p ro ach  in  a  ra tio n a l w ay th a t  th is  research  p ro g ram m e w as u n d e rta k e n .
2. A n  education programme fo r  software engineers: P roceed ings o f th e  first B ritish  
so ftw are  engineering  conference, B rig h to n , 1986. P u b lish ed  by  Springer-V erlag . 
Jo in t au th o rs : J . Jones an d  R . Shaw .
T h is p a p e r  discusses th e  design an d  im p lem en ta tio n  o f th e  P o s tg ra d u a te  D ip lom a 
in  S oftw are P rincip les an d  P ra c tic e , an d  se ts  th e  scene fo r som e of th e  ex p erim en ts  
described  in  th is  thesis.
3. Using O B J fo r  Concurrency: In v ited  p a p e r  a t  th e  B C S-FA C S C olloquium  on  O B J, 
L ondon , 1986.
T h is  p a p e r  discusses th e  in te rp re ta tio n  of a lgebraic  specifications, a n d  a t te m p ts  to  
c a p tu re  law s of in te ra c tio n  w ith in  such  a  p a rad ig m .
4. A  paradigm fo r  the development o f distributed systems: p roceed ings o f th e  14 th , 
IF A C /IF IP  w orkshop on  re a l tim e  p ro g ram m in g , H ungary , 1986. Jo in t au th o rs : 
G . B ull an d  R . M itchell
T h is p a p e r  discusses th e  n o tio n  o f a  p a rad ig m , an d  th e  ro le  th a t  m e th o d s , languages 
an d  too ls p lay  in  es tab lish in g  a  p a rad ig m  for rea l tim e  system s. I t  w as th e  c a ta ly s t 
for in v es tig a tin g  th e  w ork o f K uhn .
5. Future Research Directions: E sp rit deliverab le  for p ro je c t P eaco ck , 1986.
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T h is  p a p e r  ra ises m an y  o f th e  questions th a t  a re  still iden tified  as open  research  
issues w ith in  th is  th esis , b u t  w ith o u t th e  benefit o f th e  fram ew ork  e s tab lish ed  here  
in  w hich to  p h ra se  th em .
6. E ssentia l M athem atics fo r  Software Engineers : P u b lish ed  by  P e te r  P e reg rin u s , on 
b e h a lf  o f th e  IE E , 1987 Jo in t A u th o rs : S la te r e t. al.
T h is  com prises a  se t o f b o oks a n d  a  v ideo , p ro d u ced  as p a r t  o f an  A lvey p ro je c t. 
T h e  a p p ro a c h  ta k e n  w as n o t b ased  011 th e o ry  co n stru c tio n , how ever, b u t  on a  m ore  
tra d itio n a l concep t o f app lied  m a th e m a tic s . I t  w as p a r tly  in  re a c tio n  to  th is  w ork 
th a t  th e  a u th o r  se t o u t to  e s tab lish  exp lic itly  th e  th e o ry  bu ild in g  a p p ro ach  to  
so ftw are  design.
7. Softwai'e Engineering M athem atics: P u b lish ed  by  P itm a n s , 1988 (A lso pub lished  
by  A dison  W esley in  th e  U SA , 1989, an d  in  g erm an  tra n s la tio n  by  Springer-V erlag  
in  1990) Jo in t a u th o r: J  W oodcock
T h is  te x tb o o k  w as w ritte n  exp lic itly  to  su p p o rt th e  teach in g  of th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  
view of design.
8. M athem atics not method: p re se n ta tio n  a t  th e  IM A  conference on  so ftw are  engi­
neering  m a th e m a tic s , L ondon , 1988. Jo in t a u th o r: R . M itchell
T h is  p a p e r  w as s tru c tu re d  a ro u n d  th e  th e o ry  build ing  view , a n d  illu s tra te d  th e  use 
of p a r t ia l  th e o ry  p re se n ta tio n s  in  specifications.
9. Selfconscious or unselfconscious design : Jo u n a l o f In fo rm a tio n  T echnology, 5 (1 ), 
M arch  1990.
T h is  p a p e r  discusses th e  tw o p a rad ig m s estab lished  by  selfconscious an d  unselfcon­
scious design, an d  th e ir  im p lica tions for teach ers .
10. P utting  m athem atics to use: in v ited  c h a p te r  in  “M anag ing  C o m p lex ity  in  S oftw are 
E ng ineering , E d ite d  by  R . J . M itchell, P u b lish ed  by  P e te r  P e reg rin u s , 1990.
T h is  p a p e r  p u ts  fo rw ard  th e  th e o ry  bu ild ing  view to  an  in d u s tr ia l audience.
11. M athem atics fo r software engineers: p roceedings o f m a th e m a tic s  in  a  chang ing  
c u ltu re , A pril, 1990, G lasgow  College.
T h is  p a p e r  discusses th e  H atfie ld  a p p ro a c h  to  fo rm al m e th o d s  in  th e  co n tex t of 
changes to  p e rcep tio n s of m a th e m a tic s  generally . I t  also m akes exp lic it th e  th eo ry  
bu ild ing  ap p ro ach .
12. H um ane m athem atics fo r  software engineers: p resen ted  a t  th e  IE E  co lloquium  on 
so ftw are  engineering  ed u ca tio n , F eb ru ary , 1991. Jo in t a u th o r: J . B row n
T h is  p a p e r  p re sen ts  experiences o f ad o p tin g  th e  th e o ry  bu ild in g  a p p ro a c h  w ith  
H N D  s tu d e n ts .
13. Logic and Correctness Proofs: in v ited  c h a p te r  in  th e  S oftw are eng ineering  reference 
b o o k , pub lished  by  B u tte rw o r th s , 1991.
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This chapter discusses the role of correctness proofs in establishing fitness for pur­
pose, and provides a background to the task of carrying out such proofs.
14. Structuring Specifications: submitted to Formal Aspects of Computer Science, 
1991. Joint author: R. Mitchell
This paper discusses the implications of specification structure on system main­
tainability, and proposes an alternative style for Z specifications.
15. The mathematical revolution inspired by computing: Editing of the proceedings of 
the conference, published by OUP, 1991,Co-editor: J. Johnson
This conference raised many of the issues covered in this thesis, but from the 
mathematician’s perspective.
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